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Broadcast
Information
Service

FBIS-USR-94-028

23 March 1994



CENTRAL EURASIA



FBIS Report: Central Eurasia

FBIS-USR-94-028

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POLITICAL AFFAIRS

Poltoranin on Media 'Attacks' on Duma

944F0418A St. Petersburg NEVSKOYE VREMYA
in Russian 16 Feb 94 p 1

[Telephone interview with Mikhail Poltoranin, chairman of the mass media (SMI) committee of the State Duma, by Maxim Shabalin, Moscow, under the "At First Hand" rubric; date not given: "The Audience Should Know"]

[Text] [Poltoranin] Today's campaign against the State Duma in the mass media is nothing other than an echo of the former war between the first and fourth branch of power that was waged in the summer and autumn of last year. I think that in order to overcome this situation, we have tactical and strategic steps in reserve. I would relate to the tactical the fact that we first of all need a press center that feeds information to all of our newspapers and to our television.

As for the strategic directions, they, in my view, are these: Of course, you cannot take the mass media by assault and frontal attacks. The previous Supreme Soviet tried to do this, but this attempt was not crowned with success. The powerful structures also did not succeed in tearing off their own "Parliamentary Hour" piece by piece. This tactic is futile.

It is nonsense that the government—one of the branches of power—today monopolizes all state mass media as an instrument of public control over this very power. Therefore, we must correct the condition legislatively and create the kind of situation where the mass media works objectively, and no one interferes with it.

We intend tomorrow to submit the draft of a federal law for review by the State Duma concerning the procedure for elucidating in the state mass media the activity of the higher organs of authority of the Russian Federation.

[Shabalin] The problems about which you are talking are associated directly with articles of the law adopted by the Supreme Soviet, which, however, the president suspended....

[Poltoranin] The president suspended a lot of laws and many legislative acts. Committees (including ours also) will conduct an inventory of everything that has been suspended and will submit the question for Duma review. The mass media is an important force, the fourth branch of power, and we must do everything so that the press should cooperate with the State Duma. As for specific proposals and the adoption of decisions about renewing the transmission of "600 Seconds," etc.—these are not functions of the Duma. There is a separation of powers according to the new Constitution, there is a law on the mass media, and there are such structures as, for example, the television company "Sankt-Peterburg—Channel 5." There are also such substructures as "600 Seconds." This is their business, and not

that of the State Duma: to produce or not to produce. Our business is to create the kind of law so that there would be no barriers for one or another television program or for articles in newspapers.

[Shabalin] But in contrast to the former Supreme Soviet, the Federal Assembly, from a political standpoint, is quite heterogeneous. In accordance with your draft laws, will access to the airwaves be offered to all factions?

[Poltoranin] Unquestionably, this will be reflected in the draft law on the procedure for elucidating the work of the higher organs of authority in the state mass media. I do not think that the resumption of the "Parliamentary Hour" will aggravate the situation. On the other hand, conducting this program in the form in which it came out has no future. I assure you: By no means everyone watched this "Parliamentary Hour." Therefore, it is necessary for us to acquire air time to illuminate the work of the State Duma, both on the first and second Ostankino channels, and on the St. Petersburg channel, and, it is quite natural, on the channels of the 80 regional television companies that today live on the federal budget. This is the objective. The entire population of Russia must be informed of our work.

Zatulín on PRES Duma Actions

944F0418B St. Petersburg NEVSKOYE VREMYA
in Russian 24 Feb 94 p 1

[Remarks of Konstantin Zatulín, chairman of the Duma committee for CIS matters, and cochairman of the Party of Russian Unity and Accord, recorded from a telephone conversation by Maxim Shabalin, under the "At First Hand" rubric; date not given: "Do Not Play With Matches"]

[Text] The Party of Russian Unity and Accord [PRES], together with the Women of Russia faction, was the initiator of the adoption of the Memorandum of Accord. I had occasion several times at the council of the Duma to defend the principle of pact voting. For the first time from the beginning of work of the new parliament, I had a reason to tell the voters: Everything possible was done not to repeat the nightmare of the recent past, and so that the dead do not grasp for the legs of the living. Manifestos, memoranda, declarations—these are not documents of direct action. But there are quite a few examples in the history of many states about what kind of role the declaration or nondeclaration of such documents can play. I will risk saying that the resolutions adopted by the Duma really provide an opportunity for accord. It, of course, can be missed due to a misunderstanding or malicious intent. Unfortunately, the behavior of some of our natural allies—deputies from Russia's Choice and the Yavlinskiy bloc—is a reason to suspect at least elements of such intent in their attitude toward the Memorandum.

Very much depends now on the mass media, inasmuch as it is it that brings the essence of one or another decision of the legislative or executive authority to the

people. If all commentaries reduce the usefulness of the adopted Memorandum to zero, then its value really will prove to be no more than the value of the paper it is written on. The search for accord is not a very simple matter, but its necessity should be recognized.

The fighting fervor of the antagonistic parties, which once almost brought Russia to the brink of a civil war, remains. There is evidence of attempts by individual deputies to undermine the adoption and to dodge it at the last moment. But if the president, nonetheless, intends to observe the Constitution and not to violate the authority of the Duma, then the people who are under investigation in Lefortovo will be amnestied. How they behave in the future depends on us. Orientation on a continuation of the confrontation and on a vendetta will not lead to anything, especially when the character of the persons involved in the dispute from both sides is taken into account—of the president, of Khasbulatov, and of Rutskoy. The characters are not easy to get along with—I would say, they are Russians.

I am convinced that there are no prisons that hold you forever. It is impossible for the trial of the participants in the October events not to turn into a political trial. An example of such a trial is the GKChP [State Committee for the State of the Emergency] affair, to which there is no visible end without an amnesty. The more quickly it takes place, the fewer reasons there will be for being concerned about the fate of future elections—both local and presidential. I am confident that many alleged political authorities will waver considerably after an amnesty. We, for example, do not intend to fight for Rutskoy's electorate, but such a fight is in prospect for Vladimir Volfovich.

In addition, I do not think that an investigation into the October events is really advantageous to the current executive authority, inasmuch as any investigation inevitably will get stuck on Edict No. 1400, which the author himself recognized as unconstitutional. I want to close this page, and not only I. Individuals continue to threaten a civil war, but I would ask them to calm down and to leave the matches alone.

Yeltsin Plane Drops From Radar

944F0418C St. Petersburg NEVSKOYE VREMYA
in Russian 12 Feb 94 p 1

[Unattributed article: "Russian President's Life Exposed to Danger"]

[Text] On 7 December of last year, an aircraft carrying Boris Yeltsin ended up outside radar control. The life of the president was exposed to danger, because the power supply in the air traffic control center in Rostov-na-Donu (the "Strela" center) was suddenly turned off "for nonpayment of its electric bill."

The Strela center was turned off at the very moment when, in addition to the president's aircraft, there was

the largest number of Il's, Tu's, and Western Boeings in the air space of the Southern region.

"This was the first incident in the history of world civil aviation when a dangerous situation of such a scale was created in fact not as a result of an accident, but by the absolutely deliberate actions of a person," notes an observer. "Meanwhile, specialists know that even less dangerous disruptions in air traffic can lead to a fatal disaster"

In revealing the extremely alarming situation in air transport, the observer reports that within two days after the "presidential" incident, the electricity from the air traffic control center in Rostov was cut off once again. This time, Sergey Shakhrai, a recent deputy prime minister and now a member of the Security Council of Russia, was in one of the aircraft that ended up in the "dead zone."

Labor Party Seen as Viable Left Alternative

944F0412A Moscow OBSHCAYA GAZETA
in Russian No 9, 4 Mar 94 p 8

[Article by Vadim Lifshits: "Right Turn Through the Left Shoulder"]

[Text] It is not enough to say that the process is under way—it has begun to tear along. The process, we recall Mikhail Sergeyevich once again, of the discovery of consensus. Consensus between the radical-right nomenklatura-bourgeois groupings victorious in December. For whoever did not understand this, even having listened to President Yeltsin's report to parliament, all the discoveries will be to come. It will very shortly be revealed that the new Kremlin ideology of the "national cause" and the anticrisis policy of the government will successfully combine the white Bolshevism of Russia's Choice and the black Bolshevism of the LDPR [Liberal Democratic Party of Russia], and the upshot will be something suspiciously Zyuganovian.

The odious super-radicals are cut off here as yet—Gaydar has quit the government, Zhirinovskiy has not yet arrived, and Chernomyrdin is coping by himself. But the conservative projects going back to the summer-fall initiatives of Oleg Lobov and—horrors!—Khasbulatov's leadership of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation: the inflationary financing of "priority" state industry, the self-organization of apparatus-bureaucratic capital into "financial and industrial groups," the renunciation of privatization romanticism, and so forth, have been tacitly restored. The political realities of Russia, on the other hand, are evoking the specters not only of "Ukrainianization" or the "Belarusian option" but of Central Asian dictatorships also.

Many people certainly already understand that the LDPR did not support the "democratic" constitution fortuitously. It is not only a question of the keen political sense of Mr. Zhirinovskiy. Today's "strong of this world," having adopted the oligarchic precept: "The

strong determine progress by exploiting the weak," are already quite openly seeking an acceptable leader figure. This figure began to show in outline, it would seem, in the person of the main favorite on 12 December—in quite grotesque fashion as yet, but give it time! Practice makes perfect.

Even more important is the fact that the LDPR, which was the mirror reflection in the election campaign of the anti-Gorbachev tactics of Democratic Russia, is oriented toward the national-fundamentalist circles of that same nomenklatura bourgeoisie whose comprador wing is the social client of Russia's Choice. While deliberating a great deal on how Vladimir Volfovich managed to attract the votes of 14 million Russians (which is no difficult in our times for a man with his inclinations), commentators are omitting a far more serious question: How did this person attract multimillion financial flows, that is, win the support of part of the ruling elite?

The other December winner, the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, is essentially from that same crowd. Having become ideologically loosened since 1987, having joined up with bureaucratic business, and having lost direct access to the managerial function, the Communist Party, as a whole, ceased to be a totalitarian structure—this was the undoubted achievement of April-85 and August-91. But, having ceased to be totalitarian, the Communist Party of the Russian Federation has moved not to the left but to the right flank of the political spectrum. The program reference points of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation are based on the same conservative populism and fundamentalist statism as of the LDPR. True, Zyuganov's leadership is concerned more for respectability and is of a traditionalist frame of mind, furthermore—whence the commitment to the Soviet form of authoritarian rule and criticism of the constitution. As far, however, as left-wing phrasemongering, of a social-protection motif particularly, is concerned, nowhere is state paternalism the prerogative of forces of the left, being the alpha and omega of any populism—from Le Pen through Turkes (about the NSDAP we will say nothing). Today's Ukrainian ultranationalists, for example, are demanding an end to privatization and the concentration of all property in the hands of an independent state, but this does not make them people of the left.

There is no effective alternative to right-wing-authoritarian hegemony in the Federal Assembly. Sergey Shakhrai's PRES [Party of Russian Unity and Accord] has demonstrated the quite lifeless launch of Civic Union-2. It is possible that Shakhrai's attempt to consolidate big national capital, state capital particularly, will prove more successful thanks to the chord which is being struck between the industrialists and the regional administrators, but there is no guarantee that the PRES will not be supplanted in its parliamentary niche by that same Communist Party of the Russian Federation or by New Regional Policy, which has appeared like a bolt from the blue.

The Yavlinskiy-Boldyrev-Lukin bloc has created for itself the image of a constructive democratic alternative to Gaydar, Zyuganov, and Zhirinovskiy put together and has partially managed to attract the sympathies of the electorate committed to liberalism and social democracy. But YABLoko has not fallen far from Russia's Choice, despite the strong intellectual efforts of Yavlinskiy, who has been forced to concoct differences. The "liberal-legal" concept of essentially that same model of capitalization is formulated speculatively, which is partially connected with the absence in YABLoko of the criminal resolve typical of the leadership of Russia's Choice. In fact, YABLoko assigns itself the role of respectable generator of liberal ideas, which will someday, "at a new historical stage," be claimed in a reformed Russia. The ascent to this stage still has to be made, it is true....

So "accursed friends" were the winners in December. A kind of symbol of this community was the election of the right-wing populist Nevzorov in an elite district of Petersburg—"an area of hard-currency taverns and privatized apartments." The clashes between Russia's Choice and the LDPR and the Communist Party of the Russian Federation are a prepared version of the conflict of the "mafia against the bureaucracy" known since Mussolini's times. The political struggle of the Gaydarites and the Zyuganovites and Zhirinovskiyites has been brought about by the differences in the interests of comprador-speculative capital, the administrators of the state economy, and nationalistically oriented business. Whence the different ideological slogans—liberalism, chauvinism, communism—whence the appeal to different social strata in the search for mass support, whence the success of the demagoguery: "Either us or..." (insert as required). The common denominator of the ruling oligarchy remains, however, authoritarian elitism and statism and reliance on state power as the instrument of compulsory capitalization.

By and large, the claret-colored shadow of fascism looms over the country for the uncontested struggle of the right against the extreme right is being played out in the Russian political space. The niche of the forces of the left is empty, and wage labor and the independent economy have been cut off from actual politics—this is the main result of the menacing totalitarian degeneration.

To blame for the failure of the left (the real left!) is primarily the left itself. In an excruciating search for a path, the Social Democratic Party of Russia has split into several groupings. Thanks to its leader, Rutskoy's NPSR [Free Russia People's Party] has sunk to the bottom. Having concluded a "pink-beige" alliance with the moderate nationalists, Cossacks, and oil industrialists, the Socialist Workers Party allowed itself to be dragged into the plan for a "social-patriotic alliance" struck up on the basis of the conservative Federation of Commodity Producers and the personal interests of Yuriy Skokov. The Socialist Workers Party has thereby excluded itself from the movement of the left, virtually, which is not all

that surprising, considering its genetic kinship with the Communist Party of the Russian Federation. Running in majority-system constituencies, certain representatives of forces of the left frequently ended up on the Communist Party slate, which complicates the situation even further.

In short, the formation of a center left, in which social democracy can alone exist, has to be started almost "from scratch." This is difficult, but there is the hope that society will soon understand how dangerous it is to fly on one wing. And the left itself, it has to be thought, will bestir itself. There are already some signs of revitalization on this flank, incidentally.

The defeat of Civic Union and almost all the trade union bosses stirred among the leaders of the "traditional" trade union movement interest in the plan for a Labor Party, which is being proposed to them by the social democrats of the Social Democratic Party of Russia, the Free Russia People's Party, and the Party of Labor, which has for three years served politically the Moscow Federation of Trade Unions. The cornerstone of the plan is a strong, typically Laborite coupling of left-wing-democratic organizations and social civic associations—the "traditional," "free," and "corporate" unions, the STK movement, self-managing associations, consumer unions, civil rights organizations, and so forth.

In the event of realization of this plan, the Russian Laborites would be a political force potentially capable of defending the formation of the civil society and of strengthening and stimulating its structures. This ensues naturally from their main function—defense of the socioeconomic rights of the citizens against the background of the essentially anti-civic position of the principal political subjects of contemporary Russia. Economic democracy and self-government, the employees' share in profits and ownership, reform of the system of social insurance and taxation, the social responsibility of enterprise and state administration, stimulation of all forms of civic self-organization on a firm material and legal foundation—a movement with such a program "package" could obviously lay claim to the "pink" niche, which stands empty in today's political spectrum, and constitute a real democratic alternative to the "claret-colored" Stalinists and the in fact perfectly "white" Zyuganovites.

The consolidation of the antiauthoritarian and antifascist movement along the lines of the National Front in France in the 1930's—the sole historical example of a mass democratic movement stopping fascism—is possible on a Laborite basis. It is hard to say what would result from Russian Laborites, but the citizens are required to forestall a "chief"—they have no worthier option.

'CPSU' Leader on Ideology, Politics

944F0439A Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English
No 8, 25 Feb 94 p 13

[Interview with Sergei Skvortsov, secretary-coordinator of the CPSU Central Committee, by MN correspondent Dmitry Pushkar: "The Communist Party Hasn't Fallen to Pieces Yet"; first paragraph is introductory paragraph]

[Text] The niche which was once occupied by Viktor Anpilov, leader of the "Moscow Labour" movement who has been arrested, was not empty for long. On February 10 in Moscow, revolutionary romantics conducted a protest against the declining standard of living. The small crowd was led into battle by the zealous promoter of the people's wellbeing, the CPSU. Despite all metamorphoses the CPSU retains its former goal, that of building communism. Sergei Skvortsov, one of the few legal leaders of the party, explained to an MN correspondent, how he would do this.

The CPSU, relieved of the heavy burden of power, sanatoriums, armoured limousines, game reserves and secret laboratories for forging documents and deprived of Article 6 of the Constitution, has shrunk to the size of an ordinary party. Its leaders critically appraise the numerical strength of its Russian organization at 20,000 roughly as many as the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party had in 1917. Some time ago the central committee even allowed "dual citizenship" so that a CPSU member could be also a member of other parties, but now the rules have been made stricter.

The highest official of the CPSU Central Committee, secretary-coordinator Sergei Skvortsov, is a short, balding bespectacled man in his early forties. He completed a postgraduate course as an economist and served in the army as a deputy political instructor in a construction battalion. He lives in the Moscow Region. Besides being responsible for the party's leadership, he fulfills the role of chairman of the movement in defence of Russian history (meaning Lenin). He is also editor of the "People's Newspaper".

The CPSU is not registered and has no office nor address. The composition of its secretariat and the central committee is a secret.

Action

"On February 10 the party conducted a day of protest against declining living standards", says Sergei Skvortsov. "Several groups set up an interregional strike committee which I also joined. We do not plan to organize a general strike which would grow into an armed uprising, as was the case in 1905. We advance economic and general democratic demands: a price freeze on essential goods, the indexation of the minimal earnings to the subsistence level, compensation for a delay in paying wages at half of one percent a day, and a prohibition on the closing of enterprises. We also demand the indexation of deposits in the Savings Bank in keeping with the rising prices. Our only political demand is for free democratic elections. Our party has initiated the boycotting

of elections. The action of February 10 was in fact the first step in building a mass people's movement. The way out of an economic crisis is strict regulation by the state, in any case, the strengthening of the state's role. There is no other fitting model, you see, besides the Marxist one".

MN: Why do you laugh when you say "Marxist"?

S.: Because the word has been abused too much by many, including our activists.

Property

MN: What is your party's attitude to ownership of the means of production?

S.: There is consensus among almost all communist parties. We base ourselves on the classic Marxist approach that the state should have the commanding positions, while private property is eradicated as it gradually becomes socially unnecessary.

MN: Ownership of land?

S.: It should not exist. It is not an absolute dogma, but the absence of private property is necessary in our country, because in the event of free purchase and sale of land it does not get into the hands of those who cultivate it. The law on land was built for the area around Moscow in order to secure plots of land for country houses.

MN: What is your attitude on the property of the CPSU? Do you consider yourselves its heirs?

S.: The succession is direct. We have elected a new leadership of the party that existed. The number of new members who joined the CPSU after it was reinstated is a mere hundred or two. We practically have the same people. In legal terms we are claimants to the property. We may probably raise the question of property if a new political situation arises, but we shall demand not the return of the entire property but only of what is necessary for political activity.

Cornerstones

MN: Dictatorship of the proletariat?

S.: The concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat was considered to be a corner-stone of the Marxist theory. Those who speak about it now mean the working class. But this part of society is no longer in the majority. The leading role in society should be played by the workers of manual and mental labour, those who create not only material, but also, to use a Marxist term, spiritual benefits. But this must not necessarily be a dictatorship as it was understood before.

MN: Class struggle?

S.: Class struggle remains the way we understand it. Today we may be allies, but the situation may change tomorrow and we may have neutral relations or become opponents.

MN: The attitude to religion?

S.: According to our rules we may have believers in our ranks. We believe, generally speaking, that Marxist philosophy by which we are guided is atheistic, but do not intend to force this viewpoint on anyone, including the members of our party. This principle is now characteristic of almost all communist parties, at least of those which are not in power.

The Soviet Union

MN: What is your position on the national question?

S.: To reinstitute guberniyas is an entirely unrealistic aim connected with doing obvious violence to peoples. At the same time we naturally stand for the reestablishment of the Soviet Union. We believe that it can be done by means of adopting by the legislative body of Russia of a decision on the restoration of the operation of the USSR Constitution on the territory of the Russian Federation. Several republics can practically immediately follow this way.

The Final Goal Is To Work for Idlers

MN: It follows from the name of your party that you are fighting to build communism. Do you think that "the next generation of Soviet people" will live under communism?

S.: I cannot make categorical forecasts. I myself belong to a rather young generation, but as for the next generation... No, there won't be communism in 50 years from now, so you are right.

MN: What will communism be like?

S.: People will be engaged in some kind of creative work, though there may be some left who will want to till soil because they may find it interesting, or for the sake of relaxation. At the initial stage a certain minimum of life's benefits will be granted to all. At this stage some additional benefits will be offered to people who have made the greatest contribution to society's development. Further on, the range of these benefits will evidently decrease because the most important element is the development of a new man. I consider the desire to have two or three Mercedes cars a deviation.

Shakhray, Pain Propound Federal Approach

944F0419A Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 25 Feb 94 p 9

[Interview with Sergey Shakhray, minister for nationalities and regional policy, member of the Government of the Russian Federation Presidium, and deputy of the State Duma, and Emil Pain, leader of the group for nationality policy of the Presidential Council, by Tamara Zamyatina, observer of ITAR-TASS, specially for SEGODNYA; place and date not given: "Federalism or Disintegration—There Is No Other Way"]

[Text] The signing of the treaty between Russia and Tatarstan has spotlighted more clearly in the public

consciousness the polarization of views on the conversion of the country from a unitary into a truly federative state. The paths of the formation of federalism in Russia were reflected in the president's report which Boris Yeltsin delivered to parliament. Sergey Shakhrai, minister for nationalities and regional policy, member of the Government of the Russian Federation Presidium, and deputy of the State Duma, and Emil Pain, leader of the group for nationality policy of the Presidential Council, an interview with whom we publish today, took part in the preparation of one of its sections.

[Zamyatina] The treaty between Russia and Tatarstan has set "at odds" two positions on the further formation of the Federation. Is it a step forward and a renunciation of unitary approaches or is it, as Sergey Baburin declares, a weakening of the positions of the center? Your viewpoints, gentlemen?

[Pain] My viewpoint is that all regions should in principle have equal rights, but they have different conditions for their realization. It is for this reason that they will to a dissimilar extent delegate authority to the center, and this means that treaty relations are in the future inevitable with all regions. In this sense I welcome the agreement with Tataria as the first swallow of such treaty relations.

[Zamyatina] That is, you believe that bilateral treaties are needed with each component of the Federation?

[Shakhrai] There is a legal and economic possibility of the conclusion of treaties similar to that with Tataria with each component of the Russian Federation. And this is not Shakhrai's opinion. This is Article 11 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, clause 3 of which says that the terms of reference shall be delineated "by this constitution and the Federal and other treaties."

A government program and state approach are needed on this issue. In addition, a federal law on the principles of the delineation of terms of reference and authority is needed urgently to ensure that the bilateral treaties not look like backstage bargaining.

As far as Tataria is concerned, its leadership has earned the title of "locomotive" of federal relations.

Whoever is prepared to negotiate this path and to scrupulously prepare a similar treaty—certainly, the next in line. I believe that a treaty will be signed with Kaliningrad Oblast. This, again, is not just my desire, it is the position of the president and the Government of the Russian Federation.

[Zamyatina] In speaking of treaty relations, you have cautiously sidestepped the problem of the Chechen Republic. Is it possible to achieve a similar agreement with Chechnya?

[Shakhrai] The example of Tataria has shown that neither unilateral declarations nor one-sided pressure nor rulings of the Constitutional Court work in the

relations of the center and components of the Federation. Only the voluntary delegation of authority is acceptable. The treaty with Tataria formulated the sole possible procedure of the removal of the contradictions between constitutions of the republics and the Constitution of the Russian Federation. In respect to the Chechen Republic not the same text but the procedure of the treaty with Tataria is applicable, I believe.

[Pain] We both believe that a million Russian citizens, inhabitants of Chechnya, are today hostages to separatist-minded politicians, have been deprived of protection on the part of the Russian Constitution, and are living under conditions of growing crime, and thousands of families have already been forced to leave their native parts. This situation is, naturally, intolerable.

But there is a solution only on a strictly legal basis. Russia must strive for democratic elections in Chechnya with the participation of all ethnic, social, and political groups of society....

[Shakhrai] ...opposition included.

[Pain] But negotiations between the federal authorities and the authorities of Chechnya on a delineation of power are now possible and necessary also.

[Shakhrai] Debate here on the subject of what sovereignty and competence mean and what is eaten with them is unpromising at the start of negotiations, particularly if the political and economic situation is exacerbated. You can speak for as long as you like about who invests the "sovereignty" concept with what meaning. But each party understands by these words a sum total of practical rights: in the foreign economic sphere, in the management of state property, in budget and tax relations. But in the consciousness of a politician these concepts should be out of the frame, as it were. It is necessary for a start to negotiate on practical matters. Here we have oil industry, for example, here we have rail transport, here we have the activity of the law enforcement authorities, here we have tax rates. And when a specific agreement has been signed on each of these questions, the political component of the dispute, it transpires, and its seriousness and debatability disappear. And, as a result, it transpires that the tasks for the sake of which the concepts of sovereignty and independence were invented have already been accomplished, and it is possible to reach agreement according to other formulas.

[Zamyatina] Why are attempts not being made to realize this model in relations with the Chechen Republic?

[Pain] A common ideology of the approach to a resolution of this problem has yet to be formulated at the level of the Russian leadership. Attempts were made to approach it from positions of strength, as did Rutskoy, and, on the other hand, to forget about it altogether, as a Bermuda triangle, in which everything "cooks" itself, as it were, having been created. But in real life the stereotyped patterns do not work, they prove unrealistic. In

respect to Chechnya, therefore, I find absolutely comprehensible today merely the impermissibility of an armed solution of the problem, which would be madness.

[Zamyatina] The two years of Chechnya's independence have revealed a certain threshold of readiness not only of the politicians but also of the population of the republic for a settlement of the situation. Actual steps and action are needed. What do the Russian authorities think in this connection?

[Shakhray] The authorities are the president, parliament, and the government. Any minister or the leader of any department feels himself to be in an ambiguous position when on the one hand he is told: "give pensions to the population of Chechnya" or "allow the transportation of freight," and, on the other, there is, seemingly, sovereignty and independence there. By the decisions of the former Supreme Soviet the federal authorities deemed the elections in Chechnya illegal, and the regime, illegal, but have not further identified their position. And for this reason any minister, myself included, not having an official position, would in embarking upon negotiations be doing so at his own risk.

[Zamyatina] But you are not "any minister," you are minister for nationalities and a member of the government presidium....

[Shakhray] I will hold consultations, I am prepared for the start of negotiations, as soon as the appropriate political decision is made.

[Zamyatina] In a forecast for 1994 you, Sergey Mikhaylovich, expressed the fear that the present year could be one of interethnic conflicts. Your reasoning?

[Shakhray] There are a minimum of three reasons for this. First, an unconcealed political struggle among democrats, communists, nationalists, and so forth continues at the federal level. The regions have been left to their own devices. It is easy to take advantage of this situation to raise the national banner or the problem of economic independence.

The second reason is to be found in the text of the new constitution, from which at the final stage of modification many provisions that were by nature federative were ejected. This has engendered a certain tension in some republics. The treaty with Tataria provided a very big release in this connection, incidentally, showing that the center is taking the path of the country's conversion into a genuine federation. Speak with any Tatar in Moscow (and this is Russia's second biggest nation in terms of numbers), and it will be confirmed for you that this treaty is for the Tatars a grand occasion signifying that Russia's relations with their ethnic homeland have at last been normalized.

The third reason for a possible exacerbation of interethnic problems lies in the fact that the Russian population could with weapon in hand be a party to interethnic conflicts. Note that thus far the conflicts have been

Ossetian-Ingush, Georgian-Ossetian, Abkhaz-Georgian. But now Cossacks unhappy at the problems of the redistribution of land and the purge of personnel in the authorities of practically all national regions could, for example, be involved in them for the first time.

It should be said for fairness' sake that the unconcealed supplanting of national personnel, Caucasians primarily, in various ministries and departments is taking place in Moscow also. If they are not actually being dismissed, they are, in any event, being put in a position in which they are being forced to leave of their own accord....

[Zamyatina] What paths of an alleviation of these tensions did you attempt to put into the president's report?

[Shakhray] We have already spoken of one possible method in the example of Tataria, making it understood to the national republics that there will no longer be a return to voluntarism.

In the report, on the other hand, we tried to explain convincingly that federation, as a form of state arrangement, protects the small peoples and nationalities from the pressure of the central and local bureaucracy.

Another form of protection of the interests of the populace is the transition from debate to the realization of the concept of national and cultural autonomy. The time is coming for the abandonment of the principle of "for each nation—its own state." It is necessary to proceed along the path of recognition that Russia is the common form of state self-determination of all 15 of our national groups.

[Pain] There is an objective contradiction between two types of organization of the state: national-territorial and territorial-administrative. But national-territorial formations cannot be abolished by decree. They are, meanwhile, the sole form of preservation of the national culture and demographic self-preservation of the nations.

But the national republics in their present form, while ensuring the possibility of self-preservation of the titular nation, far from always create such conditions for a nontitular nation. Various forms of cultural autonomies are needed for the national minorities also.

And, finally, all national processes are to a considerable extent grounded in economics. When truly market relations take shape, the differences between the national republics and other components of the Federation will be supplanted.

[Zamyatina] I shall permit myself to quote the classics: "It is a pity only that neither I nor you will live in this splendid time." And I would like to bring you, my esteemed partners, back from the future to the present day—to the search for practicable solutions to the interethnic problems of the North Caucasus, for example. You, Emil Abramovich, last year received the Woodrow

Wilson International Center prize for the theory of prevention of interethnic conflicts. Is it applicable on native soil?

[Pain] We propose three basic principles of approach to the nationality problem. The first is the main national parity. Its essence lies not only in equality between components of the Federation and not only between people in relation to the law but also in the fact that no ethnic group on the territory of the Russian Federation has a monopoly right to resources, to institutions of power, and so forth. We put this formula of national parity into the text of the president's report.

The other two principles represent instruments of realization of the first, as it were. They concern the self-organization of the nations on the basis of local government and state paternalism in respect to national groups which are particularly in need of care—the small peoples of the North, for example.

[Shakhray] And I would mention that in a country in which Russians constitute 83 percent of the population, all politicians need to constantly bear in mind that the general feelings of all the other peoples of Russia depend on the general feelings of the Russian nation.

[Pain] And the fate of Russians is still determined to the greatest extent by how stable society is. I say all this to spite some artificial forms of the protection of Russians of the Russian Republic type, which are being put forward frequently.

[Shakhray] As far as Russians in the near abroad are concerned, Russia has legal, including international-legal, commitments to them. And the essence of my plan for the protection of Russians in the near abroad, which will evoke irritation in some people, consists of Russia being the successor of the USSR internationally, and of citizens with passports of the USSR who have not acquired the citizenship of another state, being under the jurisdiction of Russia.

I believe also that the Russian Federation cannot be fenced off by economic or border barriers from the republics of the CIS. This would create an environment for the subsequent departure from there of the Russian population.

And, the final point: The Russian Federation should not be embarrassed at maintaining military bases in these regions on a treaty basis. Because, as events in a number of former Union republics have shown, other ways of preserving civil peace and harmony and of preventing conflicts are insufficient.

This argument could be continued, but humanism in quotation marks leads to hundreds of thousands of people dying on account of it.

[Pain] I am disturbed in this argument by the fact that the talk about the protection of Russians is partially

reminiscent of the former Soviet campaigns—like Protection of Children Month. Whence all kinds of backing and forthing.

[Shakhray] It has reached the point in the State Duma of a vote on the formation of a committee for the protection of Russians in Russia. Imagine, this proposal had the support of 140 deputies.

[Zamyatina] And how do you see the protection of the rights of Russians in the near abroad?

[Pain] As I have already said, the need for such protection is frequently being discussed today in the spirit of the former Soviet campaigns. Much in the way of posturing, distortion, and insincerity. After all, no less urgent than the protection of rights for the Russian diaspora is the task of self-organization.

More than three-fourths of the Russian diaspora of the near abroad lives in Ukraine, in Belarus, in Kazakhstan—on land on which Russians have lived for centuries—and they have no desire to leave their native parts. For this reason the strategic line of Russia's policy should be promotion of the full-fledged inclusion of the Russian diaspora in the life of the new independent states. In some cases such integration is possible in the form of cultural autonomy, in others, administrative autonomy, like the Crimean Republic, but support for the idea of the reunification of the lands with Russia is absolutely impermissible. Under the present conditions such demands could result merely in most acute conflicts, and the first casualties of these are, as experience shows, the national minorities.

Another important principle of Russia's policy in relation to the near abroad should be an extra-ethnic approach to the defense of human rights. Democratic Russia is simply duty bound by its international status to prevent the infringement of the rights both of the Russian diaspora and of all other ethnic minorities. As the state which is the successor of the Soviet Union, it must display a readiness (for certain transitional period) to accept on its territory any citizen of the USSR, regardless of his nationality.

And, finally, the basis of a civilized policy is always the principle of equivalence and parity. If Russia is seeking an improvement in the conditions of the cultural life of Russians in the near abroad, it should itself do the same for the minorities residing on its territory. In Ukraine, for example, there are dozens of functioning Russian theaters, but in Russia, in which Ukrainians constitute the third group in terms of size, there is not a single Ukrainian theater. If Russia is seeking the right of dual citizenship for Russians in Kazakhstan, it is obliged to grant the almost 1 million Kazakhs on its territory a similar right. It is useful to imagine here a situation in which citizens of another state constitute the majority in certain areas on the border with Kazakhstan.

[Zamyatina] How is your idea of Russians' adaptation to the conditions of the new independent states to be combined with the fact that they are simply being squeezed out of there?

[Pain] There are two sides to this coin. There is a situation in which representatives of the Russian diaspora are not being admitted to citizenship, and there are regions where they themselves are still choosing and thinking, so to speak. The choice is frequently complicated by the idea of restoration of the Soviet Union.

Many problems could be resolved were it possible within the framework of the CIS to agree on cooperation on assurance of the rights of the national minorities and to remove the restrictions on freedom of the residence and movement of people which ensue today from the difference in their citizenship.

[Shakhray] I agree that it is essential that the Russians in the near abroad display greater assertiveness for self-organization. But in the regions where there are political and psychological barriers to such adaptation we should determine what is meant by protection of the Russian-speaking population. It is here that the possibilities need to be differentiated. As far as the Baltic is concerned, chiefly economic forms of pressure and appeals to international standards are applicable there. In Central Asia other solutions are needed. On the whole, however, a systemic approach to this problem is needed.

Summing up our discussion, I would like to mention that federalism is for Russia the sole way to preserve the territorial integrity of the state. The dilemma here is perfectly straightforward: Either the disintegration of the country or genuine federalism. There is no other way.

[Zamyatina] The final question, Sergey Mikhaylovich. How adequately are the ideas for a strengthening of federalism in Russia proposed by you and your Party of Russian Unity and Accord being received by the president and the government? Do you entertain hopes of these ideas being practicable?

[Shakhray] I will say this: There has been progress. Neither the president nor the prime minister are any longer rejecting these problems as incomprehensible, they recognize increasingly that real control of the economy and the territories is possible only on the principles of federalism.

The problem is that a lack of translation of conceptual ideas into the language of laws and practical organizational forms in respect to delineation of authority is perceived as yet. The leaders of the regions, seeking independence, are demanding of the center, as before, the solution of, say, questions of housing and municipal services in their republics, krais, and oblasts. They forget that the powers of the components of the Russian Federation should be exactly as many as may be realized at the regional level without disruption of the unity of the Russian state and its constitutional principles.

Shakhray Defends Amnesty Stance

94F0412B Moscow OBRASHCHAYAYE GAZETA in Russian
No 9, 4 Mar 94 p 10

[Interview with Sergey Shakhray by Yegor Yakovlev; place and date not given: "Who Has the Right To Determine Who's To Blame?"]

[Text] [Yakovlev] During the referendum and subsequently, when the Constitutional Assembly was meeting, we touched repeatedly on the subject of choice. I said that the very problem of choice, the lesser of two evils, was essentially immoral. You, on the other hand, maintained that there are times of forced choice, when this is essential in the name of higher goals, for the sake, for example, of avoiding civil war. And you continued: A new constitution will be adopted, elections will be held, and we will have an opportunity to act on the basis of moral convictions. All this has happened. Now you and your faction in the Duma have voted for a political amnesty for the prisoners of Lefortovo. This was a free choice, so its time had come?

[Shakhray] The choice about which you speak was made by me consciously and voluntarily, and I consider it, as before, correct. As far, however, as actual preferences are concerned, we will still be balancing on the razor's edge for quite some time. Take the present situation concerning the constitution. The majority of those in the Duma recognize, I believe, neither the constitution nor the Duma, but are, nonetheless, using both to resolve their problems. This does not afford them any delight, of course, and they are looking for sympathy. I made my choice on the basis of the fact that as of 3-4 October we have been in a state of civil war, although there are no hostilities currently. The possibility of their resumption is for me not ruled out. And I chose between the just but abstract demand for the proceedings to be brought to the point of the rendering of a judgment or, on the other hand, the adoption of a decision on amnesty as an important step en route to civil reconciliation.

Let us look the truth in the eye. On the first day of business of the Duma it became obvious that it would adopt a decision on a political amnesty. This was borne out by the test voting, when on each occasion there was a shortage of two to five votes. But if a fact is obvious, it is necessary to think through one's actions on the basis of this fact. Otherwise it remains merely to throw up one's hands, which is what we are today doing. Where were the advisers, analysts, aides?

We decided to support the amnesty not for amnesty's sake but as a step on the way toward civil reconciliation. And we insisted that this be done in a particular sequence, what is more. First, a Memorandum of Accord adopted by the Duma, then the negotiations of all political sides and branches of power, at which the terms of political, socioeconomic, and interethnic stabilization for the coming two years would be recorded. Finally, the president and parliament would adopt a document on legal guarantees of a political truce, the amnesty

included. And only after this would the people go free. The sequence was broken, unfortunately. The communists and the agrarians wanted an amnesty without any obligations. And Russia's Choice believed that it would prevent this, manifestly overestimating its possibilities.

[Yakovlev] But if the planned sequence in civil reconciliation was unsuccessful, you should not have voted for the amnesty, perhaps?

[Shakhray] People breathe a sigh of relief when if only some opportunity for reconciliation appears. There is currently a mass of calls, and I am receiving a heap of telegrams from the provinces: Go for the next steps. I confess, this is for me the sole outlet in the information blockade in which I have found myself in Moscow.... Following the amnesty, there have come to be more opportunities for reconciliation, incidentally. We need to be able to avail ourselves of them. The time for this is two months.

Besides, the present political amnesty has a number of paradoxical features, which are easily predicted. The amnesty corresponds to the interests of the president and the government. It is more beneficial having Rutskoy and Khasbulatov at liberty than in Lefortovo. In addition, the people who have been released have undertaken, as it were, not to call for bloodshed, assaults in the future....

[Yakovlev] Permit my disbelief: I heard what Anpilov was shouting as he came through the gate, and I know the character of Konstantinov.

[Shakhray] If Anpilov or Konstantinov once again call for violence, the law enforcement authorities should act on the basis of the new circumstances.... A second paradox of the amnesty: It will be followed, in my view, by quite a lengthy period of interaction of the president, the government, and parliament. A considerable part of the Duma has discharged its election commitments: the release of the above-mentioned persons. Now they have no interest in the further elevation of either Rutskoy or Khasbulatov, they need other leaders. They will not, most likely, move to exacerbate the confrontation with the president. The law of self-preservation will operate.

[Yakovlev] Today we know that the president did not comment on the amnesty directly. But the pressure on the prosecutor general led to his resignation. Aleksey Kazannik believed that it was more important to be honest than to swear fealty to the president. As far, however, as his entourage is concerned, how many days is it now that it has been publicly confessing that it was unable, did not know, could not think how to get around, as it were, what should be done according to the law.

[Shakhray] You are to a large extent right, unfortunately. In addition, we have seen for ourselves that, apparently, we lack a mechanism of the interaction of president and parliament. The president, parliament, the public prosecutor's office, and the judicial system. But if intelligent conclusions

are drawn from this lesson, what I have said: The need for forced reconciliation, will have been confirmed.

[Yakovlev] I cannot say that I share your opinion, at the same time, on the other hand, I accept what is undoubtedly reasonable in your arguments. But how, pray, is it possible to be reconciled with the disregard for public opinion that was manifested so forcefully at that time? The gate of Lefortovo was flung open without people even having been told who were to blame—the one who signed the edict, violating the constitution and breaking up parliament, or those who, lodged in the White House, called for the storming of the Kremlin. Do you believe that it is not you and I but merely posterity that should answer this?

[Shakhray] There is the ancient piece of wisdom, which has with time become a legal axiom: You cannot be the judge at your own trial. Both parties to the conflict are to blame, and neither of them has either the moral or the political right to condemn the other. You ask: Why are we leaving this to posterity? I shall answer the question with a question: Who would determine who was guilty? The victorious presidential party wanted to do so today. But if tomorrow there are multiple-choice elections, will those who lost the October events start to point to the guilty party? As far as public opinion is concerned, it has already rendered its verdict, and I can merely repeat it: A plague on both your houses.

[Yakovlev] When I speak of the need to explain to people what happened on 3-4 October, I am not thinking merely in categories of the judicial investigation. It seems to me that the president should get up and tell people: In signing the edict of 21 September dissolving parliament I was a poor statesman insofar as I was unable to weigh the consequences this would have. Both Rutskoy and Khasbulatov should make their confessions: Lodged in the White House, we were thinking only of ourselves, of our power, forgetting about the inevitability of the casualties, which we had provoked.

[Shakhray] Were the said people capable of steps such as you have mentioned, we would not, possibly, have the present crisis.

Political Figures Comment on Amnesty

944F04204 Moscow *SEGODNYA* in Russian 1 Mar 94 p. 3

[Statements by political figures, from INTERFAX, POSTFAKTUM, and ITAR-TASS material; places and dates not given: "Man Guilty of National Consensus Found: an Honest Jurist Follows in the Footsteps of Procurator Pilate"]

[Text] Sergey Yushenkov (chairman of the State Duma Defense Committee): "Aleksey Kazannik's resignation as Russian Federation procurator general is to his credit; it shows, however, that the procuracy is poorly prepared for practical work. The Constitutional Court also could have demanded that the Duma stick to the rules, but

there is no law on the Constitutional Court. Overall, this speaks of the weakness of the president's power.

"The government is not against carrying out the amnesty. Indirect proof of this is the way the PRES [Party of Russian Unity and Accord] and the pro-government New Regional Policy faction have voted... The government does not have a concrete program and is looking for a scapegoat on whom to dump responsibility for what is happening in the country."

Viktor Mironov (deputy chairman of the Duma Security Committee, member of the Russia's Choice faction): "Having accepted the amnesty, the criminals acknowledged their responsibility for the hundreds of people killed... I hope that the president and the enforcement structures will not allow it to come to a civil war... The duty of democratically minded people is to unite around the Russia's Choice party."

Lev Ponomarev (cochairman of Democratic Russia movement): "Kazannik betrayed the president, who had appealed to him to hold up the amnesty process."

Ivan Fedoseyev (Russian Federation Supreme Soviet Constitutional Committee, Russia faction coordinator, Russian All-Peoples Union cochairman): "I hope that Ruslan Imranovich will have enough wisdom not to exhort people to mass actions today... The legitimacy of both the new Constitution and the State Duma is questionable; however, it is unlikely that the voters would agree with it, and Ruslan Khasbulatov must take this into account."

Ivan Shashviashvili (Russia faction): "Ruslan Imranovich should enter the political arena in his old capacity as Russian Federation Supreme Soviet chairman—the only legitimate body of state power despite the October massacre."

Vladimir Isakov (Russian Federation Supreme Soviet Constitutional Committee, chairman of the Legislative and Judiciary Reform Committee): "I hope that the released prisoners will have enough political wisdom not to jump into politics in the next few months. This would seriously complicate the situation in the country."

Mikhail Astafyev (chairman of the Constitutional Democratic Party): The key figure today is Aleksandr Rutskoy. There are two presidents in Russia today, and only one of them—Rutskoy—is the legitimate one. This seriously complicates the political situation."

Ruslan Khasbulatov: "I do not see real politicians in our country. I do not see anyone in the leadership with whom you could reach an agreement and who would then keep their word. Machiavelli is a child compared to them. For me, on the other hand, moral principles in politics are particularly important... Had I not been released by the Duma decision, I would still have been freed—first, because the investigators were not able to find corpus delicti, and second, because of my state of health... An attempt to return to Lefortovo those who have been

released from the investigative detention facility under amnesty will only underline the stupidity of the organizers of such actions. In the near future I intend to sort out my papers... I have felt my heart for the first time; how it hurts; therefore, I have to take care of my health right now..."

Ilya Konstantinov (National Salvation Front leader): "The former Lefortovo prisoners do not want to see the political struggle in Russia transcend the boundaries of legitimacy, and intend to help stabilize the political situation... Attempts to link the political amnesty with the beginning of a new round of civil war in Russia are a political provocation."

Vyacheslav Kostikov: "The act of releasing from Lefortovo the organizers of and participants in the October 1993 events is a blasphemous deed. People who were ready to push Russia into a bloodbath have been set free without a trial... The deputies abused the trust people vested in them and took the side of state villains... Aleksey Kazannik's resignation is the reaction of an extremely noble and decent man who has been put in a difficult legal situation... Until a new general procurator is appointed, the situation will be deadlocked."

Gavril Popov (Russian Democratic Reform Movement chairman): "The president's staff has displayed amazing inaction... The president could have made an anticipatory move on the Duma decision by offering it his own version of amnesty, which would have precisely and clearly specified the terms on which the criminal case is dismissed: one such term could be a ban on participation in political activities for a certain period of time... The course of investigation in the GKChP [State Committee on the State of Emergency] case and the October events has demonstrated the complete helplessness of the law enforcement system; a top to bottom purge of the procuracy is needed."

Sergey Shakhrai: "The amnesty is in line with the strategic interests of the president and the government. The president loses more politically by keeping his opponents behind bars... At the same time, the result of violating the logic of the national reconciliation plan proposed by the PRES, in which the amnesty is only one element, bundled together with a memorandum of accord and the decision on disbanding the commission on investigation of the October events, will be that those released will again jump into political struggle. Its outcome will depend on random factors... Aleksey Kazannik's resignation may plunge the procuracy into the orbit of political passions."

Shmidt Dzyublyayev (general secretary of the Assembly of North Caucasus Democratic Forces): "The economic and political situation makes it incumbent on the president of Russia to impose a state of emergency... The Duma decision is an unprecedented act of absolute disrespect for the law... Sergey Shakhrai should share responsibility for this with the communist obscurantists."

Yuriy Baturin (the president's national security adviser): "The president of Russian Federation's appeal to the State Duma with the proposal to modify the decree on the amnesty should have cleared the way for the reconciliation process. However, the haste of general procuracy members considerably complicated the situation... This haste was displayed even contrary to the position of the State Duma itself... It is clear that General Procurator Kazannik's own position in this case was duplicitous... I can say that he has deceived us."

Ivan Rybkin: "If some people show that they do not have enough brains and compassion not to start a confrontation, the State Duma will see to it that such people are severely punished... Perhaps in the future a memorandum should be adopted, upon concurrence with other branches of authority, on a system of criteria and the mechanism of responsibility of state institutions and politicians for decisions aimed at reaching civic peace, national reconciliation, and consensus."

Mikhail Poltoranin: "The president cannot relax the reins of power; otherwise, the chariot of Russian statehood will overturn."

Barkashov on Amnesty, October Events

944F0427A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian
5 Mar 94 p 4

[Interview with Aleksandr Petrovich Barkashov, leader of Russian National Unity, by Sergey Turchenko; place and date not given: "A Meeting With Aleksandr Barkashov—the Bricked Up Knight's Sword"]

[Text] He was released from "Sailor's Rest" at 1815 on 26 February. Despite a serious bullet wound to the thigh, he came out of the prison by himself, adroitly supporting himself on crutches that have already become habitual.

Supporters had been waiting at the gate since 0900. A Russian National Unity honor guard company in full dress uniform was in formation. It greeted its leader with the thrice-repeated yell: "Glory to Russia!" Barkashov embraced each one of them and departed for home, where he has not been since 20 September 1993.

The building in which Aleksandr Petrovich lives had two exits as recently as five months ago. One to the courtyard, the other to Leninskiy Prospekt. When in October of last year the sleuths of "democratic" detection were hunting for the leader of Russian National Unity, the second exit was walled up with brick masonry so they would not have to maintain two posts of "operatives" here simultaneously. This wall has remained as a modest monument to victorious "democracy."

We met with Aleksandr Petrovich several days after his release at his apartment, which was left in a more than frugal condition. It had neither rugs nor expensive furniture. On the wall, next to Orthodox icons, was an ancient Russian knight's sword as the symbol of a fighting faith.

Wounded, wasted by prison, Barkashov appeared the inflexible monk of this courageous religion to which Russia is doomed.

After congratulating Aleksandr Petrovich on his release, I asked him how he felt about the amnesty.

[Barkashov] I think it is a compromise step on the part of those forces that did not want the investigative activities with respect to the "October prisoners" to reach the court, because this would reveal the true culprits of the mass murders in October of last year. Other forces were able through the act of amnesty to resolve their own concerns, for example, to release the criminals, because those forces do not have another social base. As for me personally, I interpreted the amnesty in a positive way, since I know that in our country an investigation can drag on for years and not come to anything. But sitting in prison is not for me, I have to be active. In addition, I understand that this was an act that the authorities were forced into, and not some kind of sop. The public conscience had reached a level that the authorities could not risk holding us under guard anymore. What is more, I do not feel any kind of guilt for myself. On the contrary, the Procuracy committed such a string of violations in my arrest that I do not know how it would extricate itself were it not for the amnesty.

[Turchenko] Our newspaper informed the readers about this in detail. But we have hardly written about the activities of Barkashov supporters in September-October of 1993.

[Barkashov] As early as spring, when an attempt was made to introduce OPUS [special procedure for governing the country], we announced that if the president decided to dissolve parliament and usurp power, we were ready with all available resources to oppose this. After the publication of Edict No. 1400, a subunit consisting of 300 persons arrived at the House of Soviets in an organized way. For the first two days, it was on the street. Afterwards, we settled ourselves in the reception room of the Supreme Soviet. Soon, information began to arrive that forceful actions were being planned against the leaders of the Supreme Soviet, and even that an assault on the building was being prepared. The need arose to reinforce the security of higher state officials and the internal premises of the House of Soviets. We were asked to take part in this, and we were assigned specific places to guard, in particular, the Ministry of Defense, the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs], the MB [Ministry of Security], and various vital life-support centers where, through underground communications, it was possible to get through to the inside of buildings. Our people guarded Khasbulatov and Rutskoy at their request.

On 2 October we heard growing noise, and even shooting, from the Smolensk Square side. I sent my scouts to find out what was happening there. They went and returned through underground communications. They reported that the OMON [special purpose militia

detachment] had provoked a clash and that people had been killed and wounded. That was the first time that weapons were employed against unarmed people. We have documentary pictures from which it can be seen how individual OMON members were firing from pistols at a short distance into the crowd. For some reason I did not see a word about this in the press. In addition, we also discovered that some foreign inspectors who were working under the Red Cross service for some reason were directing the activities of the OMON members, special purpose elements, and the militia. People were sitting in vehicles with foreign infantry weapons, and they were speaking in English. It became clear that a tragedy was developing under foreign leadership.

[Turchenko] Do you have documentary evidence of this?

[Barkashov] Yes, sir. When the time comes, I will publish it.

[Turchenko] But, in your opinion, did the other events of 3 October not appear to be a tragic play acted out by foreign intelligence services in order to eliminate the most active patriotically inclined citizens?

[Barkashov] I am convinced that 3 October was a real people's uprising. Almost half a million insurgents. The age group: youths from 16 to 25 and older men from 35 to 55, mainly workers and the technical intelligentsia. Plus a lot of women. Despite the clubs and tear gas, they breached several OMON barricades and in an absolutely sincere outburst broke through toward the House of Soviets.

[Turchenko] I absolutely agree, as a people's uprising the October display was spontaneous, if, of course, the fact that for a whole week prior to this people were provoked to uprising by unjustified harsh beatings is ignored. But does it not seem strange to you that it was exactly on 3 October that the militia and the OMON left the House of Soviets?

[Barkashov] You know, they did not leave. They scattered. The Dzerzhinskiy division, after receiving information about such a mass of people, quickly pulled out and departed in panic to its permanent station. Special purpose and OMON subunits also scattered in panic. Commanders abandoned their subordinates. We brought to the House of Soviets two companies of soldiers of the Internal Troops whose commanders had abandoned them. Later, two companies from Sofrino simply announced the desire to switch to the side of the insurgents. Only those who established themselves in the mayor's office fired on citizens. For some reason, nothing is being written about this, but I personally saw how people were wounded and killed by this fire. When in an outburst of indignation the crowd desperately hurled itself at the mayor's office, the firing became more intense. In order not to permit unnecessary bloodshed, seven of my companions, plus four fellows from the Union of Officers, rushed over there. All it took was several warning bursts for the mayor's office to quiet down. Then we led the half-drunk defenders of "democracy" away.

[Turchenko] But why was it necessary go after Ostankino?

[Barkashov] The leadership of the Supreme Soviet in those days undoubtedly displayed high courage. But in addition to courage, an ability to organize the popular masses was also needed.

[Turchenko] In your opinion, to organize what?

[Barkashov] This does not at all mean to shoot, to assault. It was enough with organized groups to take control of Moscow's main facilities. The march on Ostankino was a purely emotional outbreak: "The empire, they said, lies, a nest of evil..." I agree. But in such situations it is necessary to be guided not by emotions, but by sober calculation. If we need the television airwaves in order to tell people the truth about the events in Moscow, send a group of workers to Shabolovka, which was practically unguarded. And go on the air. There were many organizational miscalculations. As a result, the authorities gained time and the opportunity to organize the shelling of the House of Soviets. All that time our subunit was performing the duties entrusted to it, and was prepared to stand to the end. But when the leadership made the decision about going out, it made no sense to remain in the House of Soviets. On the evening of 4 October we surrendered our weapons in an organized way, and I ordered the boys to go out. I myself remained with Achalov when he was arrested, and demanded that I be taken together with him. However, an officer of the Ministry of Security answered that he had no instructions concerning me, and he advised that I leave with the "Alpha." I want to express my great gratitude to the officers of this subunit. Had it not been for them, there would have been far more victims. In any case, when "Alpha" turned the group with which I came out over to the OMON people, they took us in the direction of the stadium where, as we already knew, massive executions were being conducted. However, when officers of "Alpha" noticed this they raised their assault rifles and said firmly: Release these people. We were released... Unfortunately, not all of our boys remained alive. On 4 October, Dmitriy Marchenko, the editor of the letters department of our newspaper RUSSKIY PORYADOK, was wounded in the leg. He was taken to Sklifosovskiy. But relatives were soon informed that he was dead. When they came for him, they saw traces of brutal torture on his body. His nose and ears were torn off, the tendons in his legs were cut, and the back of his head was shot through. The body of Guards Major Anatoliy Surskiy was also found with traces of ritual torture.

[Turchenko] What did you do after you left the House of Soviets?

[Barkashov] We received information from our own people in the MVD that there was a directive to arrest a group of activists from Russian National Unity and, in

addition, the chiefs would have no objection if anyone was shot while resisting arrest. It became necessary to shift to an illegal situation.

[Turchenko] How did the October events affect Russian National Unity, did they not disorganize the movement?

[Barkashov] On the contrary, the fighting men became stronger in spirit. We saw a large influx of new people into the organization. Many youths. Workers of many of the Moscow plants sympathize with our views, and the first Russian National Unity cells have been established there.

[Turchenko] Would you be able to name at least the approximate numerical strength of your organization?

[Barkashov] The fact is that our membership is three-staged. The first stage is the most numerous—these are sympathizers. Those who are most active and who have shown their worth move to the second stage—fellow-fighters. They go through special training in our, so to say, training institutions, they perform one-time or permanent assignments. Achieving a certain level, a fellow-fighter can become a companion-in-arms. This is a direct member of our organization with pertinent rights and disciplinary duties. I will not name the figure for all of Russia. But in Moscow we have about 1,500 companions-in-arms and more than 10,000 fellow-fighters, and there are several times more sympathizers.

[Turchenko] What is the system of training in Russian National Unity?

[Barkashov] We place the main emphasis on political and ideological training, to put it more exactly, on world outlook. Our main weapon is propaganda and agitation. Further, there is tactics, firing training, and hand-to-hand combat.

[Turchenko] What does ideological training mean? Could you briefly formulate its basis?

[Barkashov] It is very difficult to do so briefly. Its essence is awakening the national self-consciousness of the Russian people. Because as our statehood was built around the Russian people, so it will be revived around a Russian nucleus. The main thing is that it is necessary to show the whole truth to the people to the end. So that they may see not in words but with their own eyes that they are on the brink of extinction, and so that the instinct of self-preservation be turned on. It is necessary to point out their main enemy. And one exists, for a struggle between good and evil is going on in the world.

[Turchenko] What capabilities do you have to report this truth?

[Barkashov] First, a press organ—the newspaper RUSSKIY PORYADOK. The circulation is quite high—400,000. But it is also necessary to consider that its dissemination is targeted—only to the social environment that is of interest to us. In the present period, this is most of all workers and servicemen.

[Turchenko] What is the base in the military environment?

[Barkashov] There are companions-in-arms even in the senior generals milieu. There are fellow-fighters. The main mass is sympathizers. It is technically very difficult to establish primary Russian National Unity cells in the army, for the eyes and ears of the special department are everywhere.

[Turchenko] How do you work in the units?

[Barkashov] We arrive at the main gate checkpoint in the evening and disseminate newspapers in which there is always a contact telephone. Then you begin to get calls from the military unit, and later people walk in. And it is here that individual work with them starts. People receive individual instructions, they join our studies system, etc.

[Turchenko] But are people not repelled by the fact that the symbolism of your movement has an emblem that is reminiscent of the swastika, which gives some journalists a reason to accuse Russian National Unity of fascism?

[Barkashov] This is a democratic label. Our sign is the eight-pointed Star of Our Lady, who from days of old was respected in Rus. You will also find it on ancient icons and in the ornamental embroidery of Russian national costumes. We have explained all of this, with documents, more than once in our newspaper. When people read it, all questions are removed.

[Turchenko] But why is this sign not seen in today's Orthodox Church?

[Barkashov] Today's Orthodox Church promised to anathematize those who were the first to spill blood in October 1993. Instead of this, I see on television how priests kiss the organizers of murder. But God is their judge. As for the Star of Our Lady, its description is in all canonical literature and in icon paintings. All of this was gradually etched out of our memories, probably because previously the common people called this ancient sign a zhidobor [amulet to protect against Jews].

[Turchenko] Fine, let us drop this subject. Tell us, how did you arrive at your present views?

[Barkashov] I am from a working family. My father worked all of his life in a TETs [thermal electric power center]. Mama was a nurse. I also worked at the same TETs for a long time as an electrician. As far as I can recall, I was always interested in books on Russian history. After 1985 I joined the Pamyat movement. I sensed in 1990 that it had become outdated. There was a need for a stronger and more united organization. Together with like-minded people, I left Pamyat and established Russian National Unity. My world outlook is from Russian historical science and knowledge of the attitudes of the working individual. But it was the development of the situation in the country itself that mobilized me to political activity.

[Turchenko] Of the parties that exist now, which do you cooperate with and which do you like most?

[Barkashov] We have a very strict ideology. It is difficult for us to find common language with those who paper over the cracks first and then join political games. We call things by their real names. Therefore, it is difficult to accept something like compromising alliances. But we are always ready to support tactically any political force that comes out for national interests. So the Supreme Soviet made a clear-cut statement about betrayal of national interests, and it said that it will defend them, and we immediately came to its assistance.

[Turchenko] What is your prediction for the near-term development of the situation in the country?

[Barkashov] Fundamental changes will occur this year. And if they are sufficiently fundamental (that is, if an uncompromising national policy is implemented), then within three years the people will be able to eliminate the consequences of the mess the reformers have created.

[Turchenko] But do you see such forces?

[Barkashov] I see the psychological condition of society, because I am not separated from it like Yeltsin, or as Khasbulatov was separated from it. Authority must resonate with the condition of society. If this does not exist, authority declines. Therefore, that is why changes have occurred: There is talk of accord, and the Russian question and changes in foreign policy are being stirred up. This, of course, is not out of goodwill. The present leadership simply understands that in its previous capacity it is becoming absolutely unacceptable to an overwhelming majority of the people. It will be forced to bring ever newer figures onto its staff until there is conformity between the will of the people and policy.

[Turchenko] The forecast is more than optimistic. Many thanks.

Independence of Appointed Judges Questioned

944E055SB Moscow *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA*
in Russian 4 Mar 94 p 1

[Article by Natalya Kuzina: "Does Russia Need Procurators and Judges Who Only Obey the Law?"]

[Text] There was a time when the representatives of the law needed celebrated cases and brilliant articles for fame. Everything is much simpler now. One only needs to observe the Constitution, and fame along with a position will cover you. Aleksey Kazannik, Valeriy Zorkin and, incidentally, even Valentin Stepankov proved that brilliantly.

Unfortunately, another question has remained opened: In today's Russia, can one combine observance of the law with a high position? Following the logic of the radical reformers and their popularizers, one cannot. During a recent television broadcast about A. Kazannik, they literally passed sentence—a political Don Quixote—

with some sympathy for the former general procurator. He did not understand that they had brought him "upstairs" not for his professional qualities but only because he once did the president a good turn—namely, a service. Personal devotion is the priority requirement for an official.

What does this mean in the judicial system? With the departure of people dedicated to the law from its "upper" stories, a complete failure awaits the system. Those who keep to the letter of the law will help. Already, there are not enough judges and people's assessors now. They are on the run under the threats of corrupted bureaucrats and legalized criminals. Only, where should the main mass of the population, from whom they have consistently and step by step taken away all the departments for protecting them beginning with our almost home-spun local trade union committees and ending with the opportunity to achieve justice in a court where one had not come with a purse, run?

This summer, I had an occasion to ask V. Zorkin how he would have acted if something similar to the celebrated OPUS [Osoboye Poryadok Upravleniya Stranoy—play on word "opus", meaning "work"] appeared again?

The answer was:

"I would have acted according to the constitution."

V. Zorkin proved this in the fall which does not now make him completely happy.

The Constitutional Court is still closed down. An individual, who is personally devoted but undergoing a libel case, is performing the duties of general procurator. The Constitution, even if it is a presidential one, leaves too broad a field for interpretation.

Role of Soskovets Viewed

944F0421A Moscow *SEGODNYA* in Russian 3 Mar 94 p 2

[Article by Aleksandr Bekker: "For Whom Is Oleg Soskovets Working?"]

[Text] Negotiations of the leading aluminum producers—delegations of the United States, Russia, the European Union, Australia, Canada, and Norway—will be held this week in Ottawa. If successful, agreements on the amounts of supplies of the product to the world market will be ratified. And in Moscow light will be shed, finally, on the fate of Anatoliy Dyakov, chairman of the Unified Power System of Russia stock company, whose removal is being spoken of in the Council of Ministers as a done deal. These two formally unconnected events have common roots. The initiator of Mr. Dyakov's dismissal and the key figure for presentation in Canada of Russia's "aluminum" position is Oleg Soskovets, first deputy chairman of the government.

The aluminum industry has become the most expressive example, perhaps, of Russia's "Asiatic" move onto Europe's metal markets. From 300,000 tonnes in 1990,

our exports have jumped to 1.6 million tonnes. Prices have collapsed almost twofold, and Western producers initially began to toss and turn and then, having instituted against Russia an anti-dumping inquiry, forced it into a civilized discussion, into consent to hold back its aluminum expansion included.

Having plucked the "foreign currency primrose," our enterprises have now encountered a very unpleasant situation: Exports have been compulsorily restricted, and the domestic prices of primary aluminum and rolled products have gone beyond world prices. In addition, the release price of the aluminum combines (2 million rubles [R] per tonne) is almost double the price of the independent dealers on the Moscow Metal Exchange. It is not surprising that demand for the enterprises' product has fallen. But the sector is in a mood neither to cut back on production nor to lose its dividends. And the only way it can preserve the status quo is to freeze the price of electric power, the consumption of which constitutes up to 30 percent of the prime costs of the output of the group of enterprises.

It has to be said that electric power is a natural monopoly, and the cost of a kilowatt-hour is, in any case, regulated, at three levels, what is more: The government determines the tariffs for the public and agriculture, the Federal Energy Commission establishes them for the Unified Power System of Russia regional stock company, which supplies the giants of industry, and the regional commissions impose tariffs for the local industrial enterprises.

In accordance with regulations approved last year for the Ministry of Economics, the electricity tariffs shall be revised "with a change in external conditions." The external conditions, that is, the prices of each and every thing, are growing by the month, and the electricity tariffs are raised administratively not more often than once a quarter. For the Unified Power System of Russia regional stock company, they have not been revised since September 1993. Rising up on each occasion as a wall has been Oleg Soskovets, who stated in February in the Council of Ministers Commission for Operational Matters that the power engineers had "established communism for one sector." Waves of indignation at the price policy of the fuel and energy complex, which is allegedly to blame for the endless inflation, have been rolling through the press in parallel with this. Clearly referring to the regional stock company's Mr. Dyakov, a representative of the industrial directors said that "one stock company is, in fact, directing the whole country."

The reasons for Oleg Soskovets' decisions, which are synchronous with the "public indignation," are, generally, there on the surface. On the one hand, the state's share of the exports of rolled aluminum constitutes 91 percent, and it does not, understandably, want such a channel of foreign currency to dry up. On the other, the prices of the extensive product list of the iron and steel complex have already scaled world heights, and the price of a kilowatt-hour is five times lower—and a further rise would confront a large sector of the economy with a

dilemma: either bankruptcy or a difficult rearrangement of the groups of enterprises. "Power engineering is literally oppressing the entire economy. Prices in the regions are being established chaotically, essentially, and managers are not being held responsible or to account," Oleg Soskovets declared.

This position precisely reflects the group interests of market outsiders and has nothing in common with public interests. The first deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers knows full well that it was the wild move "into the light" of Russia's metallurgists that knocked down world prices and that the energy consumption of aluminum industry considerably exceeds Western standards and is a consequence of the technological backwardness of the groups of enterprises. The abundance on the domestic market of imported commodities in aluminum wrapping against the drastic reduction in rolled products of this metal in Russia is clear evidence that the country is pumping cheap electricity to the West via aluminum. As far as the alleged arbitrary price action of the power engineers is concerned, this is, perhaps, the sole sector counting tariffs "the old way"—strictly according to the formulas from 21 supplements to the computation procedure, which can always easily be checked.

None of this is any secret for Mr. Soskovets. He could take on a task of truly state dimensions—gradually invert the pyramid of energy consumption in the country, whereby heavy industry bears the main price burden, and agriculture and the public get electricity for a pittance, virtually (5-6 percent of the cost). He could set about a leveling of the 20-fold price spread by region (threefold in the United States), for which he would win the industrial consumers' gratitude. But Oleg Soskovets, former chairman of the State Committee for Metallurgy, has opted for a path more in keeping, evidently, with the scale of his personality—he has begun to lobby Soviet-style for sectoral interests. When, in February, at a meeting of the board of the Ministry of Fuel and Energy, the power engineers presented him with evidence that the metallurgists, who were in debt to them, had money in their accounts, he told the meeting hall with irritation that "such shadowing is impermissible." He, however, beleaguered the power engineers who had shown him documents demonstrating how great was the prime cost of the product of the Bratsk and Krasnoyarsk aluminum combines. And then Mr. Soskovets decided radically to "investigate" energy prices, instructing Anatoliy Chubays to study the question of the "expediency" of Anatoliy Dyakov continuing in office as chairman of the Unified Power System of Russia regional stock company.

Removing Mr. Dyakov as a warning is, generally, uncomplicated. As is, in principle, holding back energy prices. This would turn out badly for the whole economy, it is true. With the 46 percent wear and tear of power engineering equipment, a shortage of investments would very quickly result in a growth of the breakdown rate and

a reduction in scheduled maintenance. The sector is, as a whole, inertial. You might not build here for a couple of years, and this hits three or four years later. At the start of the 1980's the introduction of capacity in power engineering constituted 10 million-12 million kilowatt-hours, incidentally; now, it is roughly 10 times less.

Oleg Soskovets has been "on the political Olympus" just under a year. Everyone has come in for it in this time—monetarists and "moderates"—and the press has hit at Gaydar and Chernomyrdin, Fedorov and Zaverukha, Chubays and Glukhikh. The first deputy prime minister has, surprisingly, emerged from the battles totally "unscathed." He has remained beyond criticism, although industrial policy has failed completely, and the concept of financial and industrial groups sponsored by Mr. Soskovets is decaying at root. There have been no breakthroughs in the field of ideas, except for curatorship of the work of academicians Shatalin and Abalkin "on a correction of the course of the reforms."

Despite the lack of achievements, the first "vice" remains under a charm and continues to gain more and more political authority. According to a recent order of the prime minister, Oleg Soskovets will coordinate key spheres of economic policy and direct 14 ministries and departments, and the composition and structure of the federal executive authorities and the federal civil service are in his hands. He is head of the government's Commission for Operational Matters, to which the function of distribution of centrally allocated credit to industry was recently transferred. And this same commission, judging by documents of the Council of Ministers, will shortly win distribution of the Western credit received by Russia and the centrally allocated foreign exchange resources of the government.

In a short space of time the 44-year-old Oleg Soskovets has made a dizzying career from deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers of Kazakhstan to first deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers of Russia. He has concentrated an enormous amount of power in his hands. Both this surge and his being off limits for criticism on the part of the president and the prime minister compel doubts as to the authenticity of the original version of his elevation: Boris Yeltsin had brought into the government "his man" Lobov, and Viktor Chernomyrdin, in response, made a move with the little-known Soskovets. It would seem, however, that people had gambled on Oleg Soskovets somewhat earlier and had pushed him persistently and recommended him just as persistently to the prime minister.

Indicating who is "pushing" Oleg Soskovets is not that easy. One thing is for certain: Among the persons with an interest in him are the industrial directors who have not joined in the reforms.

Problems in State Financing for Television

944Q0219A Moscow NOVOYE VREMYA in Russian
No 8, Feb 94 [Signed to press 22 Feb 94] pp 48-49

[Article by Anna Politkovskaya: "Television as a National Problem, or Is Life Possible Without Knife-Switches?"]

[Text] There is not a person in the country who would be satisfied with television in our country. However, when the danger started to appear on the horizon of finding ourselves in a television, and at the same time also in a radio vacuum, society united with incredible enthusiasm in the struggle for this narcotic accessible to all.

But in the meantime Premier Chernomyrdin and the cabinet headed by him did not especially want to give to television the budget funds earmarked for it. As a minimum, beginning in November they stopped the transfer to "Ostankino" and to the Russian Television and Radio Company the funds which they, in turn, must, without keeping them back in their account, transfer into the pocket of the Ministry of Communications. And the Ministry of Communications, as is well known, holds the monopoly in Russia over the distribution of the SIGNAL. . . .

Let Us Turn the Film Back

At the end of October, Yeltsin decorates the television workers who have distinguished themselves in the events, including those from CNN. He acknowledges in public that they have done more for the country than all the democrats taken together. However, money for domestic RTV (radio, television) was nevertheless not found in the treasury.

Further—November. All of the electronic mass media are also waiting for money, but can by no means wait for it. Their debt is growing with every day. For the time being, the communications workers are forgiving [the debt], understanding that those who prevent the triumph of the new constitution were almost enemies in November. Of all the forces, radio and television twist the election campaign, unprecedented for Russia. Every day, the citizens hear that one or another figure who felt the urge for politics in his blood has rented COMMERCIAL hours and minutes on the screen and on the air. Only a little time will pass and it will turn out that those who had the urge have also not paid radio and television for the election campaign.

And here it is December. The whole world, in anticipation of Christmas, dances around the Christmas tree. We are dancing to different music: The government has stormed the parliament. It will never understand its debt to society, it is always fixed on the future, it promises the television chiefs that as soon as December 12 is over, we will assume all power and settle accounts, and we will go on, and everything will become splendid, and we will begin to live, will flourish, and the gardens will break into blossom. Alas, we have not started to live, and

things turned out to the contrary. Those who promised did not seize power. Totally other people seized power.

And how do things stand with the money? Where is it? The money in the amount of 67 billion in the national Russian currency? It should already have been turned over to the communications workers without delay. . . . They are also people—those who sit in the Russian steppes and hills far away from the large cities and service the relay stations, which transmit the signal from one region to the other, from one antenna to the other. And there are many such people—alone the departmental settlements of the Ministry of Communications, which arose for the servicing of the relay stations, come to 16,000 for Russia. And all the people there are without wages, and sometimes since the summer....

Where Is the Money? The Money Is Where?

I hope is in Gosbank, because it cannot but be there. But at the same time, I am afraid, it is not. And in the meantime January has passed. From the government, which was unable to see to it that budget money went where, in accordance with the law on the budget for 1993, it should go—from this government there remain only horns and legs. The guilty, as always, do not remain, since all the guilty turn into the aggrieved and, in accordance with Russian tradition, are not subject to further beating. Boris Fedorov—the former minister of finance, or, as it turned out, minister without finances and without rights to control these finances—it now appears had nothing to do with it. Sixteen thousand settlements continue to sit without money. Patience is being exhausted. The Ministry of Communications is trying to improve its situation at the expense of the weakest—for example, it is announcing price increases for its services for newspapers and journals, moreover such an increase that, if it takes place, the majority of them would die at once. The Ministry has calculated correctly and shrewdly: For newspapers the people today will already not go into the square, and it is not to be beaten to death, and even for a demonstration it cannot be assembled, these are no longer the times of Gorbachev.

But the journalists were able all the same to consolidate corporatively at that moment and some of them saved for themselves the old prices for the communications services. Although, of course, not for long. Another week passed by after the "good" papa-Chernomyrdin met with the indignant editors-in-chief of the leading publications and promised them to moderate the ardor of the communications workers, and peace for the newspaper all the same capsized: Quietly, without noise and ardor, the Ministry of Communications all the same raised the prices, but in a differentiated manner—for some threefold, for others fivefold, and still others tenfold. Thus, a mere branch ministry, nothing more, through economic methods effected a (political?) selection in the state.

And here February came flying. The debts for the signal as before were not paid. The communications workers are on the verge of a strike—they are not being paid their wages. Where are they to turn? They demand. They

threaten, they remember that they have in their hands the very knife-switch which can extinguish both sound and light. They engage in blackmail, which, of course, is very shameful. But what is to be done? . . . A month earlier they were blackmailed.

The Hour 'X' Is Announced

If you don't settle the accounts, the communications workers scream, you will read books in the evening—and nothing else: Including prime ministers and janitors. Immediately before the discontinuation of television and radio transmissions, Prime Minister Chernomyrdin urgently convenes a meeting. The architect of perestroika, Aleksandr Yakovlev, recently appointed as chief of the Federal Service for Television and Radio Broadcasting, comes, the Minister of Communications Vladimir Bulgak comes, for some reason pulled hastily out of a polyclinic from tests. We are on fire, they say. Although, it is clear, we have been on fire for several months running. Prime Minister Chernomyrdin speaks his weighty state word at the meeting and promises to settle the accounts. He sent for Minister of Finance Dubinin. Although he knows very well that there is nothing to pay with at the moment. Minister Dubinin declares that he will not pay—there is no money, even if your life depends on it. Would there not be a question to put to Minister Dubinin, for what, they say, do you divide the money? But the prime minister takes a different road.

The prime minister hammers out a telegram to all the communications workers of Russia and in a fatherly manner asks them, for the umpteenth time, to put themselves into the position of the poverty-stricken state. He asks not to touch the knife-switch, to leave to the people simply Mary and all the inhabitants of Santa Barbara. The prime minister gets up on his knees, as if he is old. . . . This produces an impression: Some people feel sorry for him, here and there they do not touch the knife-switch, but here and there they nevertheless turn off the knife-switch, and there a panic begins. It seized even the northern capital—for a whole day St. Petersburg did not see and hear anything from Moscow, and many decided that again a social cataclysm had occurred.

The prime minister enters into a strict agreement with the minister of finance that the debts will be paid gradually during the first quarter. But this, too, is some kind of improbable oddity—for the time being, they are talking only about settlement of the accounts for the last year. Up to now they are not talking about the debts for January and February, which it was time to clear off long ago.

For What Are They Hoping THERE?

This, perhaps, is the only question in this story which one does not even need to try to answer proceeding from the classic laws of logic. Finale. Realm of fantasy [zapredel]. Anarchy. There is no money to be had anywhere. However, they will nevertheless take it from somewhere.

And in very large quantities. And not for the poverty-stricken service personnel of the relay stations, but for quite different purposes. In the evening of the same day when Chernomyrdin hammered out the telegram, First Vice Premier Oleg Soskovets visited Oleg Poptsov, head of VGTRK [All-Russia State Television and Radio Company], at Yamskoye Pole (Russian Channel). Why? They talk about various things. We will refer only to an, in our view, very correct opinion, because it belongs to a very interested person from among Poptsov's deputies. That evening they brought Mr Soskovets to Shabolovka, where the old historical television center is located, which the Russian Channel acquired some time ago. They showed Soskovets the unfinished building, and an oral agreement was reached to the effect that VGTRK, Poptsov's fiefdom, above all, falls under the patronage, and this means, the financing of the Russian government. But, you see, they screamed that there is a financial abyss, and they shed tears. . . . However, it is necessary to understand that these will be enormous expenditures for the budget, comparable even with the dollars which they threatened to throw at the new palace for the new deputies. And in order for it to be built in accordance with the latest state of technology, as Soskovets and Poptsov agreed! And in order for the installations to be like those at CNN! We would very much like to know this. Again precisely budget matters.

Up to now only one of the points of such financing is clear: The government apparently decided to stop fattening "Ostankino" and to finance only its information service, and to give all the remaining time to the [air] waves of private business—in the disposition of independent television studios and companies. Strictly speaking, this is not a bad thing and remarkable; what arouses attention is only the fact that the government for the umpteenth time has forgotten to consult with the taxpayers, who are directly involved in the formation of budget funds.

Again About Totalitarianism

It, the accursed demon, is directly related to this story, too. The point is that those very relay stations with which the communications workers are blackmailing in order to receive what is theirs are the most essential stronghold of totalitarianism.

It turned out that the civilized world already for a long time watches television and listens to radio without any "fools," it has no need for settlements abandoned a little farther from human habitation. The world uses satellites. This has proved to be more ecological and incomparably cheaper than the daily servicing of relay stations. A satellite is only expensive to make and to launch, then everything is simpler. But in the USSR, as is well known, they did not think about cheapness, and even less about ecology, they talked about the fact that everything must be listened to that can be listened to, and that everything must be suppressed that should be suppressed out of ideological considerations. The archaic relay stations, which during the time of the Soviets went through more

for the KGB agency than for any other and which now require such financial infusions as not a single modern television company would dream of, precisely corresponded to the system of total control of the conscience of people.

In connection with what has been set forth above, the next question arises: Perhaps, all of us will have to pull ourselves together, Mr Chernomyrdin, one last time, and launch the necessary number of satellites, in order for us to have everything like people [elsewhere], in order for 16,000 settlements, like the repressed, not to complain in the windy steppes, and in order for the future to be without relay stations? I would very much like to hear an answer.

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

Tatarstan/RF Treaty Given Positive Assessment

*944F0425A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 25 Feb 94 p 3*

[Article by Rais Tuzmukhamedov and Vladimir Pustogarov, doctors of legal sciences, under rubric "Opinion": "Victory, Divided Equally: Treaty Between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Tatarstan as an Act of International Law"]

[Text] The date of 15 February 1994 became a landmark in the history of relations between Moscow and Kazan, since, for the first time since Russia seized the Kazan khanate in the middle of the sixteenth century, a treaty was concluded between the new RF [Russian Federation] and the new RT [Republic of Tatarstan], a treaty that was based, as is stated in its preamble, on "the generally recognized right of nations to self-determination, on principles of the completely equal and voluntary expression of free will."

This treaty is a compromise, just as any agreement is, whether it be in everyday life, at the domestic state level, or in international relations. But it is a compromise that preserves the sovereignty of both sides. They have divided, in a sovereign manner, the powers in a new unification. Inasmuch as, according to Minister Sergey Shakhrai, one of the chief representatives of the Russian side, as quoted in a ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA interview, "the methodology of the Federative Treaty formed the basis of the document," we shall refer to that act and compare what was put in whose jurisdiction by that act.

A number of areas of behavior, including some extremely important ones, that were ascribed in the Federative Treaty to the sphere of the joint jurisdiction of the Center and the subjects of the Federation have now been firmly established as being within the exclusive, that is, sovereign, jurisdiction of Tatarstan. They include, for example, "questions of the possession, use, and disposal of the land, mineral wealth, the water, timber, and other natural resources, as well as the state enterprises, organizations, and other movable and

immovable property situated on the territory of the Republic of Tatarstan." We might note, incidentally, an extremely important principle that has been established: the topic being discussed is the "exclusive property owned by the people of Tatarstan," rather than "by the state" (read: the state bureaucracy), as is frequently written in RF acts.

According to the Treaty, Tatarstan itself has the right to resolve questions of the bar and notary practices, and to carry out the legal regulation of administrative, family, and housing relations, and relations in the area of environmental protection and use of natural resources. Tatarstan itself establishes the system of the republic's state agencies, and the procedure for organizing them and for carrying out their activities. Like any other sovereign state, Tatarstan itself resolves questions of republic citizenship. The republic itself forms its budget, establishes and collects taxes, and independently carries out foreign-economic activity; resolves questions of conversion at enterprises that are part of the republic's state property; creates the National Bank; concludes agreements with foreign states; participates in international organizations, etc. These and other exclusive powers and sovereign rights correspond to the Tatarstan Constitution, which has firmly established the state sovereignty of the Republic of Tatarstan.

It is fundamentally important that the documents that are recognized as the legal basis of the treaty are the constitutions of both states. Legally this means not only the paramount importance and the priority of the norms and principles of the two constitutions and of each of them, but also the fact that, when interpreting the treaty, each side primarily proceeds from its own Constitution and coordinates its point of view with the Constitution of the other participant in the Treaty.

For those who, in 1991, adopted the Declaration of the State Sovereignty of Tatarstan, who, in March 1992, in a referendum voted for the republic's sovereignty, and who subsequently, on the basis of that referendum, developed and adopted, in November 1992, the Constitution of the sovereign state of Tatarstan, something that must be of substantial importance is the fact that the treaty, as is stated in its preamble, is the "completely equal unification of two states," and that this unification occurred on the basis of the constitutions both of Russia and Tatarstan, as well as the principles enumerated in the treaty itself. The treaty is an agreement between sovereign states and the subjects of international law. This is not stated in the text. But that essence of the act is self-evident, primarily on the basis of the sense of the name and text of the agreement. It is called: "Treaty Between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Tatarstan." That means an agreement between two sovereign states (Article 1 in both constitutions). This is also mentioned in the preamble, where it is directly stated that the Republic of Tatarstan unites with the Russian Federation "as a state."

Furthermore, the treaty was signed at the highest level—by chiefs of state. The sovereignty of the contracting parties as entities in international law is also attested to by the subject of the agreement. It pertains to the delimitation of the authoritative powers, that is, the powers that are inherent in state sovereignty, since sovereignty is a category of authority.

The fact that the treaty is an act in international law, that is, an agreement between two subjects of international law, also evolves completely obviously from the fact the contracting parties indicated as their legal basis their own constitutions—each of them unambiguously established the quality of a sovereign state that is based on the sovereignty of the multiethnic people of those countries (Articles 1 and 3 of the RF Constitution; preamble and Articles 1, 2, and 61 of the RT Constitution).

Sergey Shakhrai, RF minister of nationalities and regional policy, stated in the interview that was previously mentioned that "this treaty is not subject to ratification, in order not to create the illusion of being a document in international law." But ratification is a completely unmandatory attribute of the nature of the treaty as a document in international law. This depends upon how the contracting parties come to an understanding. Another matter is that the treaty distributes the sovereign powers within the framework of the unification of the two contracting parties that is created by them.

Sergey Shakhrai said, "From the point of view of international law and state law, this (the signing of the treaty and Tatarstan's consent to participate in elections to the Federal Assembly) means the recognition of the federal electoral law and sovereignty of Russia." If the minister, by his use of the word "recognition," means not the assertion of the existence of Russia's sovereignty, but the subordination of Tatarstan to the sovereignty of the RF, then the very preamble of the treaty begins with words to the effect that the contracting parties are guided not only by the RF Constitution, but also equally by the RT Constitution, and that they are proceeding from the "generally recognized right of nations to self-determination, on principles of the completely equal and voluntary expression of free will", etc. Incidentally, the nation of Tatarstan also expressed its self-determination unambiguously not only in March 1992, but also during the April 1993 referendum and during the referendum on the new RF Constitution.

Gavriil Popov and Fedor Burlatskiy, in a Dialogue broadcast on 19 February, did justice to the political wisdom of President Mintimer Shaymiyev and the endurance of President Boris Yeltsin, who justly divided the victory (it is only in such an instance that it is indeed a victory) equally between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Tatarstan.

Finally, we would like to direct attention to the fact that the Treaty text contains four references to agreements between the contracting parties. As is well known, there

are more than ten of them. It must be assumed that these agreements will also become accessible to the public. That would help to make a better evaluation of the historical nature of the role and limits of the importance of a treaty that is so important for Russia and Tatarstan.

Tatarstan Prime Minister's Moscow Trip

944F0429A Kazan RESPUBLIKA TATARSTAN
in Russian 10 Mar 94 p 1

[Release of the Republic of Tatarstan Cabinet of Ministers' Press Center: "Interstate Agreement in Action"]

[Text] Tatarstan Prime Minister M.G. Sabirov visited Moscow from 28 February to 5 March. He conducted negotiations with Chairman of the Russian Government V.S. Chernomyrdin, during which they discussed issues associated with the realization mechanism for the recently signed interstate agreement "On Delineation of Subjects of Jurisdiction and Mutual Delegation of Powers Between Organs of State Authority of the Russian Federation and the Organs of State Authority of the Republic of Tatarstan." The heads of the governments emphasized the need to concentrate joint efforts of state organs, ministries, and agencies of Russia and Tatarstan on a more effective use of all the potential built into this document, which is of great importance for both states.

During the meeting between Prime Minister M.G. Sabirov and Russian Minister of Defense P.S. Grachev, both republics' defense and security issues were discussed. Articles of the intergovernment agreement between the Republic of Tatarstan and the Republic of Tatarstan in the military sphere were brought into concordance. This twelfth agreement, which had been envisaged in the course of preparation of the interstate treaty, was ratified on 5 March by Chairman of the Government of Russia V.S. Chernomyrdin and Tatarstan Prime Minister M.G. Sabirov.

At the center of attention of the negotiations that took place between Tatarstan Prime Minister M.G. Sabirov and First Deputy Chairman of the Russian Government O.N. Soskovets were issues of the state of the oil production and oil refining industries, and the situation in Tatarstan's military industrial sector.

Prime Minister M.G. Sabirov and Central Bank of Russia Chairman V.V. Gerashchenko discussed issues associated with the mechanism of implementing the agreement on the powers of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Tatarstan in the area of banking, monetary-financial, and foreign currency policy, which had been signed by the leadership of the Governments of Russia and Tatarstan, as well as by V.V. Gerashchenko, the chairman of the Central Bank of Russia, and by Ye.B. Bogachev, chairman of the National Bank of Tatarstan.

The issue of future cooperation in the area of developing the agro-industrial complexes of Russian and Tatarstan, preparation for the spring field work, and allocation of

credit resources were discussed during the negotiations between M.G. Sabirov and Deputy Chairman of the Russian Government A.Kh. Zaveryukha. Tatarstan Minister of Agriculture and Food F.S. Sibagatullin took part in the negotiations.

Prime Minister M.G. Sabirov took part in the expanded session of the Russian Federation Government on the subject of the state of the Russian economy and the prospects of its development this year.

Tatarstan Bank Reviews 1993, Plans for 1994

944F0446A Kazan RESPUBLIKA TATARSTAN
in Russian 16 Mar 94 p 1

[Article by Ye. Taran: "The Stockholders of Tatpromstroybank Did Not Miscalculate"]

[Text] The news that the joint-stock industrial construction bank of development of the Republic of Tatarstan (Tatpromstroybank) was among the top 100 banks of Russia for the second time in a row (it is the only representative of Tatarstan financial institutions on the rating chart) arrived just in time—a conference of the stockholders of Tatpromstroybank convened yesterday at which the results of last year's operation were summarized and reference points for the current year were charted.

Rafael Mingazov, chairman of the bank's board of directors, had no reason to be ashamed in front of the founders and stockholders when presenting his report on the work accomplished. The bank's balance sheet turnover, total assets, and credit deposits increased fivefold. While bank profits grew twice as fast as the volume of credit extension, increasing by a factor of 11. In the words of R. Mingazov, the bank succeeded in achieving this primarily by accelerating monetary turnover, not by setting high rates for credit.

The reliability and prestige of Tatpromstroybank is confirmed by the fact that more than 2,000 enterprises and entrepreneurs became its clients last year and 17,000 individuals became depositors.

As we know, it was decided at the previous stockholder conference to increase the bank's authorized capital to R1.5 billion. In July of last year this task was accomplished, and towards the end of 1993 the authorized capital of Tatpromstroybank had grown to R3 billion. The bank directors have proposed to the stockholders that the level of authorized capital be raised to R10 billion, especially since the Russian Federation Central Bank adopted a resolution establishing the minimum amount of capital at R2 billion, to be increased over the course of five years to R10 billion.

Tatpromstroybank's borrowers are predominantly state enterprises. They account for more than 63 percent of the credits, mainly short-term credits. Long-term credits increased fourfold in terms of absolute amount, but their rate of growth decreased. This is explained by virtue of

the overall crisis in the economy and the striving of bank directors to accelerate the turnover rate of resources. The share of long-term credits was reduced from 10 to 7 percent.

Nonetheless, R. Mingazov states that the bank saddled itself with obligations to distribute long-term resources for providing credits to the Yelabuga Motor Vehicle Plant and defense enterprises amounting to over R12 billion. The bank's income from these transactions is entirely minimal, however—3 percent annual interest.

In order to soften the blow inflicted upon enterprises by the nonpayments crisis, Tatpromstroybank has established direct corresponding accounts with 16 banks of the near abroad and 15 of the far abroad, which include financial enterprises of the United States, Germany, England, Switzerland, Turkey, and Korea. In order to regulate the use of ready cash in 1994, it is planned to introduce plastic cards for obtaining cash through automatic teller machines.

Kazan Housing Privatization Reviewed

944F0429B Kazan KAZANSKIYE VEDOMOSTI
in Russian 10 Mar 94 p 6

[Article by A. Ganeyeva: "More Millionaires Every Day"]

[Text] Privatization of housing in Kazan began three months ago. Over the elapsed time, this mechanism has been fine-tuned and now is working almost without a glitch. The city authorities have managed over an extremely short period of time to put together a legislative base—the basis for the conduct of privatization; to set up a powerful computer network linked to the main computer in the city agency for housing privatization, which gave the city the necessary information on the process of transferring housing to private hands. The agency, created at the end of November of last year, practically began its operation at the time that housing privatization got its start—on 6 December.

According to the agency's data, which were provided to us by its chief, Yevgeniy Tokarchuk, as of 5 March 4,430 apartments had been privatized in Kazan, which comprises 3.5 percent of all city housing subject to privatization by law. In Kazan's Baumanskiy Rayon, 273 persons received contracts transferring housing to private ownership; in Sovetskiy Rayon—1,083, Vakhitovskiy—572, Privolzhskiy—936, Moskovskiy—934, Leninskiy—1,220, and Kirovskiy—368.

More than 9,500 applications for housing privatization already have been submitted. Now in the housing maintenance organizations, waiting for its owners who apparently had not expected to get all [lines missing].

Instead of the period of one month envisaged by the law for a contract to be issued after the application is submitted, in Baumanskiy, Sovetskiy, and Moskovskiy Rayons the processing period for housing privatization documents has been reduced to 10 or at most 16 days. In

Leninskiy and Privolzhskiy Rayons, however, which are experiencing some computer problems, contracts are issued a month after the application is submitted.

Time begets new problems: refusal to privatize after the contract has already been processed. People had submitted applications to housing maintenance offices, and then changed their mind. Ye. Tokarchuk's comment on this situation was that they explain their change of mind by open threats of extortion. For instance, quarrels have already begun in some families, and canceling the contract in this situation is the best way out of the situation. Quite possibly, some of soon to be property owners have run into those who already own it and have realized that it is better at this point to keep living in a state-owned apartment.

The pace of housing privatization in the city has stabilized. Looking at the December data, at the time more than 1,000 applications a week were coming in; in January, the number dropped to 800, and in February—600 a week. According to the latest data from the agency, now about 650-700 applications are coming in every week. Ye. Tokarchuk noted that city residents are not well informed on the terms, rules, and advantages of housing privatization. People ask the most elementary questions. The most often asked is whether they may have to pay more for a privatized apartment.

"We have to explain patiently that payments for a privatized apartment remain the same," Ye. Tokarchuk tells us, "while the property tax amounts to only 0.1 percent of the book value of the cost of the housing as of 1 January 1994; that the tax is paid once a year in November-December, and inflation will make the amount of the tax rather modest. Besides, some categories of citizens are exempt from property taxes altogether."

Many questions are asked regarding residence permits as applied to privatized housing. People ask about the procedures of willing apartments as inheritance, giving them as a gift, and buying and selling.

Generally, however, the city agency's main tasks are not in answering people's questions. The agency represents the main link in the chain of housing privatization departments under heads of rayon administrations; it has been set up under the head of the Kazan administration. [Line missing] of privatization is computerized. One of the agency's main functions is to monitor compliance with the law. The main computer located at the agency checks whether the housing unit indicated in the application is subject to privatization. As is known, it is against the law to take possession of decrepit housing or housing assigned as part of one's official position. There are restrictions on apartment privatization in buildings that represent historic and architectural landmarks. The dispassionate machine also picks up facts of multiple residence permits and repeat privatization by the same person.

The main computer also assigns a registration number to all contracts transferring housing into private ownership. Each rayon has its own code, but the city keeps its own integrated registration. Therefore, the registration number consists of a code and a sequential number.

In addition, the agency monitors the work schedule and operations of housing maintenance offices and rayon housing privatization departments and conducts planned weekly audits.

As to the concrete results of the city agency's work, over these three months three incidents of multiple residence permits have been detected, and several precedents of attempts to privatize housing that by law is not subject to privatization. The privatization applications of all these persons were rejected.

According to fresh statistical data received in the agency through the computer network, local soviets' housing comprises 65.9 percent of all privatized housing, and 34.1 percent—housing previously owned by organizations. The city authorities had quite a few unpleasant moments dealing with reluctance and open sabotage on the part of enterprises that did not want to relinquish their housing to ownership of the people living in it. Now the situation has improved perceptibly, and enterprises that attempt at all costs to make their housing a part of their charter capital are few and far between. They have managed, however, to slow down privatization of enterprise-owned housing, which accounts for a lower share of such housing as compared to one owned by local soviets.

The main computer has a full picture of the attributes of the privatized housing. One-room apartments account for the greatest share of privatized housing (44.3 percent), followed closely by two-room apartments (37.6 percent), then three-room apartments—14.9 percent, and rooms in communal apartments—3.2 percent.

[Lines missing] cases become single or elderly people. Our state has deprived our elderly of the opportunity of leaving inheritance in a deposit book. Their life savings—3,000-5,000 rubles—have lost their value completely. Now, however, they have the opportunity to leave a million-ruble inheritance—an apartment—and the elderly want to take advantage of this right.

According to Ye. Tokarchuk, the results of analysis conducted by the service show that 3.5 percent of housing has now been privatized in Kazan; by the end of the year it will reach approximately 20 percent. In Russia during the first year also 10-12 percent of housing had been transferred to private ownership; now it is between 30 and 50 percent, depending on the region.

So far, housing privatization is proceeding here in the same way as in Russia, and only a few of us have had the chance to appreciate fully the right to own housing. However, a market in apartments is already emerging in the city, where enormous prices per square meter will lift the mood of owners of Kazan real estate.

Kabardino-Balkaria Soviet Chairman on Work Since Election

944F0411A Nalchik KABARDINO-BALKARSKAYA
PRAVDA in Russian 5 Feb 94 p 3

[Interview with Z. Nakhushiev, by I. Mezova, under rubric "Politics": "Zaurbi Nakhushiev: It's No Easy Life for the Speaker...: Interview With the Chairman of the Council of the Republic, of the KBR [Kabardino-Balkaria Republic] Parliament"]

[Text] [Mezova] Well, Zaurbi Akhmedovich, like the Council of the Republic, which you head, Parliament has been working for one and a half months. That's a short period of time, but certainly something has already been done. Precisely what?

[Nakhushiev] We were elected as deputies on 12 December, but have been working less than a month. That is linked basically with installing Parliament. Naturally, not much has been done so far. We are basically working for ourselves: we adopted Provisional Regulations, confirmed the makeup of commissions, and elected their chairmen. There is also another important document in our assets: KBR Law entitled "The Making of Amendments and Additions to the KBR Constitution (Basic Law)." The plan for the legislative activity of the Council of the Republic for the next two months is almost ready, so the house is approaching the finishing line for creating legislation.

Within the near future a commission to develop the draft of the KBR Constitution will be created. It would be a rather good idea to publish the draft in October in the mass media, and then, in November-December, to submit it for review by parliament. We are also engaged in preparing the republic's symbols—the seal, anthem, and flag. We already have final versions of the seal and flag for submittal to the President.

[Mezova] As an invited individual, you were present at the first session of the Council of the Federation. What were your impressions?

[Nakhushiev] Yes, for two days I was at sessions of the Council of the Federation. To tell the truth, it did not seem to me that discussions about the fact that the Council of the Federation is Boris Yeltsin's agency have sufficient foundation. The people who gathered in the house were the administrators of major enterprises in the defense industry, administration heads of krays and oblasts, Presidents, and well-known academicians—in general, people who can make their own judgments with regard to all questions pertaining to the vital activity of the Russian state, people who are strong personalities, professionally speaking. The fact that Shumeyko headed the Council of the Federation has a positive role. The house immediately went to work. Also, he has an excellent knowledge of the government's kitchen, so to speak, from the inside. It will be easier to cooperate with him.

[Mezova] Everyone says that the reforms will be rolled up. Is that correct?

[Nakhushhev] He (Vladimir Shumeyko) has stated frankly that we need supporters of the reforms that are being carried out by the government. In general, one thing is clear: the interaction between the Council of the Federation and the government will be good and stable.

[Mezova] Since we have touched upon this topic, you apparently know that both the RF [Russian Federation] Parliament and the KBR are predicting the fate of the pocket parliament. What do you think such suppositions are based on? What is your attitude toward them?

[Nakhushhev] I have already said that the Council of the Federation produced a favorable impression on me. It seems to me that it will scarcely be a pocket parliament. Its makeup includes deputies who are rather independent and strong.

Nevertheless I agree that they definitely are predicting. These discussions are occurring and probably contain a share of truth. But still the present Parliament is really not the Supreme Soviet, which used to engage in all state matters, and sometimes also usurped the functions of the executive power. It seems to me that these discussions are based on the fact that there has been a fundamental change in the functions and powers of the representative authority. Parliament will engage in the creation of legislation. It has retained the function of monitoring the execution of the laws and the executive power. In particular, it possesses powers concerning the expression of confidence or lack of confidence in Parliament. The budget is also in the joint jurisdiction of the houses.

[Mezova] Are you saddened that Parliament's powers have been narrowed?

[Nakhushhev] In the broad sense Parliament actually does not possess the previous completeness of power. But that is what the division of powers is. Currently it is simply that people have not yet become accustomed to this, but in two or three years, I am convinced, this situation will not surprise anyone.

Yes, we actually have been limited to a definite framework. Nevertheless, the Council of the Republic, like Parliament as a whole, will not be a pocket organization. I do not think that anyone, including the President, has an interest in this. We do not intend to cause any frictions in the interrelations with the other authorities. Each has its own functions and its own duties.

[Mezova] You probably are already rather well acquainted with the deputies in your house. Are you pleased with the makeup of the house? What would you change if that depended on you? What kind of specialists (or individuals) would you prefer to have more of in the Council of the Republic?

[Nakhushhev] I cannot say that this acquaintance is as profound or complete as I would like, but I am satisfied with the deputy corps. People of different ages, with

different knowledge and work experience, are represented in it. There are lawyers, entrepreneurs, three former school directors... I view their working ability optimistically. I hope that in a year our deputies who are working on a professional basis will actually become professionals. If, of course, we work...

[Mezova] Do you mean that Parliament might be broken up or disbanded?..

[Nakhushhev] No, no. If we work on ourselves.

[Mezova] In the house there actually are people who evoke curiosity. But am I correct in saying that it does not contain, for example, any clearly expressed radicals?

[Nakhushhev] Apparently not. But I am completely happy with this makeup, although we do not have any people who are as well known in the republic as the Council of Representatives has. However, we do have people who are very interesting, and who evoke, as you have said, genuine curiosity.

[Mezova] In general, how do you imagine the ideal parliamentarian? Do you see him in any concrete way—in the present makeup of the Parliament or the former VS [Supreme Soviet], the present or former Parliament of the RF, or even the USSR?

[Nakhushhev] I am not confident that I am speaking about the finished image of the ideal parliamentarian, but, in my view, he is a restrained individual, who is very tactful and highly cultivated. It is not mandatory that he have several higher degrees. But he must also be consistent, competent, and be able to speak laconically and expressively. He must be a democrat in the true sense of the word, and an aristocrat at heart. Incidentally, in our house I see several persons who promise to become this kind of parliamentarian in the future.

[Mezova] Could you name them?

[Nakhushhev] I shall not anticipate events. Nor shall I name real ones who have already distinguished themselves. Although, to tell the truth, I was not enraptured either by Sobchak or Popov, or even Sakharov, even at those times when everyone was delighted by them. At first I was irritated even by Yevdokiya Gayer. Do you remember that small woman? Then I learned to respect her, because it was obvious that she was speaking in a meaningful way and was genuinely experiencing what she was talking about and what she felt for her people.

[Mezova] There have been a lot of discussions about the powers assigned to the houses. For example, certain deputies of the Council of Representatives assume that it would make sense to return to a division of them. What do you think? Which powers that are, in your opinion, the prerogative of the Council of the Republic have gone to the other house, or vice versa?

[Nakhushhev] When each deputy was elected, he knew about his powers according to the Statute that had been confirmed by the President of the republic. Each one

know where he would be going and what he would engage in. Today people cannot engage in pulling the blankets over themselves. God willing, each one will be able to cope with his powers. I feel that our house has not been insulted by anyone. We have even shared a lot of them with the Council of Representatives with regard to confidence or lack of confidence in the Government. We also discuss the budget jointly. We have the responsibility for its initial review. There have been recommendations concerning the creation of joint commissions. They are, of course, necessary, but not too many of them. Why, then, was it necessary to divide parliament into two houses? Especially since that house is operating on an unrelieved basis, and it will not be convenient to convoke them each time. Everyone, so to speak, has his job to do, so let each person pull his own wagon honestly.

[Mezova] People say that the parliament is being specially evicted from Government House allegedly to emphasize that the representative power is currently out of favor and is no match for the executive power. How would you comment on that?

[Nakhushhev] First, no one is evicting us. Second, I do not know that it is mandatory anywhere for the powers to be situated together. I do not think that it is worse for Parliament to have its own accommodations...

[Mezova] Rather nice...

[Nakhushhev] If not fashionable. The building that housed the former Nalchik Gorkom of the CPSU, and that is being offered to us, is the second building in prestige after Government House. True, it will be slightly crowded for Parliament, and therefore a plan for expanding the building has been prepared.

As for whether or not the representative power is a match for the executive, I have already said earlier that everyone should engage in his own job, and the better he performs it, the more everyone wins.

[Mezova] The British Parliament, which is the ancestor of many parliamentary traditions, also gave birth to the job of speaker, which is already more than 600 years old. At first the speaker acted there in the role of the mouthpiece of the House of Commons. His basic purpose was to regulate order in conducting debates and in guaranteeing justice. In our conditions the speaker is assigned several other powers. What do you think they should consist of?

[Nakhushhev] I shall answer your question this way: the role of the speaker today is identical to the role of Parliament, and we have already touched upon that topic. Another important factor is the specifics that pertain to our republic. In general, at the present time, having worked a certain period of time, I can say that it's no easy life for the speaker, just as, incidentally, it's no easy life for the deputy.

[Mezova] Do you think that the two houses of the KBR Parliament will maintain stable, even, professional interrelations?

[Nakhushhev] I feel that we have nothing to divide. Our tasks have been defined, and now it's simply a matter of executing them. Each house has been given its powers. The two chairmen are equal and independent of each other. I repeat that there will not be any frictions. We shall not allow them.

[Mezova] What kind of house would you like to see in a year or two? A professional one?

[Nakhushhev] A professional one that is self-assured. This also pertains to the chairman. I think that we shall grow together.

[Mezova] Just yesterday, speaking figuratively, you were not the last person in the system of the executive power. But today that power allows itself to look at you condescendingly. Doesn't this offend you? Can you say that you have won by changing your place of work?

[Nakhushhev] It surprises and... yes, it offends me. But, you know, I am not the kind of person who allows others to look at him condescendingly. I will growl, but if that becomes part of the system, I will simply leave...

To tell the truth, I do not know whether or not I won as a result of the new job. Time will tell...

Kabardino-Balkaria Procurator Reviews Year's Work
944F0410A Nalchik KABARDINO-BALKARSKAYA
PRAVDA in Russian 5 Feb 94 p 4

[Interview with Ruslan Ismelovich Abazov, procurator of Kabardino-Balkar Republic, by Z. Goplachev; date and place not given: "The Vigilance of the Procurator's Eye"]

[Text] January and February are the time for summing up the results of the previous year, including results in law enforcement agencies. The results of 1993 were summed up by the republic procuracy.

There was a thorough discussion of the procurators' performance in overseeing the enforcement of laws and securing the primacy of laws, the socioeconomic liberties of citizens, and the rights of the republic. Attention was focused on shortcomings in the work, unsolved problems, and the means of solving them.

Procurator R.I. Abazov of the Kabardino-Balkar Republic was interviewed a few days ago.

[Goplachev] Ruslan Ismelovich, attempts to evaluate the performance of law enforcement agencies in quantitative terms usually produce comparatively objective results. What can you tell us about some of the results of the past year, using these evaluations as a basis?

[Abazov] I want to start with the following comment. Everyone still remembers the tragic events of last year.

These events, which were caused by the confrontation between two branches of the federal government, certainly could have moved to the regional level. In our republic this was averted by the efforts of our leaders and the wisdom of the people living here. Now I will answer your question in more specific terms.

Procurators discovered 860 violations, challenged 289 unlawful legal instruments, and filed 251 reports for the elimination of these violations. They instituted 535 suits for 380 million rubles on behalf of state and public organizations and institutions.

[Goplachev] There is valid public concern about the rising crime rate in the economic sphere. I have a question about three aspects of this: the protection of state property and the violations committed during privatization and in foreign economic activity.

[Abazov] Equipment, vehicles, and other assets worth tens of millions of rubles fell into the hands of private firms and small enterprises as a result of the negligence of some administrators in maintaining state property and the late discovery of these incidents by municipal and rayon procurators. Cases of this were discovered at the Kabbalkproyektstroy Association, the Baksan Consumer Goods Combine, the Terskiy Meat and Dairy Product Combine, and other enterprises. Measures are being taken now to recover the illegally acquired state property. Procurators conducted 27 inspections of compliance with state and private property laws, discovered 118 violations, and filed 15 reports.

The inspection of compliance in the sphere of privatization was extremely productive. Although the republic managed to avoid "wholesale" privatization, around 30 violations were found and 18 reports were filed.

Decisions on the sale of state property or other forms of traffic in this property were frequently made without going through the proper channels. Municipal and rayon procurators did not have the necessary information about the state of legality in this sphere and could not influence the activities of the rayon committee for the management of state property in sufficiently effective ways.

A comprehensive inspection in an area as new to us as foreign economic activity produced positive results. We were able to draft specific proposals to improve the mechanism of foreign economic operations. Many enterprises and organizations engaged in this activity are not pursuing the goals that were set when they were founded: the attraction of advanced technology to the republic economy and the provision of the consumer market with adequate supplies of goods. The overwhelming majority of joint ventures and private firms are conducting trade and foreign economic operations not on a permanent and concrete basis, but in sporadic barter transactions, frequently ignoring the applicable limits imposed on export and interregional deliveries by authorized agencies, including the procuracy.

[Goplachev] How would you rate the state of republic agriculture?

[Abazov] The state of affairs in the republic agroindustrial complex is seriously disturbing. The theft and loss of products and the harvest are still widespread. Just last year around 9 000 head of cattle in the republic died or were stolen. Farms in Zolskiy, Sovetskiy, Chegemskiy, Urvanskiy, and Prokhladnenskiy rayons suffered the most damage. The measures procurators took were far from adequate: Only 37 suits for 1.5 million rubles in compensation were instituted for the dead cattle.

[Goplachev] How effective has procuracy intervention been in preventing violations of social laws?

[Abazov] Inspections revealed flagrant violations in the distribution of housing and telephones in Nalchik. The municipal procuracy knew about these cases but confined its response to filed reports. It was not until the republic procuracy intervened that suits were instituted to invalidate orders and evict citizens from illegally occupied apartments. The republic procuracy lodged the necessary protests with the Nalchik municipal administration, and dozens of citizens lost their illegally installed telephones.

[Goplachev] How are things with regard to felonies?

[Abazov] Regrettably, I have nothing good to report to the readers of KABARDINO-BALKARSKAYA PRAVDA. Although the overall crime rate was relatively stable (0.6 percent below the 1992 figure), there has been an increase in felonies in the republic, including homicide (+57.4 percent), the intentional infliction of serious bodily injury (+18.6 percent), rape and attempted rape (+60.5 percent), mugging (+55.6 percent), and vandalism (+52.2 percent). The number of these crimes has risen in all cities and rayons in the republic. They now account for 17.9 percent of all crimes.

In all, 7,681 crimes were reported in the republic. An increase in crime was recorded in Prokhladnenskiy, Terskiy, Urvanskiy, Mayskiy, Chegemskiy, and Sovetskiy rayons.

Last year was marked by an unprecedented rise in the homicide rate (from 61 to 96 cases). Furthermore, one out of every three has not been solved.

The number of homicides increased most dramatically in Nalchik—from 19 to 42 (+121 percent); 17 of these, or 40.4 percent, have not been solved. There were more homicides in Terskiy, Urvanskiy, Mayskiy, Chegemskiy, Zolskiy, and Sovetskiy rayons.

The rise (73.1 percent) in the number of crimes committed with the use of loaded firearms (one out of every three homicides) is particularly disturbing. The weapons generally come from outside Kabardino-Balkaria, which still has "transparent" borders, despite the presence of checkpoints on access roads from adjacent territories.

[Goplachev] How vigilant is the procurator's eye in discovering wrongful dismissals of criminal cases?

[Abazov] Last year procurators discovered 135 crimes which were removed from police records by the issuance of unlawful decisions to drop criminal charges. Procurators filed 173 reports on the violations, leading to disciplinary actions against 109 officials. The oversight of criminal cases by the procuracy, however, was also inadequate. This is attested to by the increasing number of dismissed cases. Procuracy personnel dismissed 30.4 percent of all cases. This is an impermissible luxury.

[Goplachev] Children are also involved in crime....

[Abazov] The overall rate of juvenile crime has decreased by 5 percent. There was an increase in Nalchik and in Prokhladnenskiy, Zolskiy, Sovetskiy, and Chegemskiy rayons. There are still too many cases in which juveniles are framed for crimes. A case in Nalchik is a good example: When the 9-year-old Karatsukov was "railroaded" for 10 thefts of personal property, including such items as a television set, a rug measuring 3 x 4 meters, and a crate of champagne, no one even wondered how this "miscreant" could have carried these items.

[Goplachev] The procuracy presses charges, and the criminal is convicted. Then what happens?

[Abazov] The punishment is usually left up to the courts, but the penalty is not always administered in a timely or satisfactory manner, and laws are sometimes broken during this phase. The group overseeing corrective labor institutions and the procurators conducted 87 inspections and filed 33 reports on the results. There are still numerous violations of prisoners' rights in camps No 1 and No 3, leading to the commission of crimes, and the absence of work precludes corrective labor.

There was an excessively formal approach to the oversight of the activities of the corrective labor institutions department of the republic Ministry of Internal Affairs, where standards were relaxed and other violations were committed. These led to the mass disturbances in March. Then the case of the suspect who had been held illegally for eight months came to light in December. The procuracy lodged a protest and the guilty parties were punished.

[Goplachev] Did the economic reform affect your work?

[Abazov] The intensification of economic reform and the democratic changes in the society transferred the protection of the interests of economic entities and the majority of civil rights to the jurisdiction of arbitration boards and people's courts, increasing their workload and, consequently, the possibility of judicial error.

This called for intense work by the Division of Civil Suit Oversight and by local procurators. The effectiveness of the appeals process to protest unlawful rulings was improved slightly.

[Goplachev] Is the procuracy involved in the exoneration of victims of political repression?

[Abazov] In accordance with the requirements of the Law "On the Exoneration of Victims of Political Repression," the republic procuracy has worked with security and internal affairs agencies to restore the reputation of innocent victims. The files of 422 people were reviewed. Decisions on exoneration were made in 289 cases. The majority of exoneration orders have not been delivered yet, however, and have not been requested, despite the coverage of the review of these cases on radio and television and in the press.

[Goplachev] What can you tell us about your personnel problems?

[Abazov] Six of the ten municipal and rayon procurators are serving their second constitutional term. Last year three staff members of procuracy agencies were elected to the republic Constitutional Court and two were elected to the Kabardino-Balkar Parliament. We are proud of this. Ten staffers were promoted to higher offices after their performance evaluations.

I would like to discuss two extremely important personnel problems we cannot solve without considerable assistance from the republic leadership and the Procuracy General. One is the urgent need for a new building or new premises for the republic procuracy, because our staff is several times the size it was when our present building was designed. Besides this, our staff was increased by another 23 positions in the new year. The distinctive features of our work, particularly our investigative work, require each inspector to have an office of his own, but our present offices have to be shared by two or three people. Meanwhile, the Nalchik municipal procuracy does not even have a building of its own and half of its staff has to do its work in a residential building. We also have no facility for meetings of the whole staff.

Problems in securing housing for procuracy personnel have not been solved either, especially in the city of Nalchik. The Law "On the Procuracy in the Russian Federation" says that the local administration must supply procuracy personnel requiring better living conditions with the appropriate living area as soon as possible, or within six months in the case of newly appointed personnel. We have not received a single apartment in the city of Nalchik in recent years, although one out of every three members of our staff needs one.

[Goplachev] What would you like to say in conclusion?

[Abazov] I want to express satisfaction with the adoption of the constitutions of the Russian Federation and Kabardino-Balkar Republic at the end of last year and the beginning of this year. These exceptionally important documents will serve as a sound legal foundation for the stabilization of economic and political conditions and reinforce the legal system and the administration of justice. The individual has been granted broader rights and freedoms.

The Constitution reaffirmed the organizational principle of the procuracy as a single centralized system. Edicts of the Russian Federation president assigned the procuracy the functions of coordinating the activities of law enforcement agencies in the fight against crime and granted our personnel various types of social protection.

We will evaluate our own performance from the standpoint of the requirements engendered by these changes.

Kabardino-Balkaria MVD Views 1993 Achievements
944F0413A Nalchik KABARDINO-BALKARSKAYA
PRAVDA in Russian 10 Feb 94 p 3

[Article by the press service of KBR [Kabardino-Balkaria Republic] MVD: "MVD: Year's Results"]

[Text] The results of the work performed by the internal affairs agencies in 1993 attest to the fact that the crime situation in republic as a whole is being monitored.

During the past year 7681 crimes were recorded in the republic. This is 0.6 percent less than during the preceding year.

There was a drop in the number of crimes committed on the streets and in other public places (decrease by 8 percent); and in thefts of state property (decrease by 5 percent) and personal property (decrease by 10 percent). A larger number of economic crimes (increase by 68.7 percent) were revealed, including an increase in heinous crimes by a factor of 3.6.

Definite positive shifts were achieved in a very important work indicator—the revealing of crimes. As compared with 1992, that indicator increased by 6 percent, including an increase by 6.4 percent in the rate of revealing of crimes of a general nature.

For purposes of improving the interaction with the internal affairs agencies of the Chechen, Ingush, and North Ossetinian republics, a coordination conference was held with representatives of the internal affairs agencies of those republics, where specific joint measures were worked out for combatting interregional criminal groups, and for exposing and cutting off the channels for the distribution of firearms in the North Caucasus. During 1993, a total of 289 cases involving the illegal carrying, storage, purchase, manufacture, and sale of weapons, ammunition, or explosives were initiated. This is 73.1 percent more than in 1992, and the rate of exposing thefts of means of transportation increased by 5.3 percent.

Efforts were undertaken to intensify the fight against organized crime. In the course of implementing the tasks posed in the Decree of the KBR President, entitled "Measures to Intensify the Fight Against Organized Forms of Crime and Corruption," and the corresponding orders of the RF [Russian Federation] MVD, agencies in the republic revealed and brought to criminal responsibility 34 organized criminal groups, from which 49

firearms were confiscated, including 36 with rifled barrels. A total of 20 thefts on an especially large scale were established, and thefts with a total of approximately 1.5 billion rubles were prevented.

Eighteen persons were brought to criminal responsibility as a result of their corrupt ties, and two representatives of the state authority were removed from their jobs for the same reason.

There was an increase in the intensity of combatting the illegal turnover of narcotics. Eighty-five areas of wild hemp were destroyed; 195 persons were brought to criminal responsibility; and 213.5 kilograms of narcotic substances were confiscated (as compared with 90 kilograms in 1992).

The investigators' work had a higher rate of success.

There was a 3.5 percent decrease in the crime level in the subdivisions of the corrective affairs and social rehabilitation service, and jobs were found for the entire special contingent.

The situation improved somewhat on the republic's roads. There was a reduction (by 13.7 percent) in the committing of road-transportation incidents, and a reduction in the number of persons killed or injured.

At the same time, in a number of areas the republic's internal affairs agencies have not only shortcomings, but also unresolved problems. There has been an increase by 23 percent in the number of heinous crimes of a general criminal nature. They became especially widespread in Sovetskiy, Prokhlanskiy, Mayskiy, Chegemskiy, and Baksanskiy rayons, as well as in Promyshlennyy Rayon in the city of Nalchik. The exposure rate for this type of crimes remains low.

For purposes of reacting appropriately to the negative processes that have been occurring in the republic's economy, there was a quantitative and qualitative reinforcement of the subdivisions involved in fighting economic crimes, and an improvement in their interaction with other law-enforcement and monitoring agencies. In 1993, a total of 543 crimes of an economic nature were revealed. This is 64.5 percent more than the similar indicator in 1992; 251 heinous crimes were revealed—this is an increase by a factor of 3.6 as compared with the previous year. Attempts to commit thefts with the use of falsified letters of advice with a total of 2.34 billion rubles were thwarted. Six criminal groups of counterfeiters, consisting of a total of 26 persons, were detained. Counterfeit money with a total value of 16.2 million rubles was confiscated from them. Approximately 13 tons of stolen alcohol and 1400 bottles of counterfeit vodka were revealed. A considerable number of crimes (62 percent of the total of all crimes revealed) continue to be committed at economic institutions with the state form of ownership. A number of problems linked with this require resolution at the governmental level. In

particular, it is necessary to raise the question of creating under the government or the Ministry of Finance an independent auditing apparatus that would guarantee the execution of the instructions issued by the law-enforcement agencies. This is linked with the elimination of the departmental apparatuses, which creates serious complications when carrying out documentary audits of the economic and financial activity of enterprises where crimes are being committed, and without the existence of an official document from which, as a rule, criminal cases are not initiated. It is also necessary to enact normative documents that regulate the procedure for guaranteeing state monitoring of the proper use of the credit appropriations from the budget that are allocated to enterprises and organizations from the Russian budget, and to develop a statute governing the responsibility borne by officials for their illegal use. As a result of the large increase in the use of counterfeit banknotes and other securities and the removal since 1989 of reproduction equipment from projects in the resolution system, it would be desirable to develop and enact a document governing the procedure for the registration and functioning of print shops, companies involved in the manufacture of presses and stamps, and private individuals and legal entities having copying and reproduction equipment, and to take steps of a technical nature to increase the degree of protection of monetary denominations, especially with a value of from 5000 to 50,000 rubles.

There has been a re-examination of the organizational principles and tactics for conducting the patrol-post service and a search nature has been given to their operation.

Militia precinct inspectors revealed 26,326 administrative offenses. At the same time they eased up on the positions in such an important matter as the fight against drunkenness and alcoholism.

Improvement in the effectiveness of the operation of the GAI [State Motor Vehicles Inspectorate] was aided by the introduction of new informational-search systems. At the present time they make it possible to resolve completely the task of registering means of motor transportation. But it is necessary to raise the level of professional training among the GAI employees.

Despite the preventive steps being taken, in 1993 there was an increase in the number of registered fires (increase by 24.8 percent), the damages from which came to more than 167 million rubles. The main cause is the fact that the State Fire Inspectorate employees are insufficiently demanding and are lax in questions of reinforcing the fire-prevention methods at structures that are various forms of property, and also that there is weak monitoring of their work by the administrators of the fire and emergency rescue service.

There was a sharp decrease in the effectiveness of the work performed by the Administration of Nondepartmental Protection. And this is despite the fact that in 1993 the administration personnel rolls were augmented by 178 militiamen.

It must be admitted that the overwhelming majority of the personnel have been conscientiously executing their official duties, frequently displaying, in their fight against crime, high moral and professional qualities. In 1993 incentive awards were given to almost two-thirds of the personnel; three employees were awarded state decorations; Senior Lieutenant of Militia A. B. Bitsuyev was posthumously nominated for the Order of Personal Bravery. Nevertheless, the number of violations of legality that have been committed by employees remains high, as is attested to by instances of illegal detention, red tape methods, and other violations that were revealed.

In 1993 the number of registered illegal acts that were committed by citizens against militia employees increased by a factor of 6. For 566 of these incidents, the materials were sent to the court so that administrative measures could be applied to the violators; 16 criminal cases were initiated, 13 of which were linked with an attempt on the life of militia workers. During the past year three militia employees died as a result of these circumstances.

An extremely acute problem is the problem of providing the personnel with housing and with apartment telephones. A total of 933 MVD workers are in need of housing; 1520 employees do not have home telephones. A way out of the situation can be seen in the creation and implementation of a comprehensive long-range program that has been approved by the republic government and the RF MVD, for the social development of the republic's internal affairs agencies in the next two or three years.

The results of the operational service activities were analyzed in all the city rayon agencies, services, and subdivisions of the MVD, and specific measures to improve their operation have been planned. There are grounds for assuming that the execution of what has been planned will make it possible to achieve a considerable improvement in the public and political situation in the republic and to intensify the fight against crime. One would like to hope that these goals will be maintained by the political parties, public movements and associations, and the entire population of the republic.

Kabardino-Balkaria Justice Ministry Views Work of Courts

944F0366A Nalchik KABARDINO-BALKARSKAYA
PRAVDA in Russian 1 Feb 94 p 1

[Article by M. Kyasova: "KBR Judicial Body Presents Results"]

[Text] Last Friday the work results of the KBR [Kabardino-Balkaria Republic] People's Courts during the first half of 1993 were given at an extended meeting of the

Ministry of Justice board and the KBR Supreme Court Presidium. The KBR Minister of Justice, A. M. Batyrbekov, who gave a detailed report, noted the particular significance of the activity of the People's Courts under circumstances in which crime issues in the republic are becoming more complex. During the period in question, 7,681 crimes were committed, a significant portion of which were classified as grave offenses. The number of infractions related to narcotic substances increased by 63 percent. Persons convicted of crimes involving the use of firearms and ammunition totaled 132, while convictions for personal property theft grew by 12 percent. Also, 221 juveniles were brought to trial for various illegal acts. These statistics are more than just disconcerting, radical and decisive actions on the part of all law-upholding bodies are needed in order to turn the situation around and stop the rise in crime. How ready are our courts for this? As was explained, there is no simple answer. While giving proper due to the positive results attained in judicial proceedings, the minister of justice noted that the professional training and legal competence of certain judiciaries was cause for doubt. As a consequence there are delays, and dangerous criminals are released without consideration being given to the graveness of the crimes they have committed.

A. M. Batyrbekov directed the attention of those gathered to shortcomings in the work of the marshalls of the court, and noted the necessity of increasing efforts in the area of legal education.

The deputy chairman of the KBR Supreme Court and chairman of the Board for Criminal Proceedings, A. S. Gelyakhov spoke on an analysis of criminal cases based on data from appellate courts and courts with supervisory authority. In his opinion, the Mayskiy People's Court was deserving of the most praise, as it had not even had one judgement reversed; a statement that could not be made about the Nalchik Municipal Court (presided over by V. Vybornov), the rulings of which were cited as "least stable."

In the opinion of A. S. Gelyakhov, cases in which citizens are wrongfully convicted, and equally, those in which the guilty are acquitted, do not further judiciaries' authority, but give rise to justified social protest.

The acting KBR Supreme Court chairman, Georgiy Alekseyevich Mamilov paused to discuss neglect in how civil cases are being reviewed. According to his information, virtually every third ruling on these types of cases was reversed in appellate proceedings. Viewing this kind of regard for one's work unacceptable, Mamilov spoke in favor of conducting a review and immediately releasing judiciaries noted for neglect.

Chairmen of Municipal and Rayon People's Courts S. A. Klyuyeva (city of Prokhladnyy), V. T. Vybornov (city of Nalchik), I. Kh. Topalov (city of Zhalukonozhe), V. M. Khushtov (city of Terek), A. F. Khazhnagoyev (city of

Baksan), and several others talked about problems in need of attention, as well as their own views on how to resolve them.

The acting chief of the KBR MVD Investigation Directorate, Mukhamed Mussov answered a number of questions that arose during the exchange of opinions that took place, and pointed out the importance of close cooperation between judicial bodies, the militia, and the prosecutor's office.

We are all responsible for one thing, stressed KBR Minister of Internal Affairs Kh. A. Shogenov. He called on judiciaries to approach those who break the law and infringe upon the lives, honor and dignity of other men with the utmost strictness. In spite of differences of opinion on how to conduct the fight against crime, KBR Prosecutor R. I. Abazov said, the strategic focus of both judicial and law-upholding bodies is one and the same: to protect the population from criminal acts against them. It is in acknowledging this truth that we must proceed.

KBR Vice-President G. S. Gubin, having made a number of serious critical remarks directed at the the republic's courts, suggested the Minister of Justice demonstrate more consistency in selecting personnel and utilize the services of the qualifications commission more fully.

In spite of the impartial tone of the discourse, the finale was marked with a pleasant announcement. Gratitude was expressed for the results of the courts' work in 1993 and a monetary bonus was awarded in the sum of 100 thousand rubles by order of the republic minister of justice to the following judiciaries: A. A. Makoyev, L. A. Shapkinaya, V. S. Khashkutovaya, M. I. Olmezov, I. K. Borokov, L. A. Lesnykh, Kh. V. Kudryavtsevaya, V. B. Dogov, L. M. Martynovaya, G. I. Gorislavskaya, I. Kh. Topolov, B. Kh. Malbakhov.

KBR Prime Minister G. M. Cherkesov participated in the work of the meeting.

Kabardino-Balkaria Internal Affairs Ministry Holds Press Conference

944F0366B Nalchik KABARDINO-BALKARSKAYA
PRAVDA in Russian 3 Feb 94 p 2

[Article by Z. Malbakhova: "Situation Under Control: From an MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] Press Conference"]

[Text] A press conference took place in the assembly hall of the KBR [Kabardino-Balkaria Republic] Ministry of Internal Affairs. The republic's Minister of Internal Affairs, Kh. A. Shogenov, and his deputies: Chief of Criminal Militia M. Kh. Zhigunov; Investigation Directorate Chief M. Kh. Abrokov, Chief of Personnel Management V. S. Popov, and MVD agency leaders answered questions posed by journalists from newspapers, television and radio.

In a brief address, Kh. A. Shogenov presented the primary results of the previous year's progress. Most importantly, he said, in the overall fight against crime they managed to keep the situation under control, although there was no dramatic change for the better.

In 1993, 7,681 crimes were recorded. Analysis has shown, said the minister, that offenses under ordinary law decreased by four percent, street crime and apartment theft indices went down, auto break-ins decreased by 11 percent, and auto theft by 37.6 percent.

Kh. A. Shogenov noted that grave offenses, which grew in number during 1993 by 41.9 percent, were a cause for particular concern for the MVD. We are not satisfied with the work we have done, noted the minister. During the coming year we have a real opportunity for improvement.

Having noted that the number of homeless people on the streets has increased, and weapons have spread throughout the republic, a ZAMAN newspaper correspondent questioned the minister about how the MVD plans to combat these phenomena.

With a growth in the number of people out of work, the number of crimes will also increase, answered Kh. A. Shogenov. A big problem and a major task is to assist those previously convicted returning from detention camps to find employment. It is namely these people, unable to find a place for themselves in our society, who retrace their steps back to the world of crime.

The minister also stated that an average of 20 firearms are confiscated each day. Where they once originated in Abkhazia, firearms are now primarily coming from Ossetia, Ingushetia, and the Chechen Republic.

A second question asked by the newspaper ZAMAN touched upon the MVD's work on repatriating the Balkarian people.

The ministry's work on this issue was acknowledged by its leader as being most productive. In no republic is activity of its kind proceeding at such a rapid pace as in Kabardino-Balkaria.

In response to a question posed by a KABARDINO-BALKARSKAYA PRAVDA newspaper journalist about how much organized crime rings have decreased this year over last, the minister said that there are no exact figures as to their overall number because the rings themselves have an unstable character. One of the reasons the fight against organized crime has not yet taken on an offensive posture is that the main MVD department handling this type of work is understaffed.

There are three stages of combating organized crime. The first is to gain knowledge and control of such groups, and break them up. The second is to arrest and try, and the third is to execute. In 1993 several members of organized crime rings were executed. Several others were put out of commission, convicted, or are under investigation.

"Where is the counterfeit money in the republic originating?" In a response to this question posed by SEVERNY KAVKAZ, it was said that the "goods" were primarily being brought in from the Chechen and Ingush Republics. Quite recently 75 million counterfeit rubles were discovered in the city of Prokhladny. Three women were among those dealing in the latter.

The range of problems touched upon at the press conference was quite broad. The newspaper SINDIKA INFORM reproached the forms and methods of work applied by the MVD when ethical norms for behavior are ignored. The republic minister of internal affairs replied that the militia is a part of society, which reflects the trends and processes occurring in society as a whole. However, he said, at present it has become possible to cease recruiting employees, and implement a selection process that will invariably help to put the best people in the job.

A SOVIETSKAYA MOLODEZH correspondent asked about an incident during the MVD's pursuit of the criminal Malkanduyev in the Volnyy Aul region, when one of the people involved in the chase, A. Iritov, was injured from an explosion. The minister explained that the incident was the result of an accident, and that the ringleader was not successfully apprehended. However, another well known criminal, Bashiyeu, nicknamed "Spartak" was arrested and is being examined.

"How is the MVD combatting racketeering?" This question was given by a republic radio journalist.

If enterprise leaders, from whom criminals extort huge sums of money, turn to us for help, as did the chemical plant "Iskoz", they will in the future be protected from these types of offenses. However, we have no pity for those leaders who allow themselves to be led around by racketeers. We know the reasons why these people do not turn to the militia for help.

"The figures for auto theft are quite high in our republic. What is being done in this regard?" asked a radio broadcast journalist.

Success in this area of our work, as perhaps in no other, said Chief of Criminal Militia M. Kh. Zhigunov, depends on coordination and close cooperation between agencies. At the present time a new subdivision is being created which will serve to coordinate this type of MVD activity.

"Could the Ministry of Internal Affairs give its own answer as to why it is virtually impossible to obtain credits at the bank? After all, large sums are being appropriated to fill this need." A KABARDINO-BALKARSKAYA PRAVDA correspondent touched upon this problem.

In giving an explanation, the chief of the MVD Directorate for Economic Crimes, Yu. Kokov, said that virtually all credit resources at commercial banks are, in one form or another, state funds. The latter is comprised

of centralized credits from the bank of Russia, deposit funds from enterprises and organizations, and the free balance in accounts, with the exception of the small portion which comes from the population.

However, bank employees do not carefully review letters of guarantee or insurance coverage. They do not verify the reliability or credit worthiness of clients, their guarantors, or even the existence of firms themselves.

There have been incidents in which nonexistent structures, land parcels, cars and other property have been used as a security and considerable credit funds have been granted.

As a result on January 1 this year past due debt on bank loans came to more than 11 billion rubles.

Khakimov, a Chechen Republic resident, for example, temporarily registered in community housing in the city of Nalchik. He registered the "Martan" firm at this address, having opened an account at the "Evrazia [Eurasia]" commercial bank. However, having received credits in the sum of 20 million rubles, he absconded with the money.

Unfortunately, there are many examples of these types of incidents that one could give; incidents that have occurred at virtually all of the republic's commercial banks.

Having squandered funds, yet convinced that they were deceived, bank leaders are turning to us for help. For the commercial bank "Nalchik" alone we secured the return of 224 million rubles that had been given up as unrecoverable debt. A considerable sum, however, still remains irretrievable.

For these reasons criminal proceedings have been instituted and a search initiated for debtors throughout all of Russia and the CIS countries.

Difficulties with obtaining credit and searches for such "clients" are problems created by bank leaders and employees. However, it does not have to be this way, in which case we more than likely would not have to ask why all these bankers took such risks.

Tambov Admin Chief Struggles With Oblast Soviet

944F0379A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian
26 Feb 94 p 2

[Article by Vladimir Toporkov, SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA correspondent in Tambov: "The Governor Has Become Enraged; War With Oblast Soviet Continues in Tambov"]

[Text] It was difficult to find the open room on the third floor of the old private residential house in the center of Tambov, over which the Russian tri-colored flag still shudders dimly and shamefully. All the others were locked tight and sealed with several seals. But in this one room was the entire apparatus of the oblast soviet, all of the

representative people's power. I could not help but think: Here it is, the last redoubt of the Tambov deputies.

It was no accident that this military terminology came to mind. What has been going on in Tambov during recent months is reminiscent of fierce battles. Here the head of oblast administration, V. Babenko, has declared a real war against the soviets. But if it were only a war of words...

Vladimir Dmitriyevich is conducting the siege of the Tambov "White House" on a broad scale, using the subdivisions of the militia, the mass media, and threats to cut off the deputies' telephone service. In general, the entire experience of Krasnopresnenskaya embankment has been taken into the arsenal, except that there are no devoted Taman followers in Tambov and they are not shooting at the building from tanks. Also, the plumbing works.

What sins have the Tambov deputies committed before Mr. Governor? Here we must take a short excursion into the past.

V. Babenko assumed the chair of the head of administration after the events of August 1991 which were victorious for the "democrats." The chief physician of the oblast hospital, a urologist by education, he at first conducted himself loyally in regard to the oblast soviet. Vladimir Dmitriyevich liked to emphasize the fact that there was complete peace and mutual understanding in the relations of the local executive and representative power, and that together they have only one noble goal—to show concern for the people's welfare.

It is true, however, the welfare of the people was ever dwindling, and it was necessary to find a "scapegoat." And so they found one, particularly since the events of September-October thundered in Moscow. Here the power of Vladimir Dmitriyevich unfolded to its full extent, as well as that of the president's representative, V. Davituli. The latter directly announced in the pages of the press that "it is specifically A. Ryabov (the chairman of the oblast soviet—V. T.) who bears the main responsibility for the failures in the economy, since he... subordinated the oblast administration to himself." V. Babenko found another accusation. He exposed the oblast soviet in its anti-governmental, anti-presidential and confrontational position.

Mr. Babenko did not specifically decipher the manner in which this "terrible position" was expressed, believing that it was enough simply to issue the verdict: As of 22 October, to cease the activity of the Tambov Oblast Soviet of People's Deputies and its agencies. It is true, the decree also spoke of one other reason for the impossibility of the oblast soviet's implementation of its functions—"due to the absence of a quorum as a result of the mass resignation of its deputies from their powers and authorities." We will return to this accusation, but for now we must remind the honorable Vladimir Dmitriyevich that no later than 11 October the session of

The oblast soviet adopted by a two-thirds vote the decision not to include the question of self-dissolution on the agenda. Only six deputies supported this proposal.

That is when the pressure on the deputies started. Their official statements began to come in, which were brought by special messengers from the rayons. But without waiting for the decision of the mandate commission on the correctness of these statements, the governor publicized his decree at the meeting of the minor soviet. Naturally, the minor soviet found it to be unlawful, and on the basis of the Russian Federation law, "On the Kray Oblast Soviet of People's Deputies and the Kray Oblast Administration" (no one has repealed this law even to this day), the minor soviet appealed to the Russian Federation Procurator General and the oblast procurator with the request to answer: Are such actions by the head of administration legal?

The Procurator General of Russia, A. Kazannik, kept quiet in this affair. However, the oblast deputy procurator, V. Amelin, directly announced that since the minor soviet repealed the decree issued by the head of the oblast procurator's office, he finds no grounds for intervention. Although it is written somewhat ingeniously, it is not difficult to deduce the fact that the procurator's office holds the actions of the minor soviet to be correct.

It would seem that this should be the end of the Tambov battles. But no, this merely egged the governor on to new skirmishes. Speaking at a press conference, he openly announced that, of all the political problems today, the question of liquidating the soviets of all levels stands in first place. And that was the beginning of it all. The financing of the oblast soviet was cut off, the automobiles were "arrested", and then the phones were disconnected. As of 1 November, the oblast soviet apparatus has been placed on leave for a month and a half. And although such a term is not indicated in any KZOT [Code of Laws on Labor], nevertheless this did not trouble the head of administration. He generously paid, out of the taxpayer's pockets, the month-and-a-half idle time of the people, many of whom, we might add, had already taken their regular vacations even before.

This saga was further continued on 16 December. As described in the local press, it was specifically on this day that they were met at the oblast soviet building with sealed doors of offices and a reinforced militia guard. It is true, some people, as they say, were able to slip into the building. Deputy Head of Administration I. Filatyev assured them that all would be placed in jobs within the course of the present day.

Mr. Filatyev was evidently hasty in this announcement. Even today, not all the workers have been placed in jobs. But that is not all. Who gave permission to violate the labor legislation in the most blatant manner, to nullify the presidential edict of 26 November 1993, which clearly states that a change in the staff numbers and structure of the apparatus of the Soviet of People's

Deputies is not permitted in the period prior to start of work of the new representative organ?

I believe that Mr. Babenko's attitude at that time was definitely influenced by the results of the elections to the Federal Assembly. They turned out to be rather pathetic for the Tambov "democrats." Having understood where the gentlemen from Babenko's command were leading the oblast, the voters gave them, in the words of Sholokhov, "a complete thrashing." People who were not subject to political twists and turns were elected to the Federal Assembly. Among them was A. Ryabov, the chairman of the oblast soviet.

Here it is time to say a few words about the chairman of the soviet. Aleksandr Ivanovich worked his whole life in the Tambov area. He is a candidate of science and enjoys great authority among the people. And he entered the elections with a precise and clear program of preserving people's power, implementing social justice and protecting the interests of the people. We might add that he registered not as the former, but as the currently acting chairman, and the people appraised the true worth of Ryabov's civic courage. He won by a large margin, beating out that very same Babenko and the people from his command.

This blow to his self-esteem rocked V. Babenko. He hastily announced in the press that conclusions would be drawn also in regard to the activity of the oblast agricultural administration, the newspaper TAMBOVSKAYA ZHIZN and the experienced economic managers. Many of them did not reject their nomenclature predilections and, in essence, had dealt a stab to the back, announced the governor.

The situation in the oblast is leading to poverty. Here are but a few figures. Today there are already more than 13,000 officially registered unemployed persons in the oblast. This is two or three times more than in neighboring oblasts. The volume of industrial production has declined by 10.3 percent in a year, and fewer consumer goods were produced. And here is the situation in the rural areas. Meat production has declined by 21 percent during the year, milk—by almost 7 percent, and wool—by 22 percent. The herd size of all types of livestock is declining. Investments in the national economy have declined by 32 percent, and the operational introduction of automobile roads has declined by 46 percent.

The representative of the president, Mr. V. Davituliani, best summed up the truth, I believe. In a lengthy announcement regarding the situation, addressed to President B. Yeltsin, he writes that the old and new bureaucrats are hindering the reforms which threaten to take power out of their hands. "It was you, Boris Nikolayevich, who imposed this power! Did the people dream of such power when they supported you in 1991?"

As they say, you can't put it any better than that!

So, the problem is not in the deputies. Nevertheless, the Tambov governor continues to "storm" his "white

house." Having learned that a meeting of the minor soviet was slated for 15 February, V. Babenko urgently "took measures." At 3 o'clock in the morning, under the cover of the militia, the doors to the oblast soviet were once again sealed. And this after the oblast court of arbitration found the decree by the head of administration on terminating the financing of the oblast soviet, on the upcoming lay-off of workers of the apparatus, and on the attitude toward the newspaper TAMBOVSKAYA ZHIZN to be invalid, and after the court decision was handed down to return the building to the deputies.

Nevertheless, the minor soviet did hold its meeting. It adopted a decision on measures for ensuring the safe-keeping of the soviet's property, reviewed information on the arbitration court ruling, and repealed the 2 February decree issued by the head of administration, "On the System of Organs of State Power in Tambov Oblast." Almost immediately there followed a statement by the administration press service, saying that this decision is nothing other than a statement by a group of private individuals, and will not be implemented by the organs of executive power. These actions are qualified as being directed toward the destabilization of the socio-political situation in the oblast. No more and no less! Evidently, under pressure from some forces, the arbitration court also suspended the implementation of its ruling, forgetting even to specify the term of this suspension.

In short, the storming of the building on Internatsionalnaya Street continues. Babenko is also not embarrassed about the tyranny in regard to Federation Council member A. Ryabov. During the days when I was in Tambov, the telephone in the room assigned to him did not work. Not to mention the fact that he had been deprived of transportation, harried and exhausted by the terrible strain on his nerves.

Meanwhile, as before, people are going to the oblast soviet, as before with questions of the most vital importance. They also do not conceal their attitude toward the tyranny of the administration. This, roughly, is how N. Perepegin, an engineer and deputy of the oblast soviet, Deputy V. Drozdovich, a former scientific associate of one of the institutes, and others with whom I had occasion to meet characterized Babenko's actions.

Yet the people are worried not only about the tyranny of the executive power against the soviets. The elections to the oblast дума are coming up soon in Tambov. Only thanks to the intervention of the minor soviet was it possible to double the size of this agency and to eliminate numerous violations of the effective legislation. But the gentlemen-democrats are once again bent on their own. Once again they are pushing their Tambov fellow citizens toward confrontation. For example, the mayor of the city of Tambov and leader of the "Democratic

Russia" movement, V. Koval, had submitted the TAMBOVSKAYA ZHIZN program even at the last elections. It is quite obvious that some parties cannot be allowed to participate in the elections. In no case must the electoral commissions register representatives of the patriotic movement "Otechestvo" ["Homeland"] or any communist structures, regardless of what flag they may emerge under. Such an announcement has a wild smell about it.

Then again, the leaders of the Tambov "democrats" are not only making political announcements. They are acting unceremoniously. One of the workers of the oblast soviet told me how, in his presence, in Mordovskiy Rayon the head of administration sent a militia detachment to interfere with the meeting of a candidate for deputy in the Federal Assembly, Aleksey Ponomarev, with the voters. It is a good thing that Aleksey Alekseyevich turned out to be not of the timid sort (he managed to stay in the besieged House of Soviets on Krasnaya Presna until the last hour), and forced the zealous militiamen to leave.

There is currently a fuss going on around the people's-patriotic electoral association "Rus," which unites representatives of over ten parties and movements. The association had a lease agreement with the "Avangard" House of Culture for several rooms which it needed to conduct business with voters. After several threatening phone calls, the director hastened to break this agreement.

Pressure is also being exerted on the mass media. Even on 2 November, the head of oblast administration issued a decree on handing over to the administration the powers and authorities of the oblast soviet in regard to the newspaper TAMBOVSKAYA ZHIZN. The decree unceremoniously assigns the resolution of the question of handing over the newspaper's state property, as well as the question of co-foundership by the oblast administration. In this situation, the journalists have not yet flinched, but no one knows how things will be in the future.

...This year there is a snowy, frost-bitten winter in the Tambov region. In the city, which, it seems, has long ago been neglected by the politicians, one cannot even get through along the main roads. But the snowstorms are raging not only in nature. They are also devastating the souls of the people, before whose very eyes the scenes of destruction of the soviets are being played out and the will of the people is being flouted.

No sooner had I written the last lines of this correspondence than I received a phone call from Tambov. A. Chubushev, section head of the oblast soviet called and bitterly informed me that the governor had made the decision to hand the oblast soviet building over to the humanitarian institute. That means there will be new battles. It is a shame that, amidst all the political battles, we are losing sight of the individual, for whom life is not sweet.

Discontent of Volga Germans Examined

944F0432A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 10 Mar 94 p 2

[Article by staff correspondent Irina Chernova: "Achtung! Achtung! The Secret of Esteemed Frau Kopel's Success Lies in the Millions"]

[Text] Volgograd—They pleaded: do not harm us. If Germany refuses us help, we will have nothing else to put our hopes in. Our children have no native tongue. Our adults are the most uneducated nation in the country. There are no churches left for our believers. But who today wants to have anything to do with these trivial problems? If Germany, too, refuses help, we will have no future in Russia.

They pleaded: tell the truth. For it is even worse to live in a lie than it is to live in poverty. And with the consent of the people who trusted me, I am choosing the honest truth.

Throughout the past four years the question of Russian Germans as a repressed and not entirely rehabilitated people was a stumbling block for the two countries' politicians, for the public and for individual citizens. Passions seethed, dozens of conferences were held, and journalists engaged in furious debate. A separate republic. An autonomous national cultural entity. Renaissance. The desert lands of Elton. Practically everything imaginable was proposed to solve these problems. And the Soviet Germans quietly gathered their belongings and left for the West.

Two hundred and fifty years ago their ancestors had fled Germany to Russia. Because things were bad there and good here. Now things are good there and bad here. And people always are pulled to where things are better. In 1989 100,000 Germans left the Soviet homeland. In 1993, about 200,000 left. As a rule, these are skilled workers and the most industrious peasants. There are few members of the intelligentsia among them. That is because as of the beginning of the 1990s only about four Soviet Germans in 100 had a higher education.

Today no one speaks any longer about an autonomous entity. The explosion of ethnic conflicts has cooled the hottest heads.

Today on the intergovernmental level projects of ordinary socioeconomic and cultural development of the territories where there are concentrations of Russian Germans are being proposed and carried out. Germany is giving special attention to the Volga region. Equipment for schools, hospitals and mini plants is being sent there, along with equipment for private farmers and humanitarian aid. We spoke with those to whom this aid is directed and heard: "No one needs us—neither Russia nor Germany." These attitudes are especially strong in Volgograd Oblast.

"Our taxpayers' money is being spent uselessly in Russia." A scandal over this matter, after gradually

ripening, suddenly burst into the open, stirring up not only the upper echelons of power but also Germany's public opinion. The most popular publications started talking about Germany's having gotten bogged down in Russian problems.

Investigators from the Federal Accounting House, analyzing reports on aid to Russian Germans, discovered that the financial investments did not accord with existing expenditures. Millions of deutsche marks had disappeared altogether, and no one knew where. The state prosecutor got involved in the case.

And everything had started in 1990, when, under the pressure of the fourth wave of emigration from the Soviet Union and the problem of determining the status of the eastern lands, Germany's government reached the conclusion that it was better to aid Russian Germans within Russia itself than to help them migrate to the FRG. All that needed to be done was to create the necessary conditions for the development of their own culture and education and provide them with economic support, and everything would be fine.

A Mr. Waffenschmidt, the German Ministry of the Interior's official in charge of immigrant affairs, was assigned the job of preparing the project and carrying it out with the help of Soviet Germans. However, not having any concept of his own on this account, the civil servant shifted the burden of the problems onto the Association for Germans Abroad (VDA), turning it into his money courier. Today Karsten Slamelcher, VDA's federal secretary, has been sent on an indefinite leave that looks very much like a permanent separation. His further fate depends on the results of an investigation. However, Germany's prosecutor will hardly succeed in finding the ends of all the German money lost in Russia without help from Russia itself. In any case, our attempt to conduct our own journalistic investigation in Volgograd, where a VDA bureau has been operating for two years, led to the surprising conclusion: the truth about the money has no place whatsoever among the interests of the local civil servants.

The VDA bureau was set up in the spring of 1992 in Volgograd. A certain citizen from Ulyanovsk who calls herself Frau Kopel, became the head of it. The history of the frau's appearance and activities in Volgograd is mysterious. While spending a half-year in VDA courses in Germany, the Russian citizen Svetlana Kopel gained the support and trust of Mr. Slamelcher. After returning to Russia, she became acquainted with yet another influential "comrade," Anatoliy Yegin, Volgograd Oblast's deputy governor for ethnic questions. By mutual agreement of the two men, Svetlana moved to Volgograd, where she opened and became head of the VDA bureau, which is supposed to implement the program of aid to Russian Germans on behalf of the German government.

For reasons known only to her, the Frau did not register the bureau, did not open a bank account, and herself

obtained no residence permit in Volgograd, remaining officially employed in the Saratov Chamber of Commerce and Industry. Under Russian laws, this means that the VDA company in Volgograd does not exist, and the frau herself is not a resident and taxpayer of that city.

Through unknown means, but most likely not without the help of Yegin, she managed to obtain permission and have a seal of the Volgograd VDA bureau made. The firm does not exist, but its seal does. So she could get to work.

In accordance with an intergovernmental agreement, Germany pledged to finance the construction in eight Volgograd villages of 800 cottages for immigrants from the former USSR. Naturally, the homes were intended primarily for Russian Germans. The overall expenditures required investments of more than 8 million DM. Our country assumed obligations to build the infrastructure for the revived villages. The total expenditures are unknown. Volgograd Oblast's Deputy Governor Yegin was in charge of the project on Russia's behalf. Frau Kopel was in charge of it on Germany's behalf.

In the summer of 1992, Yegin, who knows nothing about construction, singlehandedly distributed the most profitable contracts, for which foreign exchange had been allocated, among local companies. "Who has what proposals?"

There were proposals. In certain cases the cost of houses grew to more than one and one-half times what had been planned. Once again, the reasons are unknown.

The participants in this highly unique "competition" included the owner of the VEST Individual Private Enterprise, a well-known former knitwear factory shop chief named Karapetyan. He got a contract to build 65 houses in the village of Umet for a total cost of 3.2 million marks. Yegin's decision to enlist Karapetyan in the German project is yet another riddle, since prior to June 1993 VEST had no license for construction work, and the deadline for fulfilling the contract expired in November. But Kopel approved the contract, paying an advance of 620,000 marks—part of it in cash.

When a German government delegation visited the village of Umet in November 1993, it was horrified: foundation pits that had been dug for 17 houses and foundations that had been laid were filled with ground water. There was hardened cement. Here and there stacks of broken brick had been laid with the mastery of primordial man. And this was 190,000 marks' worth. The Germans dissolved the contract and demanded that the advance of 620,000 marks be returned. No one has returned the money to them.

Incidentally, seven out of the eight contracts handed out by the generous hand of Yegin have still not been carried out. Although the deadline for their fulfillment has long since passed.

In 18 months of life in Volgograd, Frau Kopel's wealth increased with cosmic speed. It is possible that not only

the German government's lack of oversight over the expenditure of funds in Russia, but also the VDA Volgograd bureau's lack of a bank account contributed to this.

The frau brought hundreds of thousands of marks from Germany to Volgograd in nothing more than a suitcase. Out of this truly golden suitcase, she withdrew personally for herself tax-free wages of 4,600 marks. Incidentally, not a single one of the executives of Russia's other VDA agencies earns so much. The suitcase also produced a bonus of 8,000 marks and then 30,000 marks for the purchase of the apartment where Svetlana's mama now lives. This, incidentally, is also a unique phenomenon—none of the executives of the other Russian bureaus has received money for the acquisition of housing.

Money from the same suitcase was used to acquire four motor vehicles for the needs of the Volgograd VDA bureau. Only they were registered, with Slamelcher's permission, in the name of Frau Kopel and are kept in her personal garage. This four-car garage is attached to the two-story home that Svetlana has also managed to acquire in 18 months of living in Volgograd. And the more the frau's property grew, the more incomprehensible events occurred in the VDA bureau.

First a very valuable computer disappeared, and then a fax machine, and then certain other small items. On the other hand, the firm's rolls include people whom no one has ever seen. The bureau's employees have dubbed them "dead souls." However, the "dead" contrived to get their pay in foreign exchange. They included, for example, the director of the Saratov Chamber of Commerce and Industry and certain other interesting citizens. Only suddenly something unforeseen happened: part of the report documents disappeared from the VDA office. This was connected with a scandal in Germany, which broke out at the end of 1993.

The FRG Federal Accounting House demanded a report on the budget-financed money that had been spent in Russia. And delegations from the German Ministry of the Interior became frequent visitors in Volgograd. They did not want to hear any more of Mr. Yegin's eloquent discussion, and they demanded that they be taken to visit the construction projects and the schools and enterprises where German equipment had been installed.

Slamelcher's position became shaky. Yegin's was not yet.

The frightened Slamelcher sent a telex to Volgograd: "The contract with Kopel is dissolved. She is not to be allowed to work with documents until the new bureau director arrives and affairs are turned over to him." This was on 23 December 1993. And on 24 December Kopel appeared in the firm's office in the accompaniment of a man. He showed VDA employees his credentials: "Maj Shcherbak, chief of the Ninth Division of the Central Rayon Department of Internal Affairs." Together they opened sealed doors of the director's office, put something in a suitcase, and left. The raid, covered by the officer's epaulets, was repeated two more times. And

once again, a suitcase was carried off. During all this time the major was officially on leave. After the second visit of Kopel and Shcherbak, the VDA employees wrote a complaint to the militia. It disappeared. During the third visit they called the OMON special militia. In the presence of armed officers, the "raiders" laid the valuables they had taken on the table. They turned out to be contracts for the lease of tractors that Germany had turned over to Volgograd farmers, certain contracts with "dead souls," and reports on the allocation of humanitarian aid and medical equipment. They were all confiscated as evidence by the Central Rayon Department of Internal Affairs "in the interest of the investigation," and the bank packages of currency—70,000 DM, about \$2,000, and several million rubles—were also sent to the same place.

A couple of weeks later Mr. Tsilke, the new director of the Volgograd VDA, demanded that the militia return the firm's property. The money was returned. Not to the VDA, however, but to citizen Kopel. The investigator's explanation was murderous in its logic: "The lady said that the money belonged to her." And the "lady said" also that as soon as she left the militia office she was robbed immediately, so she no longer has possession of either the marks or the dollars.

One could tell something else about the humanitarian aid from Germany that was sold through the rayon trading organization, with the money earned subsequently being loaned at interest. And about how that aid was selectively unloaded at Lebyazhye Field from Boeings into the cars of civil servants from Yegin's department. One could also tell a lot about the exchange of delegations of schoolchildren, who for some reason were accompanied to Germany by those same civil servants and their wives. But all that is small potatoes, and all in the past.

Our task—to show the scale of the abuses connected with the provision of aid to Russian Germans living on the territory of Volgograd—has proved impossible to accomplish. It is already virtually impossible to find the German money that has been lost in Russia.

The Russian Germans still have draft programs for the revival of their own culture and for the social and economic development of the territories in which concentrations of them reside. The programs, however, are based not on humanitarian assistance but on the establishment of joint ventures. But local civil servants do not want to hear of these proposals. It is more interesting for them to tackle the problems of Russian Germans without the Russian Germans themselves, so that they can satisfy their own personal requirements in the course of the business. And in the broader sense both sides are to blame for this. Germany—for the fact that it was too trusting of its own and another country's civil servants. Russia—for the fact that it shifted the problems of its own citizens onto the shoulders of Germany. The color photos spread out on the VDA desk show a smiling and embracing Yegin and Kopel, who is not a frau at all but

citizen Smirnova, who kept the name of her former husband—a Russian German. As for Maj Shcherbak, he is living peaceably under the same roof with the former frau. It's such a close-knit collective.

The Story Continues

At a session of a Russian-German intergovernmental commission that just began the other day in Bonn, one of the most urgent questions will be that of implementing the Russian Federation president's 21 February 1992 edict "On Urgent Measures for the Rehabilitation of the Russian Germans." In many respects, relations between the governments of Russia and Germany will depend on the extent to which progress is made in creating the German national territorial formations provided for by the edict. As will the nature of the economic assistance in settling Russian Germans in Volgograd Oblast. The government delegation will include Anatoliy Yegin, deputy governor of Volgograd Oblast.

Volgograd Left-Wing Groups Oppose Reconciliation Monument

944F0436A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 11 Mar 94 p 4

[Article by Valeriy Korney: "Battles Over Reconciliation Monument"]

[Text] Representatives of the Volgograd Oblast organizations of the Russian Federation Communist Party, the All-Russian Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the Russian National Union, and the Congress of Soviet Women held a special press conference to announce that they had not changed their stance: "The sacred ground of Stalingrad is not the place for the so-called reconciliation monument." They were referring to the scheduled dedication of a pillar—a "symbol of reconciliation"—in Volgograd on 14 May, almost half a century after the end of the war, in accordance with a Russian-Austrian agreement. The campaign against the monument, according to the organizers of the press conference, is being joined by the whole leftwing and communist press. Petitions have already been printed. Signatures will be collected by the party obkom. Activists will also go to enterprises to collect signatures.

An open letter from the Central Council of the Officers Union "To the Veterans of the Battle of Stalingrad, Public Veterans Organizations, Patriotic Movements, and Patriots of Russia" is being distributed to protest "the erection of a monument that is hostile to our people."

A delegation from Austria, headed by Vice President Walter Seledetz of the "50th Anniversary of the Battle of Stalingrad" committee and Vice President Hugo Mueller of the "Black Cross" society, was in Volgograd at the time. The "Black Cross," which is leading the search for the remains of soldiers who fell in battle, will also be erecting the pillar in Volgograd.

It is supposed to have the following inscription: "This monument is dedicated to all of the victims of the Battle of Stalingrad of 1942-1943. It is a reminder of the suffering of the soldiers and civilians who fell here. The monument was erected with contributions from the Austrian people. We ask that the soldiers from Germany, Austria, and all other countries who fell here be granted eternal peace on Russian land."

The Austrian delegation held a press conference to voice the same request for "eternal peace on Russian land." There was one other interesting detail: The "Black Cross," according to Hugo Mueller, has learned the identity of all of the Soviet soldiers who died in Austria. The number turned out to be much higher than the figures in official records. More than a thousand requests have already been received from people wishing to attend the dedication ceremony for the "symbol of reconciliation" on 14 May.

The organizers of the protest campaign are alleging that the Volgograd administration decided in secret to erect the monument and to locate it in the square in the center of the city.

"There was nothing secret about it," Volgograd Administration Deputy Chief Svetlana Antonova responded. "There was constant coverage of the talks and the preparations for the dedication ceremony in the local press. Apparently, however, the time is right for a political campaign."

The leaders of the "opposition" to the reconciliation monument are not certain they have the support of the majority of people in Volgograd, however, and are willing to compromise: They would agree to a monument, and even a chapel, outside the city limits.

I do not wish to offend the veterans who bore the weight of the war, but will the "symbol of reconciliation" and the request for "eternal peace on Russian land" really diminish their distinction? Nevertheless, the constant propaganda has even divided the veterans themselves.

At the end of last week Volgograd Mayor Yuriy Chekhov met representatives of public organizations and political parties to discuss the issue of the reconciliation monument. The appeals of the mayor and democratic parties for the avoidance of confrontations were rejected. A new phase of the campaign began—a move to the exertion of strong pressure on government officials.

Sakha President on Developing Northern Regions

944F0425B Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 26 Feb 94 p 3

[Article by Mikhail Nikolayev, president of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia), under rubric "Position": "Peoples of the North: Prospects for Common Development. Yakutia Sets a Good Example"]

[Text] By and large, all of the problems in the North are a human problem. Primarily, the problem of the northerner—a person living in the planet's high latitudes. Nevertheless I shall never get tired or trying to prove, or of repeating, that the problems of the North were and will continue to be problems of a scale that affects mankind as a whole. Having recognized that truth, we shall move far ahead along the path primarily of humanism.

In the Russian Federation and in the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) in recent years there have been major changes in the entire way of life and it is impossible to evaluate in any simple manner the importance of those changes for the peoples of the North. However, the value of the reforms manifests itself precisely against the background of the overall condition and well-being of the peoples of the North.

Upon attentive consideration it is revealed that the northern peoples of our planet not only assimilated for mankind a vast territory that is unbelievably severe and also very rich in resources, but also created a unique spiritual and material culture. One can confidently speak about a specific circumpolar (existing in the regions of the Arctic Circle) civilization that enriched mankind by its invaluable historical experience, an experience that reveals man's ability to survive and to engage in creative activity under the most severe climatic conditions.

For Russia this experience is unusually important, or even invaluable, for the simple reason that 60 percent of Russian territory is nothing but an arctic and northern zone. For the Republic of Sakha this experience is national wealth, property that belongs to the entire nation, the dividends from which we shall receive in the twenty-first century, when we shall see the fruition of the words of the great Lomonosov, to the effect that Russia's might will accrue to Siberia and the Arctic Ocean.

The peoples that formed the circumpolar civilization have many attributes in common, such as a harmonious, completely balanced interrelationship with the fragile environment. The northern peoples created great models of economic culture, the fruits of which the industrial part of mankind is just beginning to use. The cult of life, the recognition of the inherent value of life, collectivism, mutual tolerance and mutual aid, respect for women, the family, and the tribe, heightened aesthetic sense, a sense of beauty—those are only a few of the shared and special attributes of northern civilization.

The North's vast mineral wealth became the chief reason for invading and destroying the fragile circumpolar civilization, for having it become absorbed by industrial civilization. A large amount of harm was inflicted on the peoples of the North by the social experiment that was carried out in Russia after October 1917 under the slogan of the building of a communist society. The industrial breakthrough to the unlimited natural resources of the northern territories was accompanied by a disdain for the peoples populating those lands, by the

incompetent interference of the state and officials into the social and spiritual life of the northern peoples.

At various stages in the development of Russia, the effectiveness of administering the northern territories varied. The first and most significant legal act, in our opinion, was the Regulations for Administering Aliens, which were enacted in 1822. Tribal communes were recognized as being the basis of self-government and the subject of land use. Under the Soviet authority the freedom of national associations of northerners was declared: in the early 1930's the Presidium of the VTsIK [All-Russian Central Executive Committee] even enacted a decree entitled Organizing National Associations in the Rayons Inhabited by Small-Population Nationalities of the North. For example, 15 national rayons were formed as part of the Yakut ASSR of that time. Officially that decree was never appealed, but it was also never executed. For Russia as a whole, those rayons were gradually deprived of their national status, and that fact, combined with other unfavorable factors, led to a decline in the development of the northern peoples and to a loss by them of many achievements of circumpolar civilization.

The restoration of Russia, the reformation of all aspects of its life at the present-day stage, creates excellent opportunities for overcoming the mistakes that were made. And the experience of Yakutia that was gained in recent years inspires optimism.

According to the data in the 1989 population census, there were 24,817 persons residing on the territory of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia)—representatives of 25 of the 26 peoples, practically all with a small population, inhabiting the North of the Russian Federation. We are gratified that, during the period between the most recent censuses, the size of the population in the small-population peoples of the North on the territory of our republic increased by 6372, or by 34.5 percent. During that same period the size of the Sakha nation increased by 16.3 percent, and the size of the rural—mainly indigenous—population increased by 9.8 percent. I might note that the rates of population increase among the small-population peoples of the North in the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) are considerably higher than the same indicators on the whole for the Russian Federation. There the total increase for all 25 ethnic groups was 16.6 percent. Thanks to the higher rates of population increase, the percentage of the small-population peoples of the North in the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) increased from 11.8 to 13.7 in the total figure of Russia's indigenous North.

The highest birth rate is observed among the Eveny—those rates came to 50.4 percent during the period between censuses. More than half the Eveny in the Russian Federation live on the territory of the Republic of Sakha. The number of Evenki in our republic increased by 24.5 percent, whereas, for Russia as a whole, the increase came to 10.6 percent, and in the Evenki Autonomous Okrug, which is in Krasnoyarsk

Kray, it came to only 7.4 percent. The percentage of Evenki in the Republic of Sakha in the entire Evenki population of the Russian Federation increased by 24.8 to 48.2 percent. The favorable conditions for the population increase can be explained by a number of factors.

First of all, we benefited from the declarations and promises to change over to practical matters. The republic's leadership, in defending the rights and interests of the indigenous population of the North, in the scientific posing and practical resolution of a number of problems of the socioeconomic and cultural development of the small-population peoples of the North, has been recognized in all the regions of the Russian North. Something that serves as the best confirmation of the correctness of the course that was chosen by us is the increase in the migration in the Republic of Sakha of representatives of the indigenous population of the North from adjacent krais and oblasts. For the time being, the only nationality that does not live in our republic is the Nganasany.

It is difficult to cure a sick person if he himself does not really want to be cured. In the same way, it is important in the rebirth of the northern peoples to reinforce their will to live and their confidence in their own abilities, and to develop national self-awareness. Any nation is reborn through the development of language and the resuscitation of cultural and spiritual life.

Look at the results of the 1989 population census and you will easily be convinced that a large number of people in various ethnic groups have lost the knowledge of their native language—Orochony, Chvantsy, Itelmeny, Nivkhi, Udegeytsy, Evenki, Yukagiry, and Mansi.

One could hardly expect any other result: the way of life has changed so, and there has been such a narrowing of the sphere of use of the native language. Unfortunately, it is precisely the native language of the peoples in the North that used to be viewed most frequently as a subject of secondary importance in primary school and as a linguistic phenomenon in science. Currently in the Russian Federation and the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) very important laws have been enacted, that regulate the linguistic life of the peoples residing on the particular territory. Work has been broadened to restore and develop national systems of educating the indigenous peoples of the republic, including those for the Eveny, Evenki, and Yukagiry. The Institute of Problems of Small-Population Peoples of the North, of the Siberian Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences, has submitted a concept for national Evenki, Eveny, and Yukagiry schools, the concept of preschool education. They have become components of the republic-wide concept of the national school. For the first time, the Nizhnekolymskiy College of the Peoples of the North is operating, and the School of Northern Philology has been created at Yakutsk State University. The Institute of Problems of Small-Population Peoples of the North has been created under the academy, and that institute, during just one year of its existence, in addition to conducting fundamental research, has developed state

programs entitled "The Health of Small-Population Peoples of the North" and "The Press of Small-Population Peoples of the North." The draft of a Program for the Socioeconomic Development of the Eveny, Evenki, and Yukagiry is being prepared. The institute is also executing a number of state production orders for the Russian Federation and the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) for the correct guaranteeing of social questions in the development of the peoples of the North.

For example, for several years there have been regular broadcasts by the "Gevan" ("Dawn") radio station in the Evenki, Eveny, and Yukagiry language. There is a special program on republic television, and the thick artistic magazine ROZOVAYA CHAYKA [Pink Seagull] is published. Supplements to it are published in the languages of the peoples of the North.

I shall particularly emphasize that all this work is being carried out by the forces of the republic itself and within the confines of the republic. Therefore at one time it was surprising to hear the enthusiastic report that Moscow had begun radio broadcasts in the Assyrian language for a nation that scarcely numbers 1000 persons. Why doesn't Moscow have radio and television broadcasts in the languages of the peoples of Russia, especially the peoples with small populations which spend most of their life far from populated places and for whom radio is practically the only thread that links a person with the outside world and with his state? Active, functioning language, press, radio and television, meaningful publishing activity, and the creation of literary and artistic works—all these things and many more form the nation's vital spirit and make its spiritual life unique. Nor can we do without the national intelligentsia. Using as an example the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) I can state confidently that our land has its rightful share of talent. We have brilliant individuals who are capable of becoming the expressers of the national self-awareness of the northern peoples. I do not doubt that the spiritual life of northerners will become even more enriched with the influx of fresh forces, under the conditions of freedom and democracy that are new for us. There is no need to interfere in that natural process, or to unify and level the culture of peoples. The variety of cultures is the beauty that will save the world.

Something that can serve as the confirmation of what has been said is the history of the nomadic tribal commune, which was destroyed during the years of the Soviet authority and that is being restored now. In a resolution enacted by the first congress of tribal nomadic communes that was held in our republic, it is directly stated: "...The restored tribal communes will become a true socioeconomic and spiritual base for the rebirth and further prosperity of the way of life of the small-population peoples of the North as completely equal subjects of the sovereign renewed state." Prior to that, the Constitution of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) was enacted. Article 42 of that constitution reads: "...The republic, respecting the traditions, culture, and customs of the indigenous peoples

and small-population peoples of the North, protects and guarantees their inalienable right:

- "—to own and use, in conformity with the law, the land and resources, including the tribal agricultural, hunting, and fishing grounds;
- "—to organize a social program and a medical program with a consideration of the economic peculiarities of the area being populated, and the management and ethnic specifics of the human organism;
- "—to protect against any form of coercive assimilation and ethnocide, as well as encroachments on ethnic uniqueness, the historic holy places, or monuments of spiritual and material culture."

I might note that the demand stated in the Constitution is being translated into the language of practical life. Several laws have been enacted and are in operation: "The Nomadic Tribal Commune of the Small-Population Peoples of the North," "Citizenship," "Languages in the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia)"; and "The Alternative Military Service of Representatives of Small-Population Peoples of the North." According to those documents, the languages spoken by the peoples of the North have been recognized as official in places of dense population.

In our opinion, the question of the self-government of the nomadic tribal commune as a form of national-territorial formation of the small-population nation that does not have its own state system deserves the most careful and complete study. It is also necessary for us to analyze the rich experience of the indigenous nations of the North beyond the border.

The further work of creating legislation dealing with the problems of the small-population peoples in the North of the Russian Federation must be aimed at developing, for example, legislative drafts and legal-normative acts dealing with: legal status; local self-government; the traditional trades engaged in by these peoples; benefits; the training of cadres of specialists; the northern domesticated reindeer; and the construction of housing and social and cultural amenities in places of dense population by those peoples.

The reform of the self-government of the peoples in the North of the Russian Federation presupposes a change in the strategy of state policy with respect to the northern territories. The territory of the Russian Federation remains the cradle of the unique culture of the peoples of the North. The government of the Russian Federation, like the governments of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) and the other subjects of the Federation, is responsible for preserving and developing those peoples.

There is nothing surprising in the fact that the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) has proven to be on the cutting edge of the problems pertaining to the life of the northern peoples. It is herein that the republic views the priorities of its policy and develops the strategy and tactics for its development. What is much more surprising is the shortsightedness of certain influential politicians who do not see the vital

importance of the northern problems and postpone indefinitely the resolution of those problems. The republic will patiently explain its views and its policy with respect to the future of the entire North and the Arctic zone for Russia and for mankind as a whole. Practical steps have already been taken in the direction of reinforcing the cooperation among the northern states. We shall develop as a northern state and as such shall cooperate with the world community and bear responsibility to that community for keeping intact the achievements of circumpolar civilization and for the rebirth of the northern peoples. Today the Republic of Sakha is becoming a completely equal member of the community of northern states—the Northern Forum—and feels completely confident in its new role. This kind of "northern" specialization of international cooperation under the conditions of the political thaw must yield weighty and tangible fruits both for the participants and for the rest of mankind. The Cold War is not for northerners—it's already cold here. Warfare is definitely not a northern pastime.

The time has come for the joint development and enactment of an international law governing northern space—a law governing the Arctic. It would make it possible to lay the legal basis for the efficient use of the resources of the North and to establish international monitoring of their use.

It is also necessary to strive constantly to improve the legal acts dealing with the protection of the northern ethnic groups, their traditional way of life, and modern forms of management, spiritual self-expression, and self-government. It is necessary to recognize the fact that the inhabitants of the North are now a new population of people who have become firmly established in their life in the higher latitudes. Irrespective of nationality, they must possess the corresponding set of rights and obligations that guarantee the conditions for prosperity in the North. The vital activity and the standards for guaranteeing it and providing services for people must have a zonal peculiarity. It is also necessary to proceed from the specific requirements of the natural and geographical environment in which people live.

Justice requires the consolidation of the efforts of the world community in supporting circumpolar civilization. The humanization of international relations will promote the conception and development of a new policy in the area of the Arctic Circle.

'Siberian Agreement' on Regional Growth

944F0434B Novosibirsk SOVETSKAYA SIBIR in Russian
11 Mar 94 p 1

[Report by V. Maltseva under the rubric "Press Conference": "Siberian Agreement: Concept of the Region's Development"]

[Text] Vladimir Ivankov, general director of the Siberian Agreement interregional association's executive board, held a press conference on the results of the association council meeting that took place in Moscow.

This was not the first time Moscow was selected as the place for a "large gathering" for reasons of convenience: This time heads of oblast administrations—association members—came to the capital for an expanded session of the government. It is also important that, as a rule, high-ranking statesmen take part in Moscow conferences of Siberian Agreement: On 4 March it was Deputy Prime Minister Oleg Soskovets. In his address he spoke against raising electric and transportation rates, which was supported by Siberians. The deputy prime minister detailed his trip to Norway, where he was familiarized with the practical side of taxation. The tax policy of our northern neighbors is aimed at supporting their own producers, and this, of course, is the main lesson for our legislators, through whose efforts domestic industry continues to remain in a difficult situation.

Representatives of Siberian territories who spoke at the council asked the government rather pointed questions. Their meaning was that along with delegating to Siberian regions responsibility for conducting reform, rights should be delegated that would make it possible to proceed more effectively with this process. So far there is not even a government concept of economic reform in the Siberian region. Speaking of the interdependence between the European part of Russia and its eastern territories, in this respect the scales are revealingly tilted. Siberia needs only one-tenth of the electric power produced here, one-hundredth of the aluminum, and does not need as much oil, gas, and coal... But if Siberia works for Russia as a whole, there should be a corresponding attitude toward it. So far, however, no such line is seen in economic policy.

An example is the allocation of credit to back up agricultural campaigns. Novosibirsk Oblast currently can cover only one-third of its countryside's needs for fuel and lubricants. Keeping in mind that only one-third of the needed fallow land area has been plowed, one may assume that spring plowing will "eat up" the fuel quite fast. The outcome is well known: You reap what you sow. It appears that it will again be cheaper to buy Canadian grain than to grow our own...

A score of current problems were discussed at the Siberian Agreement council, regarding which decisions were made, agreements signed, and so on.

One of the main items was the document "On the Socioeconomic Development of Siberian Regions and the Course of Economic Reforms," which was adopted after the discussion following the report by the association council chairman, V. Zubov. "Siberia and Economic Reform: Concept of a Development Strategy."

This decision states the need to prepare documents corresponding to the strategic goals of Siberia's development. The first line in this list is "On Principles of Siberian Regional Policy."

Although it was said both at the meeting and in the back rooms and at the press conference that Moscow cannot survive without Siberia, Siberian Agreement intends

through its activities to prove not so much this idea as a more fruitful one—that of restoring the eastern territories through joint efforts, protecting them from demographic expansion on the part of contiguous states. This danger is quite real: Siberians are dying out or moving away, and population centers are being filled with new residents; in some places, for instance, there are twice as many Chinese as there are Russians.

'Siberian Agreement' Seeks To Expand Regional Export Rights

944F0431B Moscow *SEGODNYA* in Russian 5 Mar 94 p 2

[Article by Vladimir Tordes: "Siberia Demands an Increase in Export Quotas: and the Far East Military-Industrial Complex Demands a Supplemental Feeding From Moscow"]

[Text] It is not just in the capital that passions over the budget are heating up: Demands by members of the Council of Ministers from the army, agriculture and the military-industrial complex are being backed up by the voices of their subordinates from remote Russian regions.

On behalf of the defense industry in the Far East (which remains the patrimony of the military-industrial complex), a "conference of commodity producers" that convened in Khabarovsk has already expressed its views perfectly clearly. The directors who gathered there stated that in the past two years their production volume has amounted to nearly 30 percent, and more than 122,000 specialists have left the region than have come there during the same period.

The major council of the Siberian Agreement Association that met yesterday identified a similar situation in Siberia. However, Siberia's raw material producers may count not only on Moscow but also on themselves. The main proposals to the government from the governors of the krais and oblasts across the Urals have to do with a very sizeable expansion of the territories' export rights. The Siberians believe that the "institution of special exporters" ought to be abolished as a concept, granting everyone equal rights to engage in foreign economic activity. At the same time, export quotas should be

increased to 20 percent of the output produced in the region—by decision of local authorities, without getting the Center's consent.

In the opinion of Siberian Agreement, the share of collected customs duties and export taxes that is left in the region should be raised to at least 30 percent. However, the export duties themselves, the Siberians insist, should be reduced, and import duties for medicines, food and equipment should be abolished entirely.

Aleksey Gumilevskiy, director of the Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations Main Administration for Coordinating the Foreign Economic Activities of the Components of the Federation, told ITAR-TASS that "such favorable treatment cannot be granted to any one territory taken by itself," and that "a number of the problems mentioned would be eliminated if there were a gradual transition from nontariff methods of regulating foreign economic activity to purely tariff-based methods of regulation." However, it does not look as though Siberia will agree to wait until that finally happens. Valeriy Zubov, governor of Krasnoyarsk Krai, has repeatedly stated that the use of regional export revenues may become the only alternative to federal budget subsidies to money-losing enterprises.

As for the military-industrial complex's directors themselves—the "commodity producers" (although the word "commodity," i.e., what is bought and sold, is somewhat strained when applied to their products)—they continue to count on being bailed out by one form of support or another. Despite the industry's crisis, fewer than 4 percent of the enterprise's in Khabarovsk Krai have been shut down, and just a little more than another 7 percent have gone to a reduced work week. Employment is being artificially maintained: with official unemployment of 6,500 persons, hidden unemployment exceeds 50,000.

In the meantime, in neighboring Maritime Krai the defense industry has already wangled money from the government to pay the power engineers. What's sensational about the situation is that the power engineers' debts were not paid anyway, and the emergency economic situation in the krai has been extended until 7 March. According to some information, the directors of the defense industries preferred to put the money into circulation and put off repayment of the debts "until later."

Smolensk 1993 Socioeconomic Figures Reported

944F0392A Smolensk RABOCHIY PUT in Russian

3 Feb 94 pp 1, 5

[Report by the Smolensk Oblast Statistics Directorate: "Socioeconomic Situation of Smolensk Oblast in 1993"]

[Text] The socioeconomic situation of the oblast last year is characterized by the following data:

	Actual values, 1993	1993 values compared with 1992 (percentage or factor increase)	Reference: 1992 values compared with 1991 (percentage or factor increase)
Industrial production:			
in actual prices	R758.4 billion (rubles)	6.8-fold	11.1-fold
in comparable prices	X	88.3	83.3
Production of consumer goods (in actual prices, 1993)	R429.5 billion	87.4	82.3
Including:			
food products	R134.5 billion	95.3	83.0
nonfood products	R275.2 billion	85.6	79.9
alcoholic beverages	R19.8 billion	101.7	124.6
Capital investments from all sources of financing (actual values)	R118.8 billion	8.8-fold	7.9-fold
in comparable figures	X	68	56
Housing commissioned (including individual housing construction), square meters	288,700	84	74
Shipment (dispatch) of freight by general-use transportation, tonnes	16.3 million	63	66
Average number of payroll employees engaged in the oblast economy (not including coopera- tives, small and private enterprises)	451,000	97.3	96.7
Per capita monetary income (average monthly)	R30,067	10.4-fold	7.3-fold
Retail trade turnover, including public kitchens, of officially registered enterprises:			
in actual prices	R245.2 billion	9.8-fold	8.4-fold
in comparable prices	R22.7 billion	90.3	50
Paid services to the populace:			
in actual prices	R18.1 billion	9.2-fold	6.2-fold
in comparable prices	R1.2 billion	61	87
Portion of paid services constituting everyday services			
in actual prices	R6.3 billion	8.9-fold	6.1-fold
in comparable prices	R0.5 billion	64	65
Consolidated consumer price index, not considering optional-use items (December 1993 as compared to December 1992)	X	8.1-fold	X
Profit, all types of economic activity, January- November 1993 (not including agriculture, consumer cooperatives, other cooperatives, and small enterprises)	R197.7 billion	8.0-fold	13.9-fold

FINANCE

Over the January-November period, R197.7 billion [rubles] was received in profit, including R65.4 billion (33.1 percent) in the nonstate sector. More than 75 percent of all profit is attributable to industry.

Profits increased 8.0-fold as compared with January-November 1992, including a 7.5-fold increase in industry. The entirety of the increase seen in profits was due to increased prices.

At the same time, the financial state of enterprises continues to be adverse. The profitability factor with respect to industrial production was on the level of 41-44 percent. However, the increased prices are noticeably depreciating the income received by enterprises. Over 16 percent of all enterprises and organizations of the oblast were operating unprofitably in January-November. In industry and transportation, 14 percent of enterprises operated at a loss; in housing and municipal facilities—12 percent; in trade—over 20 percent; and in provision of everyday services—40 percent. On the whole, the number of enterprises operating at a loss decreased by 7 percent as compared with January-November 1992, but their number in industry rose 17 percent.

On the whole in the state sector of the oblast economy, the proportion of unprofitable enterprises was 3.8 percentage points higher than was the case in the nonstate sector.

Insolvency of enterprises is significantly aggravating the problem of unprofitability. As of 1 December 1993, the total amount of creditor indebtedness of enterprises in industry, construction, transportation, and agriculture came to R145.6 billion, of which R40 billion, or 27 percent, was overdue. Residual free monetary assets totaling R19.4 billion as of 1 December covered one-seventh (13.3 percent) of their total creditor indebtedness. Debts receivable for the above-mentioned sectors amounted to R185.2 billion, 27.2 percent higher than the enterprise debt.

Low solvency (the ratio of monetary assets and debts receivable to creditor indebtedness and debts on credits and loans secured) was observed at enterprises of the coal industry (12.7 percent), the machinebuilding and metalworking industry (68.2 percent), the lumber and woodworking industry (64.7 percent), the textile industry (55.4 percent), the garment industry (69.5 percent), the food industry (54.3 percent), and at agricultural enterprises (48.3 percent).

The indebtedness of industrial, construction, transportation, and agricultural enterprises with respect to bank credits as of 1 December exceeded their own monetary assets fourfold.

Delinquent indebtedness with respect to issuance of consumption funds in the sectors of industry, construction, and agriculture amounted to R3.8 billion as of 1 January 1994. The amount of unpaid wages in industry

decreased by 23 percent in December 1993 as compared with November, amounting to R1.7 billion; in construction this figure dropped to half its November level, coming to R0.7 billion; in agriculture, the figure decreased by 13 percent, amounting to R1.3 billion.

Poor payments discipline at enterprises is complicating the generation of financial resources necessary for production and social development.

The largest share of assets expended consisted of payments to the budget—55 percent (31 percent for 1992).

Some R215.6 billion in taxes and other payments were made to the state budget from enterprises, organizations, and the populace of the oblast in 1993. This is seven times the amount paid in 1992. About half this figure (48.7 percent) came from tax on profits. Value-added tax accounted for 24.6 percent, and taxes from the populace—11.5 percent.

PRIVATIZATION

As of 1 January 1994, 1,375 enterprises in the oblast had been privatized. Of these, 439, or 32 percent, were privatized in 1993. Of the total number of privatized enterprises, 20 percent became private property through conversion to joint-stock operation (full or partial), 80 percent—through sale.

The proportion of large-scale federally owned enterprises privatized increased from 5 percent in 1992 to 11 percent in 1993, while the proportion originally constituting oblast and municipal property decreased somewhat—from 18 to 14 percent and from 76 to 75 percent, respectively.

The main avenues for sale of property of enterprises during the process of "small" privatization were: buy-up of leased property (21 percent of the total number of enterprises privatized); sale through commercial competition (35 percent); auctions (23 percent). Sale of the property of liquidated enterprises was chosen by only 1 percent of enterprises.

The proportion of enterprises privatized through conversion to joint-stock operation rose 4 percentage points over 1992. Of three alternatives of benefits offered labor collectives when converting to joint-stock operation, the second alternative was preferred, allowing the labor collective to hold a controlling package of shares. More than three-fourths of the enterprises converting to joint-stock operation selected this benefits option. One-fifth of such enterprises chose the first alternative. In addition, 2 percent of enterprises converted to joint-stock operation through transformation of leased enterprises.

The total value of property of enterprises privatized (prior to reevaluation of fixed capital) amounted to R27.5412 billion. The average value of an enterprise privatized from municipal ownership was R2.7 million, from oblast ownership—R39.6 million, and from federal ownership—R88.4 million.

Competitive demand for property privatized is determined both by sector affiliation and type of ownership. On the whole, the difference between the sale price and initially declared value of the property, i.e., the average value rate of enterprises privatized, is 12-fold, including 24-fold for enterprises of municipal ownership, and threefold for enterprises of oblast and federal ownership.

Total proceeds from the sale of property to new owners (including funds from enterprises privatized in 1992) amounted to R5.7 billion in monetary assets and 526,300 privatization checks.

Over 60 percent of the funds received from privatization of enterprise property was deposited as revenue into oblast, rayon, and city budgets; 16 percent went to the federal budget, and 22 percent was directed to state privatization organs.

As of 1 January 1994, 82,300 apartments were privatized in the oblast (30.6 percent of the total number), including 35,700 in 1993. Of the total number of apartments privatized, 99 percent were privatized at no cost.

Funds totaling R59.6 million were received from the privatization of housing, R37.4 of which (63 percent) was received in 1993.

The average value of a privatized apartment was R11,000. The average size—50 square meters.

PRICE AND RATE LEVELS AND INDICES

The fairly high level of inflation was maintained in 1993. It was spasmodic, however.

Consumer prices for basic products and services increased 8.1-fold by December 1992. The maximum level of inflation was set at the beginning of the year, when consumer goods and services had almost doubled in price toward the end of the first quarter, as compared with December of the previous year. A trend toward reduced rates of inflation was seen beginning mid-year: 1.7-fold during the second quarter, 1.8-fold during the third quarter, and 1.4-fold during the fourth quarter.

However, the growth of consumer prices of goods and services in 1993 was significantly lower than in 1992, when a 24.9-fold increase was seen.

Thus, prices for food products in 1993 increased 8.7-fold, nonfood products—6.7-fold. These figures for 1992 were 13.1-fold and 19.8-fold, respectively. In this regard, during the first half-year of 1993, food product prices rose at a galloping rate, while this was the case for nonfood products in the third quarter. Then in the fourth quarter an alternation was seen: in October in favor of food products, in November nonfood products, and in December the rate increases were the same.

Changes in the prices of individual food products were also diverse. Compared with December 1992 prices, meat dumplings increased in price 29-fold; vegetables—18-fold; cottage cheese and sausage products, meat and

meat products, milk and dairy products—from 11- to 14-fold; butter, cheeses, eggs, bread, and bakery products—from seven- to 10-fold. Fluctuations in the rates of price change for industrial commodities were also observed.

Prices increased significantly over the year for medicines (102-fold), operating stock (27-fold), office products, building materials, fuel, and individual commodities for children and adults (from 10- to 14-fold).

A more significant rise in prices was observed with respect to paid services provided the populace. This change overall amounted to a 14.8-fold increase for the year (48.2-fold for 1992). This is 2.2 times greater than the growth of prices of nonfood products, and 1.7 times greater than that for food products.

In 1993, the stipulated rates for certain notary services increased by a factor of 1,462, for legal consultation—by a factor of 61. Passes for rest and relaxation facilities increased 44-fold, tickets for the theater and museums and the initial visit to the doctor—more than 30-fold. Certain cosmetic and medical services, parental fees for child care, lodging in hotels and dormitories, photography, laundry, dry cleaning, and barber services, repair of footwear, refrigerators, and televisions, rates for electric power and intercity communications, postal rates, subscriber fees for home telephone use and cable radio—all increased in price by factors of six to 20.

Wholesale prices of enterprises for industrial production in 1993 increased 9.6-fold as compared with December 1992.

The rise in wholesale prices was most significant in the meat and chemical industry, electric power industry, and building materials industry (13- to 14-fold), and in the milk industry (10-fold). Nitrogen fertilizers, water-heating boiler facilities, footwear, meat products, and glass kitchenware increased from 11- to 14-fold in cost, and crushed stone—more than 19-fold.

The purchase price index for grain in 1993 was 578 percent, for potatoes—330 percent, vegetables—1,545 percent. The purchase price of livestock and fowl increased 13.4-fold over the year, milk—10.3-fold, and eggs—9.5-fold.

THE SOCIAL SPHERE

The demographic situation. As of 1 January 1994, the population was 1,167,000, according to estimated data.

In 1993, 9,600 infants were born in the oblast. This is 1,200 (11 percent) fewer than in 1992; 19,200 people died—2,900 (17.6 percent) more than in 1992.

The level of natural population loss was 1.7 times greater than that of 1992, and amounted to 9,600 people. This was observed everywhere except in the city of Desnogorsk. The city population of the oblast diminished by 4,700 people as a result of natural processes, the rural population—by 4,900.

Heart disease and malignant tumors remain the most frequently encountered illnesses, constituting the cause of 72 percent of deaths.

Some 8,408 marriages were registered in the oblast in 1993, or 3.7 percent more than in 1992. The number of divorces increased 2.5 percent, amounting to 5,534. There are 63 divorces for every 100 registered marriages.

The volume of migration (arrivals and departures) dropped 13 percent as compared with 1992, amounting to 66,800. The number of arrivals exceeded the number of departures by more than 10,000 individuals. New arrivals in the oblast included 4,374 refugees and people forced to resettle. Among those leaving the oblast, 208 departed for permanent residence in countries of the far abroad.

Labor resources. The number of persons employed in the oblast economy (not including cooperatives, small or private enterprises) during 1993 was 451,000. This is 2.7 percent fewer than in 1992.

Some 18,100 citizens seeking jobs filed application with the state employment service in 1993. The intermediary efforts of this service resulted in job placement for 9,200 individuals, or 51 percent of the applicants.

As of the beginning of January of this year, 2,800 citizens out of work were registered with the employment service organs. This number decreased 24 percent over the year. Some 1,100 individuals were declared unemployed. Some 44 percent of the unemployed were persons laid off in connection with the elimination or reorganization of enterprises and with personnel cuts. More than 56,000 people (12.4 percent of those employed in the oblast economy) took additional leave or were shifted to employment based on less than a full work week at the initiative of the administration, i.e., constitute the potentially unemployed. For every 10 vacancies indicated by enterprises, there are 13 individuals seeking employment. In this regard, it is blue-collar workers that enterprises require most of all (73 percent of the employment requirement).

Some 362 persons (3.7 times greater than at the beginning of 1993) underwent occupational training at the direction of the employment service.

Monetary income of the populace in 1993, according to preliminary estimates, totaled over R406 billion, a 9.7-fold increase over 1992. Growth of income of the populace last year surpassed the growth of consumer prices during all months except January, May, and July.

Income of the populace increased 10 percent over the year in real terms.

Growth of income in December is explained through the regular increase in the minimum wage and corresponding increase in salaries in the budget sphere. Also influencing the growth in incomes were material-assistance payments at the end of the year and awards for annual work results.

In the final months of 1993, the proportion of outlays for purchase of goods and services decreased, while the proportion of savings in deposits and securities increased. Significant amounts of ready cash stayed in the possession of the populace. Thus, in December 1993, the share of total income kept on hand by the populace came to 31.4 percent (in November this was 26.8 percent, in October—24.8 percent).

Average per capita face-value monetary income over 1993 amounted to 197 percent of the subsistence minimum (157 percent in 1992). At the same time, almost one-fifth of the population had an average per capita monetary income lower than the subsistence minimum during the course of 1993.

The average monthly wages of workers at enterprises and organizations (not including cooperatives, small or private enterprises) for 1993 came to R43,800—9.7 times greater than in 1992 (first quarter—R14,300, second quarter—R30,500, third quarter—R51,500, fourth quarter—R78,800).

The average wage in December 1993 was R96,300—35 percent greater than in November 1993.

In this regard, the average wage in the material production sectors exceeded R96,100. In the nonproduction sphere it was R97,000, and not including credit and insurance organizations—R77,000.

Consumer market of goods and services. Toward the end of 1993, the decline in production of consumer goods had decelerated. The industry of the oblast produced consumer goods during the year totaling R429.5 billion, or 12.6 percent less than in 1992 (for the first quarter the reduction was 26.4 percent, for the first half year—14.2 percent).

The output of nonfood products decreased to the greatest extent (by 14.4 percent). This was affected by the sharp reduction in output of light industry products (by 20.4 percent).

The production decrease was 48 percent for cotton fabrics, 34 percent for knitted articles, and 14 percent for leather shoes.

The output of food products decreased by 4.7 percent. Some 5,300 tonnes (14 percent) less meat (industrial output) was produced than in 1992, sausage products—1,200 tonnes less (7 percent), whole milk products—8,200 tonnes less (13 percent), bread and bakery products—44,300 tonnes less (21 percent), and confectionery items—1,100 tonnes less (9 percent).

The production volume of dishware and crockery, sewing machines, electric irons, umbrellas, tape recorders, and greenhouses was higher than in 1992.

Over the past year, the retail trade volume of officially registered trade enterprises and public kitchens of all forms of ownership amounted to R245.2 billion. Expenditures by the populace on the purchase of commodities

increased 9.8-fold in actual prices as compared with 1992. Trade turnover in physical terms decreased by 9.7 percent. Almost half the trade turnover volume (48 percent) was attributable to privately owned enterprises. With respect to food products on the consumer market, an adverse situation has developed concerning provision of potatoes and vegetables to the populace.

As far as nonfood products are concerned, sales of televisions and synthetic detergents rose significantly (1.4-fold). It was precisely with respect to these goods, however, that interruptions in trade were observed.

Paid services totaling R18.1 billion were provided residents of the oblast over 1993. In current prices, the provision of paid services increased 9.2-fold as compared with 1992, while in physical terms 39 percent less in services was rendered to the populace.

The volume of provision of everyday services decreased 36 percent in comparable price terms over the 1992 level. Over half the volume of everyday services were provided by officially registered enterprises of the non-state sector. Provision of everyday services to the rural population deteriorated. According to the results of a one-time survey of the network of rural enterprises providing everyday services to the populace, 16 rural rayons lack a permanent network of consumer services, and an equal number do not have the itinerant variety of service provision.

Education. As of the start of the 1993/1994 school year, there were 696 general-education schools operating during the daytime and 14 evening-session schools. Additionally, there were two nonstate schools—a private high school and orthodox secondary school.

Pupils number over 153,000—1,719 (4 percent) more than was the case the previous school year.

There continues to be an increase in the number of schools operating in two or three sessions. Whereas for the 1992/1993 school year, 17 percent of schools were in this category, the proportion was 20 percent in 1993/1994. The percentage of pupils attending second session increased from 23 to 25 percent, third session—from 0.7 to 0.8 percent.

Some 12,300 students receive instruction in five institutes of higher education of the oblast. This number includes 9,800 students in daytime instruction. As compared with the 1992/1993 school year, the number of students has decreased by 679 (5 percent). Some 2,435 individuals obtained higher education in 1993. Only 49 percent of the graduates received employment assignments. The remainder were afforded the right to seek job placement independently.

In 27 special secondary and higher educational institutions, 17,200 students are receiving instruction. This includes 7,900 students (46 percent) at nine colleges. The number of students decreased a negligible amount—by 400 (2 percent)—as compared with the (1992-1993

school year. In 1993, 4,413 specialists were trained with special secondary and higher education. Fewer than one-third of the graduates (26 percent) received an employment assignment.

Crime. Some 22,700 crimes were registered in the oblast in 1993, 10 percent more than in 1992 (in 1992 the increase was 30 percent). Over half the crimes (58 percent) were solved.

The proportion of grave crimes committed during the year increased by 3 percent, amounting to 13.6 percent.

The proportion of property crimes continues to rise. Theft constituted almost 60 percent of all the crimes committed.

MATERIAL PRODUCTION

Industry. Industrial production in the oblast in 1993 was marked by instability. A trend toward deceleration of the decline in production was noted in the final months, however. Whereas the ratio of production volume for the first quarter of 1993 to that for the same period of 1992 was just 79.4 percent, the volume of industrial production on the whole as compared to the 1992 level was 88.3 percent. Deceleration of the decline in industrial production was affected by a growth in production output achieved by enterprises of the energy-producing machine building industry (137.6 percent), garment industry (112.7 percent), butter and cheese processing and dairy industry (115.5 percent), and printing industry (103.7 percent). The most significant lag behind 1992 levels was observed in the tractor and agricultural machine-building industry (37.6 percent of the 1992 level), in instrument manufacture (75.1 percent), the fuel industry (78.4 percent), and the textile industry (73.1 percent).

A drop was noted in the production of electric power—by 4 percent, major electrical machinery—by 31 percent, light bulbs—by 13 percent, automation tools and devices and their spare parts—by 41 percent, computer equipment—by 39 percent, and mineral fertilizers—by 20 percent.

Production of commercial timber fell by 31 percent. Due to the lack of raw timber, output of sawn lumber was reduced 17 percent.

Enterprises of the construction industry curtailed their output of building bricks by 7 percent, prefabricated reinforced concrete components—by 20 percent, soft roofing materials—by 39 percent, enameled ceramic tile—by 16 percent.

At the same time that production volume in industry diminished, a reduction was seen in the number of employees. This reduction in personnel is proceeding less intensively, however. In 1993 the number of employees decreased by just 5.1 percent. As a result, the drop in labor productivity was more significant—6.9 percent. One reason for this situation is the fact that the

number of qualified workers has been retained in hopes that production will improve.

There are 10 enterprises in the oblast engaged in conversion. In 1993 the total volume of production at these enterprises decreased 17 percent from the 1992 level, including a 47 percent decrease in military production. The proportion of the total output of these enterprises attributable to civilian production was 56.8 percent, as opposed to 63 percent in 1992.

Agriculture. With respect to agriculture, 1993 saw a continuation of the redistribution of lands, their privatization, and the reorganization of kolkhozes and sovkhozes. As a result, at the end of the year the oblast had 312 partnerships and joint-stock companies of the closed variety, 60 collective farms, 31 agricultural cooperatives, 31 sovkhozes, 21 kolkhozes, and two associations of peasant (owner-operated) farms. As of 1 January 1994, there were 3,183 peasant (owner-operated) farms, with 165,800 hectares of land at their disposal.

Some 633 peasant (owner-operated) farms were newly established during the year (1,947 in 1992), while more than 300 farms ceased their operation.

The gross production output of farms of every category in 1993 amounted to R936.2 million (in 1983 comparable prices). This is R82.3 million (8 percent) less than in 1992.

More than half (52 percent) the volume of gross agricultural output was obtained from farms of the populace and peasant (owner-operated) farms. Their share amounted to 42 percent in 1992. For all categories of farms, planted crop production output was significantly less than in 1992, as a result of reduced areas under seed and diminished crop productivity. Grain output totaled 726,200 tonnes (weight after additional processing)—88,800 tonnes (11 percent) less than in 1992; vegetable production totaled 106,200 tonnes—45,500 tonnes (30 percent) less; and flax fiber output was 6,800 tonnes—11,700 tonnes (65 percent) less. Production of potatoes increased by 8 percent, amounting to 719,500 tonnes.

For the 1994 harvest, agricultural enterprises almost cut in half their sowing of winter crops and plowing of land for spring planting.

The situation with respect to livestock is ambiguous. In 1993, a 2 percent growth was achieved in livestock production output for all categories of farms by increasing production in owner-operated farms and farms of the populace.

Agricultural enterprises reduced their production of meat in 1993 by 7 percent from 1992 levels, eggs—by 4 percent, wool—by 45 percent. Production of milk increased by 7 percent due to increased productivity of the cows, amounting to 412,800 tonnes. The average amount of milk yield per cow for the year was 2,008 kilograms (1,677 kilograms in 1992). The trend toward reduced herd size is continuing. As of 1 January 1994,

the number of cattle at all varieties of farms decreased by 8 percent, amounting to 618,300 head. The number of cows was reduced by 1 percent, amounting to 276,300 head. The number of pigs came to 318,800, 0.7 percent less; the number of sheep and goats—133,000, 6 percent less.

Increased numbers of livestock on farms of the populace and owner-operated farms did not compensate for their drop at agricultural enterprises.

Agricultural enterprises went into the winter season with reduced feed supplies.

In 1993, 57,600 tonnes of mineral fertilizers (converted to 100-percent effective nutrient substance) were delivered to meet the agriculture needs of the oblast, 20 percent less than the quantity requested.

As compared with 1992, agricultural enterprises obtained 73 percent fewer trucks last year, 67 percent fewer tractor trailers, 69 percent fewer bulldozers, and 6 percent fewer tractors. Sixty-six more combines were purchased, and 44 percent more earth movers.

Capital construction. Facilities and capacities were put into operation last year in the oblast at the Yartsevo diesel engine plants, at Dvigatel (in Yartsevo), at the Smolensk printing combine, Roslavl chemical plant, and Smolensk city dairy.

Hard-paved roads were constructed over 402.6 kilometers, including 285.6 kilometers of intra-farm road. This is 34 and 51 percent less than in 1992.

Livestock breeding premises were put into operation in the oblast to accommodate 4,100 cattle and 660 pigs; storage facilities for grain and seed storage—for 14,600 tonnes; and vegetable and potato storage facilities—for 1,200 tonnes of simultaneous storage.

The volume of capital investments from all sources of financing in 1993 was reduced by 32 percent, amounting to R118.8 billion. This is the consequence of decreased investment activity on the part of enterprises over the past two years. The rate of decline of capital investment volume was significantly higher in agriculture (53 percent) than in other sectors.

The proportion of centralized capital investments dropped from 58 percent in 1992 to 36 percent in 1993. The remainder of capital investments are covered by funds of enterprises (51 percent), preferential term credits (4 percent), and investment funds (9 percent). Some 59 percent of the centralized funds are attributable to republic budget funds.

Construction work is being accomplished by contractor organizations of various forms of ownership. State contractor organizations account for 23 percent of the cost of the work. The rest is accomplished by privately owned (21 percent) and mixed (56 percent) organizations.

Some 63 percent of capital investments were used in the construction of production facilities, 33 percent lower than the prior year level.

Capital investments in the nonproduction sphere were reduced by 2 percent, amounting to R43.9 billion. Of the total volume of capital investments, the share of funds used for housing and sociocultural construction increased from 35 percent in 1992 to 37 percent in 1993.

Some 4,780 apartments with all the modern conveniences were commissioned out of all sources of financing, including individual housing construction. These covered an area of 288,700 square meters—56,200 square meters (16 percent) less than in 1992. At the same time, the volume of housing put into operation from funds of the populace increased (by 26 percent), although the share of total housing introduced in the oblast attributable to such funds is still quite low (4.9 percent).

Transportation and communications. Some 16.3 million tonnes of diverse freight was shipped in 1993 by general-use transportation of all varieties—9.7 million tonnes (37 percent) less than in 1992.

Shipments of freight by motor vehicle transport decreased 2.2-fold. Shipments by rail decreased by 11.8 percent.

Virtually the entire volume (about 97 percent) of freight shipments by motor vehicle transport was accomplished by privatized enterprises.

Passenger traffic volume in general-use transportation totaled 6 billion passenger-kilometers, a decrease of 2.2 percent. This includes motor vehicle transport—decreasing by 16.7 percent—and railroad transportation—increasing by 1.2 percent.

Over 1993, 19.8 million (6.2 percent) fewer passengers were conveyed by all types of transportation than was the case a year ago, including a drop of 2.6 percent in railroad transportation and 14.2 percent in motor vehicle transport.

The plan for number of passengers completed by intracity bus service was implemented only to the level of 79.5 percent as of 1 January 1994. This is 8 percent lower than for 1992.

Income from basic activity of communications enterprises totaled R9.1 billion in 1993, including R1.7 billion from services rendered to the populace. This represents a 10.7-fold increase over the 1992 level.

The main factor accounting for the growth in income was increased prices and rates for services.

FOREIGN ECONOMIC ACTIVITY

Fifty enterprises and organizations of the oblast shipped production output abroad in 1993 (including to the

Baltic countries). The volume of exports came to R164.6 billion in domestic prices, and \$171 million in foreign trade (contract) prices.

The production association Minudobreniya shipped \$12.5 million worth of fertilizers abroad (7.3 percent of the export volume of the oblast); the production association Kristall shipped precious stones valued at \$150.8 million (88.2 percent).

Enterprises also shipped 2,600 tonnes of artificial graphite, 2,100 tonnes of pelts, 460 tonnes of wood for fuel, 3,475 refrigerators (household), 330,900 fluorescent lamps, 131,600 square meters of facing tile, 640.7 tonnes of reinforced concrete items, 590,000 pair of socks, 624 tonnes of flax fiber, 138,100 square meters of roofing material, in addition to other production output. Some 42 percent of all exporter enterprises concluded barter transactions, receiving commodities from their foreign partners in exchange for their output.

The total volume of foreign trade turnover (total of exports and imports) through trade exchange relationships amounted to \$9.2 million in 1993.

Smolensk Internal Affairs Chief on 1993 Crime Statistics

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2 Feb 94 p 3

[Article by militia Major-General V. Vorobyev, chief of the oblast UVD (Internal Affairs Administration): "Without Overcoming Crime, We Will Not Achieve a Normal Life." Comments on summary of criminal statistics for 1993]

[Text]

[Begin boxed material]

The operational situation in the oblast during the past year was difficult. There were 22,712 crimes recorded, an increase of 10 percent over 1992.

There was a characteristic increase in serious crimes. Moreover, not only was there an increase in their number, but also in their relative share within the overall structure of crime. This signifies an escalation of violence, cynicism and harshness in relations between people. During the year there were 182 reported cases of murder with assault. Moreover, almost half of them were in the sphere of family-domestic relations. There were 421 cases of grave bodily injury, with one in four of these resulting in the death of the victim, as well as 101 cases of rape and attempted rape.

[End boxed material]

Behind each of these criminal acts are the grief and tears of the victims, their loved ones and family members, a huge and often irreplaceable material loss, moral and psychological trauma, and broken human lives.

The situation is particularly alarming in the rural areas, where crime has increased by 10.5 percent and practically one out of every three crimes registered in the oblast is committed. The blame for this may be placed not only on the ill-planned migration policy, which has flooded the rural areas with convicted persons who have persistent negative habits and who are the outcasts of society, but also on the total absence of leisure time of the rural residents, their spiritual decline. A rich, full life, healthy in its constant interaction with nature, is often replaced by a ruinous passion for alcohol. The rural areas are steadily degenerating both spiritually and physically...

We may find many reasons for the avalanche-like growth of greedy acts, but the main one, in our opinion, consists of the increasing enmity between the haves and the have-nots, which is caused by an increase in the process of stratification of society by level of income and living standard. Criminal expropriation is rampant. But they are robbing not only the millionaires. Among our 10,230 fellow citizens whose property has been subjected to criminal encroachments, the overwhelming majority are ordinary workers with moderate or low income. Thieves have "cleaned out" 2,858 apartments, stolen 790 automobiles and motorcycles, and performed 258 acts of stealing livestock from personal subsidiary farms. There have been 972 cases of robbery and 166 cases of assault and brigandage committed against the personal property of citizens.

Taking the misfortune of others close to heart and understanding very well the condition of the people who have suffered because of criminals, I once again call upon Smolensk residents to show concern for the safety of their relatives and dear ones and the safekeeping of their personal property. We are ready to give aid in equipping residences with security alarms and to issue permits in accordance with the law for obtaining hunting rifles and gas-powered weapons, to help in the protection of enterprises, stores and offices, to train our four-footed friends for the security-guard service, etc.

Such a form of greedy-violent crime as extortion also requires special mention. There were 123 recorded cases of racketeering during the year. And, unfortunately, we are predicting an increase in such crimes in the future. We must say frankly, the detainment of extortionists presents no special difficulties. Many are caught red-handed and brought to criminal responsibility on all instances which have been reported in a timely manner by the victims. Nevertheless, according to the estimates of our experts, there are hundreds of times more cases of extortion than are officially reported and registered. This is an extremely dangerous crime, fraught with the most serious consequences, and the appraisal which the criminal code gives it is rather inadequate to the severity and social significance of racketeering.

Indulging in extortion and the obedient payment of the sums demanded by it will inevitably lead the bribe-payer into a maze of crime and will place him in jeopardy, along with the members of his family, his life and health, his

property and well-being. I suggest that anyone who knows of cases of extortion and anyone who has become the victim of criminal terror, threats and violence immediately report this to the law enforcement agencies.

The number of encroachments on state property is continually growing. Underground "privatization" is going on due to the carelessness, connivance, and sometimes even the participation of economic managers and other official and materially responsible persons. This is inflicting a great loss upon the economy. Along the line of criminal investigation alone there have been 6,470 registered crimes against state property, 79.5 percent of which constitute theft. The number of violent encroachments on our goods has increased: There have been 100 recorded cases of robbery and 13 cases of assault and brigandage.

The decline in the level of morality and culture, the disappearance of many hindering barriers, coupled with the spread of alcohol, have led to a significant deterioration of law and order. There were 2,271 crimes committed in public places, an increase of 54.5 percent. Street crime has increased by almost 30 percent. Moreover, almost half of these crimes were committed in Smolensk, and one-fourth—in Promyshlennyy Rayon, which for a number of reasons has become the most dangerous in terms of crime for Smolensk residents.

The increase in all forms of crime has been facilitated by a weakening in the struggle against drunkenness. Drunks committed around 5,000 crimes, which is 26 percent higher than in 1992. And in individual rayons, as for example in Roslavlskiy, Khislavichskiy, Monastyrshchinskiy, Temkinskiy and Rudnyanskiy Rayons, the increase in "drunken" crimes has comprised more than 80 percent.

Especially negative processes are taking place among the young people. Today few are worried that a thousand youths have been thrown out of schools and other educational institutions, deprived of the possibility of earning an honest living. Left to their own devices, having lost their moral guidelines and faith in justice, raised not on respect for the traditions of the older generations and all-human moral principles, but on worship of far from the best examples of Western life, young people often embark upon the path of crime.

Around 2,000 crimes of the racketeering type are committed by young people ranging in age from 14 to 18 years old. Among them there are thieves, robbers, rapists and murderers. Statistics show that the "army" of those who have transgressed the criminal law is being replenished not from the ranks of repeat offenders, but at the expense of young people. While recidivist crime has declined by 5.2 percent, crimes committed by minors have increased by one-fourth.

Especially daring crimes are often committed in groups. The increase in group crime comprised 24.3 percent. The participants in many criminal groupings are juveniles. An exceptional social danger is posed by the increasing

tendency of adults to involve juveniles in criminal activity, by the division of spheres of influence between the groupings, and by the training of physically developed but morally deficient young people who are ready to do anything for money in semi-underground sections and karate, boxing and kick-boxing clubs.

One other very complex problem is the struggle against the unlawful distribution of narcotics. The desire to withdraw into the phantom, unreal world of dope is especially inherent to young people. Judging by the official data, the scope of drug distribution is huge. In Russia during 1993 there were 53,169 identified cases of crimes associated with the illegal circulation of drugs, with one out of every 72 of these being discovered in our oblast. The Russian internal affairs agencies have seized around 20 tonnes of narcotic-containing plants from criminals, and here in our oblast—over 300 kilograms! Yet the "profession" of the drug addict is certainly not quiet: Considerable money is required to obtain the drugs. And this money is acquired through theft, robbery and hold-ups.

The increased boldness and violent directionality of crimes is expressed also in the fact that criminals are using weapons more often, including firearms. They are showing active resistance to the associates of the militia. According to the data of the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs], during the year associates of the Russian militia had to use weapons in suppressing crimes and detaining malefactors in 2,186 cases. The militia itself has borne tangible losses in this uncompromising struggle: 183 associates of law enforcement agencies were killed and 572 wounded in encounters with criminals.

There have been over 400 cases of unlawful storage and carrying of firearms discovered in the Smolensk region. Seized from the underground arsenal were 70 rifles, an anti-tank gun, 53 sawed-off shotguns, 39 homemade firearms, 81 grenades, 8 mines, 13 kilograms of tolite and almost 14,000 cartridges. There were over 800 recorded cases of resistance to associates of the militia, and 64 criminal cases were filed against persons using physical violence against the associates. The associates of the Smolensk militia were forced to use their weapons in over 200 cases!

Last year, thanks to the intensive work of the investigative services, 14.6 percent more criminal cases were investigated. The rate of crimes solved increased by 0.7 percent and comprised 58.1 percent (for all of Russia this figure is 50.6 percent). Of course, neither we, the professionals, nor the victims of the crimes, nor the oblast population can be satisfied by any positive results as long as there are 19 murderers and attempted murderers, 51 persons guilty of committing grave bodily injuries, 12 rapists, 500 robbers and brigands and over 7,000 thieves whose wrongdoings have not been exposed living in our midst. All our efforts and means are directed toward exposing these grave crimes and identifying and detaining the guilty parties.

This in general was the criminal situation in the oblast last year. We cannot call it extreme, but we predict an even more difficult situation whose control will require the effort of all forces and the attraction of all available means.

Sverdlovsk 1993 Socioeconomic Figures Reported
944F0380A Yekaterinburg URALSKIY RABOCHIIY
in Russian 4 Feb 94 pp 1-2

[Article by Sverdlovsk Oblast Statistical Administration: "Gaydar Would Call It Stabilization...On the Socioeconomic Position of Sverdlovsk Oblast in 1993"]

[Text] In 1993 enterprises of the oblast produced 5.4737 trillion rubles [R] worth of products in current prices, which is 6.5 times more than last year's production volume.

In comparable prices, the volumes of industrial production were 17 percent below the 1992 level, and the reduction of volume in 1992 as compared to the level of the preceding year was 27.4 percent, that is, the rates of reduction have slowed up. At the same time the highest rates of reduction of volumes of production of products occurred during the first and fourth quarters, and the lowest during the second and third quarters.

The main reasons for the reduction of production volumes were the difficult financial position of the enterprises caused by nonpayments of buyers of products, lack of material resources and difficulties with the sale of products, and numerous production shutdowns. The greatest losses were observed at enterprises of machine building and metal processing and light, chemical, and petrochemical industries.

The basic volume of products (56.6 percent) was produced by enterprises with a mixed form of ownership. They make up 29.7 percent of the overall number of enterprises, and 49.1 percent of the industrial production personnel work at them. State enterprises, making up 55.5 percent and employing 44.2 percent of the personnel, produced 37.7 percent of the overall volume of products. Additionally, there were 88 private enterprises and nine municipal enterprises functioning in industry along with 11 enterprises that are the property of public organizations.

Industry

A reduction of the volumes of the production of products occurred in all branches of industry but there were significant differences in terms of rates and scale. Thus light industry enterprises reduced volumes as compared to last year's level by 25.2 percent, machine building—23.3 percent, nonferrous metallurgy—22.8 percent, and the food industry—1.6 percent.

In the fuel and energy complex there was a reduction of the output of electric energy of 14.2 percent as compared to the 1992 level, the extraction of coal—by 3.7 percent, and peat—by 51 percent.

In ferrous metallurgy there was a reduction as compared to the 1992 level of the output of iron—by 10.3 percent, steel—by 11.9 percent, high grade cold rolled steel—by 36.1 percent, and cold rolled sheet metal—by 66.4 percent. At the same time the production of finished rolled metal was 3.1 percent above last year's level and cold rolled steel strips—5.6 percent.

For a number of kinds of machine building products the output was below the 1992 level: The production of technological equipment for the processing branches of the agro-industrial complex decreased by 47.2 percent, diesel engines and diesel generators—by 40.3 percent, gas turbines—by 37.1 percent, large electrical machines—by 32.4 percent, excavators—by 13.4 percent, blast furnace and steel smelting equipment—by 7.1 percent, and machine tools with numerical programmed control—by 66.7 percent (although the output of metal cutting machine tools exceeded the 1992 level by 35.4 percent).

Enterprises of the chemical-timber complex reduced the production of sulfuric acid by 18.6 percent as compared to last year's level, synthetic resins and plastics—by 16.7 percent, commercial timber—by 23.7 percent, lumber—by 27.3 percent, chip board—by 30.4 percent, and paper—by 57.2 percent. The output of passenger vehicle and motorcycle tires and nitrogen fertilizers remained at the 1992 level.

In the construction materials industry the output of cement increased by 1.4 percent as compared to last year, window glass—by 15.7 percent, ceramic facing tiles—by 4.2 percent, and ceramic sanitation items—by 3.5 percent. But there was a reduction of the production of construction brick—by 24.1 percent and prefabricated reinforced concrete elements—by 17.7 percent. Consumer goods production amounted to R836.9 billion, which in comparable prices is 6.9 percent below the 1992 level. For all groups of goods except wine and vodka and beer we did not manage to maintain the 1992 production volumes.

Food production amounted to R299.3 billion. The sharp decline in the production of food products in 1992 by 19.4 percent was replaced by a relative stabilization of their output in 1993 (a reduction of 0.8 percent as compared to the level of the preceding year). More meat was produced during the year—4,499 tonnes (4.9 percent), butter—1,067 tonnes (14.9 percent), mayonnaise—1,701 tonnes (15.1 percent) and confectionery items—1,529 tonnes (2.2 percent). At the same time less semimanufactured meat products were produced—386 tonnes (1.8 percent), whole milk products—27,061 tonnes (7.4 percent), margarine—10,136 tonnes (30.3 percent), vegetable oil—373 tonnes (17.7 percent), and bread and bakery items—34,918 tonnes (6.4 percent).

Some R34.7 billion worth of wine and vodka items and beer was produced, which exceeds last year's level by 8.1 percent, as a result of increasing the output of strong alcoholic beverages, champagne, and beer.

At light industry enterprises there was a reduction of the production of fabrics by 24.2 percent, footwear—by 48.3 percent, knitted items—by 19.8 percent, and the output of goods for children decreased by 31-67 percent.

The output of nonfood consumer goods (not including light industry goods) decreased by 9.2 percent, while this figure was 6.8 percent in 1992. The production of motorcycles was 7.4 percent less, enameled steel dishware—37.6 percent, bicycles—40.5 percent, and household goods—41.2 percent less. There was an increase in the output of certain kinds of complicated household equipment: kitchen appliances—by 38.4 percent, television sets—by 167.8 percent, electric irons—by 29.2 percent, and electric teapots—by 8.4 percent. At the same time there was a 39.2 percent reduction of the production of washing machines, video cassette recorders—53.5 percent, and radio equipment—56.3 percent.

Capital Construction

In the oblast national economy during the report year fixed capital valued at R257.5 was introduced, including for production purposes—R140.7 billion (54.6 percent of the overall amount introduced, in 1992 it was 64.6).

During the report period 1,490,500 square meters of residential space was introduced (100.1 percent of the 1992 level). At the same time there was a reduction of the rates of housing construction in 11 cities (35.5 percent of the overall number) and 18 rayons (78.2 percent). Among them were the cities of Irbit, Nvyansk, Serov, and Severouralsk, and the following rayons: Verkhoturskiy, Prigorodnyy, and Krasnoufimskiy.

General educational schools were introduced to accommodate 8,837 (72.7 percent of the 1992 level), children's preschool institutions to accommodate 2,310 (65.3 percent), hospitals with 639 beds (2.8 times more than in 1992), and polyclinics for 2,702 visits per shift (149.7 percent).

The introduction of housing per one oblast resident amounted to 0.32 square meters (in 1992—0.31), children's preschool institutions—0.53 places for 100 children of preschool age (in 1992—0.78), general educational schools—1.11 places for every 100 school children (in 1992—1.54), hospitals—1.37 beds for every 10,000 residents (1992—0.48), and polyclinics—5.78 visits per shift per 10,000 residents (1992—3.84).

Capital investments in the oblast economy amounted to R671.5 billion (71.4 percent of the 1992 level in comparable prices). Of these R385.6 billion (57.4 percent; in 1992—61.2 percent) was used for production purposes.

Centralized capital investments in the oblast national economy amounted to R204.2 billion (98.0 percent of

the 1992 level), and of these, money from the federal budget amounted to R65 billion (63 percent of the 1992 level) and from local budgets—R139.2 billion (132.4 percent). Capital belonging to state enterprises and organizations amounted to R200.9 billion (38 percent of the 1992 level) and other forms of ownership and credit—R254.9 billion (136.1 percent of the 1992 level), and capital belonging to the population and housing construction collectives—R11.5 billion (71.8 percent of the 1992 level).

In the agro-industrial complex during the report year fixed capital valued at R25.7 billion was introduced, including for production purposes—R19.7 billion. There was a reduction of the volume of startup of housing and social, cultural, and domestic facilities: In 1993, 126,500 square meters of dwelling space was introduced (70.8 percent of the 1992 level), children's preschool institutions to accommodate 50 (18.9), schools to accommodate 960 (in 1992—71.4), and clubs and houses of culture to accommodate 360 (48.0).

As of 1 January 1994 there were 514 contracting and repair-construction organizations in operation (as of 1 January 1993—514), of which 131 (192) were state, 4 (5)—municipal, 229 (199)—with a mixed form of ownership, and 150 (118)—private. They performed contracting work in a volume of R504.7 billion, including by state enterprises—R93.6 billion (19.1 percent of the overall volume; in 1992—33.6), municipal—2.6 (0.5 percent; in 1992—0.5), with a mixed form of ownership—254.3 (50.4 percent; in 1992—41.1), and by private organizations—R151.5 billion (30.0 percent; in 1992—24.8).

Agriculture

The increase in the number of producers of agricultural products did not lead to an increase in their production. According to the estimate, the gross agricultural output decreased by 5 percent as compared to 1992.

In 1993 the gross yield of grain on all categories of farms amounted to 744,200 tonnes in weight after cleaning (73 percent of last year's level), potatoes—654,700 tonnes (72 percent), and vegetables—228,900 tonnes (121 percent). The production of potatoes was 139 kg and vegetables—49 kg per oblast resident. Grain production was concentrated mainly on agricultural enterprises and potatoes and vegetables—on private subsidiary farms belonging to the population.

By the beginning of 1994, 12,700 tonnes of grain had been added to state resources, which is 2.5 times more than last year; potatoes—26,000 tonnes (39 percent of the 1992 level), and vegetables—53,300 tonnes (76 percent). The proportion of grain procured as compared to the volume of its production was 2 percent, potatoes—4 percent, and vegetables—23 percent.

The situation in animal husbandry is characterized by a reduction of the arrival of products from the farms of agricultural enterprises and simultaneously a small

increase in their production in private yards of the citizens. For one resident of the oblast they produced 319 eggs, 199 liters of milk, and 36 kg of meat.

Agricultural enterprises sold 149,200 tonnes of cattle and poultry for slaughter (94 percent of 1992), including poultry—60,900 tonnes (99.8 percent); the milk yield—562,200 tonnes (99.7 percent); and 1,374.1 million eggs were received (94.5 percent). The average milk yield from one cow was 2,681 kg and exceeded last year's level by 202 kilograms.

The reduction of the breeding herd led to a reduction of the production of young animals. During the report year as compared to the 1992 level we failed to receive 17,700 calves (7 percent) and 34,800 piglets (5 percent). Losses from death and destruction of hogs exceeded last year's level by 19,900 and cattle—by 200 head. As of 1 January 1994 the farms had 501,300 head of cattle, including cows—193,200, horses—17,000 (92 percent each), hogs—347,100 (93 percent), and poultry—13,706,100 head (97 percent).

State procurements of animal husbandry products (except for eggs) during January-December 1993 exceeded last year's level and amounted to: cattle and poultry—137,200 tonnes (101 percent), milk—480,000 tonnes (102 percent), eggs—1,153.9 billion (98 percent); the share from agricultural enterprises in state resources accounted for 94.1 percent of the meat and 99.2 percent of the milk. The amounts purchased from the population were 7,400 tonnes (5.4 percent) of cattle and poultry and 2,400 tonnes (0.5 percent) of milk, and the amounts purchased from farmers were 700 tonnes (0.5 percent) and 1,400 tonnes (0.3 percent), respectively.

As of 1 January 1994 there were 3,119 farmers, which was 16 percent more than at the beginning of 1993. Farmyards occupy 91,200 hectares of land, including 57,300 hectares of plowed land, which amounts to an average of 18 hectares per one farm.

Transportation and Communications

There was a reduction of freight shipments on all kinds of transportation, including automotive—by 47 million tonnes (38.5 percent), and rail—34.6 million tonnes (20 percent). The volume of shipments of freight and mail on air transportation decreased by 6,400 tonnes (37.2 percent). The reduction of the shipments of freight was caused by the reduction of the output of many kinds of products and also their concentration in warehouses of enterprises because of nonpayments.

Passenger turnover on general purpose transportation increased by 433.7 million passenger-kilometers (1.6 percent), including on rail transportation—by 2.3365 trillion passenger-kilometers (14.5 percent) and automotive—by 32.3 million passenger-kilometers (0.5 percent). Passenger turnover on air transportation decreased by 1.9351 trillion passenger-kilometers (47.7 percent).

The quality of passenger service is still poor. There was a considerable deterioration of the work of city transportation in Yekaterinburg. Each week buses and streetcars fail to make up to 13 percent of the planned trips, and trolleys—up to 10 percent of the trips. An investigation conducted by state statistical organs in November 1993 showed that during the morning peak hours every other bus passenger had to wait more than 20 minutes for a bus to come, as did every fifth streetcar passenger and every sixth trolley passenger. Time spent traveling to work and back amounted to an average of 1.5 hours a day, but 16 percent of the passengers (every sixth one) spends more than two hours. Three-fourths of the passengers questioned mentioned the crowding of the transportation vehicles during the morning peak hours. Only 2 percent of those questioned used the subway.

Commuter train and bus service for the population of the city of Yekaterinburg is getting worse. The number of scheduled suburban trips has been reduced. During January-February 1993 each week the schedule included 2,400 suburban trips, and during November-December—only 2,100.

As of 1 January 1994 there were 14 joint-stock companies operating in the general purpose automotive transportation system (25 percent of the overall number). They moved 62 percent of the freight and 8 percent of the passengers.

During 1993 communications enterprises received R34.7 billion in revenues from their basic activity, including R8.8 billion from the population. The volume of communications services in physical terms decreased considerably: The delivery of newspapers, magazines, and parcels—twofold, and letters, printed material, money transfers, and telegrams—by one-fourth.

The number of telephones in cities of the oblast increased by 21,200 (4 percent), and in rural locations—by 600 (1 percent). At the same time the number of city and rural automatic telephones decreased by 404 (6 percent) and interurban ones—by 143 (17 percent).

Finances

In 1993 the consolidated budget of Sverdlovsk Oblast received R837.3 billion in revenues, which is 10 times more than last year's level. The main sources of revenue are still: profit tax—R449.2 billion, income tax from citizens—R147.6 billion, value added tax—R87.1 billion, property tax—R19.2 billion, and excise tax—R18.2 billion. But because of the unsatisfactory financial conditions of a number of enterprises and organizations, the debt on payments to the oblast and local budgets continues to grow. As of 1 January of this year its amount reached R49.5 billion.

Budget expenditures amounted to R829.7 billion and increased 11-fold. Financing the national economy took R287.8 billion, public education—R180.7 billion, public health and physical culture—R203.7 billion, culture and

art—R16.3 billion, science—R0.7 billion, and stipends and compensation payments for children amounted to—R16.5 billion.

The consolidated oblast budget ended up with a surplus (with revenues surpassing expenditures) of R7.6 billion.

According to preliminary calculations, the sum of profit received by enterprises and organizations of the oblast during 1993 will amount to R1.750 trillion. State enterprises account for 43 percent of all the profit, and nonstate enterprises—57 percent. Based on the results of their operation over 11 months, losses were sustained by 306 of the more than 2,100 enterprises considered. The sum of their losses amounted to R5.4 billion.

Credit indebtedness of industrial, construction, transportation, and agricultural enterprises and organizations as of 1 December amounted to R1.4344 trillion, of which R438.9 billion or 30.6 percent was defaulted. The monetary funds of the enterprises, which amounted to R110.5 billion, covered their credit indebtedness by 7.7 percent, including in industry—7.8 percent, construction—5.4 percent, transportation—10.7 percent, and agriculture—5.9 percent.

Significant amounts of defaulted credit indebtedness are related to the existence of debit indebtedness. As of 1 December debit indebtedness amounted to R1.5395 billion, including defaulted debts—R538.8 billion, 92 percent of which are defaulted debts of buyers.

Prices and Rates

In December 1993 as compared to December 1992 consumer prices for goods and services rose 8.5-fold (not including non-necessities—8.6-fold), and wholesale prices for industrial products—10.7-fold. The growth rates for food and nonfood goods were considerably below the rates of prices and rates for paid services to the population, which increased 33.5-fold during the year.

In 1993 subsidies were allotted to producers of agricultural products for livestock, milk, and eggs, and there was regulation of wholesale prices of monopoly enterprises, rates for certain socially significant kinds of services, and also trade increments for a number of goods, which undoubtedly retarded the growth of prices.

In December 1993 as compared to the level of December of the preceding year vegetables became 16 times more expensive, milk and dairy products—15 times, and eggs—12 times. Prices of meat and poultry, sausage and macaroni items, and potatoes increased 9-10-fold; fish, butter and vegetable oil, flour, bread and bakery items—7-8-fold, and cheeses, margarine, and confectionery—6-7-fold. For fabrics, knitwear, leather and textile footwear, tobacco items, radio equipment, and electrical goods prices rose 3-4-fold, and clothing, rubber footwear, and furniture—5-fold. The highest growth was for medications—an average of 36-fold.

Of the services rendered to the population, the greatest price increases were for services of a legal nature and of banking institutions (386-fold) and also institutions of culture (86-fold). Rates for passenger transportation and communications and prices of medical service and housing services increased 17-19-fold, and consumer and tourist-excursion services and services for keeping children in preschool institutions—22-24-fold, and the cost of passes to sanatorium-health resort and health institutions rose 26-fold. The least growth in rates occurred for municipal services (11.3-fold).

As of the end of December in retail trade in the oblast the following average prices developed for the main food products: beef—R2,058 per kg, butter—R3,327 per kg, potatoes—R287 per kg, sugar—R812 per kg, eggs—R752 for 10, and milk R301 per liter. There is still a considerable differentiation of prices among the various cities (rayons) of the oblast. The minimum price for a liter of milk in the oblast in December was R123 and the maximum—R524; for 10 eggs—R405 and R930, respectively, for a kilogram of beef—R1,800 and R2,943, for butter—R2,765 and R4,485, for sugar—R620 and R848, and for potatoes—R70 and R360.

The greatest disparity of prices among the various cities and rayons of the oblast is still for paid services to the population. Thus the disparity in prices for laundry services was 10-fold, hotels—12-fold, bathhouses—25-fold, dormitories—80-fold, and medical service—from 10-fold to 39-fold.

Prices of food products at city markets in 1993 increased more slowly than they did in state trade. In December 1993 as compared to December 1992 at the markets meat increased in cost on average 7.8-fold, milk, sour cream, and cottage cheese—6.6-fold, and potatoes and vegetables—14-fold. As before, the market price level was higher than prices in organized trade. At the end of December the average price level at city markets for meat was R2,474 per kg, sour cream—R4,254 per kg, cottage cheese—R1,780 per kg, potatoes—R363 per kg, and milk—R656 per liter.

Prices of producers of industrial products grew at more rapid rates than did consumer prices, and in December 1993 as compared to December 1992 they increased for products for production and technical purposes 10.8-fold, and for consumer goods—9.5-fold. Since September the growth rates of prices for industrial products have begun to drop and in December they were the lowest in the report year—11.6 percent. In December a smaller increase in prices than in all the preceding months of 1993 was found in ferrous metallurgy, forestry and light industry, in which, as compared to December 1992, prices increased on average 10-12-fold. Prices increased most during the year in electric energy engineering, especially electric energy for agricultural consumers (91-fold). Rates for electric energy for industrial consumers increased 16.7-fold, for electric commuter rail transportation—23-fold, for city transportation—37.5-fold, and for thermal energy—on average 35.7-fold.

The rates for the shipment of freight for all kinds of transportation in December 1993 as compared to December 1992 increased almost 23-fold, including automotive—11.5-fold, air—15.2-fold, pipelines (gas)—20.9-fold, and rail—26.7-fold.

Commodity Turnover

Retail commodity turnover, including the sale of goods for hard currency, amounted to R1,267.3 trillion, including in the trade network—R1,178.7 trillion, and at public catering enterprises—R88.6 billion. In actual prices commodity turnover exceeded last year's level 10-fold, but in comparable prices it was 5.3 percent less.

Retail commodity turnover of all officially registered trade enterprises developed as follows: 39.6 percent (in 1992—54.9 percent) of all the goods were sold in the state sector, and in the private sector—47.9 percent (35.6 percent), at enterprises of the consumer cooperation system—5.8 percent (9.3 percent), and at other nonstate enterprises—6.7 percent (0.2 percent).

Commodity supplies in warehouses of the retail network of officially registered trade enterprises as of 1 January 1994 amounted to R202.5 billion, which was R496.5 million (2.5 percent) more than as of the beginning of last year. This volume of commodity resources could maintain continuous trade for 28 days.

There was an increase in the proportion of nonfoodstuffs in the structure of retail commodity turnover in 1993.

The situation in the foodstuffs market was relatively stable, but the assortment and quality of the products and the prices did not always meet consumer demand. In spite of the constant availability of practically all foodstuffs for free sale and their active sales, the low buying power of the population allowed them to acquire less food than in past years, although there was an increase in sales in the main commodity groups.

The situation with the provision by state trade organizations of potatoes and vegetables for the population is worse than in previous years. By the beginning of the winter season in the storage facilities of the trade network there was less for long-term storage than last year: potatoes, onions, and carrots—by half, and cabbage—by one-third. The volumes that were stored up were practically 50 percent less than the amount sold annually in the trade network.

The provision of the population with nonfoodstuffs improved last year, with R597.9 billion sold. The stores were saturated mainly because of costly goods and increased foreign procurements by commercial structures. According to accounting data, more than half of the fabrics, clothing, and footwear brought into the oblast, up to 40 percent of the business goods, and 30 percent of the haberdashery items are imports.

In turn, one-fourth of the commodity mass produced in the oblast is shipped outside, including one-third of the

finished knitwear items, one-fourth of the felt footwear, one-half of the hosiery items and leather footwear, and 70-80 percent of the radio equipment, motorcycles, and motor scooters.

The following was sold to the population of the oblast during the year: clothing and underwear—1.1 times more than during 1992, hosiery items—1.2 times, footwear—1.1 times, silk fabrics—1.8 times, and cotton fabrics—1.3 times. The demand of the population for cultural and domestic goods is not declining—99,100 radios were sold (1.8-times more than last year), and television sets—92,200 (1.7-times). Of the goods in daily demand there was an increase in the sales of toilet soap by 15.5 percent (5,500 tonnes were sold), household soap—30 percent (4,200 tonnes), and detergents—61.5 percent (13,200 tonnes). The sale of wool fabrics and knitted items did not reach last year's level.

The volume of sales of paid services amounted to R125.8 billion, but in physical terms the population received half the volume of services rendered in 1992.

The sale of paid services was mainly at enterprises of the state and municipal sectors, which accounted for 83.0 percent of the total volume. Enterprises with the mixed and private forms of ownership accounted for 16.5 percent of the overall volume of paid services, and 0.5 percent was at enterprises that are the property of public organizations. The greatest decline in the number of orders was for consumer services—repair of housing and furniture, laundry, and dry cleaning.

Foreign Economic Activity

Product exports amounted to R520.9258 trillion in domestic prices or \$892 million in foreign trade prices. The volume of goods delivered for freely convertible currency was R82.2799 trillion in domestic prices or 15.8 percent of the overall volume of exports.

The largest proportion of the overall volume of exports was made up of raw and processed materials—93.9 percent. The proportion of machines and equipment was 3.5 percent; equipment and materials for facilities under construction abroad with technical assistance from the Russian Federation—0.8 percent; consumer goods—0.3 percent; and services—1.5 percent of the overall volume of exports. The main export items are metals and items made from them, chemical products, ores, and concentrates.

The largest exporting enterprises are: the NTMK Joint-Stock Company—48.5 percent of the overall volume of exports, the VIZ Joint-Stock Company—3.4 percent, and the Bogoslovskiy Aluminum Plant Joint-Stock Company—2.9 percent.

Among the countries delivering raw materials, the industrially developed countries are in the lead. Thus imports from Japan amounted to \$9,447,000, the United States of America—\$9,237,000, Austria—\$7,809,000, and Germany—\$5,220,000.

During 1993, \$581.4 million was deposited in the foreign currency accounts of enterprises and organizations. Foreign currency revenues from exporting products amounted to \$461.1 million, services—\$42.7 million, and other revenues—\$77.4 million. A total of \$562.4 million in foreign currency funds were spent, including for importing products—\$97.1 million, services—\$2.6 million, and other payments—\$96.1 million. Foreign currency amounting to \$366.4 million was sold.

Exchanges

During the year the five exchanges held 946 trading sessions and concluded 5,120 transactions. The turnover of the exchanges amounted to R55.0597 trillion. More than half of the transactions—56.6 percent—were for the sale of products for production and technical purposes, and commodity turnover amounted to R23.4783 trillion.

Monetary resources that were sold amounted to R16.2194 trillion, of which R8.068.5 were credit resources and R8,150.9 were deposit resources. Security sales amounted to R7.8805 trillion, including stocks—R3.4437 trillion, options—R2.3932 trillion, and privatization checks—R2.0436 trillion.

The Standard of Living of the Population

After the sharp decline in 1992 the standard of living of the population stabilized at a mark considerably below that of the pre-reform period. Monetary incomes of the population increased 10.2-fold, reaching R41,000 per one resident per month. In December the nominal per capita monetary income amounted to R95,000.

According to data from an ongoing selective study of family budgets, during the fourth quarter 14 percent of the families were on the threshold of poverty, which is defined by the physiological minimum for nutrition (R38,100). 41 percent were underprivileged families with income per one family member between the poverty threshold and the subsistence minimum, which is evaluated by the consumer basket, which is valued at R71,500. The proportion of these families decreased from 69 percent in the fourth quarter of 1992 to 55 percent during the same period of last year.

There was a 10 percent increase in the proportion of families with incomes equal to the value of one to two consumer baskets. There were more well-off families (with an average per capita income equal to the value of two to four consumer baskets)—8 percent, while a year ago they made up 5 percent, and for the first time it was possible to single out rich people—0.4 percent of the families have an average per capita income in excess of the value of four consumer baskets. As a result of the continuing stratification of the population, the average level of per capita income of the 10 percent of the most well-off citizens was 7.7 times above the corresponding level of the 10 percent of the least well-off.

Bank deposits of the population as of 1 January 1994 amounted to R125.8 billion. The increase in savings of

the population in deposits and securities (bonds, certificates, treasury notes) reached R108.5 billion and increased 13.3-fold as compared to the preceding year.

The AVERAGE ANNUAL NUMBER OF WORKERS was 1,785,900 (not counting workers at small enterprises), which is 4.2 percent less than in 1992.

A one-time study of the employment of the population conducted by statistical organs during the period from 20 through 31 October 1993 encompassed 0.3 percent of the population between 15 and 72 years of age living permanently in the cities and rayons (except Garinskiy and Tabsoinskiy) of Sverdlovsk Oblast. As a result it was discovered that of the overall number studied, 62.1 percent had work and 3.1 percent of them were looking for different or additional work. Of the number who did not have work, 8.2 percent were looking for it, including those registered with the employment service as unemployed—1.4 percent, those not looking for work—36.2 percent, and those who did not need to work—55.6 percent.

The number of citizens applying to the employment service regarding questions of labor placement amounted to 80,563 at the end of 1993, 46,832 of which were women.

The demand for labor force continues to decrease. Notifications by enterprises of the need for workers decreased as compared to the beginning of the year by 17.4 percent and as of 1 January 1994 amounted to 5,459.

As of 1 January 1994, 28,015 people were officially recognized as unemployed, of whom 17,471 received compensation. Women make up 67.2 percent of the unemployed. The number of youth under 29 years of age among the unemployed decreased by 2 percent as compared to last year and amounted to 36.0 percent.

During the year R1,165.1 million was spent for payment of compensation, including R235.7 million during December.

The average annual wages in the oblast reached R59,551, which is 8.8 times above last year's level. In December in the oblast wages amounted to R133,554, and the average amount of material assistance and benefits per one worker was R25,312.

According to preliminary figures, the population as of 1 January 1994 amounted to 4,665,300. There remains a tendency toward decrease of the birth rate and increase of the death rate of the population. In 1993, 4,400 fewer children were born than in the preceding year, and the coefficient of the birth rate (the number of births per 1,000 population) decreased from 9.5 in 1992 to 8.6, or by 10 percent.

The decline of the birth rate is explained not only by objective demographic factors but also by the deterioration of the socioeconomic situation in the oblast. These same factors can explain the continuing rise of the level of the death rate of the population; during the past year

the number of deaths increased by 10,700. The coefficient of the death rate (the number of deaths per 1,000 residents) was 15.0, and in the preceding year it was 12.7. There was a 9 percent increase in the coefficient of infant mortality: 19 children die out of every 1,000 births. The number of deaths in 1993 exceeded the number of births by 30,000.

As a favorable factor in the demographic situation one can observe a certain increase in the number of marriages—by 1,300.

By the beginning of 1994 on the territory of the oblast there were 4,000 refugee families registered and only 8,400 who were forced to resettle. The majority came from Tajikistan—42 percent, from Georgia—23 percent, and from Azerbaijan—9 percent. Two-thirds of them are Russians, and then come Greeks, Armenians, and Tatars. They are settling mainly in Yekaterinburg and other large cities of the oblast; 824 people have settled in rural areas.

During the year internal affairs organs registered 108,123 crimes—1,528 less than in 1992. There were 5,435 fewer crimes committed in Yekaterinburg and 1,768 more crimes committed in the other territories of the oblast. The proportion of these crimes increased from 18.7 percent to 23.6 percent. The number of premeditated murders increased—1,097 (last year—898), premeditated serious bodily harm—3,334 (2,662), torture—650 (550), and rape—587 (last year—466). As a result of the crimes that were committed, 2,828 people died. The number of property crimes decreased by 5 percent compared to last year, and their proportion in the structure of crime is the highest—74 percent; there was a 4 percent increase in crimes against public order and the health of citizens, and the number of crimes against individuals increased by 26 percent. The number of people who had committed crimes who were found out was 44,165.

During the year 45 rallies and demonstrations were registered in the oblast in which more than 278,000 people participated, four strikes, with a total of 1,704 strikers, and 18,822 work days were lost.

Privatization

The year 1993 is characterized by the completion of "small-scale" privatization and the beginning of privatization of enterprises of the base branches of the national economy. As of 1 January 1994 2,828 enterprises in the oblast had been privatized (which was about one-third of the number of enterprises owned by the state), including 1,610 in 1993. The number of privatized enterprises increased 2.3-fold as compared to 1992. Of the overall number of privatized enterprises, 74.3 percent were completely bought out, of which 58.5 percent were bought in 1993, which exceeds the 1992 rates 1.4-fold. By the time of their privatization more than 620,000 people were employed at these enterprises. Privatization of enterprises and individual facilities was conducted in

all cities and rayons of the oblast except Garinskiy, Pyshminskiy, and Taborinskiy.

With the development of "large-scale privatization" there was an increase in the proportion of federally owned enterprises in the overall number of those privatized from 8.6 percent in 1992 to 16 percent in 1993, and the proportion of enterprises privatized through the creation of joint-stock companies increased from 0.7 percent to 18 percent. The most widespread form was privatization of enterprises on a competitive basis—41.5 percent; 8.1 percent of the facilities were sold at auction; and 27 percent of the enterprises were purchased by collectives who were leasing the property. The sales price exceeded the initial price 4.5-fold as compared to two-fold in 1992.

Earnings from privatization of enterprises (facilities), including joint-stock companies, during 1993 amounted to R10.2179 trillion, which was 90.4 percent of the volume of monetary funds envisioned by the oblast program for privatization for 1993. From privatization of municipally owned enterprises they received R6.3225 trillion (61.9 percent), oblast owned—R499.1 million (4.9 percent), and federally owned—R3.3963 trillion (33.2 percent). Of the earnings, 41.8 percent was transferred into local budgets, 25.6 percent—into the oblast budget, 13.9 percent—into the federal budget, and 18.7 percent went to state privatization organs.

During the year 276,500 apartments were turned over to private ownership of citizens; this is 23.1 percent of the number of apartments subject to privatization. The overall value of privatized apartments is estimated at R17.919 trillion. The local budget received R32.7 million. Since the beginning of privatization of the housing supply (July 1992) a total of 364,700 apartments (30.4 percent) have been sold to the citizens for private ownership.

Environmental Protection

As compared to last year investments in environmental protection measures decreased by 20 percent (in comparable prices) and amounted to R26.392 trillion. Of the overall volume of capital investments, 56 percent went for protection and rational utilization of water resources, 28 percent—for protection of the air, and 4 percent—for protection and rational utilization of land.

During the year 29 cases of surging overflows and discharges of pollutants were registered. They led to extremely high levels of pollution of the environment. The overall total damage amounted to R88.4 million.

Discharges of pollutants into bodies of water in excess of the norm were allowed by almost every fifth enterprise of the 975 that were investigated, and every sixth one of the 1,096 inspected was functioning while exceeding the maximum permissible discharges into the atmosphere.

In 1993, 521 cases of forest fires were registered, 9,400 cubic meters of timber burned or was damaged in the stand, and the damage caused by forest fires is estimated at

R7.6 million. Forest restoration work has been conducted on an area of 59,500 hectares, 41.6 percent of which are planted in seeds and seedlings.

Rossel Continues Work To Legalize Urals Autonomy

944F0415A Moscow OBSHCAYA GAZETA in Russian
No 9, 4 Mar 94 p 8

[Article by Oleg Zhirnov: "Rossel Persists"]

[Text] The all but buried and long-forgotten plan for the Ural Republic has risen like a phoenix from the ashes.

Last week former Governor Eduard Rossel, now a senator from Sverdlovsk Oblast, officially submitted a package of documents to the Federation Council in an attempt to legalize the Ural Republic. Copies of the documents were forwarded to the State Duma. According to plan, the State Duma should pass a law to change the status of the federation member, and the Federation Council should ratify it.

Both will require the support of a two-thirds majority. Eduard Rossel and his fellow countrymen in the Duma have launched an intense lobbying campaign. The former governor, who was removed from office by the RF president precisely for his declaration of the Ural Republic, asserts that he is finding support in the higher chamber. Furthermore, he is winning the support of not only senators from krays and oblasts, but also senators from republics who were previously against this idea. In the lower house, parliamentary hearings on the Ural initiative have already been scheduled for 18 April.

On his next trip to Moscow, the ex-governor hopes to talk to the leaders of political parties and parliamentary factions: Zhirnovskiy, Zyuganov, and Gaydar. He has special hopes for his meeting with Vladimir Volfovich, who is "always talking about the equality of federation members." Sergey Shakhrai, the leader of the PRES and the minister for federation affairs who is willing to support the idea of a Ural Republic extending to at least two oblasts, but who objects to a republic confined within the boundaries of only Sverdlovsk Oblast, was given a copy of the constitution of the Ural Republic, autographed by Rossel: "A keepsake, an example of the construction of a strong Russian state."

"This will be a colossal breakthrough," Eduard Ergartovich told the OBSHCAYA GAZETA correspondent. "We are the flagship. If we break through the lines, all oblasts can have the same status in the future."

In the words of the ex-governor, "after the blow we were dealt, none of the oblasts is claiming the right to republic status and its own constitution." The new Russian Basic Law, however, gave each oblast the right of legislative initiative and the right to approve its own charter. This started a run on the Sverdlovsk Oblast legislative drafts. According to Rossel, all krays and oblasts, without exception, quickly analyzed the text of the Ural constitution and copied it in their own charters. There was no

need to rack their brains: All they had to do was preface the text with their own title: "Charter of X Oblast."

In view of the fact that the new Russian Constitution proclaimed the equality of federation members, can the duplication of the Ural constitution in the kray and oblast charters serve as a practical method of realizing this desired equality? Can this give new life, "a second wind," to Rossel's own initiative, which seemed to have been stifled completely by the president's stern decision?

The Ural constitution does not grant the federation member the kind of privileges that were granted to Kazan, for example, in the treaty with Moscow. There is one article, however, which Rossel calls a "major breakthrough": The declaration that anything within the boundaries of Sverdlovsk Oblast "belongs to the Ural Republic." On this basis, local economic laws can be published and local economic programs can be launched. There would be no need for the dozens of economic agreements Kazan concluded with Moscow. Everything would be defined by local laws. The Ural Republic is being used as a model in several oblasts, such as Ulyanovsk Oblast, for example, where bicameral representative bodies of government will be empowered to make laws.

"We see the Ural Republic as the prototype of the territorial division of the Russian Federation," Chairman Vasily Tarasenko of the Senate Committee on Federation Affairs, the Federation Treaty, and Regional Policy told the OBNCHAYA GAZETA correspondent after he had read the package of Ural documents. He warns that they still need careful examination. "If, however, they do make references to regional or territorial legislation, I would welcome this. All krays and oblasts need good basic legislation today."

Rossel has less chance of success in the Duma. The Duma Committee on Federation Affairs and Regional Policy insists that the general principles of the federal process must be consolidated before specific forms of this process can be regulated. Chairman Vladimir Lysenko of the Subcommittee on the Development of Federal Relations believes that Rossel's idea is less relevant now that the new Russian constitution has granted federation members equal rights. "As soon as this equality was declared, the other oblasts seem to have calmed down and stopped making demands. Precedents can be quite dangerous in Russia, however, and if the Ural Republic wins approval, the others will begin demanding the same treatment, and this process will be impossible to stop."

The next "breakthrough" in the federal process could be accomplished in different ways: either by elevating the status of a particular RF member or by concluding a separate treaty with one of them. The "breakthrough" could occur far from the Urals (Kaliningrad Oblast was the first claimant) and could have completely different consequences, especially in view of the fact that

Chechnya and Tatarstan—and not the Urals or Kaliningrad—are still the main source of headaches for central government officials.

Tyumen Statistics Committee Reports 1993 Figures

Statistics for Enterprises

944F0462A Tyumen TYUMENSKAYA PRADA in Russian
9 Feb 94 p 1

[Report of Tyumen Oblast Statistics Committee: "The Amount of Money Is Substantial but Insufficient"]

[Text] Businessmen and organizations in the oblast earned 1.2 trillion rubles in profit in the first 11 months of 1993. Around 84 percent of all the profit in the oblast was earned by industrial enterprises and transport organizations. The higher profits in these branches were mainly due to higher wholesale and retail prices.

The majority of industrial enterprises and agricultural, transport, and construction organizations are experiencing financial difficulties. This is attested to by data on the status of mutual settlements between the buyers and producers of goods.

Overdue payments on incurred debts (or nonpayments) increased by 586.2 billion rubles (or 42 percent) in November 1993, and nonpayments on credit debts increased by 482.1 billion rubles (36 percent). (Incurred debts are all of the debts owed to enterprises—Ed.)

Almost one out of every two enterprises was unable to pay its debts to creditors on time. Financial conditions are particularly unsatisfactory at the Otdelochnik-20 and Sibkomplektavtotrans joint-stock companies of the closed type, the Tobolsk Meat Combine, the Surgut Municipal Dairy, the Gydansk Fish Plant, the Vagay Joint Timber Association, the Feniks joint-stock company, the Mir Sovkhoz, and the Sibir Kolkhoz.

There were no overdue payments on credit debt in the Kogalymtruboprovodstroy Trust, the Ishim Reinforced Concrete Products Plant, the Surgut Meat Processing Combine, the Tyumenskiy Dom Khleba open joint-stock company, the Akva joint-stock company, the Pyshminskoye closed joint-stock company, and the Marma Oil Company.

Enterprises in the petroleum refining industry now owe the budget 567.2 billion rubles, or 80 percent of all nonpayments to the budget in the oblast. Overdue payments to the budget amount to 127.3 billion rubles for the Yuganskneftegaz joint-stock company, 79.2 billion for Langepasneftegaz, 62.4 billion for Kondpetroleum, and 43 billion for the Noyabrskneftegaz Production Association.

Oblast enterprises applied for bank credit and loans to supplement their financial resources. Their total debt amounted to 341.6 billion rubles (including 19.3 billion

in overdue payments). This figure is lower than the figure for 1 November 1993.

Deposits in State Bank branches in the oblast from savings banks in 1993 were 24.4 times as high as the 1992 figure, receipts from rail, air, and water transport were 20.6 times as high, the receipts of enterprises of the Ministry of Railways were 15.9 times as high, local transport receipts were 6.8 times as high, and the receipts of consumer service enterprises were 9.6 times as high. The rate of increase in receipts in the oblast was slightly lower in January-December.

The amount of money put into circulation in the oblast was 2.0721 trillion rubles. This was 11 times as high as last year's figure.

Production Statistics

94410402B Tyumen TYUMENSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 10 Feb 94 p 1

[Report of Tyumen Oblast Statistics Committee: "More New Structures, Fewer Products"]

[Text] **Output and Deliveries of Manufactured Goods:** The process of forming new entrepreneurial structures was more intense in 1993. At the beginning of 1994 there were 154 joint-stock companies (45 percent of the total number), 26 commercial partnerships (8 percent), and 14 leased enterprises (4 percent) engaged in industrial production. The number of joint-stock companies was six times as high as at the beginning of 1993, and the number of partnerships was three times as high. The number of leased enterprises was reduced by more than half.

Oblast industry produced goods worth 7.2127 trillion rubles in existing prices, with state enterprises accounting for 94 percent, mixed enterprises accounting for 5 percent, and municipal and private enterprises accounting for 0.4 and 0.6 percent respectively. Enterprises of the Khanty-Mansiysk Autonomous Okrug produced 71.2 percent of the total output, enterprises in the Yamalo-Nenetsk Autonomous Okrug produced 19.6 percent, and enterprises in the south of the oblast produced 8.2 percent.

The growth of production volume (or the maintenance of the previous volume) at enterprises of the Rosneftegaz corporation and Gazprom concern began to stabilize the output of manufactured goods in the oblast as a whole and in the autonomous okrugs in October 1993. Production volume is still decreasing, however, at enterprises in the southern zone. Output decreased at the turbomachine and Ishim Agricultural Machinery plants, the Zased ATF joint-stock company, the Ishim Machine-Building Plant, the Tobolsk Petrochemical Combine, and other enterprises.

Production Output in Physical Terms: The output of petroleum and gas condensate at oblast enterprises in 1993 was 35.6 million tonnes (or 13.7 percent) below the

figure for 1992 and amounted to 224.7 million tonnes, including 218.6 million tonnes of oil. Most of the oil (98.8 percent) was produced by enterprises of the Rosneftegaz corporation, and the rest was produced by enterprises of the State Geology Committee (0.7 percent), the Urengoygazprom Production Association (0.4 percent), and the Krasnoleninskneftegazgeologiya state enterprise (0.1 percent).

The Kalchinsk subdivision of the Tyumenneftegaz Scientific Production Association and the Tyumennedra state enterprise produced 50,300 tonnes of petroleum in Uvatskiy Rayon.

The average daily output of petroleum and gas condensate at the end of 1993 was equivalent to the 1977-78 level and amounted to 615,600 tonnes. This was 13.5 percent below the 1992 figure and 0.5 percent below the figure for January-November 1993. The output decreased at all enterprises of the Rosneftegaz corporation, with the exception of the Varyeganneftegaz joint-stock company.

The output of natural gas was 3.1 percent below the 1992 figure. The average daily output was 2.8 percent below the previous year's figure.

Urengoygazprom, the largest gas production association, produced 24.8 billion cubic meters, or 8.6 percent, less than it had produced the previous year.

There was a decrease in the output of electricity, liquefied hydrocarbon gases, synthetic resins and plastics, metal-cutting and woodworking machine tools, oil production equipment, technological equipment for light industry, tractor and vehicle trailers and semi-trailers, agricultural machines, building brick, prefabricated reinforced concrete structures and elements, and other items. The output of all of the main products of the timber and woodworking industry also decreased.

The output of diesel fuel, batteries, and disposable needles and syringes increased.

More Production Statistics

944F0402C Tyumen TYUMENSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 15 Feb 94 p 2

[Report of Tyumen Oblast Statistics Committee: "Work in 'Automatic Stop' Mode"]

[Text] Industrial enterprises in the oblast employed 304,500 people in January-November 1993: 52 percent in the Khanty-Mansiysk Autonomous Okrug, 20.4 percent in the Yamalo-Nenetsk Autonomous Okrug, and 27.6 percent at enterprises in the south of the oblast. Funds designated for consumption during that period amounted to 611.2 billion rubles, with wages accounting for 89 percent of the total and financial assistance and special incentives accounting for 11 percent. Funds for all personnel were equivalent to 10.5 percent of the total production output. The average wage of people

employed in oblast industry in November was 317,300 rubles, and the figure in the southern zone was 123,600 rubles.

In December there were work stoppages in some production units at 17 industrial enterprises (3 in the Khanty-Mansiysk Autonomous Okrug and 14 in the south). They included the Nadezhda joint venture, the Zavod ATE joint-stock company, the Ishim Machine-Building Plant, plants of the Ishim Agricultural Machinery Production Association, the electrical machinery plant, the DSP-250 plant, and other enterprises.

The main reasons were difficulties in selling products and shortages of material resources. The stoppages led to the dismissal of 151 workers in December, including 125 from Ishim Machine-Building Plant. Another 4,012 workers had to take an unpaid leave at the administration's request.

Production Expenditures: Expenditures per ruble of commercial product were 14.3 percent above the figure for January-November 1992 and amounted to 82.7 kopecks. Expenditures decreased by 5 percent at enterprises in the oblast's southern zone and amounted to 70.68 kopecks. Expenditures per ruble of commercial product increased in all branches of industry except the chemical and petrochemical industry, machine building, and metal working.

Expenditures were much higher than they had been the previous year at the Chernogorneft closed joint-stock company (by 145.8 percent), the Langepasneftegaz joint-stock company (58.5 percent), enterprises of the Nizhnevartovskneftegaz Association (31.7 percent), the Megion, Mezhdurechenskiy, and Pionerskiy timber associations, the Lina joint-stock company, the electrical machinery plant, and other enterprises.

Meanwhile, production expenditures decreased at the Tobolsk Meat Combine, the Tyumen Bread Combine, the Serginoles joint-stock company, the Sovetskiy Saw Mill and Woodworking Combine, Vinzili firm, and other enterprises.

Tyumen Counterintelligence Service Restructured

944F0403A Tyumen TYUMENSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 9 Feb 94 p 1

[Press release of Tyumen Oblast Administration of Federal Counterintelligence Service: "Tyumen Counterintelligence Will Be Regional"]

[Text] Colonel-General Nikolay Golushko, director of the Federal Counterintelligence Service (FSK), had a conference in Moscow with Tyumen Oblast and Khanty-Mansiysk and Yamalo-Nenetsk autonomous okrug administration chiefs Leonid Roketskiy, Aleksandr Filippenko, and Lev Bayandin, Tyumen Oblast Presidential Representative Gennadiy Shcherbakov, and Major-General Anatoliy Antipin, chief of the oblast FSK administration.

They discussed the structure of local counterintelligence agencies and their objectives in view of the present critical state of the fuel and energy complex. A decision was made to form a regional FSK administration for all three members of the federation in Tyumen Oblast and to reduce the staff of the former oblast office of the Ministry of Security by 12 percent for the more effective safeguarding of the security of the strategic facilities of the fuel and energy complex and the performance of other functions defined in the statute on the FSK of 5 January 1994.

Tyumen Law Enforcement Officials Meet Press

944F0403B Tyumen TYUMENSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 5 Feb 94 p 1

[Article by V. Grachev: "Not That Bad?"]

[Text] The heads of oblast law enforcement agencies had a meeting with journalists last Wednesday at the suggestion of the oblast administration.

I have to say right away that I do not share the skeptical views of some of my colleagues with regard to this gathering. It is true that the specific purpose of the press conference was absolutely obvious: Deputy Administration Chief Valeriy Bagin, who conducted the press conference, frankly admitted that the crime rate is rising, but the public must not lose all hope. Law enforcement agencies are doing their job in spite of all obstacles and are adapting to the new conditions. Criminals do not feel as unconstrained as some news programs have suggested.

It seems to me that this is a valid statement. The reason for the rising crime rate is not the unsatisfactory performance of the police, the courts, or the procuracy. The main cause is the steady disintegration of the economy and all the foundations of our daily life. The personnel of the police force, the courts, the procuracy, and other law enforcement agencies that did not leave, in spite of all inducements, and move into the comfortable offices of commercial structures—where everything is peaceful and where the pay is much higher—might deserve more respect today than anyone else, in spite of all the remaining problems, in spite of the fact that people feel the need to hide behind iron gates, and in spite of the fact that "every flock has its black sheep."

The statements at the press conference were reserved. The situation is still under control, thank God, and has not reached the point of total chaos and lawlessness. Furthermore, there have been some successes: Several homicides that were "pending" for several years were recently solved, the organizers of the recent notorious and bloody fights between mafia clans were exposed and arrested, and the invaluable canvases of the Russian old masters that had been stolen from the Tyumen Art Gallery were recovered. Even the president heard about this case. The devastated service for the prevention of economic crime is being revitalized to some extent.

It is extremely difficult to do this work today. As I look through my notes, the following details stand out: Viktor Simonov, administration chief in the State Trade Inspectorate—subjected to intense psychological pressure by criminal gangs during inspections of commercial stores, around 90 percent of which are paying protection money to racketeers. Valeriy Borisov, chief of the regional administration for action against organized crime—identified more than 100 criminal gangs and broke up over 30 of them last year. The gangs are well-organized: They have power structures, fighting forces, and economic divisions for the "laundering" of money, the organization of credit operations, and so forth. Last year the regional administration solved more than 400 serious crimes—homicides, cases of extortion, and racketeering. Veniamin Basharin, chief of the oblast internal affairs administration: The criminals feel invulnerable. They commit murders here and then go abroad—to Kazakhstan, Georgia, or Armenia. Ten people were arrested in connection with the mafia clan warfare and two are still at large. The main culprit—a professional hired killer—was "brought to light" in Kazakhstan, but our request for his extradition led to a whole series of other events. It took the threat of road blocks on all highways—so that not one vehicle carrying lumber or anything else could reach Kazakhstan—before the murderer was finally turned over to us. Our neighbors in Sverdlovsk Oblast also experienced bloody confrontations and have not found the guilty parties yet. In the words of V. Basharin, the present irresponsible behavior of some citizens is interfering with the performance of police work: People cannot be arrested for vagrancy. They do not have to work if they do not want to. They are free to make their own choices, but this is a breeding ground for criminals. Witnesses are another big problem. They are completely unprotected by the state and the law and are intimidated and threatened. People are afraid of saying anything, and criminals escape responsibility for crimes because of a lack of evidence. There are many other problems as well, but the number of solved crimes was nevertheless higher than in 1992 in some areas. V. Belyayev, chairman of the oblast court: Legal protection should not depend on attendant circumstances, but it does. Judges are not the problem: They will work as many hours as they have to. The problem is the shortage of jurors. People do not want to serve on juries. By law, their place of employment pays them the average wage for the time they spend in court, and who wants that? There are not enough auxiliary personnel in the courts, no process servers, no gasoline, no vehicles or guards to bring the criminals to court, etc. Witnesses cannot be called because people are afraid.

That is the situation in our law enforcement agencies today. As I have already said, however, they are still doing their job. They have finally begun taking action against people who take bribes. Last year they investigated 146 cases of bribery. The figure is not that high, but at least there has been some progress. They prevented 120 crimes connected with forged bank remittance notes during the year, saving 46 billion rubles.

Someone asked when the agencies would restore order in the market: The prices there, after all, are being set by the market mafia. Simonov replied that the market is a matter of constant concern to the State Trade Inspectorate. Prices drop as soon as the inspectors arrive, but the next day they are raised again. Basharin said that a special office of the internal affairs administration had been opened to take charge of the market, and he assured the press that order would be restored. All of the same problems still exist: There are no witnesses to testify. People either do not want to get involved or are simply afraid. Nevertheless, the situation in the market will get better. The registration of "foreigners" from the former fraternal republics, who are largely responsible for the present situation in the market, should be a big help. Those who behave unscrupulously run the risk of losing their licenses, and that does have an impact.

There were understandable questions about the amnesty. In view of the present crime wave, no one at the press conference was in favor of this. The prognosis was that this would cause more outbreaks of criminal behavior and that things would get worse.

There were many other questions as well. Some of the answers were reassuring and some were not. The law enforcement officials agreed to hold regular press conferences. I had the idea that it might be best to arrange for televised conferences of this kind once or twice a month for the whole oblast population, so that the people who have locked the iron gates of their homes can see that they can rely on the services of the police force, the courts, the procuracy, the trade inspectorate, and even the former State Security Committee, now renamed the Counterintelligence Committee, all of the individuals entrusted to combat corruption, the illegal drug traffic, and the theft of our national resources. They could take a look at these people and ask them—if they have a telephone—whatever they want to ask them, and find out what lies ahead. What bothers the people most, after all, is the uncertainty and unpredictability of events and the extremely depressing suspicion that the state and its law enforcement agencies have simply forsaken all of us. Mutual understanding is a great achievement, especially at a time of crisis.

Tyumen Oblast, Autonomous Okrugs Negotiate on Treaty

94410403C Tyumen TYUMENSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 13 Feb 94 p 1

[Article by S. Shilnikov, economic correspondent: "The Negotiations Are Over"]

[Text] On 11 February "groups of experts from Tyumen Oblast, the Khanty-Mansiysk Autonomous Okrug, and the Yamalo-Nenetsk Autonomous Okrug, having discussed the drafts of the treaty submitted by the State Committee of the Russian Federation and Tyumen Oblast in conjunction with the Khanty-Mansiysk and Yamalo-Nenetsk autonomous okrugs, agreed on the following":

Subsection One: "It is necessary and possible to combine" the drafts of the treaty submitted by Tyumen Oblast and the Khanty-Mansiysk and Yamalo-Nenetsk autonomous okrugs for the purpose of elaborating a single, agreed draft treaty on this basis.

"Necessary and possible"—this is quite good in itself. What is the subject of the treaty? Take a look at the second subsection: "The subject of the treaty is the whole group of interrelations" between Tyumen Oblast and the two okrugs.

Let us move on from the subject of the treaty to the title. It is listed in the third subsection: "The working title of the treaty is the Treaty on the Interrelations of Tyumen Oblast, the Khanty-Mansiysk Autonomous Okrug, and the Yamalo-Nenetsk Autonomous Okrug—with a specific reference in the text of the treaty to the status of the parties to the treaty as autonomous and equal members of the Russian Federation."

An old Russian adage tells us: "Go ahead and call it a pot if you wish, but do not put it on the stove." This is not the case here, and this is why I have quoted the third subsection in its entirety.

This is the time to say something about the structure of the treaty. Experts are experts, and they make provisions for these "minutiae." This, therefore, is the structure: the preamble, the general provisions, the principles of interrelations, the interrelations of state governing bodies, interrelations with agencies of local self-government, interrelations with federal government agencies and their territorial structures, humanitarian contacts, the settlement of disputes, and the final provisions.

As we can see, everything is specified in detail. This was the fourth and last subsection of the protocol of consent, and now it is time to move on to the protocol of dissent. It consists of only one sentence: "The groups of experts from Tyumen Oblast, the Khanty-Mansiysk Autonomous Okrug, and the Yamalo-Nenetsk Autonomous Okrug, having discussed the drafts of the treaty submitted by the State Committee of the Russian Federation and Tyumen Oblast in conjunction with the Khanty-Mansiysk and Yamalo-Nenetsk autonomous okrugs, could not reach a general consensus on the interpretation of the term used in Article 66 (4) of the Constitution of the Russian Federation—autonomous okrugs constituting part of the oblast—and the term proposed jointly by the groups of experts from the Khanty-Mansiysk and Yamalo-Nenetsk autonomous okrugs—'autonomous okrugs located within the territorial-administrative boundaries of the oblast.'"

The protocol of dissent is cited exactly as written, down to the last comma. The fourth subsection of Article 66 of the Constitution is a serious matter and, in general, there is no reason to expect the parties to find a common language in a hurry. After all, why would an okrug want to give up its constitutionally guaranteed status as an equal member of the federation? The very fact that the experts met for this conference suggests that the oblast

administration has reconsidered its methods of solving the problem of oblast unity and has given up making decisions "from a position of strength" in favor of making decisions "from a position of probability."

This is not a bad change, particularly from the standpoint of the economy. After all, while they were fighting, they managed to cause considerable destruction. To put it more precisely, they managed to miss several opportunities. All I have to add is that the oblast administration was represented by the following experts: G. Chebotarev, L. Berezin, and S. Nikitin; the Khanty-Mansiysk Autonomous Okrug was represented by G. Tikhonov, N. Usoltsev, and V. Sharafilov; the Yamalo-Nenetsk Autonomous Okrug was represented by A. Artyev and G. Chudnovskiy.

Now all of this is a matter of public record.

Komsomolsk-on-Amur, Sakhalin Clash Over Gas Pricing

944F0431A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 10 Mar 94 p 2

[Article by Boris Reznik, IZVESTIYA staff: "Sakhalin, Too, Is Beginning a 'Gas' War"]

[Text] Khabarovsk Kray—Gas stoves are not working in the homes of residents of Komsomolsk-on-Amur, and primus and kerosene stoves have been taken out of storage. The city central heat and power station has shifted from burning natural gas to burning residual fuel oil. Once again, the Sakhalinmorneftegaz Association has grabbed the Komsomolsk-on-Amur residents "by the throat" and cut off the supply of the blue fuel.

This time the reason for such harsh measures was not a delay in mutual settlements but the petroleum that, along with the gas, is discharged from Sakhalin wells in the form of condensate. The islanders were sending it, like the gas, to the "city of youth" through the pipelines whose construction was hailed in the well-known novel *Daleko ot Moskvy* [Far From Moscow]. The price for it was cranked up immensely—to 140,000 rubles per tonne. If the Komsomolsk Petroleum Refinery had continued to take raw material at that price, it would have long since gone bankrupt. The petroleum refinery found suppliers with a better-quality and less expensive product—the Tyumen oil fields, which are delivering petroleum to Khabarovsk Kray at R110,000 a tonne. The Sakhalin people did not rack their brains trying to figure out how to lower the price of their oil, but decided to act from a position of strength—they delivered an ultimatum to the Komsomolsk-on-Amur's residents: either take our oil at our prices, or we will close the valve on the gas pipeline.

They closed it, forgetting that Khabarovsk Kray could take countermeasures. After all, Sakhalin receives up to 70 percent of its economic cargo by way of the Vanino-Kholmsk ferry crossing. However, to the credit of the kray's leaders, this time, as during the first such incident

last year, they have been showing restraint and reasonableness. Residual fuel oil, jet fuel and all other goods addressed to the island oblast are being punctually dispatched to it. The kray's administration has sent an emergency telegram informing the Russian president and head of government of the existing situation. The law, not arbitrary rule, should act.

Arkhangelsk Banker Reports Nomenklatura Machinations

944F0423A Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian
3 Mar 94 p 2

[Article by Pavel Anokhin: "Solovetsk Miracles, or How 434 Voters Cast 1604 Ballots"]

[Text] Passions aroused by the December parliamentary elections have not yet settled, and now Russians will have new elections in March and April, this time for local government bodies. The Russian President's Edict No. 1765 allows administration chiefs to approve local election statutes themselves: The parliament is only just beginning to consider a general federal law. One doesn't have to be a genius to imagine what will happen. However, much is already clear: Read our item.

"There is a vast bureaucratic plot against democracy in the country, which took shape just before the parliamentary election," says Vladimir Rasskazov, former people's deputy and chairman of the banking subcommittee of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet, retired vice-chairman of the Russian Central Bank, and current president of the All-Russian Stock Bank. "I know from personal experience that local nomenklaturas were given complete control over the elections to the Federation Council."

Like every businessman, he supports his statements with specific documents and facts, although many of them are clearly colored by the pain of a person who has lost an election campaign. Vladimir Rasskazov ran for the Russia's Choice bloc for an Arkhangelsk Oblast seat in the Federation Council. His opponent, Yuriy Guskov, chairman of the Arkhangelsk Oblast Soviet and before that first secretary of the Arkhangelsk Oblast CPSU Committee, was nominated as candidate by the Russian Communist Party. He won by 9,000 votes. In Vladimir Rasskazov's view, this was a result of machinations, forgery and outright legal arbitrariness of the local powers that be. Nor was it only the issue that communist representatives could conduct their campaigns directly at enterprises during work hours, which democratic candidates could not. Or that the oblast radio would fall silent "for technical reasons" precisely when broadcasting an interview with Vladimir Rasskazov.

Much more mysterious was the kaleidoscope of number errors in the Arkhangelsk election returns. Thus, 42,000 ballots more were cast for the Federation Council election than in the federal district, where parties and blocs were determining their standing with the people. What does this suggest? Two assumptions come to mind:

Either the voters deliberately failed to cast their "party" ballots, or someone deliberately stuffed the ballot boxes with extra "paper" ballots, which decided the outcome of the race for the upper chamber of parliament.

There are many such flaws. For example, the total number of ballots issued to voters or cancelled was 118,508 less than the number of registered Arkhangelsk voters. One can think of many reasons for this. Say, again blame voters who for some reason put the lacking number of ballots in their pockets. But is it possible that more than 100,000 people would want to commit an identical prank? Or could one justifiably say that voter turnout in the oblast was expected to be low, so fewer ballots were printed in order to save paper.

For all its peculiarities, the complex existing situation may not have aroused so many distortions if Vladimir Rasskazov or his representatives had a document stating the total number of printed ballots, indicating how many were handed out and how many remained in reserve. The absence of such information has aroused the most evil suspicions of the losing side: Where the ballots "saved" before or after the election? Try and find out now, while 116,000 election ballots account for almost 20 percent of the vote.

Also surprising are the "miracles" of the Solovetsk election precinct, where 434 voters cast a total of 1,604 ballots. It is hard to imagine that in their civic enthusiasm the Solovetsk citizens managed to vote several times. Was this some unfortunate accident? Quite possible, but if the mistake was discovered and not corrected one can't help thinking of direct fraud.

"Nevertheless," says Vladimir Rasskazov, "a preliminary count of votes in Arkhangelsk, Severodvinsk and Novodvinsk, which include half the district constituents, showed that 1.7 times more had voted for me than for my opponent. Seeing this, the district commission immediately halted ballot collection for three days. In the final result Yuriy Guskov was already ahead..."

Incensed by such "democratism," Vladimir Rasskazov prepared papers and appealed to the Central Election Committee and procurator agencies, seeking a recount of the Arkhangelsk Oblast ballots. So far with no result.

"As fate would have it, the Central Election Committee's complaint commission is headed by P. Zhigaltsov, an Arkhangelsk crony of Yu. Guskov," says the would-be deputy, explaining the reason for his unsuccessful quest for the truth.

The first thing that comes to mind after talking to him is: Here is a person who has lost an election and now seeks to make a political issue of it. New times breed new traditions. And all his appeals to courts and procurator offices, allusions to the biased makeup of election commissions "formed back in 1989 by the communists," and "the absence of the possibility to monitor their actions

by democratic forces" could be seen as an effort to create "publicity" around his name with an eye on future elections.

You must agree that if something like this were expounded by some run-of-the-mill politician or a representative of the humanities his words could be classified as populism. But the assertions of a ranking banking-brokerage executive well versed in the intrigues of the powers that be, moreover an economic scholar with two university degrees who acquired professional experience both as a director at the Computer Center and in academic and research work at the economics and management chair of a technical college, tend to ring true. Moreover, the results of the latest election reflect, as on a screen, the strategic redeployment of the communist-soviet nomenklatura forces, bringing hidden secrets to light.

Understanding that the democrats' political prestige depends on the local successes of the changes taking place, and that the apparat plays a key role in this process, the nomenklatura, having regained consciousness after the August debacle, hastily began to deploy its people over the entire vertical of power. Launching a personnel offensive, it soon gained control over Russia's major regions. Suffice it to cite facts for just a few of them (see table).

Oblast	Total number of administration chiefs	Of them, former secretaries or executives of central, oblast, city, rayon CPSU committees
Rostov	58	28
Voronezh	33	25
Belgorod	27	21
Irkutsk	38	16
Novosibirsk	37	14
Sverdlovsk	24	12

In Krasnoyarsk Kray, every other city or rayon administration chief is a former CPSU apparatchik. And if one considers personnel who completed the Higher Party School, then it is all of 80 percent...

This was described and happened two years ago, but for some reason we only now seem to have overcome amnesia and are worriedly asking: How come that in, say, Penza Oblast 40 out of 45 seats in the legislative assembly have gone to former party committee secretaries, deputies of disbanded soviets, directors of plants and state farms, and other local leaders of communist orientation? And now, egged on by Sergey Filatov, chief of the Russian president's administration, and Nikolay Medvedev, chief of that administration's department for work with territories, the democratic chorus has suddenly voiced its alarm at the possibility of the formation of a "red belt" made up of regions with strong anti-reform moods around Moscow and the return of the local party-managerial nomenklatura to power.

Actually, it never lost that local power, only adapting deftly to circumstances. We all remember the metamorphoses when the leaders of party committees of various levels instantaneously, like a shoal of fish following some signal known only to them, occupied leadership positions in soviets of the respective levels, and then, with the same alacrity, moved over to the positions of administration chiefs. Now, again in consort, they are occupying the seats of dumas and other legislative bodies. Today the entire nomenklatura force is following their biases in the "personnel offensive." Which is to say that so far the only "belt" around Moscow has been "red."

Maritime Kray Struggles To Save Economy

944F0445B Vladivostok KRASNOYE ZNAMENI
in Russian 15 Mar 94 p 1

[Article by Dmitriy Latypov: "Alas, Moscow Has Cooled Toward Us: The Center Is Far Away. Economy Is a Shambles, and Only We Ourselves Can Save the Kray"]

[Text] This was more or less the tone of the conference held by the kray administration last week. Among those present were deputy heads of the kray administration, heads of administrations and committees, as well as of the fuel and power generation complex, a large group from the military, and trade unions.

"Lately we feel acutely that the government has cooled off quite noticeably toward the Maritime Kray," said the kray administration head, Yevgeniy Nazdratenko. It is practically impossible to "wring out" the money already envisaged by Decree No. 1001. And the transport factor, which practically separates our kray from Russia's central regions, is high transportation rates. Instead of somehow helping the Far East in this respect, the Russian Federation Government just a few days ago made a decision to raise them again by more than 20 percent.

What the result will be is clear. High costs will force many enterprises located in West Siberia, in the Ural, and the European part of Russia to reroute the flow of export cargo. Now it will go abroad through the ports on the Black or Baltic Sea. This trend already is detectable. The following data point in this direction: Freight volume at the Far Eastern segment of the railroad system fell off by 37 percent. Naturally, the output of our plants and factories, and most importantly, mining enterprises will not be competitive in the regions where industrial consumers are and which are long distance away from Maritime Kray.

In this situation, a vitally important question arises up with all urgency: How is Maritime Kray to survive? Vladimir Kolesnichenko, who is considered the most knowledgeable and competent economist in the kray, predicts this development of the situation. If electricity power rates will go up. This blow will push a considerable number of kray enterprises into bankruptcy. They are already literally being strangled by hidden unemployment. It runs by most modest estimates at 25-40 percent of enterprises' labor force. One year of

course, understand the directors—they still hope for some mythical subsidies and preferential credits. But there will be none. Therefore, says V. Kolesnichenko, we need to take radical steps right now. We have to immediately set up a commission that will determine the backbone enterprises in the kray capable of surviving at the current stage of transition to a market. Those labor collectives that cannot survive we should declare bankrupt and start finding jobs for the people.

The first to go bankrupt, in V. Kolesnichenko's opinion, are enterprises in the cities where mining combines and machine-building plants are located. It is Dalnegorsk, Arsenyev, and the settlement Kavaleroovo. We can already see the validity of this forecast—the mining and enrichment combine in Khrustalnyi is practically dying.

The kray administration presented at the conference its plan for saving Maritime Kray from the impending destructive processes: the plan had been drafted by Moscow academics and executive branch departments. It was decided to "bring it into proper shape" during March, incorporate proposals of economic managers and the military, and then send the document for consideration to the Russian Federation Government.

N. Pimenov, the chief of the kray administration's main planning and economic administration, related to the conference participants the gist of this plan. According to the document, the priority sectors will be defense, foreign economic relations, and transportation. In order to move it all from the a centralized-economy state into a market-based one, the government will have to provide financial support. Otherwise, nothing will come out of it. Here is why. The government owes 56 billion rubles [R] to our defense plants, even those where it had placed orders. (For instance, production of the "Black Shark" helicopter at the Progress plant.) And now they are literally dying at the root.

Next. One may say that the government forgot about the existence of its troops and their high concentration in Maritime Kray. Take the cost of the Pacific Fleet alone! The center practically keeps them on a financial starvation diet. The kray is compelled in extreme cases to provide money for the military from its own budget. And quite substantial sums, sometimes. The result is that in addition to paying taxes, Maritime Kray residents carry an additional load, which affects the social sphere.

Foreign economic relations. Maritime Kray already has in operation five vehicle crossings and eight ports open for entry to foreign vessels. What does the territory get from it? Nothing. Only 10 percent of the customs duty goes into the kray budget; the rest goes to the center. The document proposes to leave the entire customs duty collected in the kray for about two years.

The transportation complex cannot be improved without targeted federal programs. Ports and port-adjacent rail stations need to be developed, new branch lines built. All of this requires government investment money. The program proposed in the document

assumes, of course, subsidies from the federal budget. And this is not dumping one's problems on the center—these are precisely the expenditures the state has to finance: maintenance of the Armed Forces, development of foreign trade and large transportation systems. As to our own business, says the kray leadership, it is time to pay very close attention to the development of the entire spectrum of relations with the countries of the Southeast Asia and the Pacific region. The following fact is quoted in support of this argument: In order to bring grain from Altay Kray, Maritime Kray has to pay agricultural producers and the railroad R270,000 per tonne. Transportation of the same tonne from Canada will cost R100,000. A tangible difference. And it is visible in everything.

Railways Official on New Tariffs

944F0446B Vladivostok KRASNOYE ZNAMYA
in Russian 16 Mar 94 p 1

[Article by German Orlovskiy: "The Debt Predicament"]

[Text] The Russian Federation Committee on Pricing Policy has established effective 10 March 1994 the maximum index of tariff increases for freight shipments in intra- and interstate transportation in the amount of 1.20 of the tariffs in effect prior to that date.

To what degree does the decision of the Russian pricing department affect the railroads and clients of the maritime region? Viktor Yefimovich Lyannykh, deputy chief of the freight and commercial operations section of the Vladivostok Division of the Far Eastern Railroad, provides commentary.

"Following the directive of the Committee on Pricing Policy came the order of the Ministry of Railways with a specific deciphering of the financial aspects with our business partners. In particular, it was prescribed that the tariffs for intrastate transportation would be applied to export-freight shipments through Russian border and port stations.

"Additional charges will be applied over and above the tariffs and fees (with the exception of export-freight shipments, including to the Baltic countries), consisting of a tax of 20 percent and special 3 percent tax (for financial support to the most important sectors of the national economy). The application of a maximum index of 1.20 to existing payment rates for other operations and services is authorized. But in order to preclude monopolistic pressure from being applied to clients, the ministry has established an upper limit of profitability for operation and services in the amount of 35 percent.

"The measures being undertaken by the ministry are not for the sake of enjoyment. The ministry itself is operating at a loss. The Far Eastern Railroad, for example, has entered 'minus 6 billion rubles' in the 'Profits' column. Losses from transportation operations include rising costs of fuel and electric power, spare parts—now

in short supply—for diesel locomotives and freight cars, outlays for worn-out track, cross ties, and switching-signal sections.

"And prospects for the future are cloudy. The transportation business is in decline. The enterprises—our clients—are shutting down production output. Our partners of yesterday are turning their attention with ever increasing frequency to motor vehicle transport. Short-run motor vehicle transport has been more convenient, more advantageous, and quicker. Thus, the railroads are facing a struggle for clients who want efficient execution of orders and high-quality service.

"In the meantime, a natural process of reduction of our worker contingent has begun. We are not taking action to effect this, but neither are we accepting people for work.

"And then we have that same old situation today concerning debts receivable. They are colossal! The list of enterprises in debt to us for transport spans 10 pages—they owe us R12.5 billion.

"We are trying to restrict our acceptance of freight for transport from those dispatching enterprises that are most steeped in debt. But this is a two-edged sword. When enterprises do not ship production output, they do not get paid for it. And they do not settle accounts with us either. While the state treasury tells us to hand over the required amount, think about paying wages later.

"The only aspect, undoubtedly, that does not distress everyone is the following point of the ministry order: 'The boosted index for tariffs in effect is not applied with respect to small, lightweight shipments of freight and citizens' household goods being transported by intra- and interstate transportation.'"

Novosibirsk Migration Official on Refugees

944104524 Novosibirsk SOVETSKAYA SIBIR
in Russian 15 Mar 94 p 2

[Interview with Yuriy Moshkov, head of the Novosibirsk Oblast migration service, and Mikhail Bakshin, his deputy, by SOVETSKAYA SIBIR correspondent G. Sassa, place and date not given: "Siberia Can Be Warm, Too: Refugee's Fate"]

[Text] This service is located at Krasnyy Prospekt, in the former national economic council building. It occupies just three small rooms on the fourth floor. The entire staff is six people. The problems the migration service is dealing with are many, however, and all of them are difficult, requiring a lot of hard work and human empathy.

The Russian Federal Migration Service was set up recently, when the Soviet Union disintegrated, when tens of millions of Russians suddenly found themselves abroad and in a number of places deprived of elementary human rights. The word "refugees" entered our vocabulary.

Our correspondent met with Yuriy Mikhaylovich Moshkov, the head of the Novosibirsk Oblast migration service, and Mikhail Sergeyevich Bakshin, his deputy.

[Sassa] Tell me please, what is the trend in the migration process? Has the flow of refugees not diminished during winter months?

[Answer] We also assumed that the cold Siberian winter would reduce the number of people coming here. We were mistaken. The same number—450-550 people—arrive every month as did in the summer. Last year our oblast accepted more than 40,000 refugees and forced resettlers. All in all, more than 2 million people arrived in Russia. The time of year and weather conditions have no effect on flow intensity. If people leave behind apartments, dachas, everything they have accumulated over the years, it means that they absolutely cannot live in these conditions. We talk to every person, listen to their sad, tragic tales, and therefore have a good idea of the situation in which our compatriots have found themselves. We see people who are barely clothed, semi-starved. Here, for instance, a young woman from Tajikistan. Not a kopek, head uncovered, no passport, no labor service book. Turns out that her home was hit by a bomb. We took her to the social protection department. They gave her a cap, jeans, some other things, and R5,000. The militia issued papers to her. Then they started looking for a job, which is very difficult now. Finally they found her a job as an attendant in one of the hospitals. She lives right there. Or a Georgian family—husband, wife, two children. They made it from Sukhumi to Moscow. No money to buy tickets to go from there. The woman sold the only valuable possession—her wedding ring. They called acquaintances in Novosibirsk, who sent the money. This was enough for three tickets. The mother and children came to our city. The husband is still in Moscow.

[Sassa] So it is not only Russians who are coming here?

[Answer] Most are Russians, of course. But there are also many people of other nationalities. There are many Armenians, Ukrainians, Tatars, Tajiks. Some Azerbaijanis, Moldovans, Chechens, Abkhazians, Germans, Ossetians, Kazakhs, Turks, Jews, Chuvash. People of all kinds of professions, including doctors, teachers, and scientists.

The telephone rings. Yuriy Mikhaylovich greets the caller, listens, and says:

"No, no. You cannot delay the move. You absolutely have to be in place by March or April. Keep it in mind that potatoes and vegetables are planted in May here. And you absolutely have to have a vegetable garden—you have children. You know yourself what life is like. This is one of the farms in Moshkovskiy Rayon. There is housing, school, a cafeteria, running water. No money whatsoever? That is all right, we will help you with the move."

Our conversation continues.

[Sassa] Does it not look like opportunities to house people and find jobs for them are dwindling? There are already unemployed and semi-unemployed in our oblast as well.

[Answer] This is true. Nevertheless, we are still able to somehow help the people left without any shelter. Our service maintains contacts with the employment and social protection services, with enterprises and organizations, with oblast rayons, kolkhozes, sovkhozes, joint-stock societies. Right now there are 5,500 job vacancies in the oblast. The demand is mostly for skilled workers and construction workers.

Fast development of commercial activities and the emergence of a large number of businessmen relieves some pressure. Many people found cozy jobs in commercial structures, they resell the goods bought from wholesalers.

Some agricultural enterprises help to house and provide jobs for people. There is the Aleksandrovskoye Joint-Stock Society (AO) in Maslyaninskiy Rayon, which is headed by Valeriy Ivanovich Prikhno. They accepted 14 families. More than 30 resettler families received housing and jobs in Suzdalskoye AO, where Nikolay Nikolayevich Goryunov is the chairman. Iskitimskiy and Moshkovskiy Rayons build apartments and create jobs.

[Sassa] Where do they get the money?

[Answer] The Federal Migration Service helps. It does not have much money, but you can get some. If you knock on the door, they will open it. Take, for instance, the head of the Moshkovskiy Rayon administration. He personally went to Moscow, told of his plans, shared his troubles, and came back with R74 million "in a pocket." The Aleksandrovskoye AO was among aid recipients.

We have to underline one important detail here. Many heads of administrations, and enterprise and farm directors do not use the opportunity to improve to a certain extent the situation of their collectives with the help of the migration service. There are many unfinished production facilities in villages and cities, as well as housing. If their construction is completed, it will produce new jobs and new apartments. But the owners do not have the money. This is where the migration service may become a magic wand. An economic manager submits a project for the facility to us, indicates how many new jobs it will create, and how many refugees he can accept and provide housing for. We send these documents to Moscow, and there is a good chance of getting positive results.

A telephone call. Yu. Moshkov:

"Fergana? What do you have? No, we do not pay for the move. We do not have housing. Why can you not live in Uzbekistan? Language... Well, the children should study Uzbek if you live there. Impossible to live... Well, you decide. If you come, you will get papers as refugees and temporary resettlers. What does it give you? The right to

obtain a residence permit to live with relatives or acquaintances regardless of the size of their living space. Then you can get an interest-free loan for home construction. So you think about it..."

[Sassa] The call from Fergana has interrupted us... Are there examples that will support that your offer is realistic?

[Answer] Take the same Moshkovo. They are building 12 apartments there. By the agreement with the migration service, which has provided the money, the oblast migration service will get six apartments intended for refugees; three apartments go to local authorities, to be distributed at their discretion; and three are placed at Moscow's disposal.

[Sassa] Moscow?

[Answer] Yes, they have a very difficult situation there. Four and a half thousand refugees live in hotels, room-and-board facilities, and pioneer camps. We visited one such room-and-board facility. It is Vatutinka, which belongs to the Council of Ministers' economic administration. There are 118 refugee families living there. It was decided to set up a rehabilitation center in this facility; equipment has been brought in, but they cannot install it. Refugees do not want to leave their temporary shelter. Moscow has to "unload" its refugees. Therefore, in the agreements the republic service puts in a clause that some apartments go to them.

Two young men enter the office. They are from Kazakhstan, from Semipalatinsk. Both are construction workers, have families, apartments. But no job. There are no prospects. It is impossible to sell the apartments. And even if they do sell them, it will be very cheap and only for local money. What are they going to do with this money in Russia? Yuriy Mikhaylovich and Mikhail Sergeyevich tell of the situation in the oblast: that construction workers will find jobs here; that one can now buy a house in a rural area with yard structures and a vegetable garden, inexpensive by current standards—about R4-R5 million. But the men do not have these "lemons." If the apartments could be sold as a noncash transaction and Kazakh money converted into rubles through official channels... The interlocutors take time to discuss the feasibility of such an operation...

The visitors leave with some hope.

[Sassa] So you are saying that refugees get free of charge the apartments built with the help of migration service?

[Answer] Yes, but under certain conditions. They do not have the right to sell or exchange the apartments, and must work in the organization to which the apartments belong. Because enterprises accept refugees in professions and skills they need.

[Sassa] One can understand it when Russians move from Central Asia, the Baltics, the Caucasus. But why do Georgians from Abkhazia not go to Georgia, or Armenians from Azerbaijan not want to go to Armenia?

[Answer] These people have learned what war is like; they have seen senseless bloodshed. They abandon everything they held dear and escape from hell to where at this point there is no shooting; where the situation is more or less stable; where they can save the children.

The Russian people are great in their generosity, good-naturedness, and hospitality. Themselves impoverished, humiliated, and insulted, having become "occupiers" and "strangers" in those newest states that they had protected, made them strong and prosperous; they share the last with the people crippled by fate. They understand that it was not these ordinary people who started the competition of sovereignties.

And so it became warmer in Siberia than in Central Asia or Transcaucasia.

And what if, God forbid, shooting begins here? We have no place to run.

Another telephone call. A young woman says:

"Thank you, good people!"

She and her husband came here straight from the train station. He has a Category II disability. Used to work as an explosives expert in a mine in Uzbekistan. Something happened: He got "pushed," with damage to the spine. Everything they had they have used up for food. Came here without a penny.

Problems cannot be solved in one day. The arrivals spent the night at a train station. Then spent another day there.

Meanwhile, people from the migration service were struggling to find a place for them to live. They talked a student dormitory superintendent into taking them in for just one night. Then they found the money to pay for one week in a hotel. Meanwhile, they were calling around at enterprises and organizations. Finally they found some gardening cooperative that hired the resettlers as watchmen. This means free room, electricity, a plot, and some pay. The gardeners helped with potatoes and vegetables.

The woman confessed once:

"I was on the verge on jumping in front of a train..."

Yuriy Mikhaylovich, a kindest man, exploded:

"Forget these idiotic ideas. Did you read Sholokhov's 'A Man's Fate'?; did you see the movie? Andrey Sokolov returned from war—everything has been destroyed, it lays in ruins. He has nothing but the clothes on his back. He took Vanyusha by hand and went to look for a new destiny... And you? You are still young!"

I was listening to this tale, looking at the window sill in Moshkov's office. Two different flowers shared one pot. Yuriy Mikhaylovich perked up:

"See, I found this bulb. Brought it here and stuck into the pot. Before you know it, a shoot came out. Leaves sprouted. A bud formed. And now look—it is blooming.

It is holding to the soil by white threads, but what a beautiful red flower! I have to add more soil..."

Novosibirsk Land Distribution Detailed

944F0441A Novosibirsk SOVETSKAYA SIBIR in Russian
12 Mar 94 p 1

[Unattributed report: "Land Distribution"]

[Text] The oblast administration has approved the report on the inventory of lands and their distribution by category, agricultural use, proprietor, land owner, and land user as of 1 January 1994. The report also quotes the following figures: The oblast area comprises 17,7756 million hectares, which include 8,3205 million hectares of agricultural land, of which 8,3205 million hectares are plowed land. To meet the needs of individuals, village and settlement administrations have under their jurisdiction 1,2623 million hectares of land for hay mowing and livestock pasture. The oblast has 5,843 private farms, to which 294,200 hectares of agricultural land have been transferred. Another 26,400 hectares have been allocated for collective orchards, and 20,000 hectares—for collective vegetable gardens.

Vladivostok Mayor Adds Referendum to Vote

944F0434A Vladivostok VLADIVOSTOK in Russian
11 Mar 94 p 2

[Report by VLADIVOSTOK correspondent Vladimir Rozanov: "The Mayor Wants the City To Live by a Charter"]

[Text] The head of the Vladivostok administration, Viktor Cherepkov, announced in a television address on 9 March that on 27 March, simultaneously with the elections, he intends to hold a citywide referendum on two issues: Whether city residents think it necessary to shift to a single system of managing the city economy; liquidating rayon structures, and whether they approve the draft of the Vladivostok Charter, written by Cherepkov personally. The text of the charter has not yet been made available to city residents, however.

The city mayor explained the need for a general referendum on these two issues by such an important factor as Vladivostok entering market relations at a time when the city administration system has outlived itself and is no longer relevant. Viktor Cherepkov especially emphasized that introducing a centralized system in such matters as allocation of apartments and tax collection will allow, as he put it, correct justice to be achieved.

The Vladivostok Charter also is extremely important in the new economic conditions and political realities. Viktor Cherepkov said that city soviet deputies had worked on the charter earlier, and he continued what they had started, reducing the deputies' version to five pages. The mayor did not describe in detail the contents of the draft city charter, only saying that the charter will delineate the functions of the executive and representative branches of power in Vladivostok and the city's

relations with kray and republic authorities. Viktor Cherepkov also said that he refused to put in the draft charter a provision that the city mayor serves at the same time as head of the city дума.

State law specialists, commenting on Viktor Cherepkov's address, told our VLADIVOSTOK correspondent that the city mayor is most likely attempting to widen his power base, protect himself in advance from дума interference in the mayoralty's affairs, and acquire maximum powers. Blessed by a popular vote, the charter may make the mayor practically absolutely invulnerable in his confrontation with kray authorities.

Vladivostok To Be Polled on City Charter

944F0447A Vladivostok UTRO ROSSII in Russian
16 Mar 94 p 2

["Proposed Charter of the City of Vladivostok"]

[Text]

Popular Referendum

[Begin box]

On 27 March, together with elections to the Vladivostok City Duma, a popular referendum will be conducted.

Vladivostok residents will answer two questions:

1. Do you find it expedient to approve a common system of city administration, which envisages the functioning of city services as one whole, with the phased elimination of rayon administrations?
2. Do you agree with the text of the draft Vladivostok Charter?

This draft contains the basic principles of organizing the representative and executive authority in Vladivostok and defines their powers in the structure of local self-rule bodies.

We ask that proposals and comments on the draft Charter be sent in writing to the following address: 20 Ocean Avenue, Vladivostok, or call 222-333.

[End box]

1. General provisions.

- 1.1. Vladivostok is the administrative center of Maritime Kray, a city, a single administrative-territorial unit without apportionment into rayons.
- 1.2. Vladivostok's city limits are defined by Decree of the RSFSR Council of Ministers No. 138 dated 25 April 1985.
- 1.3. The city of Vladivostok has an official seal, approved by the Statute on the Seal of the City of Vladivostok.
- 1.4. "City Day" is the first Sunday in July.

2. Status of City Resident

- 2.1. Any person who is a citizen of the Russian Federation and lives permanently in the city is considered a resident.
- 2.2. A city resident possesses to the full extent all socioeconomic, political, and personal rights and freedoms proclaimed and guaranteed by the Constitution of the Russian Federation and this Charter, including the right to elect and be elected to bodies of state authority and administration, and take part in public debates and referendums on matters of city life and control over the activities of elected bodies of administration.
- 2.3. A city resident has the right to receive without obstruction any information on the state of affairs in the city, on issues under discussion in city bodies of authority and administration, appointments and transfers of city officials, with the exception of information that contains state secrets, as defined in corresponding normative acts.
- 2.4. A city resident has the obligation to observe the provisions of this Charter, directives and decrees of administrative bodies on matters that have bearing on the stable and efficient functioning of city services.
- 2.5. Conscientious labor for the good of personal and public well-being is the obligation and matter of honor for all work-eligible city residents.
- 2.6. A physical person who has rendered great services to the city may be named an honorary citizen of the city of Vladivostok.

3. Vladivostok City Administration

- 3.1. City administration is carried out in keeping with the Constitution of the Russian Federation and the current law.
- 3.2. The city authorities are the State Duma and the mayoralty (city administration).
- 3.3. The City Duma is elected by city residents who permanently live on the territory of the city, on the basis of equal and direct electoral right in a secret ballot.

Any city resident who has reached the age of 18 and has lived in Vladivostok at least 10 years may be elected a City Duma deputy.

The membership of the City Duma shall be 22 persons.

The term deputies serve in the City Duma shall be two years.

Up to 20 percent of City Duma deputies may work on a professional (permanent) basis; they cannot hold government jobs or engage in other paid activities, with the exception of teaching, research, and other creative work.

3.4. City Duma prerogatives include:

- approval of the local budget;
- local taxation and duties;
- development of general principles of price formation keeping in mind the interests of city residents;
- matters of ecology, use of natural resources, environmental protection;
- general issues of upbringing, education, science and culture, and sports;
- health care;
- relations with religious communities and ethnic groups;
- social protection of the population.

3.5. The mayoralty's prerogatives are:

- ownership, use, and disposal of land, mineral deposits, water and all other natural resources;
- rational and prudent management and disposal of municipal and other property under its ownership;
- expenditure of budget and nonbudget means;
- setting the general principles of organizing the system of local self-rule bodies, including appointment and removal of heads of municipal enterprises, organizations, and institutions;
- coordination of economic ties with Russian Federation components;
- establishing and carrying out international and foreign economic relations within the boundaries of existing Russian Federation law;
- assisting the functioning of the mass media;
- coordinating operations of postal, telegraph, and telephone services on the territory of the city;
- creating favorable conditions for functioning of the city's financial and credit institutions, keeping in mind the interests of Vladivostok residents and the city's economic development;
- control over fulfillment of contract obligations between commercial structures and municipal enterprises, organizations, and institutions in matters of the city's life support;

- protection of historic and cultural landmarks;
- awarding and revoking the title of "Honorary Citizen of Vladivostok."

3.6. The city mayor of Vladivostok is the head of the local self-rule on the entire territory of the city.

The city mayor is the guarantor of implementation of the provisions of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, current Russian Federation law, and this Charter, and of citizens' rights and freedoms, he ensures the coordinated functioning and interaction of bodies of state authority and local self-rule, defines the main direction of city infrastructure development, and represents the city administration at the federal and international level.

3.7. The city mayor is elected for a five-year term by popular vote of citizens who are permanent residents of the city of Vladivostok.

3.8. Any Russian Federation citizen who has lived on the territory of the city of Vladivostok for at least 10 years and is not younger than 30 or older than 60 may be elected mayor.

3.9. In assuming office, the city mayor takes the following oath of allegiance to city residents:

"I solemnly swear (promise) that I will carry out conscientiously my duties as mayor of the city and will to the full extent of my capabilities support, protect, and defend the Constitution of the Russian Federation, ensure the safety and peace of city residents, and faithfully serve their interests."

3.10. The city mayor has the right:

- to approve the appointment or dismissal of heads of the mayoralty's structural subunits, municipal enterprises, organizations, and institutions;
- form the mayoralty's structures and staff roster;
- through decrees and directives, define and regulate activities of city residents, interaction between enterprises, organizations, agencies, and other formations and structures located on the territory of Vladivostok in the interests of city residents;
- coordinate relations with the military authorities on matters of functioning of military units and rendering assistance in the maintenance of public order in the city, interact in the event of the emergency situations and natural disasters, as well as elimination of their consequences, and direct civil defense;
- submit drafts of normative acts to the City Duma.

- on the basis of Russian Federation law, "veto" City Duma decisions;
- issue decrees, directives, and instructions that are mandatory for heads of municipal enterprises, organizations, and institutions on the territory of the city;
- carry out control over normative acts issued by the mayorality's structural subunits and municipal enterprises, organizations, and institutions and revoke them in the event they are not in compliance with current law;
- approve the boundaries of intra-city territorial units.

3.11. Early recall of the mayor's powers is possible only as a result of a popular vote of citizens who reside permanently in the city of Vladivostok, if more than 50 percent of eligible voters vote for such a recall; or by his own volition.

4. Making changes to the Charter

- 4.1. Changes to the city Charter, adopted by citywide referendum of the Vladivostok population and approved by decree of the city mayor, may be made only on the basis of a new citywide referendum.
- 4.2. Decisions on holding citywide referendums on the most important problems of the city's functioning are made by the mayor at his initiative or at the proposal of the City Duma.

5. Concluding provisions

- 5.1. This Charter becomes effective the day of official publication of the results of the popular vote (referendum) of the city population.
- 5.2. The day of the popular referendum shall be considered the day of adoption of the Charter.
- 5.3. Normative acts of local bodies of municipal and federal authority that were in effect on the territory of the city continue to apply after the adoption of this Charter in the parts that do not contradict it.

Vladivostok City Manager Runs for Kray Duma

944F0435A Vladivostok UTRO ROSSII in Russian
11 Mar 94 p 1

[Interview with Vladimir Gilgenberg, Vladivostok city manager, by Raisa Fomicheva; place and date not given: "Vladimir Gilgenberg: 'There Is Hope...'"]

[Text] Vladimir Aleksandrovich Gilgenberg, 38 years old, manager of the city of Vladivostok, married, has been nominated to the Kray Duma from the Republican Party.

[Fomicheva] Vladimir Aleksandrovich, you have power today. Quite a lot! You manage the city. What is prompting you to run for the Kray Duma?

[Gilgenberg] The law is being flouted here in the presence of all the branches of authority. Everyone has already sensed that it is bad living without deputies. Deputies are a restraining and controlling factor for the executive branch. They compel all the organs to work.

[Fomicheva] That is, you are moved only by a desire to help the kray?

[Gilgenberg] I decided several years ago that Moscow was not for me. I am a person of my own kray, my own city. [line missing in original] position, after all, it is a new one—city manager.

The position has existed for a long time in world practice. And if we are aspiring to a market economy, this kind of position will also exist. It is possible that it has not yet achieved the necessary level with my performance. At the present time, it is necessary to expend a lot of effort on the attacks of the kray administration, which authorized the subordinate organs not to subordinate themselves to the city mayorality. But in the meantime we received a letter from the Ministry of Justice yesterday which states that the mayorality is right on all questions. But they frayed our nerves for three months, and inflicted damage on the city in a useless fight. Who will answer for this?

[Fomicheva] What is authority to you?

[Gilgenberg] I would not want that feeling—of authority. The work is difficult and thankless, but I will work until we get democracy going.

[Fomicheva] Here is a question for you from a meticulous reader: Are you planning to go to the FRG? It is said that you agreed to this position because you want the same kind of position in another country.

[Gilgenberg] I have relatives in the FRG. They asked me: Are you not insane to remain in Russia at such a time? I answered that I will only go there when everything is fine in Russia, and when it is necessary to help Germany.

[Fomicheva] A question from many readers: Why has it become so dirty in the city?

[Gilgenberg] It would be strange if it were clean, considering that the kray administration authorized the rayon authorities not to show up for four months at planning meetings and conferences in the mayor's office. So, under conditions of such anarchy, the city became swamped in garbage. But the administration for services and utilities was disbanded back during Yefremov's time. We are now restoring it. Relations with the sanitary inspection service have also become tense. The chief doctor, who did not punish those responsible for the dirty conditions, has compiled a protocol against me as the manager. But about 200 persons work in this system. I recall a case in the former USSR, in the city of

Solikamsk: The chief doctor shut down plants with injurious wastes. She was summoned to the party bureau, a scandal broke out, and the whole country came to the defense of the chief doctor, letters were written, telegrams sent. You do not investigate such heroes here. No one is fined, no appeals are made to the mayor's office. There is no sanitary militia. Then at least let the district militia officer look after cleanliness together with the yardmen. I think that it will be said in any house now that, against the background of the fights between the two administrations, the yardmen are practically not working. I think that the residents should come out in spring and tidy up; after all, they also are littering. But I can imagine what the VLADIVOSTOK newspaper will write in this regard: "The mayor's office has acknowledged its impotence and has decided to summon everyone to volunteer weekend work. But, after all, not in one city of the world do residents conduct themselves so unwisely. As if it were not their yard, home, and street. They do not give a damn, they litter, they move on."

[Fomicheva] You were the deputy of a kray soviet and enjoyed great authority among your voters. I remember that grateful letters addressed to you were sent to our newspaper. You have experience. What do you think? Will you succeed in leaving the old [illegible word] soviet?

[Gilgenberg] A Duma of 40 persons also cannot solve all problems immediately. However, it is not a matter of the number of deputies. At the end of the 1970's I was in the state of Vancouver, where the parliament consisted of 200 persons, but they all wanted the best for their state. We have a different psychology and a habit of constantly living in a fight with one another. Beginning with the Pioneers, remember: "In the struggle for the cause, be prepared!" Now, everything depends on the voters. If they in all seriousness elect worthy people, the Duma will be able to change the situation.

[Fomicheva] Did you easily collect the signatures for your registration as a candidate?

[Gilgenberg] Yes.

[Fomicheva] But how did you collect them?

[Gilgenberg] I do not know, my supporters did this in the microrayons.

[Fomicheva] Did you use your official position? We have a lot of letters that talk about such cases in other cities.

[Gilgenberg] In no way!

[Fomicheva] A commission headed by Nelli Yakimenko from the human rights committee came to Vladivostok to look into the dispute of the two administrations. Did you meet with it?

[Gilgenberg] Of course. I have known Yakimenko for a long time: We worked together in the militia, and we joined the democratic movement together. But this time I met her as a person who was an official from Moscow.

She has set herself up well in the capital, and the apartment question was resolved. But, after all, there have been a lot of commissions, and we hope that they will gain an understanding.

[Fomicheva] What is it like in the mayor's office now? Quiet?

[Gilgenberg] Those who came to work along with Cherepkov have mastered the situation and are working. We are accepting new people for a probationary period.

[Fomicheva] I wrote once that when we were electing a mayor we had a poor idea of what it meant. Are you planning a trip abroad for training?

[Gilgenberg] This is an interesting question. We are planning one. Cherepkov's trip to Japan has already fallen through. Now he is being invited to Italy. Four employees have been invited to Alaska. However, we cannot leave yet, work in the city has not been settled. But, then, imagine what we will hear about the trips. "They left for a rest," it will be said.

[Fomicheva] You will excuse me, but even you have the old viewpoint! So, let them say it! In any country a person goes where he has a mind to, and it is only in our "camp of socialism" that a trip by someone in a managerial position is accompanied by "howling" in the newspapers. Previously, this was understandable, as they traveled on party money. But now?

[Gilgenberg] When we were getting buses from South Korea, I wanted to go myself, but I did not allow myself to do so for this reason. Although today a trip abroad is really open to everyone, and any cooperator has traveled through Turkey, France.

[Fomicheva] You have always wanted democracy to come, when you started the movement for it with Yakimenko. But are you living well today?

[Gilgenberg] I will answer you like this. The builders of both socialism and a society with market relations are one and the same. And the methods are old, unfortunately.

[Fomicheva] Well, is it good for you or not?

[Gilgenberg] There is the hope that it will be good. And I think that it is absolutely necessary to retain one principle of socialism: A person should not fall below a certain level. And it seems that there was a higher morality.

[Fomicheva] But this is all in your power as the city manager. Perhaps, start with pornography on vendor stands. After all, children pass by. Such, excuse me, nonsense is being disseminated in many aspects of life where we are smartly trying on the garments of foreign life. Without a moment's hesitation. But they do not accept pornography there either. What do you think of the decision of the State Duma on the amnesty?

[Gilgenberg] It seems to me that this question should have been decided by lawyers at an international level. I am not very pleased that they were all released. But at the same time, in periods of crisis, the leadership was completely changed in all countries. A younger generation of politicians should normalize the situation in Russia.

[Fomicheva] And in the kray? Will the two administrations reach an agreement?

[Gilgenberg] I hope that common sense will prevail among the kray leadership. And then Maritime Kray has every chance of coming out of the crisis.

Vladivostok City Manager Shuffles Staff

944F0445A Vladivostok KRASNOYE ZNAMYA in Russian
15 Mar 94 p 1

[Article by Sergey Glushkov: "A Personnel Revolution?"]

[Text] Last Friday, administrations of three rayons in Vladivostok were literally shocked by an unexpected visit.

Early in the morning several persons, led by City Administrator V. Gildenberg, showed up in the office of T. Vadilyeva, the acting head of Sovetskii Rayon administration. Two of them wore militia uniforms and were armed. After an "entertaining" conversation, T. Vadilyeva learned that she had been removed from the job, and the new appointee was N. Beletskiy, a former head of the city education department and a former candidate for a mayor. Our readers may recall that during the election campaign he stepped down as a candidate in favor of the current head of administration, V. Cherepkov.

After that, V. Gildenberg, again with an escort, visited Pervomayskiy Rayon, where the head of administration, V. Pletnev, was relieved of his duties. His place was taken by V. Kalenik, a former deputy chairman of Sovetskii Rayon Soviet.

The same fate befell the head of Leninskiy Rayon administration S. Zhurmilov, whose chair will now be occupied by D. Ilyinskiy. One can only tell about him that he is 50 and is a retired Captain 1st Rank. By the way, S. Zhurmilov did not accept his dismissal and filed a court complaint.

A strange personnel "reshuffling...." Especially keeping in mind that not too long ago the head of the Frunzenskiy Rayon administration was replaced—by a militia officer.

Vladivostok Official Interferes With Media

944F0441B Vladivostok UTRO ROSSII in Russian
12 Mar 94 p 1

[Article by Damir Gaynutdinov under the rubric "The Authorities and the Press": "Dare Not To Have an Opinion—Vice Governor Igor Lebedinets Demanded of our UTRO ROSSII Correspondent"]

[Text] From now on, esteemed reader, there will be no reports from teleconferences of the extraordinary commission for kray heat supply, which used to be published on Wednesdays and Saturdays under the rubric "Winter Problems." Not because with the advent of spring these problems have disappeared overnight. It is simply that Igor Petrovich, our chief troubleshooter everywhere, forbade me to attend these events from now on. Not for the first time, though.

Back in December he was very unhappy over the item "Where Did the Firewood Come From?" in which the author made no secret of reports from Khorol officials that because of coal shortages in rayon villages, people were chopping down the woods. This was a misstep, as the "Cheka" [extraordinary commission] chairman explained to me the next time we met. Instead of mobilizing people to struggle against adversity, the way it used to be during the times of agitation and propaganda and party committee press departments, it turns out that I, in Lebedinets' opinion, had demoralized the workers. It somehow does not occur to Igor Petrovich that only the truth can mobilize people, including the kray leadership, toward liquidation of the fuel crisis. The Khorol leadership has rung enough alarms by then.

The most entertaining part at the time was Igor Petrovich's accusation that both I personally and UTRO ROSSII are doing everything possible to make things worse... for President Yeltsin. I have to confess that sometimes I disagree with the actions of Boris Nikolayevich—who during his visit to Vladivostok gave his blessing to the publication of our newspaper—which should be a normal thing in a law-based state and a democratic society. But Igor Petrovich himself developed an affinity for Yeltsin only when he ascended to this administrative job. As I recall, he had none of that affinity during his time in the communist faction of the kray soviet, which he headed.

Whatever—the result was that he banned me from attending the conferences then, but later relented after M. Savchenko, chairman of the kray administration committee for housing and municipal services, said publicly (this is how you discover people's mettle even in our democratic times) that I do write objectively.

On 5 March, however, Mikhail Lvovich sensibly remained silent, having decided that to keep trying to educate and teach Igor Petrovich is like trying to cure a dead man. Here is what happened.

Not a single teleconference passes without a reminder of the money owed to the energy sector. All the rayons and cities are in this debt up to their ears. All of them Igor Petrovich treats with benevolence and understanding, however, but as soon as it comes to Vladivostok he literally goes into a fit of rage. This time what prompted his outburst was that I do not get upset and treat Vladivostok like every other place. My especially dangerous fault was that I did not write that one of the causes of our common shivering this winter was the fact

that V. Cherepkov allocated money to start the BOLSHOY VLADIVOSTOK newspaper.

"Why do you not write about that?" the vice governor said, looking as if he were spoiling for a fistfight.

I explained to him that then I would have to write that millions of taxpayer rubles are allocated by the kray administration to KRASNOYE ZNAMYA and NOVOSTI, as well as by local authorities to all rayon and city newspapers. Is this a solution to the heating and power problem?

"A demagogue," was the label slapped on me this time. Kray party committee ideologist Antokhin once called me a rebel; another party secretary, Kharchev, suggested that I decide for myself whether I was for the Soviet power or not. It turned out that the way he saw it, I was against it. And now another kray zealot of propaganda customs, without doubting for a moment...

There are many people in the kray who have known both Igor Petrovich and myself for many years. Since he got his education as a part-time student, I will remind our mutual acquaintances—as food for thought—of the meaning of one word.

DEMAGOGUERY (demagogia in Greek, from demos—people and ago—lead)—deception through intentional distortion of facts, false promises, and flattery; hypocritical pandering to the taste of the less educated part of the masses in order to achieve political goals.

I really cannot accept such a characteristic of myself. As to I. Lebedinets, who calls journalists "slimeballs"—I do not know.

Watching Igor Petrovich in his capacity as de facto first vice governor, I cannot help recalling his namesake and predecessor Igor Chernyanskiy. He was rakishly rough, but while holding this job he did not stoop to pettiness and vindictiveness.

"I want to understand, looking from the position of an elephant (meaning his job of great responsibility—D.G.) why I am being barked at, even if I am not aware of it," he said once.

I think it is time for Igor Petrovich to grow to fill this job rather than staying in the old position he is accustomed to.

Actually, he is not as insignificant as some may think or imagine. If I am asked some time in the future who Ye Nardratenko was, I will say he was Maritime Kray governor during Lebedinets' time.

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

International Conference on Bosnia Under UN Aegis Urged

944Q02.04 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 4 Mar 94 p 4

[Article by Igor Laptev, Foreign Policy Association: "Conference on Bosnian Conflict Needed"]

[Text] The process of reaching a settlement in Bosnia and Herzegovina based on the principle of threat of use of force has reached an impasse and constitutes the road to nowhere. The NATO countries cannot go on threatening air strikes for years on end. Nor can the peoples of Bosnia, Serbia, and Croatia live under such a threat for years on end. Unfortunately, not even having begun combat operations, military leaders in the United States are already discussing the possibility of their expansion. UN Secretary General Butrus-Ghali and the NATO leaders have not rescinded their threat—they have only postponed it. They are not considering that in the event of air strikes in Bosnia, NATO and the United Nations will turn into a warring faction. The blue helmets will turn dark with blood, and the units wearing them will be quickly swept aside by armed forces of Serbs, Croats, and Bosnians—which might evoke a responsive reaction from the NATO forces. Such a course of events could lead inevitably to large-scale war in Europe.

It is clear that the peoples of Bosnia, Serbia, Montenegro, and Croatia would be the primary victims of this. It is not clear who would compensate for the material damage—many times surpassing the scope of humanitarian assistance now being extended to Bosnia.

Today like never before it is important to prevent escalation of the conflict in Bosnia into a European tragedy and to deny NATO the right to determine when bombing and missile strikes will be carried out in Bosnia. It is important that we urgently begin to seek new approaches and ideas for achieving a political settlement in Bosnia and, on the broader scale, in the Balkans. As a minimum such a decision must be made by the UN Security Council. It seems that a conference must be convened to this end under the aegis of the United Nations to attain a settlement in the former Yugoslavia. The initiator of such a conference could be Russia and other Slavic states that support even contacts with all sides in the Bosnian conflict. Such a conference could give all republics of the former Yugoslavia the opportunity to participate in it on an equal basis and preclude the possibility of a situation arising where decisions would be made behind their backs and be imposed on them by outsiders. It is also important that all permanent members of the UN Security Council participate in the conference.

In the event accord is reached with respect to convening this conference, the preparations group need not be limited to international representatives David Owen and

Thorevald Stoltenberg, whose positions reflect the pro-West, pro-NATO orientation, but should include representatives from Serbia, Montenegro, Croatia, and Bosnia, as well as the ethnic minorities of these republics. The group could include Russia, Greece—as the neighbor of the Yugoslav republics, and Bulgaria—as a Balkan Slavic country. The preparatory work of a broad-based group could help convene the international conference in a more favorable environment than that in which negotiations have thus far been conducted.

Conflict in the former Yugoslavia has been ongoing for almost two years and no end is in sight under the current mismanagement of events. Conference preparation with participation of the Serbs, Croats, and Bosnians themselves should help reduce the tension. Negotiations can and must replace military operations.

The time has come to establish in Russia the Committee of the Russian Community To Facilitate a Political Settlement of Bosnia and Herzegovina, with the participation of representatives of political parties, social movements, and Slavic organizations. This committee should also facilitate the search for a settlement through the establishment of unofficial contacts between representatives on the sides in conflict. This too could yield great dividends.

RI: Diplomacy on Bosnia, Politicking on Foreign Policy Assessed

Adapted from *ORSHCHAYA GAZETA* in Russian News of March 14 p. 7

Editorial by David Kandel: "Russian Policy in the Bosnian Conflict."

Let's: Russia's actions in the recent crisis around Sarajevo can be relegated to a number of rare successes from the standpoint of diplomatic skill. There was, it is true, a certain confusion in the beginning. Indications of this are the diplomatic illness that the president "endured on his feet" and the statements of various officials that contradicted each other, which has already become traditional. But at the culminating moment the situation was assessed accurately, the weakness and ambiguity in the positions of the other players were fully exploited, and the thrust that was created by NATO's ultimatum was used to support its own line, which also led to the triumph of Russian diplomacy.

There is frustration in Moscow about Russia's independent role. The obvious irritation in Western capitals with Russian "inactivity" is competing with secret satisfaction over the outcome of the Sarajevo crisis. Meanwhile, countries becoming possible only because all the players, through mostly by agreement, played their role in the general game. Using KGB terminology, the West played the role of "independent investigator," after which came Russia's turn, in whom it fell, in the person of the "good investigator," to reap the fruit.

Russia and the Western powers objectively mutually complemented each other in their actions, but differed sharply in their substantiation. The price of such rhetoric, it would seem, is not high. But it always addresses itself to those social forces that have a predominant influence on foreign policy and, therefore, it is not indifferent to the real driving motives of the parties. Russia explained its resistance to NATO's ultimatum in a different way: The impermissibility of attempts to bypass it, the unacceptability of imposing the model of settlement, and the danger of any decision other than a continuation of negotiations. But objectively this denoted an attempt to lessen international pressure on the Serbian side, which was the most powerful and most successful in seizures, and which would also reinforce its position behind the negotiating. And while at the beginning of the Bosnian conflict Russian foreign policy tried, albeit inconsistently, to be impartial, as it developed it began to regard "Orthodox co-religionists" and "Slavic brothers" with greater and greater favor. This corresponded fully to the biased leniency of the European states toward Croatia, and of the United States toward the Bosnian Muslims.

However, the important interests of the Western states are not affected here, and only the Bosnian gap in European law and order stains their reputation. It is hardly possible to ascribe to genuine Russian foreign policy interests an inclination to assist the Belgrade regime in a partition of the former SFRY in accordance with the ideals of a Greater Serbia. Bosnian rural areas are hardly the most effective scene for demonstrating greatness. The space, where the collapsed Yugoslav dinar, contrary to an anti-German mood, is being squeezed out by the German mark, which Russia will be unable to counter with anything for a long time, is outside the radius of influence of the Russian economy. In precisely the same way a military advanced post, separated from it by the territories of Ukraine, Moldova, and Romania, is not very suitable for the defense of Russia, if the counterproductive task of having a permanent irritant on NATO's southern flank is not set. There is also no promise of foreign policy dividends in an alliance with an international social outcast that contrived to squander the enormous foreign policy capital of the former SFRY.

Of course, it can be assumed that Russia's readiness to support "a Serbian cause" to the last Serbian soldier is explained by sober political realism. After all, Serbia, as has happened more than once, will remain an "historical ally" of Russia only while the war lasts and the international isolation continues. It is then in Russia's interests to support this status as long as possible. The task is the more gratifying in that it does not require any sacrifices by Russia, except for damage to its international prestige. But access to the matches for the powder keg of Europe is a considerable temptation. The intent is sufficiently cynical to appear politically authentic. Of course, in this case also, the question of the cost of such a temporary "historical alliance" remains.

The reality, however, is more transparent. Russian foreign policy is more and more becoming a direct derivative of the arrangement of internal political forces, taking on a dangerous independence from the strictly foreign policy interests and objectives of the country. The most authoritarian ruler is incapable for long of refuting through his behavior the well-known formula of foreign policy being a continuation of domestic policy. The exerted striving for foreign policy self-affirmation is greater the weaker the domestic stability of the existing regime, the narrower its social base and political support, and the more dismal its socioeconomic situation. It is not just a question of compliance to the pressure of the national-communist opposition that prevails in parliament and to the intrigues of the lobbyist groups, from the pro-Serb to the Karabakh and Abkhaz groups, which need an example and an international-legal precedent to legalize their own claims. It is not only a matter of the efforts of the president's "court" to forestall the opposition by intercepting some of their slogans and the votes of the electorate. For the country as a whole, which is obsessed with a complex of greatness but which is deprived of many of its status symbols and a material basis, there is an inevitable striving to assert an independent role in the international arena.

The time has also come for a sobering up of Russian foreign policy from "romantic Westernism," and just as naturally for a departure from "market romanticism." The policy is ever more pertinent in that such romanticism is principally foreign to the West itself. Fraternizing with windmills is just as absurd as fighting them. Perhaps it is for this reason that all the factions of the State Duma voted for a resolution that denounces NATO's ultimatum. However, the age-old misfortune of the Russian character—dislike for the middle ground—turns into a tragic shortfall in the policy of the centrist social and political forces. Therefore, there is a very great risk that "market romanticism," given the most insignificant changes in the composition of the leading personalities, will be replaced by an antimarket romance, and that illusory Westernism will turn into great power illusions. The magical transformation of Kozyrev's Stockholm parody into a Russian foreign policy program is a dangerous symptom of precisely such an evolution. It is entirely superfluous to talk about the foreign policy constructions of the national-communist opposition.

The Sarajevo crisis revealed latent maturing processes of changes in Russian foreign policy. This may become the guarantee of more businesslike relations of Russia with Western states—proof of the fact that not only is the West necessary to Russia, but that Russia is also necessary to the West. The Sarajevo crisis can also turn out to be the start of a new opposition. But while Russia cannot escape a serious discussion with the Western partners, for example, as a result of their attempts to counteract the voluntary reintegration of the post-Soviet space, to quarrel regarding Bosnia is pure childishness. But the president and his circle are hardly ready to be at loggerheads with the State Duma over this. It is because what is happening there in fact makes no difference to one or

the other. After all, Russian foreign policy, to Russian politicians of various colors, is only a place for settling domestic political scores.

Brutents Ponders Russia's Position Between East, West

944Q0212A Moscow INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
in English No 1-2, Jan-Feb 94 [Signed to press 26 Jan 94]
pp 40-44

["Viewpoint" article by Karen Brutents, doctor of historical sciences and adviser to the president of the Political Studies Foundation: "Russia and the East"]

[Text] Russia is in transition in almost every respect. This also goes for the crystallization of its identity as regards both its rightful role in the world community and its concept of its own distinctiveness and essence. I take the view that in this respect as in some others Russia still keeps in large measure to the past, to disconnected fragments of it, and may be said to apply the formula of its legal succession to this sphere as well.

Yet Russia will have to "predetermine itself," with its vision of the problems of "Russia and the East," of relations with the East, as a most important part of the process.

What is the issue today, when the substance of a problem that seems so very traditional or rather historical for the country is undergoing a serious transformation as a result of 70 years of membership in the Soviet Union and, above all, drastic geostrategic, social, and economic changes in Russia?

It is primarily our relations with Eastern (in fact Asian) countries as well as their projection into our relations with the West. Until recently this part of the globe received little attention from Russian policy and diplomacy for both objective and subjective reasons. But Boris Yeltsin's visit to South Korea, China, India and Japan, his remarks in Peking about "breakthroughs" to Asia and in Delhi about a "period of pro-Eastern policy" give hope for serious reassessment, for a continuation of the process of revision, with tangible deeds following important statements.

The attitude to the East and relations with it are a key aspect of Russia's identity, of its self-determination as a civilized spiritual, psychological and even political phenomenon. Whether Russia belongs to or sees itself as part of the West or the East was the object of a controversy that ran through Russian social thought for a long time, being slightly diluted in the 1920s by emigres who advanced the concept of Eurasianism. Nor is this surprising, for the controversy has always involved diametrically opposed political notions of the road along which Russia should move.

It seems to me, however, that this aspect of the controversy has lost meaning (assuming that it ever had any).

and the present flare-up of Eurasianism is rather indicative of the opposition's search for ideological equipment and its reaction to immoderate (and occasionally indecent) Westernisation on the part of a section of the intelligentsia and some spokesman for the government. Be that as it may, the formula of Westernisers versus Eurasianists and those who consider themselves inseparable from Russia's "native soil" provides no answer to the question of the relationship between Russia and the East.

The issue today is obviously Russia's fundamental attitude to the East, the need to recall certain distinguishing characteristics of our country, not a reproduction of theses of Eurasianism, which argues that Russia is following a road of its own and that regular global developments do not apply to it. The experience gained to date leaves no room for doubt that they involve the East, West, North and South. Hence Russia cannot stay off the road of democracy and a social market economy, whose various forms are winning ever wider recognition.

This, however, presupposes realising that the long-standing notion of the "ownership" of the phenomenon of democracy is outdated and that to embark on democracy is not the same as accepting the Western model.

The vitality of democracy depends on its ability to make further progress. Currently, many in the West are pondering on how to improve the democratic procedure in use. More and more people there consider that these procedures are by no means ideal and that it is indispensable to devise effective ways of combating increasing corruption, overcoming the population's political indifference due to the crisis of the party system in its present form and to the disregard of pressing needs of the electorate by leaders, to their selfishness and demagoguery of defending the interests and rights of minorities from the democratic diktat of the majority. In this situation the search for consensus which is typical of Eastern countries seems to be coming to the fore in various sections and structures of society.

The 21st century is likely to become an era of democratisation in the East. But this will hardly come down to a mere transplantation of the Western model and hence to Westernisation. Incidentally, all talk about grafting Western ideals is indefensible also tactically. It may complicate the democratisation process, causing this "extraneous" phenomenon to be rejected, a prospect exploited by nationalist and oligarchic forces in the East. Formerly, in the period of confrontation between two world systems, there certainly was a point in stressing the "Western" character of democracy. Today, however, the situation is entirely different.

Russia largely owes its originality (but not exclusiveness) and its legitimate role and potential as a member of the world community to the fact that it combines, if not always harmoniously, the features of Western (European) and Asian (Eastern) civilisations. While the poet Alexander Blok used those famous words "Yes, we are

Scythians, yes, we are Asians" in the heat of debate, they were not accidental but reflected a historic intertwining.

Traditionally drawn primarily to the West, Russia has always been a Eurasian country nonetheless, and this not only territorially. Its history, polyethnic environment, culture and very interests induced it to play the role of a link or even mediator between the two countries. Of course, how far it coped with this role is open to question. But there is no doubt that over the centuries diverse civilisational streams converged in the expanses of Russia, where a polyphonic socio-cultural area, a fabric of intercivilisational bonds and a culture of mutually enriching interchanges came into being and an atmosphere of psychological tolerance and openness to beneficial influences was created.

Everything relating to Russian nationals—their way of life, individual and social psychology, arts and letters, character and mentality—bear the imprint of this intercivilisational and supranational phenomenon influencing also the political evolution of the country, if not decisively. The "non-Westernness" of many spiritual and moral qualities of ethnic Russians and other inhabitants of Russia is obvious.

Directly deducing the specifics of Russia and its people from contacts with the foreign and internal parts of the East or from the "Eastern" component of their "soul" is out of the question, for they are a product of more complex interaction.

Still, the influence of these contacts, of Russia's Eastern environment, seems indisputable. Traces of it can be found in the language, the humanities (meaning their scope and the range of their interests), literature, noblemen's names and much else. This is as it should be, for, apart from two and a half centuries of the Mongol domination, Russia continuously and intensively extended its contact with the East through conquest and cultural interpenetration. It grew into Asia, forming its own East, an Asia of its own, where hundreds of thousands of ethnic Russians and other Russian nationals closely interacted psychologically, intellectually, and emotionally with the Eastern way of life and Eastern culture.

No non-Asian country has anything like this, and the spiritual reverberations of this interaction were bound to make themselves felt in one way or another throughout Russia. How very tangible the results of this mutual receptiveness can be is illustrated by the problem of adaptation of today's wave of emigration from some southern republics. It appears that there is a substantial distinction in psychology and way of life between these emigrants and their compatriots in, say, Central Russia, which creates difficulties in this respect as well.

A high degree of tolerance for a polytechnic environment is a further reflection of Russia's historic identity, of the blend of Western and Eastern components that its genetic type represents. To be sure, Russian chronicles have also recorded other things. Chauvinism, too, has

had and still has influential adherents. By and large, however, Russia as a country and society is more resistant—as the dramatic experience of recent years shows—to anti-emigration trends like those that are now rife in, for example, Western Europe.

Russia's attitude to the East is an attitude to itself, too, for Russia is also home to Tatars, Bashkirs, Yakuts, Caucasian, and dozens of other "Eastern" nationalities. Their place in our country, in its life and fortunes, is entirely different from that of, say, Arabs or Africans in France, Indians or Pakistanis in Britain. Russia is not just a habitat of diverse ethnic groups but a polytechnic country where the Russians as its backbone and other peoples have for centuries lived not only side by side but together, intermingling, fusing culturally and spiritually, jointly weathering social cataclysms and repulsing foreign invasions. They have a common history and common destiny.

Add to this that for 70 years we lived in one state, leading a common life with millions of Uzbeks, Kazakhs, Kirghiz, Turkmens, Tajiks, Azerbaijanians, and that today we belong with them to the Commonwealth of Independent States. All this was bound to and did have its effect, drawing and linking us together.

In other words, whereas Western Europe and the United States may look on the East as something different or even alien, it would be unnatural of Russia to do so. This is what geography and history, cultural and civilisational factors have willed.

Some Russian leaders today repudiate Russia's "Asian heritage," seeing nothing in it but negative, ignominious things, a burden pulling us back. Yet this heritage is as contradictory as any other legacy of history. Along with elements of medieval stagnation and even slavery, it includes what is a natural part of the historic strength and potential of Russia and its civilisation.

Russia belongs to neither the West nor the East alone. It is at once a Western and Eastern country. This does not mean that Russia is a mix or mechanical combination of cultural continents. Our country is the product of a synthesis that has given rise to a new, distinctive civilisation, a whole civilisational mainland, an original organism whose thinking and sentiments set it apart from others. And so all attempts to "rid" us of things Eastern and fully Westernise us are futile. What is more, they are absurd.

Today the multicivilisational, Western and Eastern sources and nature of Russian distinctiveness are acquiring special value. "Integration" is a word you now hear almost everywhere. It is a trend paving the way to the future for humanity. A universal civilisation is dawning all over the world, and its components are taking shape and spreading, especially to the economic sphere but also to politics and culture.

Much less is said, however, about the circumstances that the result will by no means be a unified world, the

effacement of distinctions, the abolition of cultural diversity. If this were to happen, humanity would become faceless, for it would lose one of the most powerful driving forces of its progress.

I am sure the 21st century will give existing civilisations a second wind as they develop and adapt to new conditions without losing their identity. It will usher in an increasingly polycentric world. We will arrive at it after abolishing a bipolar system, as we have already done, and completing the present transitional stage of unbalanced concentration of political influence, military power, and information potential at one pole.

Unlike the past, however, the evolution of diverse civilisations will probably take place in unprecedentedly close mutual contact. The era of isolated civilisations shutting out all others is over. They are being drawn together by the transnationalisation of economic life and information, the feverish development of communications, mass migrations. This creates tensions at "junctions" and other difficulties. Experience shows that even the achievement of a high, roughly equal level of economic growth does not eliminate problems arising from civilisational and cultural heterogeneity.

We live at a time when not only close contacts and a rapprochement between countries and nations but a convergence of civilisations and cultures are gaining in importance and urgency. This is all the more essential now that the greatest ideological conflict of the 20th century is over. Against this background Russia with its mixed civilisation, a country which has gone through a social experiment, is a particularly noteworthy phenomenon. Its intercivilisational essence, the experience of the coexistence of and contacts between diverse nations, may prove very valuable for humanity at this stage if preserved and fostered.

The East always held a prominent place in the foreign policy and overall potential of the Russian state and the Soviet Union. Basically, this also applies to the present period even though a number of important circumstances and vectors have changed, which means that many earlier approaches will have to be revised. What is different now is primarily Russia's real status.

Russia used to identify itself with a superpower, the Soviet Union, and actually embodied it. The Soviet Union was chiefly a Russian state. Most foreigners called it "Russia" and its citizens "Russians," doing so not only by mistake or force of habit.

Today Russia is striving to act as a full-fledged legal successor of the Soviet Union, and Russian diplomacy is doing as much in the main sectors. Yet the changes that set in with the disappearance of the Soviet Union as a superpower strongly affected Russia even though it may still not quite realise its new situation because the aura of the recent past and reflexes of a state that has gone out of existence linger on. Russia has joined the ranks of great powers (with a population half the size of the Soviet Union's and an area that is smaller by a third) and will

yet have to back up this new status by providing itself with an appropriate economic and political basis.

The priorities and main tasks of Russian policy and diplomacy are not quite clear as yet. They are certain to depend for some time to come on personal predilections, reflexes of attraction and rejection, automatic reactions evolved over the past few years. But however pro-American and pro-European a section of the intelligentsia and some leaders of the country may be (they understandably want Russia to be regarded as inseparable from Europe and the West and to have a say in European affairs), there is no disregarding realities.

The disintegration of the Soviet Union has objectively shifted the geostrategic and geopolitical epicentre of Russia to the East, towards Asia, although nominally this is not the case and, more importantly, is somewhat contrary to our current requirements. A belt of new independent states has emerged to the west of Russia (Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, the Baltic republics) drawn mainly to Western Europe, not Russia. These states are virtually moving Russia away from Europe, being a partition that may become a barrier where the position on Russia is unfriendly. On its southern periphery Russia is now faced with independent Transcaucasian and Central Asian states plus Kazakhstan. Furthermore, some of them are becoming a serious security problem.

Today Asia accounts for nearly 80 percent of Russia's territory, 70 percent of its frontiers and the lion's share of its natural resources. What the country can expect to help it end the present economic deadlock and make progress are primarily its eastern areas. Siberia and the Far East (12 million square kilometres of territory and the longest Pacific coastline), their economic cooperation with and integration into the fast-developing Asia-Pacific region.

As matters stand, the Asian part of Russia is thus bound to play a bigger role in the destiny of the country, its economic growth and foreign policy. This is also true of its Far Eastern coast at a time when most of the country's Baltic and Black Sea ports are gone.

A welcome change is the fact that Russia is no longer shackled by a superpower policy involving overarmament and ideological messianism and demanding that the country approach the world as the arena of an all-out rivalry for leadership. Russia no longer sees the East as an area of confrontation between two systems. It has withdrawn from an unacceptable and unwinnable game.

I believe all this means that Russia must resist the temptation of a duumvirate approach that, while possibly tickling its self-esteem, is useless. Besides, the United States remembers Russia in this context mostly when it is a question of certain survivals of the Cold War, an attitude which is only natural from the point of view of that country's national interests.

Russia's most powerful neighbours are in the East—in Asia. Its relations with the East include relations with

China. These are already of fundamental importance and their importance for Russia's destiny will grow further in the first decade of the next century, when China will have a real chance to become an economic (and possibly also a military) superpower, according to many forecasts.

Russia's Past Contribution to Civilization Invoked

944Q0211A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 1 Mar 94 p 3

[Article by Richard Ovinnikov, ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary, doctor of historical sciences. "We Should Be Proud of Our Mission"]

[Text] The Russian Federation, which is currently overloaded to breaking point, will, of course, ultimately determine its fate itself, within its own walls. But the question also of the international climate in this difficult period is far from secondary.

The dramatic content of the external problems which Russia is encountering is obvious. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, it has for the first time in several centuries been deprived both of the western and Central Asia-Transcaucasus cordon. Beyond its new borders is an encircling focal point of conflicts, and 25 million of its colinguals today rank as foreigners.

To avoid being caught unawares by the further development of events, a sober, impartial analysis of trends in the surrounding world is required. It is time that Russians tired of the incantations about the fact that to each proclaimed course there is no alternative recalled the truth that the way to the future is always variant. As far as the possible forecasts for the future are concerned, four scenarios of the impact of the surrounding world on the national interests of the Russian Federation may be imagined.

First scenario (optimistic or positive). The reintegration of the economies of a sizable number of countries of the CIS and their political and military interface occur. Conflicts on Russia's borders subside. Relations with countries of East Europe improve. The West, primarily in the shape of the Seven, renders the restoration and modernization of our industry appreciable assistance by way of large investments and the lifting of trade restrictions.

Second scenario (pessimistic or negative). Economic and political disintegration of the space around Russia occurs. It suffocates without friends or markets. Problems of its security as a consequence of the proliferation of nuclear weapons close by and/or the growth of conflicts along the perimeter intensify sharply. The West denying Russia stabilization on its borders, engages in a tug-of-war in respect to the former allies and republics of the USSR, and its economic interaction with us amounts to shoring up Russia's raw material sectors.

Third scenario (interim or stagnant). The formation of a common market of the CIS comes to a standstill. With the East European countries—cool relations. Conflicts

along Russia's perimeter smolder, although they do not develop into a conflagration. The danger of the proliferation of nuclear weapons nearby hangs in the air. The West dribbles out economic assistance and politically and strategically contemplates the development of events.

Fourth scenario (sudden or spontaneous). An abrupt deterioration in Russian-Ukrainian relations arises. In the wake of the Transcaucasus, borders are revised in Central Asia between former Union republics. Tension is created throughout the system of relations with an increasingly assertive West. The distant surroundings could bring rolling to Russia seismic waves of their own tectonic shifts—the bankruptcies of a number of important developing countries, trade wars, and the unleashing of "hot wars" in the Third World or against it.

It is not known which of these scenarios is possible today. There are even more uncertainties with regard to their probable combinations. The sole solution for Russia in this situation is to be ready to defend its national interests all along the line and to assert its statehood. Precise reference points are required for this first and foremost.

It would seem that the cornerstone of the policy course of the Russian Federation should, as in critical times in the past also, be its clear understanding of its own significance in world geopolitics. A big ship has no need to be constantly flashing its lights. It cannot be forgotten that we are a major global factor, and in emergency situations, an irreplaceable factor.

The truth is that the entire history of mankind in the second millennium would have developed tragically had there not been at the intersection of Europe and Asia the Russian state. Three times it has saved the European continent, and on the last occasion, the world also, from unprecedented aggression. The first time, when, in the 13th-15th centuries, Russians shielded Europe from the invasion of the hordes of the descendants of Genghis Khan. The second, at the start of the 19th century, when Russia crushed the armies of Napoleon, invincible to subjugated Europe. The third time, in the 1940's, when two-thirds of the might of Hitler's fascism was pulverized and its backbone broken on the Soviet-German front. Who else could have done all this?

Russia has thus traditionally, throughout the millennium, acted the part of proven stabilizer of European civilization, guarantor of its peace, and dependable shield against history's biggest acts of aggression. To maintain anything different is to falsify.

It is odd under these conditions, if not insulting to Russians' national pride, to hear today talk to the effect that, for example, Russia generally (both tsarist and Soviet) has always been a "constant threat" to Europe. But this imaginary threat has simply never materialized. Or that Russia, the times of the USSR included, has been an invariable "potential aggressor." Finally, that Russia,

ideology notwithstanding, is organically "inclined" to "realize" "imperial ambitions." And once again there is "nothing" something ascribed to us, but unconfessed.

Well, lack of scruples, let it pass. Gratitude is a stranger to politics. But today's rehashes of unforgotten history may, not, in any event, provoke us into needless and humiliating excuses or evoke an inferiority complex. Russians have nothing to make excuses for. We should be proud of our noble historical mission and conscience. Russia is now, and will remain a great power vitally important to the world. Only such a confident, majestic posture is the way to its revival.

A most important specific task of the Russian Federation, as of any other state also, is the attainment of tranquility for internal transformations, a necessary way of the formation of friendly surroundings. Today, these are primarily the CIS countries. Apathy or chronic unnatural alienation would mean tearing at the 2,000-year-old roots, the earth for which cannot be separated from overseas. Russians do not, under any circumstances, want such a development. At the recent elections, stability within the CIS figured as a priority in the programs of the majority of election associations. Of course, this can only be a question of a process of achieving unity by political methods.

Another large-scale practical goal of the Russian Federation on the outside is assurance of a generally healthy international climate. This signifies a return to the principle of confrontation with the West and a search for mutually profitable and long-term cooperation. But this presupposes also Russia's firm defense of its considerable national interests and legitimate demands in world politics and economics. In any event, attempts to erect either a cordon sanitaire or a wide network of barriers to Russia's borders are unnatural, discriminatory, and unacceptable.

Are any of these reference points a threat to national interests? Great, sovereign Russia, with the motto "for our men," is approaching the world of the future in the best possible way.

Citizens Democracy Corps Projects Outlined

944Q02274 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS and PRESS
No 9, 4-10 Mar 94 p 7

[Article by Sergei Stokan: "Economic Mission: From the USA Coming to Russia" (first paragraph, introductory paragraph)]

[Text] An American organization has suggested a form of cooperation to Russian enterprises, to attract Western specialists and pay for their work at Russian enterprises.

"The purpose of our organization is to bring the knowledge and resources of the US private sector to assist reforms in Central Europe," said Michael Kiser, official representative of the Citizens Democracy

Corps (CDC) in Moscow. "We are working on the assumption that the transition to the market implies not only reforms at the macro-level, but also day-to-day work at the level of enterprises, public organizations and municipal services."

The Citizens Democracy Corps is an American noncommercial, nongovernmental organization whose Executive Committee includes former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, former US Ambassador in Russia Robert Strauss, many prominent Congressmen, industrialists and scientists. It is financed by the state-owned US Agency of International Development (USAID) which has allotted 2.2 million dollars for the Corps' programmes. These programmes envisage the extension of aid by highly skilled consultants from the USA.

A distinctive feature of the CDC program is that it envisages the extension of aid in the shape of business advice on a pro bono basis. The Corps' staff members identify what specialists are needed for a particular enterprise and undertake all subsequent work to complete the Russian applications. They find specialists in the USA and pay the cost of air tickets. Customers must only offer local transportation, provide housing and an interpreter.

One more feature of the programme is its volunteers. They are Americans who desire to share their time and knowledge with those who could utilize it in Russia.

The work of the Citizens Democracy Corps is carried out on the basis of two main programmes. The first—Business Entrepreneur—is geared to small and medium-size businesses. "We do not impose our model, but explain things which are the abc's of any successful entrepreneurship making it possible to bring out competitive products," says Robert C. Jacoby, director of the Business Entrepreneur program in Moscow.

The second programme—Citizens Volunteer Program—focuses on strengthening the economic basis of public and private democratic institutions. This programme is used to render assistance to local authorities in areas such as local economic development and institution supporting privatization.

The selection of Russian customers is highly competitive. "For the time being we select a mere 10 percent of the total number of applications, counting on promising enterprises which seriously desire to reach out to the world market," says Robert C. Jacoby about his programme.

What requirements must an enterprise meet? The number of its employees vary from 50 to 1,500, the enterprise must have been privatized or be in the process of privatization, with priority being given to producer enterprises. Besides, the leadership of the enterprise must be receptive to new ideas. At present and in the next few months the Business Entrepreneur program will be carried out the most actively in Moscow, the Moscow Region and Samara.

The Citizens Democracy Corps has been active in Russia since July 1992. Here are but a few examples of its cooperation with Russian partners.

Administration of the Nizhny Novgorod Region

Barbara Chronovski, business consultant with international experience, has helped in appraising the investment proposals of individual enterprises and in selecting the most attractive of them for the CEETEX-94 Exhibition in London.

Lima joint-stock company—Obninsk, Kaluga Region

Michael Laurence, a businessman with 40 years of experience in different countries, has analyzed the company's work and suggested a plan of its reorganization. The samples of products were sent to the USA. The second consultant, Paul Kirschner, carried out a financial analysis of the activities of one of Lima's subunits and compiled a business plan.

Troika-Dialogue investment company—Moscow

Robert Green, Assistant Vice-President of the RCY Information Technology Co., assisted in the development of the department's information system.

Moscow Public Committee Russian Reforms

Wendel Hulcher, a specialist with 30 years of experience in the fields of business, state administration and higher education, has helped in drafting projects for the organization of the Corporation for the Development of Territory and the Administration of Small Business.

Factory of Theatre Properties—Moscow

Gerald Berstell, who once consulted companies such as IBM, Fiat, United Technologies and Nutra-Sweet, has given a number of recommendations for the adaptation of the methods of American marketing to the conditions of the enterprise's work and for the reorganization of the marketing system.

Tenzor instrument-making works—Dubna, Moscow Region

The work of Gerry Behler, owner of the American consulting firm, has been instrumental in reorganizing the enterprise.

Association of charitable organizations "United Way"—Voronezh

Jean Gerding of the American charitable organization "United Way" helped in the organizational rise of the Association of Six Charitable Funds in Voronezh, held seminars on the methods of fund-raising, and helped establish contacts with organizations capable of offering financial and other support in the USA.

Proposed Diamond Deal With U.S. Firm Criticized

944Q02284 Moscow: KOMMERSANT-DAILY in Russian
2 Mar 94 p 11

[Article by Vladimir Teslenko: "Lazare Kaplan Project Discussed in Moscow: The Yankees Want To Fortify Their Position in the World Raw Diamond Market"]

[Text] This week the lively discussion of the proposal by the New York firm, Lazare Kaplan International, to grant the Russian government a loan of 3.3 billion dollars for 10 years on the security of raw diamonds continues (KOMMERSANT wrote about this on 23 February). The president of Lazare Kaplan, Leon Tempelsman, made a short visit to Moscow from 25 February through 1 March. All his Moscow meetings were strictly confidential. But the editorial office of KOMMERSANT managed to gather some information regarding the position of the interested parties and to determine that final negotiations are planned for mid-March.

The precedent of large loans secured by diamonds was created in 1990: the DeBeers firm loaned the USSR government 1 billion dollars for 5 years on the security of 14.6 million carats in raw diamonds. Only certain details of the liquidation of the loans are known: payments are made under a special schedule four times a year and by the end of 1995 will total 1.25 billion dollars. After that the Ministry of Finance received a whole number of such proposals. Some of them have already been rejected and some are still being considered. In accordance with existing practice, all negotiations in this field were strictly confidential. But in the case of Lazare Kaplan International (LKI), there was an information leak and the American firm's proposal began to be discussed extensively throughout the diamond world.

In Western business circles, it is commonly thought that the purpose of Lazare Kaplan International's proposal is to prevent an excessive flow of jewel-grade diamonds out of Russia by transferring the entire federal reserve to the United States.

But according to KOMMERSANT experts' opinion, with its proposal LKI is demonstrating the serious intention of North American capital to launch a power play in the world raw diamond market: to drive a wedge in DeBeers' delicate relations with Russia, squeeze them out of the market, and free up a niche for Canadian diamonds (industrial production of these diamonds amounting to 5-7 million carats a year is expected in 3 or 4 years). The participation of the large firm DuPont de Nemour and the American branch of the mining company VNR is possible in this project.

In any case it is quite unlikely that the Russian Federation government will accept LKI's proposal. In mid-March the deputy minister of finance, Anatoly Golovaty, plans to conduct final negotiations with the LKI leadership and make a counter proposal which is more modest in parameters, for example, a 5-year loan of 1 billion dollars on the security of raw diamonds worth 1.2

billion dollars, on the condition that the specialists of Komdragmet [Committee on Precious Metals and Precious Stones] make up the specifications and there is a commission of 0.1 percent. Mr. Tempelsman will most likely reject this proposal. But then the Yakut government and the Almaz Rossii-Sakha company will apparently continue separate negotiations with LKI on a loan of 300 million dollars on the security of 3-4 million carats in raw diamonds from their own reserves. If the federal authorities do not take a sharply negative stand on this issue, an American-Yakut agreement can be expected by the summer (the start of the navigation season).

As of today, the interested parties upon whom realization of LKI's deal with the federal government depends take the following stands:

The Group of Experts of the Russian Federation President

"We have no instructions on the LKI proposal," the leader of the group, Viktor Krivov, reported yesterday. Most likely if the group is hired to analyze this proposal, its experts will take the finding prepared by the Ministry of Finance and Komdragmet as a basis.

Russian Federation Ministry of Finance

After Boris Fedorov's resignation, Anatoly Golovaty became responsible for preparing the text of the decision. He let it be known that there are "respectable, well-known banks" behind the LKI proposal, but it is a "raw" one. According to information from other sources in the Ministry of Finance, two provisions in the LKI proposal are absolutely unacceptable: the enormous amount of the security and the high commission to Mr. Tempelsman.

Mr. Golovaty emphasized that the possible loan secured by diamonds "in no case should violate the agreement with DeBeers." "Whatever agreement there may be, it must be fulfilled," he stated.

Russian Federation Committee on Precious Metals and Precious Stones

"This is an unacceptable proposal," announced the deputy chairman of Komdragmet, Leonid Gurevich. It is interesting that 2 years ago Mr. Gurevich was a supporter of diamond security and during his time as a member of the parliamentary committee on foreign investments vigorously promulgated Western banks. But recently his opinion did an about-face. According to his assertion, this happened "as a result of new guidelines in the diamond strategy of Russia, which today has more effective means of using raw diamonds on international markets in its arsenal."

Administration of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia)

In the accompanying letter to Boris Yeltsin attached to the text of the LKI proposal, the president of Yakutia, Mikhail Nikolayev, not only showed fundamental interest in this idea but even formulated four additional

points. Taking into account persistent efforts to return some of the diamonds from the federal storage facility to the republic to receive part of the money from transactions with them, Yakutia's interest in federal loans secured by diamonds becomes completely clear.

As KOMMERSANT found out from circles close to the Russian Ministry of Finance, Yakutia is hoping to receive around 10 percent of any "diamond" loan which the federal government decides to take out. Moreover, Yakutia will be able to insist on an increase in the internal Russian quota for exports of raw diamonds through the DeBeers channel.

The Almaz Rossii-Sakha Company

The company does not have instructions from the federal government to provide a conclusion on the LKI proposal," said the executive director of the company, Sergei Ufim. It is not impossible that such instructions will be given in the near future, since the company specialists, in particular advisor Valeriy Rudakov, participated actively in preparing the security agreement with DeBeers and has valuable experience in ongoing diamond security transactions. Obviously, a state loan secured by diamonds meets both the company's tactical (increasing the internal quota on exports) and strategic interests.

DeBeers

"LKI informed the DeBeers management of the essence of its proposal but does not act on DeBeers' instructions," reported the LKI representative, Robert Keshima. Most likely the president of LKI discussed the possibility of having DeBeers specialists to make up the security specification with the DeBeers executives. But there were no public announcements on DeBeers' part.

Obviously, the DeBeers management is facing a dilemma: either free Russian reserves with LKI's help, and if the security agreement is violated, buy up the diamonds and thereby increase its own reserves which are already horrendous (according to information of the newspaper BUSINESS DAY, they are estimated at 3.4 billion dollars) or refrain from any participation in this deal and turn its back to the "diamond drain from Russia" which it follows.

Description of Lazare Kaplan International

Lazare Kaplan International was founded in 1903. It became a public company in 1972, the only diamond firm in the United States whose stock is quoted on the stock exchange.

LKI is a shareholder of DeBeers, participates in a joint advertising campaign for prestigious diamond jewelry, and jointly with DeBeers is realizing a project in Ghana on the Bawliu River.

LKI concluded the fiscal year which ended on 31 March 1993 with a sales volume of 150 million dollars, which is 4 percent higher than the result of the preceding year. The

sales volume in cut and polished diamonds totaled 43 million dollars, but in March-May dropped by 30 percent. In the next half year, which ended on 30 November, the total volume of sales grew by 32 percent, although cut and polished diamond sales fell by another 6 percent. The volume of sales of raw jewel-grade diamonds rose by 48 percent in the second half year, which allowed profits of 1.1 million dollars to be obtained.

Basic Provisions of the LKI Proposal (According to Information from the Western Press: Reuters, WALL STREET JOURNAL, BUSINESS DAY, and others):

- LKI is undertaking to organize a loan for Russia in the amount of 3.3 billion dollars for 10 years at 6 percent annual interest;
- raw diamonds worth 4.5 billion dollars function as security and are removed from the federal storage facility in Moscow by representatives of the creditor;
- in the event Russia violates the obligations, the diamond security or part of it will be sold through the Central Marking Organization (a trade subdivision of DeBeers);
- for the deal LKI acts as the foreign advisor of the Russian government and receives 1.5 percent of the total amount of the loan plus costs and consultation fees (in all about 50 million dollars).

Chemical Bank To Trade Russian Government Securities

944Q02104 Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY in Russian
22 Feb 94, p 9

[Article by Sergey Aspin: "Clients of New York Bank Offered 'Taiga Securities'"]

[Text] One of the largest American banks—Chemical Bank—on Monday began regular operations in the purchase and sale of Russian Ministry of Finance state domestic currency loan bonds. The emergence on the market of such a professional participant, in the opinion of KOMMERSANT experts, will not only bring qualitatively new forms of operation with these securities, but will also become the source of additional liquidity for the still weakly organized market in currency bonds.

The "Taiga bonds" (in the terminology of the Chemical bank, this is what the Minfin [Ministry of Finance] state domestic loan bonds issued against the frozen debts of the Vneshekonombank [Foreign Economic Bank] are called) have attracted the attention of banking experts for a number of reasons. First of all, Chemical Bank has the reputation of being one of the most active dealers on the state loan bonds markets of the developing countries. Bank experts have experience in working also with Soviet debts. Specifically, the bank conducts active operations with the European bonds of Vneshekonombank. Secondly, in the opinion of the Chemical Bank, domestic currency loan bonds are very important from the standpoint of evolution of the Russian securities market. A significant volume of emissions, a broad investment base

and diversification of repayment terms makes these securities one of the basic financial instruments in Russia.

As our KOMMERSANT correspondent was told at Chemical Bank, today on the world market there is a small but stable demand for Russian Minfin currency bonds. Specialists at the American bank believe that the market in these securities is in the stage of formulation and a serious quantitative leap may occur only after certain steps have been taken in the development of its commercial and accounting infrastructure. Nevertheless, the Chemical Bank hopes that already in the near future transactions on currency bonds may be conducted through the international clearing systems Euroclear/C&DEL. In response to our KOMMERSANT correspondent's question about what presently hinders the performance of bilateral fixed quotation of these bonds (for now the bank buys them from its clients, setting the price in the process of negotiations), the bank representatives gave the reason as being the insufficient liquidity of the market. They defined the criterion of liquidity as follows: "When at least three large financial institutions begin to announce bilateral quotations of bonds for purchase and sale, and also are ready at any moment to buy or sell the bonds for a sum of no less than \$2 million, then we too will join in this game."

Commentary

KOMMERSANT experts believe that the initiative in the organization of a secondary market in currency bonds will nevertheless come from the Russian banks. Judging by the available information, at the beginning of the second quarter the largest banks will be able to assure the bond market that level of liquidity which experienced Western financial institutions such as Chemical Bank demand. Moreover, the rapid rates of development of the commercial networks of the MFD [Interbank Financial House] and the Cash Union will already by summer make it possible for the banks to conduct trade through professionally organized dealing systems.

January Foreign Trade Statistics

944Q0210B Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 22 Feb 94 p 11

[Unattributed article: "Decline in Import of Basic Food Products in January Exceeded 50 Percent"]

[Text] The foreign trade turnover of Russia in January of 1994 declined by 7.6 percent as compared with January of 1993, and comprised \$3.6 billion, according to the operational data of Goskomstat [State Committee on Statistics]. The positive balance reached \$1.4 billion, as compared with \$1 billion in January of last year.

The volume of export comprised \$2.5 billion, increasing by 1.3 percent as compared with January of 1993 (we must note that the average export prices on a number of goods in January of 1994 were significantly lower than the January 1993 level). The relative share of power sources within the structure of export declined by 7 percent, and comprised 50 percent. Export deliveries of crude oil declined by 16 percent, to 5 million tonnes. On the other hand, deliveries of petroleum products increased by 38 percent, to 1.676 million tonnes, and of natural by 14 percent, to 10.121 billion cubic meters.

Import comprised \$1.1 billion, declining by 23 percent as compared with January of last year. Import deliveries of basic staple food products continued to decline. The import of grain declined by 57 percent, of meat—by 64 percent, of butter—by 91 percent, and of tea—by 63 percent. The main reasons for the continued decline in import, explained the deputy chief of the MVES [Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations] Main Economic Administration, Vladimir Kiselev, were the introduction of increased excise tax rates on certain types of goods at the end of 1993, the repeal of subsidy coefficients on centralized import for state needs which became effective on 1 January 1994, as well as the lack of resolution in the question of exempting goods of centralized import from the payment of NDS [value-added tax] and import duties. A significant role here was played also by the sharp decline in the exchange rate of the ruble : the beginning of the year, as well as the increase in import tariffs which was planned for March of 1994.

Table 1. Export of the Russian Federation

	for January 1993, in percent	for January 1994, in percent
Developing countries	13.7	13.7
Former CEMA (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance) countries	20.3	21.8
China, DPRK (Democratic People's Republic of Korea), Laos, Yugoslavia	7.9	6.5
Baltic countries	0.8	0.8
Industrially developed capitalist countries	57.3	57.2

Table 2. Foreign trade turnover of Russian Federation for January 1994

	January 1993, million dollars	January 1994, million dollars
Former CEMA countries	658.6	655.8
China, DPRK, Laos, Yugoslavia	434.6	330.6
Baltic countries	25.6	24.6
Industrially developed capitalist countries	2200.2	2082.8
Developing countries	603.3	532

Table 3. Import of the Russian Federation

	for January 1993, in percent	for January 1994, in percent
Developing countries	18	17
Former CEMA countries	11	10
China, DPRK, Laos, Yugoslavia	17	15
Baltic countries	0.4	0.4
Industrially developed capitalist countries	54	58

Table 4. Export of basic goods from Russia in January 1994

Name	Unit of measure	1994		1994/1993, %		Price per unit, dollars		Relative share in volume, %	
		Amount	Sum, million dollars	Amount	Sum	1994	1993	1994	1993
Total			2522.0		101.3			100.0	100.0
Fish, fresh frozen	thousand tonnes	50.9	49.3	116.7	80.4	969.6	1407.2	2.0	2.5
Calcium phosphates	thousand tonnes	44.3	2.3	515.5	264.7	51.3	100.0	0.1	0.0
Iron ores and concentrates	thousand tonnes	718.2	12.5	256.5	139.4	17.4	32.0	0.5	0.4
Rock coal	thousand tonnes	1043.9	35.6	115.4	119.3	34.1	33.0	1.4	1.2
Coke	thousand tonnes	7.5	0.5	126.7	168.3	70.2	52.9	0	0
Crude oil	thousand tonnes	4994.5	454.0	83.6	69.8	90.9	109.0	18.0	26.2
Petroleum products	thousand tonnes	1676.4	161.7	138.1	108.3	96.4	123.0	6.4	6.0
Natural gas	million cubic meters	10121.6	749.4	113.5	102.1	74.0	82.3	29.7	29.5
Electrical energy	million kWhr	433.0	9.2	150.3	142.8	21.3	22.5	0.4	0.3

Table 4. Export of basic goods from Russia in January 1994 (Continued)

Name	Unit of measure	1994		1994/1993, %		Price per unit, dollars		Relative share in volume, %	
		Amount	Sum, million dollars	Amount	Sum	1994	1993	1994	1993
Total			2522.0		101.3			100.0	100.0
Ammonia	thousand tonnes	351.0	33.4	151.9	165.9	95.2	87.1	1.3	0.8
Methanol	thousand tonnes	78.3	6.6	147.2	196.4	84.7	63.4	0.3	0.1
Nitrogen fertilizers	thousand tonnes	403.6	32.9	189.2	185.6	81.4	83.0	1.3	0.7
Phosphate fertilizers	thousand tonnes	1.7	0.3	19.3	29.4	159.4	104.7	0	0
Potassium fertilizers	thousand tonnes	283.3	18.5	215.3	187.7	65.3	75.0	0.7	0.4
Mixed fertilizers	thousand tonnes	237.4	29.1	156.7	158.9	127.4	120.7	1.2	0.7
Synthetic rubber	thousand tonnes	13.4	9.7	156.5	130.6	730.1	874.9	0.4	0.3
Unprocessed lumber	thousand cubic meters	444.0	23.1	96.7	99.2	52.1	50.0	0.9	0.9
Processed lumber	thousand cubic meters	127.7	18.8	82.1	82.1	147.1	147.1	0.7	0.9
Plywood	thousand cubic meters	23.0	7.1	130.1	143.6	310.1	281.0	0.3	0.2
Cellulose	thousand tonnes	49.4	10.2	205.0	152.2	207.2	279.0	0.4	0.3
Newsprint	thousand tonnes	22.9	5.3	71.5	53.0	231.7	312.5	0.2	0.4
Iron, steel and rolled stock			192.1		164.1			7.6	4.7
Cast iron, converted and specular	thousand tonnes	142.1	15.7	152.7	157.3	110.2	107.0	0.6	0.4
Ferroalloys	thousand tonnes	4.4	4.2	25.3	48.0	947.9	500.0	0.2	0.4
Copper	thousand tonnes	3.0	4.2	45.5	29.1	1479.8	2220.1	0.2	0.6
Nickel, unprocessed	thousand tonnes	2.0	8.5	49.9	37.0	4154.4	5599.6	0.3	0.9
Aluminum, unprocessed	thousand tonnes	90.1	50.3	103.5	67.2	558.0	840.0	2.0	3.0
Machines and equipment									
Transport means			92.7		55.8			3.7	6.7

*Based on operating data of the Goskomstat of Russia.

Table 5. Import of basic goods into Russia in January 1994

Name	Unit of measure	1994		1994/1993, %		Price per unit, dollars		Relative share in volume, %	
		Amount	Sum, million dollars	Amount	Sum	1994	1993	1994	1993
Total			1103.7		77.0			100.0	100.0
Meat, fresh frozen	thousand tonnes	3.0	3.5	35.5	25.6	1186.3	1643.3	0.3	1.0
Poultry meat	thousand tonnes	3.1	3.2	259.6	283.2	1013.4	929.0	0.3	0.1
Butter	thousand tonnes	0.2	0.3	8.8	8.7	1453.6	1454.6	0	0.2
Citrus fruit	thousand tonnes	4.6	2.4	74.5	106.5	527.7	369.1	0.2	0.2
Apples	thousand tonnes	3.2	1.0	135.6	72.0	300.9	582.0	0.1	0.1
Coffee, coffee substitutes	thousand tonnes	0.3	0.6	60.0	45.8	2474.9	3256.9	0.1	0.1
Tea	thousand tonnes	1.0	3.5	36.6	56.9	3314.8	2129.8	0.3	0.4
Grain crops	thousand tonnes	271.9	37.8	43.2	49.5	139.0	121.3	3.4	5.3
wheat		105.0	16.4	58.0	65.5	156.4	138.6	1.5	1.7
barley			0	0		113.2	0	0.7	
corn		166.9	21.4	51.2	55.7	128.0	117.7	1.9	2.7
Vegetable oil	thousand tonnes	1.2	1.3	53.2	69.9	1074.0	817.4	0.1	0.1
Raw sugar	thousand tonnes	19.1	5.7	15.7	19.0	297.4	246.2	0.5	2.1
White sugar	thousand tonnes	38.4	14.2	112.3	117.9	370.8	353.2	1.3	0.8
Macaroni products	thousand tonnes	0.4	0.4	3.6	5.2	913.0	626.5	0	0.5
Aluminum ores and concentrates	thousand tonnes	77.4	17.4	104.9	110.2	224.4	213.5	1.6	1.1
Medicines			23.5		104.1			2.1	1.6
Natural rubber	thousand tonnes	1.2	1.3	61.3	65.7	1039.6	969.4	0.1	0.1
Fur clothing			7.0		40.3			0.2	0.4
Tricot clothing			15.6		77.4			1.4	1.4
Textile clothing			34.6		63.8			3.1	3.8
Leather footwear	thousand pairs	375.6	7.5	36.6	47.8	19.5	15.2	0.7	1.1
Iron, steel and rolled stock			1.6		63.0			0.1	0.2
Steel pipes	thousand tonnes	38.2	32.0	269.3	237.2	837.4	950.7	2.9	0.9
Machinery and equipment									
Transport means			350.9		113.6			31.8	21.5
Furniture			6.0		7.3			0.2	0.2

* Based on operating data of the Goskomstat of Russia

RF Deputy Foreign Minister Views Goals in Asia-Pacific Region

944Q0232A Moscow SFGODNYA in Russian 4 Mar 94 p. 3

[Report on interview with Aleksandr Nikolayevich Panov, deputy minister of foreign affairs, by Vladimir Abarinov; place and date not given: "The Asian Year of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Aleksandr Panov: Power Politics Is Ineffective in the East"]

[Text] Aleksandr Nikolayevich Panov is a career diplomat. His professional biography began with the position of reviewer in the Far East Department of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1968. He then worked for several years as part of the permanent mission of the USSR at the United Nations in New York. In the period 1983-1988 he was first secretary and then counselor at the USSR Embassy in Japan. At the end of the 1980's he worked at the Pacific and Southeast Asia Desk in the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and in the period 1990-1992, as chief of the desk. Prior to his appointment as deputy minister of foreign affairs, he was ambassador of Russia in the Republic of Korea. His diplomatic rank is ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary. He is a candidate of historical sciences.

This year will be the year of Asia for the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Aleksandr Panov, deputy minister of foreign affairs of the Russian Federation, declared in an interview with our SFGODNYA correspondent. Russian diplomacy is setting itself the assignment here not only of maintaining good-neighbor relations with all Asian countries but also of becoming an active part of the economic life of the region and contributing to ensuring that Asia become a region of stability, security, and cooperation. An extensive program of exchanges of visits is planned. The minister of foreign affairs and then the chairman of the PRC, the president of the Republic of Korea, and the prime minister of India are expected in Moscow this year, and visits by the Vietnamese and Mongolian prime ministers are possible. Chernomyrdin, chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation, will head for Beijing in June, and a Russian delegation will take part in an ASEAN ministerial session in Bangkok in July. The deputy minister observed that greater attention to the rapidly developing region has come to be paid by Russian private business. Far East business particularly. The new commercial structures are accounting for up to 50 percent of commodity turnover in trade with certain Asian countries. According to Aleksandr Panov, Russia could not export such a quantity of finished goods to any other region of the world.

The Russo-Japanese consultations at deputy foreign minister level which were held in Moscow recently, the diplomat said, showed that "quickly arriving at a peace treaty" and, consequently, resolving the territorial problem were impossible under the current conditions. The parties understand this and intend in the immediate future to concentrate on specific questions in order to

gradually create a "new atmosphere" in bilateral relations. In the course of the consultations it was arranged, as we all know, that Tsutomu Hata, minister of foreign affairs of Japan, would visit Moscow in March. As was to be understood from the statements of Mr. Panov, no breakthroughs are to be expected from this visit.

To the correspondent's question as to how the Japanese side is reacting to Moscow's proposals concerning joint economic activity in the "Northern territories," the deputy minister responded that "the Japanese are giving our position a guarded reception." Joint ventures on the South Kurils must observe Russian legislation, and this, from Japan's viewpoint, is a violation of Japan's sovereignty. Mr. Panov disagreed that the numerous violations of Russia's border by Japanese fishermen were being perpetrated for political reasons and with the direct support of Tokyo officialdom. The border incidents, the diplomat declared, are explained primarily by economic factors. Moscow is raising the question of fishing in the area of the Kuril chain in strict terms; nonetheless, it is obvious that an economic solution needs to be found. A version of such a solution is already being applied in the area of Signalny Island, where the Japanese have obtained the right to procure sea bream on a compensation basis.

Things are comparatively better with respect to observance of the moratorium on fishing in the central Sea of Okhotsk. This area is not part of Russia's economic zone but Russia deemed it possible to announce last year a unilateral moratorium in connection with the fact that the reduction in the stocks of pollock had reached crisis point. At the present time neither Japan and nor South Korea are fishing, and China has reduced it 25 percent and is prepared to examine the question of compensation, that is, the exchange of this area for another within Russia's economic zone. This leaves Poland, which is agreeing to no restrictions.

Aleksandr Panov is not disposed to dramatize the fact of Russia's nonaccession to the Prevention of Pollution of the Seas Convention. Moscow and Tokyo are conducting negotiations on assistance in the utilization [utilizatsiya] of Russia's liquid radioactive waste, specifically, the financing of the construction of a repository for such waste. Until there is a repository, there will be no further disposals, which has been stated clearly.

But the most serious problem of the region is undoubtedly the DPRK's nuclear program. It is being complicated by Pyongyang's hard-line negotiating position. Mr. Panov said. The North Korean side is endeavoring to compensate each positive step on its part with a total concession by Washington. As a result a specific situation has been created, the deputy minister observed. On the one hand inspections of nuclear facilities are the prerogative of the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Authority], on the other, the DPRK is preferring to negotiate on this topic with the Americans. But there is a "third angle" also: the North-South negotiations on denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. Unfortunately

this knot is not easy, Mr. Panov said. Moscow, he declared, occupies a balanced position. The Sarajevo example has shown that a positive result cannot be achieved with ultimatums. Power politics will produce nothing in the East: History testifies that these countries are capable even in a difficult situation of sustaining quite strong political pressure. If, despite all the diplomatic efforts, the question is put to the UN Security Council for consideration, Russia will act circumspectly there also.

The Russian-North Korean intergovernmental agreement on the basis of which from 15,000 to 20,000 lumberjacks of the DPRK have been working at Khabarovsk Kray and Amur Oblast timber industry enterprises expired on 1 January. In this connection the SEGODNYA correspondent asked about the future of this document and, most importantly, about the legal status of the Korean timber industry enterprises, which are known for their mass violations of human rights. The agreement, the deputy minister observed, has expired and is operating now only "within a particular framework." But dropping it altogether would not seem possible: The local authorities maintain that they have no one with whom to replace the Koreans. A new negotiating position, with which we will resume negotiations in the very near future, is being shaped in the government at this time. In any event, whatever the economic agreements, the state within a state and the ex-territoriality of the Korean settlements have been done away with, was Aleksandr Panov's assurance.

The deputy minister commented on the reports of President Yeltsin's recent message to Indonesian President Suharto. The message, Mr. Panov reported, had been preceded by an appeal to Russia on the part of a number of members of the Nonaligned Movement proposing that it join the movement as an observer. Moscow deemed the proposal flattering and expedient. It is this that was the subject of Yeltsin's message sent to Suharto, as the present chairman of the Nonaligned Movement. According to the movement's charter, a member of the Security Council may not be a member, but is entitled to apply for observer status.

South Korea's Relations With DPRK, Russia Assessed

944Q0207A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 25 Feb 94 p 4

[Article by V. Tkachenko: "Preliminary Results: One Year After Kim Yong-Sam Took Office as South Korean President"]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted] Big hopes were placed on a new policy in Seoul regarding North Korea and reducing tensions on the peninsula. The president conceived the idea of a gradual convergence between North and South resulting from joint efforts to overcome animosity and mistrust, broaden cooperation, and ensure mutual coexistence and prosperity. The key feature of the new ideas

was that the convergence was to be voluntary and democratic, i.e., the majority of the population in the North and South would agree to live together at the same standard of living in two parts of a unified country.

Nonetheless, in spite of the proclaimed declarations relations between North and South have noticeably worsened in the last year. The euphoria caused by the sensationalized agreements reached in 1991-1992 on reconciliation and reducing tensions, was replaced by a deep pessimism. Contacts in humanitarian and cultural spheres that had been maintained even during sharp confrontation were broken off.

The cause for stagnation in inter-Korean relations involved a nuclear arms problem on the peninsula. MAGATE [IAEA, International Atomic Energy Agency] inspections of both DPRK nuclear sights and military bases in the North and South, and a bilateral agreement on a nuclear-free zone. No agreement was successfully reached on these issues during inter-Korean negotiations, and now a dialog is underway between the U.S. and the DPRK.

There were no major events that transpired last year in the development of Russian-South Korean relations. A feeling of dissatisfaction arose in connection with Russia's failure to act as a bridge between North and South Korea when a sharp political crisis followed the DPRK's decision in March to withdraw from a nuclear arms nonproliferation agreement. However, what bearing could Russia have had on the situation after relations became paralyzed between Russia and the DPRK for ideological reasons? The role traditionally belonging to Russia as a peacekeeper and guarantor of security in Korea has now gone to China, which is now skillfully performing these duties to its obvious benefit.

No boom in economic relations has taken place between Russia and the Republic of Korea. The exchange of goods between them has not even exceeded the 2 billion dollar mark, that is, it has remained at the same level as our trade in 1988 with North Korea. Not one of the 23 projects for economic and scientific-technical cooperation submitted for review to the South Korean government by Russia has been realized. The problem of Russia repaying 1.5 billion dollars in credit extended to us by the Republic of Korea, has also not yet been resolved.

This year Kim Yong-Sam will visit our country. Now is the time for tallying up results, studying prospects for strengthening cooperation between our countries to our mutual benefit, and preparing new terms and agreements. The Russian-Korean summit meeting, as expected, will allow for making our relations more dynamic and purposeful. [passage omitted]

Scholar Views Russo-Chinese Contacts, Prospects for China

944002181 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 1 Mar 94 p 10

[Interview with Sinologist V.S. Myasnikov by Andrey Vinogradov; place and date not given: "Chinese Civilization Has Proven Its Capacity for Survival"]

[Text] Vladimir Stepanovich Myasnikov is a well-known Sinologist, corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, deputy director of the Russian Academy of Sciences Far East Institute, and leader of the Russia-China Center. The author of more than 200 scientific works on the history of Russo-Chinese and Soviet-Chinese relations and problems of the development of countries of Northeast Asia.

[Vinogradov] Vladimir Stepanovich, you were a member of the delegation that accompanied Kozyrev, minister of foreign affairs of the Russian Federation, to China. In connection with the fact that there was quite scant coverage of Kozyrev's trip in the press, could you describe this visit in somewhat more detail? As far as I know, the visit is seen in the Foreign Ministry as having been exclusively successful. It did not seem so to me.

[Myasnikov] In order to evaluate the success of a visit it is necessary to compare the purposes that were set for it and the results that were obtained.

This visit had been planned long since, but its preparation was dragged out, and then the elections, formation of the cabinet, and so forth were approaching. A decision was ultimately made on a visit at government level by the foreign minister. The main task consisted of two components. First, following the visit of President Yeltsin, it was necessary to conduct a stock-taking, as it were, of how the agreements were being fulfilled. And, as practice shows, things are not moving successfully in all directions. This inspection purpose was combined with a desire to make good what had not been done during President Yeltsin's visit. You know that he was unable to go to Shenzhen, and a purpose of the visit, therefore, was a trip to the free economic zones. Specifically, the area of Heihe and Blagoveshchensk on the Russo-Chinese border, where it is planned to create a joint zone. And, of course, Shenzhen—a zone that has been in operation for 15 years now, which is the best-known in China, and which has achieved excellent results. The Chinese Government has decided, as you know, to make a northern Shenzhen of Heihe.

[Vinogradov] These matters are more within the jurisdiction of Shokhin, it would seem to me, not Kozyrev.

[Myasnikov] You are right. As I said, the visit of another member of the government had been planned originally, but in connection with various matters (I dislike the term "government crisis") the most suitable figure in this case was the minister of foreign affairs. But traveling with him were experts, administration chiefs, people involved in actual economies. And some of them, what is more,

Ivanov, chief of the Administration of Chita Oblast, and Volkov, chief of the Administration of the Jewish Autonomous Oblast, say, had already been to Shenzhen as part of the group accompanying the president.

The appropriate invitations were made to the Chinese side during Yeltsin's visit for a return visit. But changes had occurred in this time in the Chinese leadership also, and it was necessary to extend an invitation to the new persons. In addition, agreement was reached on the visit to China this spring of Prime Minister Chernomyrdin, and problems of bilateral relations, border problems primarily, were discussed. You know that the transparency of the border and its openness and penetrability are a two-edged sword. On the one hand this stimulates border trade, on the other, a negative effect is manifested also: The potential for crime increases. Quite broad masses of representatives of the Chinese and Russian sides are coming into direct contact, but these are not, to be blunt, the best representatives of the two peoples. Prior to this, the "main conduits of relations with China" with us were L. Tolstoy, Gorkiy, a whole group of prominent Soviet writers, and so forth. Their works and they themselves are known in China and treated with great respect. Exhibitions of the Chinese artist Xu Beihong were held in our country in the 1930's, and the actor Mei Langfang, many theatrical ensembles, and so forth visited us. Today this line of cultural relations is somehow dormant, and quite a different line of interaction has emerged instead, which is causing quite a good deal of negative consequences of a purely psychological plane both in China and in Russia. The nations' ideas of one another are changing, and not for the better, what is more. This could create distorted stereotypes, which would influence our countries' relations in the future, in the 21st century. You know that, according to information of the Chinese side, at the end of the past month there were over 2 million Chinese on the territory of Russia. This figure is growing all the time. How many Russians, I cannot account for.

[Vinogradov] Quite a few also, particularly in Beijing. But not millions, of course.

[Myasnikov] If we wish to achieve mutual understanding, which is very important for good-neighborliness and for the strategic development of the relations of the two countries, order needs to be brought to bear. This does not mean that we have to ban or close down some things—we need elementary order at the state level. And the Chinese side is better and more successful here, as a rule. For example, they entrusted Heilongjiang Province with dealing with Russia and the CIS. Everything is specialized there: There is a permanent annual fair in Harbin and there is a particular set of companies that pursue commerce. On our side, on the other hand, total freedom, but not in the best meaning of this word. It was decided as the first order of business, therefore, to establish visa conditions.

[Vinogradov] As far as I recall, these matters were raised in the course of Sergey Shakhrai's trip to China last July also....

[Myasnikov] Shakhrai discussed primarily models of national relations within the country. He was beginning his campaign as leader of the PRES [Party of Russian Unity and Accord] at that time. China is the same type of multinational country as Russia and is typologically very close—the history of the creation of the two states is very similar. True, Shakhrai had a mandate from the Siberian Accord public organization to discuss questions of border cooperation also. But I believe that neither he nor the Chinese side were prepared for a serious discussion. In this case this is within the jurisdiction of the minister of foreign affairs, minister of internal affairs, and minister of state security.

[Vinogradov] As far as I know, the Chinese and Russian Ministries of Security have signed an agreement on the mutual extradition of criminals....

[Myasnikov] Yes, but besides this, a new agreement has now been signed which amounts to the following: Persons who are truly engaged in developing trade and economic, scientific and technological, and other relations between China and Russia and Russia and China have preferential conditions for crossing the border. They may be issued multiple visas and one-year, two-year passports. Obstacles are put in the way only of people engaging in semi-legal and illegal business and making episodic raids on the neighboring territory.

[Vinogradov] How is the one distinguished from the other?

[Myasnikov] I agree that making the distinction is difficult. Development will, obviously, be along the lines of the consolidation of firms. If a firm has given a good account of itself, its representatives will be granted preferential conditions. I recall that we were visited here in the institute by staff of the embassy and the trade mission of the PRC in charge of economic problems, and they were severely critical of us at that time: "You sign an agreement immediately with the first Chinese who gives you his card. But this does not mean that he is a person backed by a real business or administrative structure. It is not hard to make calling cards in China."

[Vinogradov] I also have repeatedly taken part in such "negotiations" which subsequently were not continued. More, when I would attempt to find in Beijing the office of the "major firms" with whom we had been negotiating in Moscow, this proved more often than not to be a tiny stall.

[Myasnikov] For the entire world practice of the market economy checking out one's partner and his actual possibilities is one of the main rules. Aside from the new rules of visa conditions, therefore, other agreements will be signed also. But not all at once. This needs to be done thoughtfully to avoid foolish mistakes.

In addition, serious regional problems, the Korean problem specifically, were discussed. As we all know, following the meeting in Seattle, this has become a controlled problem, and China is now performing a principal role in the achievement of a balance of interests. The proximity of positions was discussed and confirmed.

A second important question that was of interest to the Russian side was Russia's participation in the Asia-Pacific Economic Council (APEC). As we all know, a three-year moratorium on the admittance of new members to the council was imposed in Seattle. The question of the need to make an exception for Russia was raised in the course of the visit. The Chinese side took note of our wish.

[Vinogradov] But did not express a reciprocal wish to actively support the Russian aspiration.

[Myasnikov] It cannot make such declarations immediately. I can give you my viewpoint, which I conveyed to representatives of the Chinese side before, during, and after the visit. We should not be arguing along the lines of the "you help me, I'll help you" principle, of course. The Soviet Union formerly did a great deal for China's admittance to the United Nations. The support was very strong, even in the confrontation years. We refused to sign the San Francisco Treaty because the PRC had not been invited. But this does not mean that China must today pay us back. China should proceed from its own interests.

[Vinogradov] How far is it in China's interests to promote an increase in Russia's economic role in Asia, thereby creating competition for itself and depriving itself of a monopoly position in the sphere of contacts with the Russian Federation to a large extent?

[Myasnikov] I will explain it this way. Very important economic projects, in which China also has an interest, are being advanced at the present time. The idea of the creation of a free trade zone in Northeast Asia, say, which would encompass China, Japan, the Korean peninsula, and Russia, has been mooted for two years now. Without Russia it would be impossible to link this zone with the North American Free Trade Area, Mexico-Canada, and the United States, in Alaska. Could such a project be realized without Russia's membership of APEC? Or, say, the far-reaching "Yakut gas" project—the transfer of Yakut gas to China and South Korea. I believe that this would be extremely difficult on a bilateral basis. The Tyumenjiang project is also part of these integration economic processes, and Russia's participation is essential not only, of course, in the United Nations, where this project is being stewarded, but in APEC also. Of course, quite a tough struggle is under way in structures of an economic kind, but common rules of the game for this region should be formulated, and formulating such rules without Russia would be unrealistic.

[Vinogradov] You always emphasize in your articles and speeches that Russo-Chinese relations represent a zone of contact of two different civilizations. To what extent are psychological differences influencing specific bilateral relations?

[Myasnikov] We are undoubtedly representatives of two different civilization complexes. We will not say whose civilization is the more ancient, this is not the issue. But for an understanding of one's partner, an understanding of the motives of his policy, and an understanding of his political mentality a knowledge of civilization features is extraordinarily important. I have the impression, what is more, that the Chinese side has progressed further in this respect than us. It is possible that the Sinologists, you and I, are at fault here. The Chinese side is making very skillful use of the particular features of the Russian mentality and knows history well, which is a hallmark of far from all our representatives.

China is today laying the foundations of a new state of the 21st century, and its policy is pursuing long-term goals. The main thing here is plan orientation and precise adherence to the charted plans. And a particular feature of the Chinese mentality, what is more, is the fact that the plans are formulated by all the participants in the foreign economic process. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs or some other body over it may collate a whole number of proposals, but each organization necessarily has its own plan of interaction with its partners, which, as a rule, is not the case with the Russian side. In a word, it is necessary in all situations to take account of a whole number of salient features of Chinese custom and the Chinese mentality.

[Vinogradov] In respect to the human rights problem, for example.

[Myasnikov] If we are speaking of human rights, the millennial experience of Chinese civilization and Chinese philosophical social thought has formulated entirely different criteria of the relationship of the individual and society, the individual and the state. What are Western human rights today? They are Protestant morals in generalized form. At the start of the 19th century a number of founders of American democracy formulated some basic parameters, in their opinion, of democratic institutions for their country. They then embedded some messianic character in these notions of theirs and began to spread them to other countries. But inter-civilizational convergence should not even contemplate the imposition of one's own historical experience. This is the mistake of the West today—demanding that China conform to its ideas or adopt its human rights legislation. It is necessary to perceive one's partner in international relations as he is, not attempt to remake him. Otherwise there will be conflicts. China understands Western experience and studies it, but cannot adapt it in a few years. There has to be a sufficient amount of time for an evaluation of the moral principles of Protestantism also. From China's viewpoint, they could seem absurd. After all, a beautiful European opera could

be perceived by the Chinese as some preposterous cacophony. Just as Chinese traditional music is not accepted by Europeans.

Political music is heterogeneous also. Of course, it is the job of diplomacy to level these differences. But diplomatic barriers cannot be crossed. The ideas of the Chinese concerning human rights are shaped by Confucian precepts, which exist in society. These are by no means communist inventions, against which the West is struggling. The Chinese communists, incidentally, have always made skillful use of their people's traditional experience and have adopted it in propaganda and ideological work. In the precepts that exist in China today there is a very great deal that is purely traditional. Let us take a look. A campaign to limit the birthrate is being conducted in China at this time. This is the sole rational policy possible in this country in this specific historical period. And combating it from the standpoints of human rights, as the American Congress has done at times, is to become ridiculous.

[Vinogradov] The events in Tienanmen Square in 1989, for example. I personally encountered in China the fact that even liberals and intellectuals today justify the actions of the authorities in that situation since this helped preserve stability in society. Except for the students who took part in these events themselves, almost no one in China now sees them as some crime on the part of Deng Xiaoping and others. They regard them as a tragedy, but historically necessary.

[Myasnikov] Yes, I also heard such opinions, and we need to try to understand them. Remember the events in Kwangu, in South Korea, when the students rebelled against the then Chon Tu-hwan regime. After all, liberal thought did not condemn the South Korean regime of that time for the shoot-up in Kwangu. Nor during their visits did the prime ministers of China and Japan condemn the events in Kwangu, but observed: There must be stability in Asia. That is, stability at the state level, at the level of international relations, was put above democratic aspirations. This is the point. So let us leave things Western to the West, things Eastern, to the East.

The West has been operating in the East for five centuries now—since the times of the great geographical discoveries. And throughout these centuries the West has continually attempted to bring here at times Christian standards, at times Catholicism, but the foundations of the oriental civilizations have proven quite strong. In addition, they are today undergoing a renaissance, a positive renaissance, I would say, because the "dragons" of East Asia have largely grown up in the soil of Confucianism and traditional ideology. So we should not be fighting inter-civilization differences, we should be adapting them.

[Vinogradov] What are the prospects of Russia's relations with China? After all, according to some estimates China has today reached the position of the third economic power. China's role and influence in the world are



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FBIS-USR-94-028

23 March 1994



CENTRAL EURASIA



FBIS Report: Central Eurasia

FBIS-USR-94-028

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POLITICAL AFFAIRS

Poltoranin on Media 'Attacks' on Duma

944F0418A St. Petersburg NEVSKOYE VREMYA
in Russian 16 Feb 94 p 1

[Telephone interview with Mikhail Poltoranin, chairman of the mass media (SMI) committee of the State Duma, by Maxim Shabalin, Moscow, under the "At First Hand" rubric; date not given: "The Audience Should Know"]

[Text] [Poltoranin] Today's campaign against the State Duma in the mass media is nothing other than an echo of the former war between the first and fourth branch of power that was waged in the summer and autumn of last year. I think that in order to overcome this situation, we have tactical and strategic steps in reserve. I would relate to the tactical the fact that we first of all need a press center that feeds information to all of our newspapers and to our television.

As for the strategic directions, they, in my view, are these: Of course, you cannot take the mass media by assault and frontal attacks. The previous Supreme Soviet tried to do this, but this attempt was not crowned with success. The powerful structures also did not succeed in tearing off their own "Parliamentary Hour" piece by piece. This tactic is futile.

It is nonsense that the government—one of the branches of power—today monopolizes all state mass media as an instrument of public control over this very power. Therefore, we must correct the condition legislatively and create the kind of situation where the mass media works objectively, and no one interferes with it.

We intend tomorrow to submit the draft of a federal law for review by the State Duma concerning the procedure for elucidating in the state mass media the activity of the higher organs of authority of the Russian Federation.

[Shabalin] The problems about which you are talking are associated directly with articles of the law adopted by the Supreme Soviet, which, however, the president suspended....

[Poltoranin] The president suspended a lot of laws and many legislative acts. Committees (including ours also) will conduct an inventory of everything that has been suspended and will submit the question for Duma review. The mass media is an important force, the fourth branch of power, and we must do everything so that the press should cooperate with the State Duma. As for specific proposals and the adoption of decisions about renewing the transmission of "600 Seconds," etc.—these are not functions of the Duma. There is a separation of powers according to the new Constitution, there is a law on the mass media, and there are such structures as, for example, the television company "Sankt-Peterburg—Channel 5." There are also such substructures as "600 Seconds." This is their business, and not

that of the State Duma: to produce or not to produce. Our business is to create the kind of law so that there would be no barriers for one or another television program or for articles in newspapers.

[Shabalin] But in contrast to the former Supreme Soviet, the Federal Assembly, from a political standpoint, is quite heterogeneous. In accordance with your draft laws, will access to the airwaves be offered to all factions?

[Poltoranin] Unquestionably, this will be reflected in the draft law on the procedure for elucidating the work of the higher organs of authority in the state mass media. I do not think that the resumption of the "Parliamentary Hour" will aggravate the situation. On the other hand, conducting this program in the form in which it came out has no future. I assure you: By no means everyone watched this "Parliamentary Hour." Therefore, it is necessary for us to acquire air time to illuminate the work of the State Duma, both on the first and second Ostankino channels, and on the St. Petersburg channel, and, it is quite natural, on the channels of the 80 regional television companies that today live on the federal budget. This is the objective. The entire population of Russia must be informed of our work.

Zatulin on PRES Duma Actions

944F0418B St. Petersburg NEVSKOYE VREMYA
in Russian 24 Feb 94 p 1

[Remarks of Konstantin Zatulin, chairman of the Duma committee for CIS matters, and cochairman of the Party of Russian Unity and Accord, recorded from a telephone conversation by Maxim Shabalin, under the "At First Hand" rubric; date not given: "Do Not Play With Matches"]

[Text] The Party of Russian Unity and Accord [PRES], together with the Women of Russia faction, was the initiator of the adoption of the Memorandum of Accord. I had occasion several times at the council of the Duma to defend the principle of pact voting. For the first time from the beginning of work of the new parliament, I had a reason to tell the voters: Everything possible was done not to repeat the nightmare of the recent past, and so that the dead do not grasp for the legs of the living. Manifestos, memoranda, declarations—these are not documents of direct action. But there are quite a few examples in the history of many states about what kind of role the declaration or nondeclaration of such documents can play. I will risk saying that the resolutions adopted by the Duma really provide an opportunity for accord. It, of course, can be missed due to a misunderstanding or malicious intent. Unfortunately, the behavior of some of our natural allies—deputies from Russia's Choice and the Yavlinskiy bloc—is a reason to suspect at least elements of such intent in their attitude toward the Memorandum.

Very much depends now on the mass media, inasmuch as it is it that brings the essence of one or another decision of the legislative or executive authority to the

people. If all commentaries reduce the usefulness of the adopted Memorandum to zero, then its value really will prove to be no more than the value of the paper it is written on. The search for accord is not a very simple matter, but its necessity should be recognized.

The fighting fervor of the antagonistic parties, which once almost brought Russia to the brink of a civil war, remains. There is evidence of attempts by individual deputies to undermine the adoption and to dodge it at the last moment. But if the president, nonetheless, intends to observe the Constitution and not to violate the authority of the Duma, then the people who are under investigation in Lefortovo will be amnestied. How they behave in the future depends on us. Orientation on a continuation of the confrontation and on a vendetta will not lead to anything, especially when the character of the persons involved in the dispute from both sides is taken into account—of the president, of Khasbulatov, and of Rutskoy. The characters are not easy to get along with—I would say, they are Russians.

I am convinced that there are no prisons that hold you forever. It is impossible for the trial of the participants in the October events not to turn into a political trial. An example of such a trial is the GKChP [State Committee for the State of the Emergency] affair, to which there is no visible end without an amnesty. The more quickly it takes place, the fewer reasons there will be for being concerned about the fate of future elections—both local and presidential. I am confident that many alleged political authorities will waver considerably after an amnesty. We, for example, do not intend to fight for Rutskoy's electorate, but such a fight is in prospect for Vladimir Volfovich.

In addition, I do not think that an investigation into the October events is really advantageous to the current executive authority, inasmuch as any investigation inevitably will get stuck on Edict No. 1400, which the author himself recognized as unconstitutional. I want to close this page, and not only I. Individuals continue to threaten a civil war, but I would ask them to calm down and to leave the matches alone.

Yeltsin Plane Drops From Radar

944F0418C St. Petersburg NEVSKOYE VREMYA
in Russian 12 Feb 94 p 1

[Unattributed article: "Russian President's Life Exposed to Danger"]

[Text] On 7 December of last year, an aircraft carrying Boris Yeltsin ended up outside radar control. The life of the president was exposed to danger, because the power supply in the air traffic control center in Rostov-na-Donu (the "Strela" center) was suddenly turned off "for nonpayment of its electric bill."

The Strela center was turned off at the very moment when, in addition to the president's aircraft, there was

the largest number of Il's, Tu's, and Western Boeings in the air space of the Southern region.

"This was the first incident in the history of world civil aviation when a dangerous situation of such a scale was created in fact not as a result of an accident, but by the absolutely deliberate actions of a person," notes an observer. "Meanwhile, specialists know that even less dangerous disruptions in air traffic can lead to a fatal disaster"

In revealing the extremely alarming situation in air transport, the observer reports that within two days after the "presidential" incident, the electricity from the air traffic control center in Rostov was cut off once again. This time, Sergey Shakhrai, a recent deputy prime minister and now a member of the Security Council of Russia, was in one of the aircraft that ended up in the "dead zone."

Labor Party Seen as Viable Left Alternative

944F0412A Moscow OBSHCHAYA GAZETA
in Russian No 9, 4 Mar 94 p 8

[Article by Vadim Lifshits: "Right Turn Through the Left Shoulder"]

[Text] It is not enough to say that the process is under way—it has begun to tear along. The process, we recall Mikhail Sergeyevich once again, of the discovery of consensus. Consensus between the radical-right nomenklatura-bourgeois groupings victorious in December. For whoever did not understand this, even having listened to President Yeltsin's report to parliament, all the discoveries will be to come. It will very shortly be revealed that the new Kremlin ideology of the "national cause" and the anticrisis policy of the government will successfully combine the white Bolshevism of Russia's Choice and the black Bolshevism of the LDPR [Liberal Democratic Party of Russia], and the upshot will be something suspiciously Zyuganovian.

The odious super-radicals are cut off here as yet—Gaydar has quit the government, Zhirinovskiy has not yet arrived, and Chernomyrdin is coping by himself. But the conservative projects going back to the summer-fall initiatives of Oleg Lobov and—horrors!—Khasbulatov's leadership of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation: the inflationary financing of "priority" state industry, the self-organization of apparatus-bureaucratic capital into "financial and industrial groups," the renunciation of privatization romanticism, and so forth, have been tacitly restored. The political realities of Russia, on the other hand, are evoking the specters not only of "Ukrainianization" or the "Belarusian option" but of Central Asian dictatorships also.

Many people certainly already understand that the LDPR did not support the "democratic" constitution fortuitously. It is not only a question of the keen political sense of Mr. Zhirinovskiy. Today's "strong of this world," having adopted the oligarchic precept: "The

strong determine progress by exploiting the weak," are already quite openly seeking an acceptable leader figure. This figure began to show in outline, it would seem, in the person of the main favorite on 12 December—in quite grotesque fashion as yet, but give it time! Practice makes perfect.

Even more important is the fact that the LDPR, which was the mirror reflection in the election campaign of the anti-Gorbachev tactics of Democratic Russia, is oriented toward the national-fundamentalist circles of that same nomenklatura bourgeoisie whose comprador wing is the social client of Russia's Choice. While deliberating a great deal on how Vladimir Volfovich managed to attract the votes of 14 million Russians (which is not difficult in our times for a man with his inclinations), commentators are omitting a far more serious question: How did this person attract multimillion financial flows, that is, win the support of part of the ruling elite?

The other December winner, the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, is essentially from that same crowd. Having become ideologically loosened since 1987, having joined up with bureaucratic business, and having lost direct access to the managerial function, the Communist Party, as a whole, ceased to be a totalitarian structure—this was the undoubted achievement of April-85 and August-91. But, having ceased to be totalitarian, the Communist Party of the Russian Federation has moved not to the left but to the right flank of the political spectrum. The program reference points of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation are based on the same conservative populism and fundamentalist statism as of the LDPR. True, Zyuganov's leadership is concerned more for respectability and is of a traditionalist frame of mind, furthermore—whence the commitment to the Soviet form of authoritarian rule and criticism of the constitution. As far, however, as left-wing phrasemongering, of a social-protection motif particularly, is concerned, nowhere is state paternalism the prerogative of forces of the left, being the alpha and omega of any populism—from Le Pen through Tuques (about the NSDAP we will say nothing). Today's Ukrainian ultranationalists, for example, are demanding an end to privatization and the concentration of all property in the hands of an independent state, but this does not make them people of the left.

There is no effective alternative to right-wing-authoritarian hegemony in the Federal Assembly. Sergey Shakhrai's PRES [Party of Russian Unity and Accord] has demonstrated the quite lifeless launch of Civic Union-2. It is possible that Shakhrai's attempt to consolidate big national capital, state capital particularly, will prove more successful thanks to the chord which is being struck between the industrialists and the regional administrators, but there is no guarantee that the PRES will not be supplanted in its parliamentary niche by that same Communist Party of the Russian Federation or by New Regional Policy, which has appeared like a bolt from the blue.

The Yavlinskiy-Boldyrev-Lukin bloc has created for itself the image of a constructive democratic alternative to Gaydar, Zyuganov, and Zhirinovskiy put together and has partially managed to attract the sympathies of the electorate committed to liberalism and social democracy. But YABLoko has not fallen far from Russia's Choice, despite the strong intellectual efforts of Yavlinskiy, who has been forced to concoct differences. The "liberal-legal" concept of essentially that same model of capitalization is formulated speculatively, which is partially connected with the absence in YABLoko of the criminal resolve typical of the leadership of Russia's Choice. In fact, YABLoko assigns itself the role of respectable generator of liberal ideas, which will someday, "at a new historical stage," be claimed in a reformed Russia. The ascent to this stage still has to be made, it is true....

So "accursed friends" were the winners in December. A kind of symbol of this community was the election of the right-wing populist Nevzorov in an elite district of Petersburg—"an area of hard-currency taverns and privatized apartments." The clashes between Russia's Choice and the LDPR and the Communist Party of the Russian Federation are a prepared version of the conflict of the "mafia against the bureaucracy" known since Mussolini's times. The political struggle of the Gaydarites and the Zyuganovites and Zhirinovskiyites has been brought about by the differences in the interests of comprador-speculative capital, the administrators of the state economy, and nationally oriented business. Whence the different ideological slogans—liberalism, chauvinism, communism—whence the appeal to different social strata in the search for mass support, whence the success of the demagoguery: "Either us or... (insert as required)." The common denominator of the ruling oligarchy remains, however, authoritarian elitism and statism and reliance on state power as the instrument of compulsory capitalization.

By and large, the claret-colored shadow of fascism looms over the country for the uncontested struggle of the right against the extreme right is being played out in the Russian political space. The niche of the forces of the left is empty, and wage labor and the independent economy have been cut off from actual politics—this is the main result of the menacing totalitarian degeneration.

To blame for the failure of the left (the real left!) is primarily the left itself. In an excruciating search for a path, the Social Democratic Party of Russia has split into several groupings. Thanks to its leader, Rutskoy's NPSR [Free Russia People's Party] has sunk to the bottom. Having concluded a "pink-beige" alliance with the moderate nationalists, Cossacks, and oil industrialists, the Socialist Workers Party allowed itself to be dragged into the plan for a "social-patriotic alliance" struck up on the basis of the conservative Federation of Commodity Producers and the personal interests of Yuriy Skokov. The Socialist Workers Party has thereby excluded itself from the movement of the left, virtually, which is not all

that surprising, considering its genetic kinship with the Communist Party of the Russian Federation. Running in majority-system constituencies, certain representatives of forces of the left frequently ended up on the Communist Party slate, which complicates the situation even further.

In short, the formation of a center left, in which social democracy can alone exist, has to be started almost "from scratch." This is difficult, but there is the hope that society will soon understand how dangerous it is to fly on one wing. And the left itself, it has to be thought, will bestir itself. There are already some signs of revitalization on this flank, incidentally.

The defeat of Civic Union and almost all the trade union bosses stirred among the leaders of the "traditional" trade union movement interest in the plan for a Labor Party, which is being proposed to them by the social democrats of the Social Democratic Party of Russia, the Free Russia People's Party, and the Party of Labor, which has for three years served politically the Moscow Federation of Trade Unions. The cornerstone of the plan is a strong, typically Laborite coupling of left-wing-democratic organizations and social civic associations—the "traditional," "free," and "corporate" unions, the STK movement, self-managing associations, consumer unions, civil rights organizations, and so forth.

In the event of realization of this plan, the Russian Laborites would be a political force potentially capable of defending the formation of the civil society and of strengthening and stimulating its structures. This ensues naturally from their main function—defense of the socioeconomic rights of the citizens against the background of the essentially anti-civic position of the principal political subjects of contemporary Russia. Economic democracy and self-government, the employees' share in profits and ownership, reform of the system of social insurance and taxation, the social responsibility of enterprise and state administration, stimulation of all forms of civic self-organization on a firm material and legal foundation—a movement with such a program "package" could obviously lay claim to the "pink" niche, which stands empty in today's political spectrum, and constitute a real democratic alternative to the "claret-colored" Stalinists and the in fact perfectly "white" Zyuganovites.

The consolidation of the antiauthoritarian and antifascist movement along the lines of the National Front in France in the 1930's—the sole historical example of a mass democratic movement stopping fascism—is possible on a Laborite basis. It is hard to say what would result from Russian Laborites, but the citizens are required to forestall a "chief"—they have no worthier option.

'CPSU' Leader on Ideology, Politics

944F0439A Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English
No 8, 25 Feb 94 p 13

[Interview with Sergei Skvortsov, secretary-coordinator of the CPSU Central Committee, by MN correspondent Dmitry Pushkar: "The Communist Party Hasn't Fallen to Pieces Yet"; first paragraph is introductory paragraph]

[Text] The niche which was once occupied by Viktor Anpilov, leader of the "Moscow Labour" movement who has been arrested, was not empty for long. On February 10 in Moscow, revolutionary romantics conducted a protest against the declining standard of living. The small crowd was led into battle by the zealous promoter of the people's wellbeing, the CPSU. Despite all metamorphoses the CPSU retains its former goal, that of building communism. Sergei Skvortsov, one of the few legal leaders of the party, explained to an MN correspondent, how he would do this.

The CPSU, relieved of the heavy burden of power, sanatoriums, armoured limousines, game reserves and secret laboratories for forging documents and deprived of Article 6 of the Constitution, has shrunk to the size of an ordinary party. Its leaders critically appraise the numerical strength of its Russian organization at 20,000 roughly as many as the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party had in 1917. Some time ago the central committee even allowed "dual citizenship" so that a CPSU member could be also a member of other parties, but now the rules have been made stricter.

The highest official of the CPSU Central Committee, secretary-coordinator Sergei Skvortsov, is a short, balding bespectacled man in his early forties. He completed a postgraduate course as an economist and served in the army as a deputy political instructor in a construction battalion. He lives in the Moscow Region. Besides being responsible for the party's leadership, he fulfills the role of chairman of the movement in defence of Russian history (meaning Lenin). He is also editor of the "People's Newspaper".

The CPSU is not registered and has no office nor address. The composition of its secretariat and the central committee is a secret.

Action

"On February 10 the party conducted a day of protest against declining living standards", says Sergei Skvortsov. "Several groups set up an interregional strike committee which I also joined. We do not plan to organize a general strike which would grow into an armed uprising, as was the case in 1905. We advance economic and general democratic demands: a price freeze on essential goods, the indexation of the minimal earnings to the subsistence level, compensation for a delay in paying wages at half of one percent a day, and a prohibition on the closing of enterprises. We also demand the indexation of deposits in the Savings Bank in keeping with the rising prices. Our only political demand is for free democratic elections. Our party has initiated the boycotting

of elections. The action of February 10 was in fact the first step in building a mass people's movement. The way out of an economic crisis is strict regulation by the state, in any case, the strengthening of the state's role. There is no other fitting model, you see, besides the Marxist one".

MN: Why do you laugh when you say "Marxist"?

S.: Because the word has been abused too much by many, including our activists.

Property

MN: What is your party's attitude to ownership of the means of production?

S.: There is consensus among almost all communist parties. We base ourselves on the classic Marxist approach that the state should have the commanding positions, while private property is eradicated as it gradually becomes socially unnecessary.

MN: Ownership of land?

S.: It should not exist. It is not an absolute dogma, but the absence of private property is necessary in our country, because in the event of free purchase and sale of land it does not get into the hands of those who cultivate it. The law on land was built for the area around Moscow in order to secure plots of land for country houses.

MN: What is your attitude on the property of the CPSU? Do you consider yourselves its heirs?

S.: The succession is direct. We have elected a new leadership of the party that existed. The number of new members who joined the CPSU after it was reinstated is a mere hundred or two. We practically have the same people. In legal terms we are claimants to the property. We may probably raise the question of property if a new political situation arises, but we shall demand not the return of the entire property but only of what is necessary for political activity.

Cornerstones

MN: Dictatorship of the proletariat?

S.: The concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat was considered to be a corner-stone of the Marxist theory. Those who speak about it now mean the working class. But this part of society is no longer in the majority. The leading role in society should be played by the workers of manual and mental labour, those who create not only material, but also, to use a Marxist term, spiritual benefits. But this must not necessarily be a dictatorship as it was understood before.

MN: Class struggle?

S.: Class struggle remains the way we understand it. Today we may be allies, but the situation may change tomorrow and we may have neutral relations or become opponents.

MN: The attitude to religion?

S.: According to our rules we may have believers in our ranks. We believe, generally speaking, that Marxist philosophy by which we are guided is atheistic, but do not intend to force this viewpoint on anyone, including the members of our party. This principle is now characteristic of almost all communist parties, at least of those which are not in power.

The Soviet Union

MN: What is your position on the national question?

S.: To reinstitute guberniyas is an entirely unrealistic aim connected with doing obvious violence to peoples. At the same time we naturally stand for the reestablishment of the Soviet Union. We believe that it can be done by means of adopting by the legislative body of Russia of a decision on the restoration of the operation of the USSR Constitution on the territory of the Russian Federation. Several republics can practically immediately follow this way.

The Final Goal Is To Work for Idlers

MN: It follows from the name of your party that you are fighting to build communism. Do you think that "the next generation of Soviet people" will live under communism?

S.: I cannot make categorical forecasts. I myself belong to a rather young generation, but as for the next generation... No, there won't be communism in 50 years from now, so you are right.

MN: What will communism be like?

S.: People will be engaged in some kind of creative work, though there may be some left who will want to till soil because they may find it interesting, or for the sake of relaxation. At the initial stage a certain minimum of life's benefits will be granted to all. At this stage some additional benefits will be offered to people who have made the greatest contribution to society's development. Further on, the range of these benefits will evidently decrease because the most important element is the development of a new man. I consider the desire to have two or three Mercedes cars a deviation.

Shakhray, Pain Propound Federal Approach

944F0419A Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 25 Feb 94 p 9

[Interview with Sergey Shakhray, minister for nationalities and regional policy, member of the Government of the Russian Federation Presidium, and deputy of the State Duma, and Emil Pain, leader of the group for nationality policy of the Presidential Council, by Tamara Zamyatina, observer of ITAR-TASS, specially for SEGODNYA; place and date not given: "Federalism or Disintegration—There Is No Other Way"]

[Text] The signing of the treaty between Russia and Tatarstan has spotlighted more clearly in the public

consciousness the polarization of views on the conversion of the country from a unitary into a truly federative state. The paths of the formation of federalism in Russia were reflected in the president's report which Boris Yeltsin delivered to parliament. Sergey Shakhrai, minister for nationalities and regional policy, member of the Government of the Russian Federation Presidium, and deputy of the State Duma, and Emil Pain, leader of the group for nationality policy of the Presidential Council, an interview with whom we publish today, took part in the preparation of one of its sections.

[Zamyatina] The treaty between Russia and Tatarstan has set "at odds" two positions on the further formation of the Federation. Is it a step forward and a renunciation of unitary approaches or is it, as Sergey Baburin declares, a weakening of the positions of the center? Your viewpoints, gentlemen?

[Pain] My viewpoint is that all regions should in principle have equal rights, but they have different conditions for their realization. It is for this reason that they will to a dissimilar extent delegate authority to the center, and this means that treaty relations are in the future inevitable with all regions. In this sense I welcome the agreement with Tataria as the first swallow of such treaty relations.

[Zamyatina] That is, you believe that bilateral treaties are needed with each component of the Federation?

[Shakhrai] There is a legal and economic possibility of the conclusion of treaties similar to that with Tataria with each component of the Russian Federation. And this is not Shakhrai's opinion. This is Article 11 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, clause 3 of which says that the terms of reference shall be delineated "by this constitution and the Federal and other treaties."

A government program and state approach are needed on this issue. In addition, a federal law on the principles of the delineation of terms of reference and authority is needed urgently to ensure that the bilateral treaties not look like backstage bargaining.

As far as Tataria is concerned, its leadership has earned the title of "locomotive" of federal relations.

Whoever is prepared to negotiate this path and to scrupulously prepare a similar treaty—certainly, the next is Kaliningrad Oblast. I believe that a treaty will be signed with Kaliningrad Oblast. This, again, is not just my desire, it is the position of the president and the Government of the Russian Federation.

[Zamyatina] In speaking of treaty relations, you have cautiously sidestepped the problem of the Chechen Republic. Is it possible to achieve a similar agreement with Chechnya?

[Shakhrai] The example of Tataria has shown that neither unilateral declarations nor one-sided pressure nor rulings of the Constitutional Court work in the

relations of the center and components of the Federation. Only the voluntary delegation of authority is acceptable. The treaty with Tataria formulated the sole possible procedure of the removal of the contradictions between constitutions of the republics and the Constitution of the Russian Federation. In respect to the Chechen Republic not the same text but the procedure of the treaty with Tataria is applicable, I believe.

[Pain] We both believe that a million Russian citizens, inhabitants of Chechnya, are today hostages to separatist-minded politicians, have been deprived of protection on the part of the Russian Constitution, and are living under conditions of growing crime, and thousands of families have already been forced to leave their native parts. This situation is, naturally, intolerable.

But there is a solution only on a strictly legal basis. Russia must strive for democratic elections in Chechnya with the participation of all ethnic, social, and political groups of society....

[Shakhrai] ...opposition included.

[Pain] But negotiations between the federal authorities and the authorities of Chechnya on a delineation of power are now possible and necessary also.

[Shakhrai] Debate here on the subject of what sovereignty and competence mean and what is eaten with them is unpromising at the start of negotiations, particularly if the political and economic situation is exacerbated. You can speak for as long as you like about who invests the "sovereignty" concept with what meaning. But each party understands by these words a sum total of practical rights: in the foreign economic sphere, in the management of state property, in budget and tax relations. But in the consciousness of a politician these concepts should be out of the frame, as it were. It is necessary for a start to negotiate on practical matters. Here we have oil industry, for example, here we have rail transport, here we have the activity of the law enforcement authorities, here we have tax rates. And when a specific agreement has been signed on each of these questions, the political component of the dispute, it transpires, and its seriousness and debatability disappear. And, as a result, it transpires that the tasks for the sake of which the concepts of sovereignty and independence were invented have already been accomplished, and it is possible to reach agreement according to other formulas.

[Zamyatina] Why are attempts not being made to realize this model in relations with the Chechen Republic?

[Pain] A common ideology of the approach to a resolution of this problem has yet to be formulated at the level of the Russian leadership. Attempts were made to approach it from positions of strength, as did Rutskoy, and, on the other hand, to forget about it altogether, as Bermuda triangle, in which everything "cooks" itself, as it were, having been created. But in real life the stereotyped patterns do not work, they prove unrealistic. In

respect to Chechnya, therefore, I find absolutely comprehensible today merely the impermissibility of an armed solution of the problem, which would be madness.

[Zamyatina] The two years of Chechnya's independence have revealed a certain threshold of readiness not only of the politicians but also of the population of the republic for a settlement of the situation. Actual steps and action are needed. What do the Russian authorities think in this connection?

[Shakhray] The authorities are the president, parliament, and the government. Any minister or the leader of any department feels himself to be in an ambiguous position when on the one hand he is told: "give pensions to the population of Chechnya" or "allow the transportation of freight," and, on the other, there is, seemingly, sovereignty and independence there. By the decisions of the former Supreme Soviet the federal authorities deemed the elections in Chechnya illegal, and the regime, illegal, but have not further identified their position. And for this reason any minister, myself included, not having an official position, would in embarking upon negotiations be doing so at his own risk.

[Zamyatina] But you are not "any minister," you are minister for nationalities and a member of the government presidium....

[Shakhray] I will hold consultations, I am prepared for the start of negotiations, as soon as the appropriate political decision is made.

[Zamyatina] In a forecast for 1994 you, Sergey Mikhaylovich, expressed the fear that the present year could be one of interethnic conflicts. Your reasoning?

[Shakhray] There are a minimum of three reasons for this. First, an unconcealed political struggle among democrats, communists, nationalists, and so forth continues at the federal level. The regions have been left to their own devices. It is easy to take advantage of this situation to raise the national banner or the problem of economic independence.

The second reason is to be found in the text of the new constitution, from which at the final stage of modification many provisions that were by nature federative were ejected. This has engendered a certain tension in some republics. The treaty with Tataria provided a very big release in this connection, incidentally, showing that the center is taking the path of the country's conversion into a genuine federation. Speak with any Tatar in Moscow (and this is Russia's second biggest nation in terms of numbers), and it will be confirmed for you that this treaty is for the Tatars a grand occasion signifying that Russia's relations with their ethnic homeland have at last been normalized.

The third reason for a possible exacerbation of interethnic problems lies in the fact that the Russian population could with weapon in hand be a party to interethnic conflicts. Note that thus far the conflicts have been

Ossetian-Ingush, Georgian-Ossetian, Abkhaz-Georgian. But now Cossacks unhappy at the problems of the redistribution of land and the purge of personnel in the authorities of practically all national regions could, for example, be involved in them for the first time.

It should be said for fairness' sake that the unconcealed supplanting of national personnel, Caucasians primarily, in various ministries and departments is taking place in Moscow also. If they are not actually being dismissed, they are, in any event, being put in a position in which they are being forced to leave of their own accord....

[Zamyatina] What paths of an alleviation of these tensions did you attempt to put into the president's report?

[Shakhray] We have already spoken of one possible method in the example of Tataria, making it understood to the national republics that there will no longer be a return to voluntarism.

In the report, on the other hand, we tried to explain convincingly that federation, as a form of state arrangement, protects the small peoples and nationalities from the pressure of the central and local bureaucracy.

Another form of protection of the interests of the populace is the transition from debate to the realization of the concept of national and cultural autonomy. The time is coming for the abandonment of the principle of "for each nation—its own state." It is necessary to proceed along the path of recognition that Russia is the common form of state self-determination of all 15 of our national groups.

[Pain] There is an objective contradiction between two types of organization of the state: national-territorial and territorial-administrative. But national-territorial formations cannot be abolished by decree. They are, meanwhile, the sole form of preservation of the national culture and demographic self-preservation of the nations.

But the national republics in their present form, while ensuring the possibility of self-preservation of the titular nation, far from always create such conditions for a nontitular nation. Various forms of cultural autonomies are needed for the national minorities also.

And, finally, all national processes are to a considerable extent grounded in economics. When truly market relations take shape, the differences between the national republics and other components of the Federation will be supplanted.

[Zamyatina] I shall permit myself to quote the classics: "It is a pity only that neither I nor you will live in this splendid time." And I would like to bring you, my esteemed partners, back from the future to the present day—to the search for practicable solutions to the interethnic problems of the North Caucasus, for example. You, Emil Abramovich, last year received the Woodrow

Wilson International Center prize for the theory of prevention of interethnic conflicts. Is it applicable on native soil?

[Pain] We propose three basic principles of approach to the nationality problem. The first is the main national parity. Its essence lies not only in equality between components of the Federation and not only between people in relation to the law but also in the fact that no ethnic group on the territory of the Russian Federation has a monopoly right to resources, to institutions of power, and so forth. We put this formula of national parity into the text of the president's report.

The other two principles represent instruments of realization of the first, as it were. They concern the self-organization of the nations on the basis of local government and state paternalism in respect to national groups which are particularly in need of care—the small peoples of the North, for example.

[Shakhray] And I would mention that in a country in which Russians constitute 83 percent of the population, all politicians need to constantly bear in mind that the general feelings of all the other peoples of Russia depend on the general feelings of the Russian nation.

[Pain] And the fate of Russians is still determined to the greatest extent by how stable society is. I say all this to spite some artificial forms of the protection of Russians of the Russian Republic type, which are being put forward frequently.

[Shakhray] As far as Russians in the near abroad are concerned, Russia has legal, including international-legal, commitments to them. And the essence of my plan for the protection of Russians in the near abroad, which will evoke irritation in some people, consists of Russia being the successor of the USSR internationally, and of citizens with passports of the USSR who have not acquired the citizenship of another state, being under the jurisdiction of Russia.

I believe also that the Russian Federation cannot be fenced off by economic or border barriers from the republics of the CIS. This would create an environment for the subsequent departure from there of the Russian population.

And, the final point: The Russian Federation should not be embarrassed at maintaining military bases in these regions on a treaty basis. Because, as events in a number of former Union republics have shown, other ways of preserving civil peace and harmony and of preventing conflicts are insufficient.

This argument could be continued, but humanism in quotation marks leads to hundreds of thousands of people dying on account of it.

[Pain] I am disturbed in this argument by the fact that the talk about the protection of Russians is partially

reminiscent of the former Soviet campaigns—like Protection of Children Month. Whence all kinds of backing and forthing.

[Shakhray] It has reached the point in the State Duma of a vote on the formation of a committee for the protection of Russians in Russia. Imagine, this proposal had the support of 140 deputies.

[Zamyatina] And how do you see the protection of the rights of Russians in the near abroad?

[Pain] As I have already said, the need for such protection is frequently being discussed today in the spirit of the former Soviet campaigns. Much in the way of posturing, distortion, and insincerity. After all, no less urgent than the protection of rights for the Russian diaspora is the task of self-organization.

More than three-fourths of the Russian diaspora of the near abroad lives in Ukraine, in Belarus, in Kazakhstan—on land on which Russians have lived for centuries—and they have no desire to leave their native parts. For this reason the strategic line of Russia's policy should be promotion of the full-fledged inclusion of the Russian diaspora in the life of the new independent states. In some cases such integration is possible in the form of cultural autonomy, in others, administrative autonomy, like the Crimean Republic, but support for the idea of the reunification of the lands with Russia is absolutely impermissible. Under the present conditions such demands could result merely in most acute conflicts, and the first casualties of these are, as experience shows, the national minorities.

Another important principle of Russia's policy in relation to the near abroad should be an extra-ethnic approach to the defense of human rights. Democratic Russia is simply duty bound by its international status to prevent the infringement of the rights both of the Russian diaspora and of all other ethnic minorities. As the state which is the successor of the Soviet Union, it must display a readiness (for certain transitional period) to accept on its territory any citizen of the USSR, regardless of his nationality.

And, finally, the basis of a civilized policy is always the principle of equivalence and parity. If Russia is seeking an improvement in the conditions of the cultural life of Russians in the near abroad, it should itself do the same for the minorities residing on its territory. In Ukraine, for example, there are dozens of functioning Russian theaters, but in Russia, in which Ukrainians constitute the third group in terms of size, there is not a single Ukrainian theater. If Russia is seeking the right of dual citizenship for Russians in Kazakhstan, it is obliged to grant the almost 1 million Kazakhs on its territory a similar right. It is useful to imagine here a situation in which citizens of another state constitute the majority in certain areas on the border with Kazakhstan.

[Zamyatina] How is your idea of Russians' adaptation to the conditions of the new independent states to be combined with the fact that they are simply being squeezed out of there?

[Pain] There are two sides to this coin. There is a situation in which representatives of the Russian diaspora are not being admitted to citizenship, and there are regions where they themselves are still choosing and thinking, so to speak. The choice is frequently complicated by the idea of restoration of the Soviet Union.

Many problems could be resolved were it possible within the framework of the CIS to agree on cooperation on assurance of the rights of the national minorities and to remove the restrictions on freedom of the residence and movement of people which ensue today from the difference in their citizenship.

[Shakhray] I agree that it is essential that the Russians in the near abroad display greater assertiveness for self-organization. But in the regions where there are political and psychological barriers to such adaptation we should determine what is meant by protection of the Russian-speaking population. It is here that the possibilities need to be differentiated. As far as the Baltic is concerned, chiefly economic forms of pressure and appeals to international standards are applicable there. In Central Asia other solutions are needed. On the whole, however, a systemic approach to this problem is needed.

Summing up our discussion, I would like to mention that federalism is for Russia the sole way to preserve the territorial integrity of the state. The dilemma here is perfectly straightforward: Either the disintegration of the country or genuine federalism. There is no other way.

[Zamyatina] The final question, Sergey Mikhaylovich. How adequately are the ideas for a strengthening of federalism in Russia proposed by you and your Party of Russian Unity and Accord being received by the president and the government? Do you entertain hopes of these ideas being practicable?

[Shakhray] I will say this: There has been progress. Neither the president nor the prime minister are any longer rejecting these problems as incomprehensible, they recognize increasingly that real control of the economy and the territories is possible only on the principles of federalism.

The problem is that a lack of translation of conceptual ideas into the language of laws and practical organizational forms in respect to delineation of authority is perceived as yet. The leaders of the regions, seeking independence, are demanding of the center, as before, the solution of, say, questions of housing and municipal services in their republics, krais, and oblasts. They forget that the powers of the components of the Russian Federation should be exactly as many as may be realized at the regional level without disruption of the unity of the Russian state and its constitutional principles.

Shakhray Defends Amnesty Stance

944F0412B Moscow OBSHCAYA GAZETA in Russian
No 9, 4 Mar 94 p 10

[Interview with Sergey Shakhray by Yegor Yakovlev; place and date not given: "Who Has the Right To Determine Who's To Blame?"]

[Text] [Yakovlev] During the referendum and subsequently, when the Constitutional Assembly was meeting, we touched repeatedly on the subject of choice. I said that the very problem of choice, the lesser of two evils, was essentially immoral. You, on the other hand, maintained that there are times of forced choice, when this is essential in the name of higher goals, for the sake, for example, of avoiding civil war. And you continued: A new constitution will be adopted, elections will be held, and we will have an opportunity to act on the basis of moral convictions. All this has happened. Now you and your faction in the Duma have voted for a political amnesty for the prisoners of Lefortovo. This was a free choice, so its time had come?

[Shakhray] The choice about which you speak was made by me consciously and voluntarily, and I consider it, as before, correct. As far, however, as actual preferences are concerned, we will still be balancing on the razor's edge for quite some time. Take the present situation concerning the constitution. The majority of those in the Duma recognize, I believe, neither the constitution nor the Duma, but are, nonetheless, using both to resolve their problems. This does not afford them any delight, of course, and they are looking for sympathy. I made my choice on the basis of the fact that as of 3-4 October we have been in a state of civil war, although there are no hostilities currently. The possibility of their resumption is for me not ruled out. And I chose between the just but abstract demand for the proceedings to be brought to the point of the rendering of a judgment or, on the other hand, the adoption of a decision on amnesty as an important step en route to civil reconciliation.

Let us look the truth in the eye. On the first day of business of the Duma it became obvious that it would adopt a decision on a political amnesty. This was borne out by the test voting, when on each occasion there was a shortage of two to five votes. But if a fact is obvious, it is necessary to think through one's actions on the basis of this fact. Otherwise it remains merely to throw up one's hands, which is what we are today doing. Where were the advisers, analysts, aides?

We decided to support the amnesty not for amnesty's sake but as a step on the way toward civil reconciliation. And we insisted that this be done in a particular sequence, what is more. First, a Memorandum of Accord adopted by the Duma, then the negotiations of all political sides and branches of power, at which the terms of political, socioeconomic, and interethnic stabilization for the coming two years would be recorded. Finally, the president and parliament would adopt a document on legal guarantees of a political truce, the amnesty

included. And only after this would the people go free. The sequence was broken, unfortunately. The communists and the agrarians wanted an amnesty without any obligations. And Russia's Choice believed that it would prevent this, manifestly overestimating its possibilities.

[Yakovlev] But if the planned sequence in civil reconciliation was unsuccessful, you should not have voted for the amnesty, perhaps?

[Shakhray] People breathe a sigh of relief when if only some opportunity for reconciliation appears. There is currently a mass of calls, and I am receiving a heap of telegrams from the provinces: Go for the next steps. I confess, this is for me the sole outlet in the information blockade in which I have found myself in Moscow.... Following the amnesty, there have come to be more opportunities for reconciliation, incidentally. We need to be able to avail ourselves of them. The time for this is two months.

Besides, the present political amnesty has a number of paradoxical features, which are easily predicted. The amnesty corresponds to the interests of the president and the government. It is more beneficial having Rutskoy and Khasbulatov at liberty than in Lefortovo. In addition, the people who have been released have undertaken, as it were, not to call for bloodshed, assaults in the future....

[Yakovlev] Permit my disbelief: I heard what Anpilov was shouting as he came through the gate, and I know the character of Konstantinov.

[Shakhray] If Anpilov or Konstantinov once again call for violence, the law enforcement authorities should act on the basis of the new circumstances.... A second paradox of the amnesty: It will be followed, in my view, by quite a lengthy period of interaction of the president, the government, and parliament. A considerable part of the Duma has discharged its election commitments: the release of the above-mentioned persons. Now they have no interest in the further elevation of either Rutskoy or Khasbulatov, they need other leaders. They will not, most likely, move to exacerbate the confrontation with the president. The law of self-preservation will operate.

[Yakovlev] Today we know that the president did not comment on the amnesty directly. But the pressure on the prosecutor general led to his resignation. Aleksey Kazannik believed that it was more important to be honest than to swear fealty to the president. As far, however, as his entourage is concerned, how many days is it now that it has been publicly confessing that it was unable, did not know, could not think how to get around, as it were, what should be done according to the law.

[Shakhray] You are to a large extent right, unfortunately. In addition, we have seen for ourselves that, apparently, we lack a mechanism of the interaction of president and parliament. The president, parliament, the public prosecutor's office, and the judicial system. But if intelligent conclusions

are drawn from this lesson, what I have said: The need for forced reconciliation, will have been confirmed.

[Yakovlev] I cannot say that I share your opinion, at the same time, on the other hand, I accept what is undoubtedly reasonable in your arguments. But how, pray, is it possible to be reconciled with the disregard for public opinion that was manifested so forcefully at that time? The gate of Lefortovo was flung open without people even having been told who were to blame—the one who signed the edict, violating the constitution and breaking up parliament, or those who, lodged in the White House, called for the storming of the Kremlin. Do you believe that it is not you and I but merely posterity that should answer this?

[Shakhray] There is the ancient piece of wisdom, which has with time become a legal axiom: You cannot be the judge at your own trial. Both parties to the conflict are to blame, and neither of them has either the moral or the political right to condemn the other. You ask: Why are we leaving this to posterity? I shall answer the question with a question: Who would determine who was guilty? The victorious presidential party wanted to do so today. But if tomorrow there are multiple-choice elections, will those who lost the October events start to point to the guilty party? As far as public opinion is concerned, it has already rendered its verdict, and I can merely repeat it: A plague on both your houses.

[Yakovlev] When I speak of the need to explain to people what happened on 3-4 October, I am not thinking merely in categories of the judicial investigation. It seems to me that the president should get up and tell people: In signing the edict of 21 September dissolving parliament I was a poor statesman insofar as I was unable to weigh the consequences this would have. Both Rutskoy and Khasbulatov should make their confessions: Lodged in the White House, we were thinking only of ourselves, of our power, forgetting about the inevitability of the casualties, which we had provoked....

[Shakhray] Were the said people capable of steps such as you have mentioned, we would not, possibly, have the present crisis.

Political Figures Comment on Amnesty

944F0420A Moscow *SEGODNYA* in Russian 1 Mar 94 p. 3

[Statements by political figures, from INTERFAX, POSTFAKTUM, and ITAR-TASS material; places and dates not given: "Man Guilty of National Consensus Found: an Honest Jurist Follows in the Footsteps of Procurator Pilate"]

[Text] **Sergey Yushenkov (chairman of the State Duma Defense Committee):** "Aleksey Kazannik's resignation as Russian Federation procurator general is to his credit; it shows, however, that the procuracy is poorly prepared for practical work. The Constitutional Court also could have demanded that the Duma stick to the rules, but

there is no law on the Constitutional Court. Overall, this speaks of the weakness of the president's power.

"The government is not against carrying out the amnesty. Indirect proof of this is the way the PRES [Party of Russian Unity and Accord] and the pro-government New Regional Policy faction have voted... The government does not have a concrete program and is looking for a scapegoat on whom to dump responsibility for what is happening in the country."

Viktor Mironov (deputy chairman of the Duma Security Committee, member of the Russia's Choice faction): "Having accepted the amnesty, the criminals acknowledged their responsibility for the hundreds of people killed... I hope that the president and the enforcement structures will not allow it to come to a civil war... The duty of democratically minded people is to unite around the Russia's Choice party."

Lev Ponomarev (cochairman of Democratic Russia movement): "Kazannik betrayed the president, who had appealed to him to hold up the amnesty process."

Ivan Fedoseyev (Russian Federation Supreme Soviet Constitutional Committee, Russia faction coordinator, Russian All-Peoples Union cochairman): "I hope that Ruslan Imranovich will have enough wisdom not to exhort people to mass actions today... The legitimacy of both the new Constitution and the State Duma is questionable; however, it is unlikely that the voters would agree with it, and Ruslan Khasbulatov must take this into account."

Ivan Shashviashvili (Russia faction): "Ruslan Imranovich should enter the political arena in his old capacity as Russian Federation Supreme Soviet chairman—the only legitimate body of state power despite the October massacre."

Vladimir Isakov (Russian Federation Supreme Soviet Constitutional Committee, chairman of the Legislative and Judiciary Reform Committee): "I hope that the released prisoners will have enough political wisdom not to jump into politics in the next few months. This would seriously complicate the situation in the country."

Mikhail Astafyev (chairman of the Constitutional Democratic Party): The key figure today is Aleksandr Rutskoy. There are two presidents in Russia today, and only one of them—Rutskoy—is the legitimate one. This seriously complicates the political situation."

Ruslan Khasbulatov: "I do not see real politicians in our country. I do not see anyone in the leadership with whom you could reach an agreement and who would then keep their word. Machiavelli is a child compared to them. For me, on the other hand, moral principles in politics are particularly important... Had I not been released by the Duma decision, I would still have been freed—first, because the investigators were not able to find corpus delicti, and second, because of my state of health... An attempt to return to Lefortovo those who have been

released from the investigative detention facility under amnesty will only underline the stupidity of the organizers of such actions. In the near future I intend to sort out my papers... I have felt my heart for the first time: how it hurts; therefore, I have to take care of my health right now..."

Ilya Konstantinov (National Salvation Front leader): "The former Lefortovo prisoners do not want to see the political struggle in Russia transcend the boundaries of legitimacy, and intend to help stabilize the political situation... Attempts to link the political amnesty with the beginning of a new round of civil war in Russia are a political provocation."

Vyacheslav Kostikov: "The act of releasing from Lefortovo the organizers of and participants in the October 1993 events is a blasphemous deed... People who were ready to push Russia into a bloodbath have been set free without a trial... The deputies abused the trust people vested in them and took the side of state villains... Aleksey Kazannik's resignation is the reaction of an extremely noble and decent man who has been put in a difficult legal situation... Until a new general procurator is appointed, the situation will be deadlocked."

Gavriil Popov (Russian Democratic Reform Movement chairman): "The president's staff has displayed amazing inaction... The president could have made an anticipatory move on the Duma decision by offering it his own version of amnesty, which would have precisely and clearly specified the terms on which the criminal case is dismissed: one such term could be a ban on participation in political activities for a certain period of time... The course of investigation in the GKChP [State Committee on the State of Emergency] case and the October events has demonstrated the complete helplessness of the law enforcement system; a top to bottom purge of the procuracy is needed."

Sergey Shakhrai: "The amnesty is in line with the strategic interests of the president and the government... The president loses more politically by keeping his opponents behind bars... At the same time, the result of violating the logic of the national reconciliation plan proposed by the PRES, in which the amnesty is only one element, bundled together with a memorandum of accord and the decision on disbanding the commission on investigation of the October events, will be that those released will again jump into political struggle. Its outcome will depend on random factors... Aleksey Kazannik's resignation may plunge the procuracy into the orbit of political passions."

Shmidt Dzyublyayev (general secretary of the Assembly of North Caucasus Democratic Forces): "The economic and political situation makes it incumbent on the president of Russia to impose a state of emergency... The Duma decision is an unprecedented act of absolute disrespect for the law... Sergey Shakhrai should share responsibility for this with the communist obscurantists."

Yuriy Baturin (the president's national security adviser): "The president of Russian Federation's appeal to the State Duma with the proposal to modify the decree on the amnesty should have cleared the way for the reconciliation process. However, the haste of general procuracy members considerably complicated the situation... This haste was displayed even contrary to the position of the State Duma itself... It is clear that General Procurator Kazannik's own position in this case was duplicitous... I can say that he has deceived us."

Ivan Rybkin: "If some people show that they do not have enough brains and compassion not to start a confrontation, the State Duma will see to it that such people are severely punished... Perhaps in the future a memorandum should be adopted, upon concurrence with other branches of authority, on a system of criteria and the mechanism of responsibility of state institutions and politicians for decisions aimed at reaching civic peace, national reconciliation, and consensus."

Mikhail Poltoranin: "The president cannot relax the reins of power; otherwise, the chariot of Russian statehood will overturn."

Barkashov on Amnesty, October Events

944F0427A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian
5 Mar 94 p 4

[Interview with Aleksandr Petrovich Barkashov, leader of Russian National Unity, by Sergey Turchenko; place and date not given: "A Meeting With Aleksandr Barkashov—the Bricked Up Knight's Sword"]

[Text] He was released from "Sailor's Rest" at 1815 on 26 February. Despite a serious bullet wound to the thigh, he came out of the prison by himself, adroitly supporting himself on crutches that have already become habitual.

Supporters had been waiting at the gate since 0900. A Russian National Unity honor guard company in full dress uniform was in formation. It greeted its leader with the thrice-repeated yell: "Glory to Russia!" Barkashov embraced each one of them and departed for home, where he has not been since 20 September 1993.

The building in which Aleksandr Petrovich lives had two exits as recently as five months ago. One to the courtyard, the other to Leninskiy Prospekt. When in October of last year the sleuths of "democratic" detection were hunting for the leader of Russian National Unity, the second exit was walled up with brick masonry so they would not have to maintain two posts of "operatives" here simultaneously. This wall has remained as a modest monument to victorious "democracy."

We met with Aleksandr Petrovich several days after his release at his apartment, which was left in a more than frugal condition. It had neither rugs nor expensive furniture. On the wall, next to Orthodox icons, was an ancient Russian knight's sword as the symbol of a fighting faith.

Wounded, wasted by prison, Barkashov appeared the inflexible monk of this courageous religion to which Russia is doomed.

After congratulating Aleksandr Petrovich on his release, I asked him how he felt about the amnesty.

[Barkashov] I think it is a compromise step on the part of those forces that did not want the investigative activities with respect to the "October prisoners" to reach the court, because this would reveal the true culprits of the mass murders in October of last year. Other forces were able through the act of amnesty to resolve their own concerns, for example, to release the criminals, because those forces do not have another social base. As for me personally, I interpreted the amnesty in a positive way, since I know that in our country an investigation can drag on for years and not come to anything. But sitting in prison is not for me, I have to be active. In addition, I understand that this was an act that the authorities were forced into, and not some kind of sop. The public conscience had reached a level that the authorities could not risk holding us under guard anymore. What is more, I do not feel any kind of guilt for myself. On the contrary, the Procuracy committed such a string of violations in my arrest that I do not know how it would extricate itself were it not for the amnesty.

[Turchenko] Our newspaper informed the readers about this in detail. But we have hardly written about the activities of Barkashov supporters in September-October of 1993.

[Barkashov] As early as spring, when an attempt was made to introduce OPUS [special procedure for governing the country], we announced that if the president decided to dissolve parliament and usurp power, we were ready with all available resources to oppose this. After the publication of Edict No. 1400, a subunit consisting of 300 persons arrived at the House of Soviets in an organized way. For the first two days, it was on the street. Afterwards, we settled ourselves in the reception room of the Supreme Soviet. Soon, information began to arrive that forceful actions were being planned against the leaders of the Supreme Soviet, and even that an assault on the building was being prepared. The need arose to reinforce the security of higher state officials and the internal premises of the House of Soviets. We were asked to take part in this, and we were assigned specific places to guard, in particular, the Ministry of Defense, the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs], the MB [Ministry of Security], and various vital life-support centers where, through underground communications, it was possible to get through to the inside of buildings. Our people guarded Khasbulatov and Rutskoy at their request.

On 2 October we heard growing noise, and even shooting, from the Smolensk Square side. I sent my scouts to find out what was happening there. They went and returned through underground communications. They reported that the OMON [special purpose militia

detachment] had provoked a clash and that people had been killed and wounded. That was the first time that weapons were employed against unarmed people. We have documentary pictures from which it can be seen how individual OMON members were firing from pistols at a short distance into the crowd. For some reason I did not see a word about this in the press. In addition, we also discovered that some foreign inspectors who were working under the Red Cross service for some reason were directing the activities of the OMON members, special purpose elements, and the militia. People were sitting in vehicles with foreign infantry weapons, and they were speaking in English. It became clear that a tragedy was developing under foreign leadership.

[Turchenko] Do you have documentary evidence of this?

[Barkashov] Yes, sir. When the time comes, I will publish it.

[Turchenko] But, in your opinion, did the other events of 3 October not appear to be a tragic play acted out by foreign intelligence services in order to eliminate the most active patriotically inclined citizens?

[Barkashov] I am convinced that 3 October was a real people's uprising. Almost half a million insurgents. The age group: youths from 16 to 25 and older men from 35 to 55, mainly workers and the technical intelligentsia. Plus a lot of women. Despite the clubs and tear gas, they breached several OMON barricades and in an absolutely sincere outburst broke through toward the House of Soviets.

[Turchenko] I absolutely agree, as a people's uprising the October display was spontaneous, if, of course, the fact that for a whole week prior to this people were provoked to uprising by unjustified harsh beatings is ignored. But does it not seem strange to you that it was exactly on 3 October that the militia and the OMON left the House of Soviets?

[Barkashov] You know, they did not leave. They scattered. The Dzerzhinskiy division, after receiving information about such a mass of people, quickly pulled out and departed in panic to its permanent station. Special purpose and OMON subunits also scattered in panic. Commanders abandoned their subordinates. We brought to the House of Soviets two companies of soldiers of the Internal Troops whose commanders had abandoned them. Later, two companies from Sofrino simply announced the desire to switch to the side of the insurgents. Only those who established themselves in the mayor's office fired on citizens. For some reason, nothing is being written about this, but I personally saw how people were wounded and killed by this fire. When in an outburst of indignation the crowd desperately hurled itself at the mayor's office, the firing became more intense. In order not to permit unnecessary bloodshed, seven of my companions, plus four fellows from the Union of Officers, rushed over there. All it took was several warning bursts for the mayor's office to quiet down. Then we led the half-drunk defenders of "democracy" away.

[Turchenko] But why was it necessary go after Ostankino?

[Barkashov] The leadership of the Supreme Soviet in those days undoubtedly displayed high courage. But in addition to courage, an ability to organize the popular masses was also needed.

[Turchenko] In your opinion, to organize what?

[Barkashov] This does not at all mean to shoot, to assault. It was enough with organized groups to take control of Moscow's main facilities. The march on Ostankino was a purely emotional outbreak: "The empire, they said, lies, a nest of evil..." I agree. But in such situations it is necessary to be guided not by emotions, but by sober calculation. If we need the television airwaves in order to tell people the truth about the events in Moscow, send a group of workers to Shabolovka, which was practically unguarded. And go on the air. There were many organizational miscalculations. As a result, the authorities gained time and the opportunity to organize the shelling of the House of Soviets. All that time our subunit was performing the duties entrusted to it, and was prepared to stand to the end. But when the leadership made the decision about going out, it made no sense to remain in the House of Soviets. On the evening of 4 October we surrendered our weapons in an organized way, and I ordered the boys to go out. I myself remained with Achalov when he was arrested, and demanded that I be taken together with him. However, an officer of the Ministry of Security answered that he had no instructions concerning me, and he advised that I leave with the "Alpha." I want to express my great gratitude to the officers of this subunit. Had it not been for them, there would have been far more victims. In any case, when "Alpha" turned the group with which I came out over to the OMON people, they took us in the direction of the stadium where, as we already knew, massive executions were being conducted. However, when officers of "Alpha" noticed this they raised their assault rifles and said firmly: Release these people. We were released... Unfortunately, not all of our boys remained alive. On 4 October, Dmitriy Marchenko, the editor of the letters department of our newspaper RUSSKIY PORYADOK, was wounded in the leg. He was taken to Sklifosovskiy. But relatives were soon informed that he was dead. When they came for him, they saw traces of brutal torture on his body. His nose and ears were torn off, the tendons in his legs were cut, and the back of his head was shot through. The body of Guards Major Anatoliy Surskiy was also found with traces of ritual torture.

[Turchenko] What did you do after you left the House of Soviets?

[Barkashov] We received information from our own people in the MVD that there was a directive to arrest a group of activists from Russian National Unity and, in

addition, the chiefs would have no objection if anyone was shot while resisting arrest. It became necessary to shift to an illegal situation.

[Turchenko] How did the October events affect Russian National Unity, did they not disorganize the movement?

[Barkashov] On the contrary, the fighting men became stronger in spirit. We saw a large influx of new people into the organization. Many youths. Workers of many of the Moscow plants sympathize with our views, and the first Russian National Unity cells have been established there.

[Turchenko] Would you be able to name at least the approximate numerical strength of your organization?

[Barkashov] The fact is that our membership is three-staged. The first stage is the most numerous—these are sympathizers. Those who are most active and who have shown their worth move to the second stage—fellow-fighters. They go through special training in our, so to say, training institutions, they perform one-time or permanent assignments. Achieving a certain level, a fellow-fighter can become a companion-in-arms. This is a direct member of our organization with pertinent rights and disciplinary duties. I will not name the figure for all of Russia. But in Moscow we have about 1,500 companions-in-arms and more than 10,000 fellow-fighters, and there are several times more sympathizers.

[Turchenko] What is the system of training in Russian National Unity?

[Barkashov] We place the main emphasis on political and ideological training, to put it more exactly, on world outlook. Our main weapon is propaganda and agitation. Further, there is tactics, firing training, and hand-to-hand combat.

[Turchenko] What does ideological training mean? Could you briefly formulate its basis?

[Barkashov] It is very difficult to do so briefly. Its essence is awakening the national self-consciousness of the Russian people. Because as our statehood was built around the Russian people, so it will be revived around a Russian nucleus. The main thing is that it is necessary to show the whole truth to the people to the end. So that they may see not in words but with their own eyes that they are on the brink of extinction, and so that the instinct of self-preservation be turned on. It is necessary to point out their main enemy. And one exists, for a struggle between good and evil is going on in the world.

[Turchenko] What capabilities do you have to report this truth?

[Barkashov] First, a press organ—the newspaper RUSSKIY PORYADOK. The circulation is quite high—400,000. But it is also necessary to consider that its dissemination is targeted—only to the social environment that is of interest to us. In the present period, this is most of all workers and servicemen.

[Turchenko] What is the base in the military environment?

[Barkashov] There are companions-in-arms even in the senior generals milieu. There are fellow-fighters. The main mass is sympathizers. It is technically very difficult to establish primary Russian National Unity cells in the army, for the eyes and ears of the special department are everywhere.

[Turchenko] How do you work in the units?

[Barkashov] We arrive at the main gate checkpoint in the evening and disseminate newspapers in which there is always a contact telephone. Then you begin to get calls from the military unit, and later people walk in. And it is here that individual work with them starts. People receive individual instructions, they join our studies system, etc.

[Turchenko] But are people not repelled by the fact that the symbolism of your movement has an emblem that is reminiscent of the swastika, which gives some journalists a reason to accuse Russian National Unity of fascism?

[Barkashov] This is a democratic label. Our sign is the eight-pointed Star of Our Lady, who from days of old was respected in Rus. You will also find it on ancient icons and in the ornamental embroidery of Russian national costumes. We have explained all of this, with documents, more than once in our newspaper. When people read it, all questions are removed.

[Turchenko] But why is this sign not seen in today's Orthodox Church?

[Barkashov] Today's Orthodox Church promised to anathematize those who were the first to spill blood in October 1993. Instead of this, I see on television how priests kiss the organizers of murder. But God is their judge. As for the Star of Our Lady, its description is in all canonical literature and in icon paintings. All of this was gradually etched out of our memories, probably because previously the common people called this ancient sign a zhidobor [amulet to protect against Jews].

[Turchenko] Fine, let us drop this subject. Tell us, how did you arrive at your present views?

[Barkashov] I am from a working family. My father worked all of his life in a TETs [thermal electric power center]. Mama was a nurse. I also worked at the same TETs for a long time as an electrician. As far as I can recall, I was always interested in books on Russian history. After 1985 I joined the Pamyat movement. I sensed in 1990 that it had become outdated. There was a need for a stronger and more united organization. Together with like-minded people, I left Pamyat and established Russian National Unity. My world outlook is from Russian historical science and knowledge of the attitudes of the working individual. But it was the development of the situation in the country itself that mobilized me to political activity.

[Turchenko] Of the parties that exist now, which do you cooperate with and which do you like most?

[Barkashov] We have a very strict ideology. It is difficult for us to find common language with those who paper over the cracks first and then join political games. We call things by their real names. Therefore, it is difficult to accept something like compromising alliances. But we are always ready to support tactically any political force that comes out for national interests. So the Supreme Soviet made a clear-cut statement about betrayal of national interests, and it said that it will defend them, and we immediately came to its assistance.

[Turchenko] What is your prediction for the near-term development of the situation in the country?

[Barkashov] Fundamental changes will occur this year. And if they are sufficiently fundamental (that is, if an uncompromising national policy is implemented), then within three years the people will be able to eliminate the consequences of the mess the reformers have created.

[Turchenko] But do you see such forces?

[Barkashov] I see the psychological condition of society, because I am not separated from it like Yeltsin, or as Khasbulatov was separated from it. Authority must resonate with the condition of society. If this does not exist, authority declines. Therefore, that is why changes have occurred: There is talk of accord, and the Russian question and changes in foreign policy are being stirred up. This, of course, is not out of goodwill. The present leadership simply understands that in its previous capacity it is becoming absolutely unacceptable to an overwhelming majority of the people. It will be forced to bring ever newer figures onto its staff until there is conformity between the will of the people and policy.

[Turchenko] The forecast is more than optimistic. Many thanks.

Independence of Appointed Judges Questioned

944E0555B Moscow *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA*
in Russian 4 Mar 94 p 1

[Article by Natalya Kuzina: "Does Russia Need Procurators and Judges Who Only Obey the Law?"]

[Text] There was a time when the representatives of the law needed celebrated cases and brilliant articles for fame. Everything is much simpler now. One only needs to observe the Constitution, and fame along with a position will cover you. Aleksey Kazannik, Valeriy Zorkin and, incidentally, even Valentin Stepankov proved that brilliantly.

Unfortunately, another question has remained opened: In today's Russia, can one combine observance of the law with a high position? Following the logic of the radical reformers and their popularizers, one cannot. During a recent television broadcast about A. Kazannik, they literally passed sentence—a political Don Quixote—

with some sympathy for the former general procurator. He did not understand that they had brought him "upstairs" not for his professional qualities but only because he once did the president a good turn—namely, a service. Personal devotion is the priority requirement for an official.

What does this mean in the judicial system? With the departure of people dedicated to the law from its "upper" stories, a complete failure awaits the system. Those who keep to the letter of the law will help. Already, there are not enough judges and people's assessors now. They are on the run under the threats of corrupted bureaucrats and legalized criminals. Only, where should the main mass of the population, from whom they have consistently and step by step taken away all the departments for protecting them beginning with our almost home-spun local trade union committees and ending with the opportunity to achieve justice in a court where one had not come with a purse, run?

This summer, I had an occasion to ask V. Zorkin how he would have acted if something similar to the celebrated OPUS [Osoboye Poryadok Upravleniya Stranoy—play on word "opus", meaning "work"] appeared again?

The answer was:

"I would have acted according to the constitution."

V. Zorkin proved this in the fall which does not now make him completely happy.

The Constitutional Court is still closed down. An individual, who is personally devoted but undergoing a libel case, is performing the duties of general procurator. The Constitution, even if it is a presidential one, leaves too broad a field for interpretation.

Role of Soskovets Viewed

944F0421A Moscow *SEGODNYA* in Russian 3 Mar 94 p 2

[Article by Aleksandr Bekker: "For Whom Is Oleg Soskovets Working?"]

[Text] Negotiations of the leading aluminum producers—delegations of the United States, Russia, the European Union, Australia, Canada, and Norway—will be held this week in Ottawa. If successful, agreements on the amounts of supplies of the product to the world market will be ratified. And in Moscow light will be shed, finally, on the fate of Anatoliy Dyakov, chairman of the Unified Power System of Russia stock company, whose removal is being spoken of in the Council of Ministers as a done deal. These two formally unconnected events have common roots. The initiator of Mr. Dyakov's dismissal and the key figure for presentation in Canada of Russia's "aluminum" position is Oleg Soskovets, first deputy chairman of the government.

The aluminum industry has become the most expressive example, perhaps, of Russia's "Asiatic" move onto Europe's metal markets. From 300,000 tonnes in 1990,

our exports have jumped to 1.6 million tonnes. Prices have collapsed almost twofold, and Western producers initially began to toss and turn and then, having instituted against Russia an anti-dumping inquiry, forced it into a civilized discussion, into consent to hold back its aluminum expansion included.

Having plucked the "foreign currency primrose," our enterprises have now encountered a very unpleasant situation: Exports have been compulsorily restricted, and the domestic prices of primary aluminum and rolled products have gone beyond world prices. In addition, the release price of the aluminum combines (2 million rubles [R] per tonne) is almost double the price of the independent dealers on the Moscow Metal Exchange. It is not surprising that demand for the enterprises' product has fallen. But the sector is in a mood neither to cut back on production nor to lose its dividends. And the only way it can preserve the status quo is to freeze the price of electric power, the consumption of which constitutes up to 30 percent of the prime costs of the output of the group of enterprises.

It has to be said that electric power is a natural monopoly, and the cost of a kilowatt-hour is, in any case, regulated, at three levels, what is more: The government determines the tariffs for the public and agriculture, the Federal Energy Commission establishes them for the Unified Power System of Russia regional stock company, which supplies the giants of industry, and the regional commissions impose tariffs for the local industrial enterprises.

In accordance with regulations approved last year for the Ministry of Economics, the electricity tariffs shall be revised "with a change in external conditions." The external conditions, that is, the prices of each and every thing, are growing by the month, and the electricity tariffs are raised administratively not more often than once a quarter. For the Unified Power System of Russia regional stock company, they have not been revised since September 1993. Rising up on each occasion as a wall has been Oleg Soskovets, who stated in February in the Council of Ministers Commission for Operational Matters that the power engineers had "established communism for one sector." Waves of indignation at the price policy of the fuel and energy complex, which is allegedly to blame for the endless inflation, have been rolling through the press in parallel with this. Clearly referring to the regional stock company's Mr. Dyakov, a representative of the industrial directors said that "one stock company is, in fact, directing the whole country."

The reasons for Oleg Soskovets' decisions, which are synchronous with the "public indignation," are, generally, there on the surface. On the one hand, the state's share of the exports of rolled aluminum constitutes 91 percent, and it does not, understandably, want such a channel of foreign currency to dry up. On the other, the prices of the extensive product list of the iron and steel complex have already scaled world heights, and the price of a kilowatt-hour is five times lower—and a further rise would confront a large sector of the economy with a

dilemma: either bankruptcy or a difficult rearrangement of the groups of enterprises. "Power engineering is literally oppressing the entire economy. Prices in the regions are being established chaotically, essentially, and managers are not being held responsible or to account," Oleg Soskovets declared.

This position precisely reflects the group interests of market outsiders and has nothing in common with public interests. The first deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers knows full well that it was the wild move "into the light" of Russia's metallurgists that knocked down world prices and that the energy consumption of aluminum industry considerably exceeds Western standards and is a consequence of the technological backwardness of the groups of enterprises. The abundance on the domestic market of imported commodities in aluminum wrapping against the drastic reduction in rolled products of this metal in Russia is clear evidence that the country is pumping cheap electricity to the West via aluminum. As far as the alleged arbitrary price action of the power engineers is concerned, this is, perhaps, the sole sector counting tariffs "the old way"—strictly according to the formulas from 21 supplements to the computation procedure, which can always easily be checked.

None of this is any secret for Mr. Soskovets. He could take on a task of truly state dimensions—gradually invert the pyramid of energy consumption in the country, whereby heavy industry bears the main price burden, and agriculture and the public get electricity for a pittance, virtually (5-6 percent of the cost). He could set about a leveling of the 20-fold price spread by region (threefold in the United States), for which he would win the industrial consumers' gratitude. But Oleg Soskovets, former chairman of the State Committee for Metallurgy, has opted for a path more in keeping, evidently, with the scale of his personality—he has begun to lobby Soviet-style for sectoral interests. When, in February, at a meeting of the board of the Ministry of Fuel and Energy, the power engineers presented him with evidence that the metallurgists, who were in debt to them, had money in their accounts, he told the meeting hall with irritation that "such shadowing is impermissible." He, however, beleaguered the power engineers who had shown him documents demonstrating how great was the prime cost of the product of the Bratsk and Krasnoyarsk aluminum combines. And then Mr. Soskovets decided radically to "investigate" energy prices, instructing Anatoliy Chubays to study the question of the "expediency" of Anatoliy Dyakov continuing in office as chairman of the Unified Power System of Russia regional stock company.

Removing Mr. Dyakov as a warning is, generally, uncomplicated. As is, in principle, holding back energy prices. This would turn out badly for the whole economy, it is true. With the 46 percent wear and tear of power engineering equipment, a shortage of investments would very quickly result in a growth of the breakdown rate and

a reduction in scheduled maintenance. The sector is, as a whole, inertial. You might not build here for a couple of years, and this hits three or four years later. At the start of the 1980's the introduction of capacity in power engineering constituted 10 million-12 million kilowatt-hours, incidentally; now, it is roughly 10 times less.

Oleg Soskovets has been "on the political Olympus" just under a year. Everyone has come in for it in this time—monetarists and "moderates"—and the press has hit at Gaydar and Chernomyrdin, Fedorov and Zaveryukha, Chubays and Glukhikh. The first deputy prime minister has, surprisingly, emerged from the battles totally "unscathed." He has remained beyond criticism, although industrial policy has failed completely, and the concept of financial and industrial groups sponsored by Mr. Soskovets is decaying at root. There have been no breakthroughs in the field of ideas, except for curatorship of the work of academicians Shatalin and Abalkin "on a correction of the course of the reforms."

Despite the lack of achievements, the first "vice" remains under a charm and continues to gain more and more political authority. According to a recent order of the prime minister, Oleg Soskovets will coordinate key spheres of economic policy and direct 14 ministries and departments, and the composition and structure of the federal executive authorities and the federal civil service are in his hands. He is head of the government's Commission for Operational Matters, to which the function of distribution of centrally allocated credit to industry was recently transferred. And this same commission, judging by documents of the Council of Ministers, will shortly win distribution of the Western credit received by Russia and the centrally allocated foreign exchange resources of the government.

In a short space of time the 44-year-old Oleg Soskovets has made a dizzying career from deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers of Kazakhstan to first deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers of Russia. He has concentrated an enormous amount of power in his hands. Both this surge and his being off limits for criticism on the part of the president and the prime minister compel doubts as to the authenticity of the original version of his elevation: Boris Yeltsin had brought into the government "his man" Lobov, and Viktor Chernomyrdin, in response, made a move with the little-known Soskovets. It would seem, however, that people had gambled on Oleg Soskovets somewhat earlier and had pushed him persistently and recommended him just as persistently to the prime minister.

Indicating who is "pushing" Oleg Soskovets is not that easy. One thing is for certain: Among the persons with an interest in him are the industrial directors who have not joined in the reforms.

Problems in State Financing for Television

944Q0219A Moscow NOVOYE VREMYA in Russian
No 8, Feb 94 [Signed to press 22 Feb 94] pp 48-49

[Article by Anna Politkovskaya: "Television as a National Problem, or Is Life Possible Without Knife-Switches?"]

[Text] There is not a person in the country who would be satisfied with television in our country. However, when the danger started to appear on the horizon of finding ourselves in a television, and at the same time also in a radio vacuum, society united with incredible enthusiasm in the struggle for this narcotic accessible to all.

But in the meantime Premier Chernomyrdin and the cabinet headed by him did not especially want to give to television the budget funds earmarked for it. As a minimum, beginning in November they stopped the transfer to "Ostankino" and to the Russian Television and Radio Company the funds which they, in turn, must, without keeping them back in their account, transfer into the pocket of the Ministry of Communications. And the Ministry of Communications, as is well known, holds the monopoly in Russia over the distribution of the SIGNAL. . . .

Let Us Turn the Film Back

At the end of October, Yeltsin decorates the television workers who have distinguished themselves in the events, including those from CNN. He acknowledges in public that they have done more for the country than all the democrats taken together. However, money for domestic RTV (radio, television) was nevertheless not found in the treasury.

Further—November. All of the electronic mass media are also waiting for money, but can by no means wait for it. Their debt is growing with every day. For the time being, the communications workers are forgiving [the debt], understanding that those who prevent the triumph of the new constitution were almost enemies in November. Of all the forces, radio and television twist the election campaign, unprecedented for Russia. Every day, the citizens hear that one or another figure who felt the urge for politics in his blood has rented COMMERCIAL hours and minutes on the screen and on the air. Only a little time will pass and it will turn out that those who had the urge have also not paid radio and television for the election campaign.

And here it is December. The whole world, in anticipation of Christmas, dances around the Christmas tree. We are dancing to different music: The government has stormed the parliament. It will never understand its debt to society, it is always fixed on the future, it promises the television chiefs that as soon as December 12 is over, we will assume all power and settle accounts, and we will go on, and everything will become splendid, and we will begin to live, will flourish, and the gardens will break into blossom. Alas, we have not started to live, and

things turned out to the contrary. Those who promised did not seize power. Totally other people seized power.

And how do things stand with the money? Where is it? The money in the amount of 67 billion in the national Russian currency? It should already have been turned over to the communications workers without delay. . . . They are also people—those who sit in the Russian steppes and hills far away from the large cities and service the relay stations, which transmit the signal from one region to the other, from one antenna to the other. And there are many such people—alone the departmental settlements of the Ministry of Communications, which arose for the servicing of the relay stations, come to 16,000 for Russia. And all the people there are without wages, and sometimes since the summer....

Where Is the Money? The Money Is Where?

I hope is in Gosbank, because it cannot but be there. But at the same time, I am afraid, it is not. And in the meantime January has passed. From the government, which was unable to see to it that budget money went where, in accordance with the law on the budget for 1993, it should go—from this government there remain only horns and legs. The guilty, as always, do not remain, since all the guilty turn into the aggrieved and, in accordance with Russian tradition, are not subject to further beating. Boris Fedorov—the former minister of finance, or, as it turned out, minister without finances and without rights to control these finances—it now appears had nothing to do with it. Sixteen thousand settlements continue to sit without money. Patience is being exhausted. The Ministry of Communications is trying to improve its situation at the expense of the weakest—for example, it is announcing price increases for its services for newspapers and journals, moreover such an increase that, if it takes place, the majority of them would die at once. The Ministry has calculated correctly and shrewdly: For newspapers the people today will already not go into the square, and it is not to be beaten to death, and even for a demonstration it cannot be assembled, these are no longer the times of Gorbachev.

But the journalists were able all the same to consolidate corporatively at that moment and some of them saved for themselves the old prices for the communications services. Although, of course, not for long. Another week passed by after the "good" papa-Chernomyrdin met with the indignant editors-in-chief of the leading publications and promised them to moderate the ardor of the communications workers, and peace for the newspaper all the same capsized: Quietly, without noise and ardor, the Ministry of Communications all the same raised the prices, but in a differentiated manner—for some threefold, for others fivefold, and still others tenfold. Thus, a mere branch ministry, nothing more, through economic methods effected a (political?) selection in the state.

And here February came flying. The debts for the signal as before were not paid. The communications workers are on the verge of a strike—they are not being paid their wages. Where are they to turn? They demand. They

threaten, they remember that they have in their hands the very knife-switch which can extinguish both sound and light. They engage in blackmail, which, of course, is very shameful. But what is to be done? . . . A month earlier they were blackmailed.

The Hour 'X' Is Announced

If you don't settle the accounts, the communications workers scream, you will read books in the evening—and nothing else: Including prime ministers and janitors. Immediately before the discontinuation of television and radio transmissions, Prime Minister Chernomyrdin urgently convenes a meeting. The architect of perestroika, Aleksandr Yakovlev, recently appointed as chief of the Federal Service for Television and Radio Broadcasting, comes, the Minister of Communications Vladimir Bulgak comes, for some reason pulled hastily out of a polyclinic from tests. We are on fire, they say. Although, it is clear, we have been on fire for several months running. Prime Minister Chernomyrdin speaks his weighty state word at the meeting and promises to settle the accounts. He sent for Minister of Finance Dubinin. Although he knows very well that there is nothing to pay with at the moment. Minister Dubinin declares that he will not pay—there is no money, even if your life depends on it. Would there not be a question to put to Minister Dubinin, for what, they say, do you divide the money? But the prime minister takes a different road.

The prime minister hammers out a telegram to all the communications workers of Russia and in a fatherly manner asks them, for the umpteenth time, to put themselves into the position of the poverty-stricken state. He asks not to touch the knife-switch, to leave to the people simply Mary and all the inhabitants of Santa Barbara. The prime minister gets up on his knees, as if he is old. . . . This produces an impression: Some people feel sorry for him, here and there they do not touch the knife-switch, but here and there they nevertheless turn off the knife-switch, and there a panic begins. It seized even the northern capital—for a whole day St. Petersburg did not see and hear anything from Moscow, and many decided that again a social cataclysm had occurred.

The prime minister enters into a strict agreement with the minister of finance that the debts will be paid gradually during the first quarter. But this, too, is some kind of improbable oddity—for the time being, they are talking only about settlement of the accounts for the last year. Up to now they are not talking about the debts for January and February, which it was time to clear off long ago.

For What Are They Hoping THERE?

This, perhaps, is the only question in this story which one does not even need to try to answer proceeding from the classic laws of logic. Finale. Realm of fantasy [zapredel]. Anarchy. There is no money to be had anywhere. However, they will nevertheless take it from somewhere.

And in very large quantities. And not for the poverty-stricken service personnel of the relay stations, but for quite different purposes. In the evening of the same day when Chernomyrdin hammered out the telegram, First Vice Premier Oleg Soskovets visited Oleg Poptsov, head of VGTRK [All-Russia State Television and Radio Company], at Yamskoye Pole (Russian Channel). Why? They talk about various things. We will refer only to an, in our view, very correct opinion, because it belongs to a very interested person from among Poptsov's deputies. That evening they brought Mr Soskovets to Shabolovka, where the old historical television center is located, which the Russian Channel acquired some time ago. They showed Soskovets the unfinished building, and an oral agreement was reached to the effect that VGTRK, Poptsov's fiefdom, above all, falls under the patronage, and this means, the financing of the Russian government. But, you see, they screamed that there is a financial abyss, and they shed tears. . . . However, it is necessary to understand that these will be enormous expenditures for the budget, comparable even with the dollars which they threatened to throw at the new palace for the new deputies. And in order for it to be built in accordance with the latest state of technology, as Soskovets and Poptsov agreed! And in order for the installations to be like those at CNN! We would very much like to know this. Again precisely budget matters.

Up to now only one of the points of such financing is clear: The government apparently decided to stop fattening "Ostankino" and to finance only its information service, and to give all the remaining time to the [air] waves of private business—in the disposition of independent television studios and companies. Strictly speaking, this is not a bad thing and remarkable; what arouses attention is only the fact that the government for the umpteenth time has forgotten to consult with the taxpayers, who are directly involved in the formation of budget funds.

Again About Totalitarianism

It, the accursed demon, is directly related to this story, too. The point is that those very relay stations with which the communications workers are blackmailing in order to receive what is theirs are the most essential stronghold of totalitarianism.

It turned out that the civilized world already for a long time watches television and listens to radio without any "fools," it has no need for settlements abandoned a little farther from human habitation. The world uses satellites. This has proved to be more ecological and incomparably cheaper than the daily servicing of relay stations. A satellite is only expensive to make and to launch, then everything is simpler. But in the USSR, as is well known, they did not think about cheapness, and even less about ecology. They talked about the fact that everything must be listened to that can be listened to, and that everything must be suppressed that should be suppressed out of ideological considerations. The archaic relay stations, which during the time of the Soviets went through more

for the KGB agency than for any other and which now require such financial infusions as not a single modern television company would dream of, precisely corresponded to the system of total control of the conscience of people.

In connection with what has been set forth above, the next question arises: Perhaps, all of us will have to pull ourselves together. Mr Chernomyrdin, one last time, and launch the necessary number of satellites, in order for us to have everything like people [elsewhere], in order for 16,000 settlements, like the repressed, not to complain in the windy steppes, and in order for the future to be without relay stations? I would very much like to hear an answer.

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

Tatarstan/RF Treaty Given Positive Assessment

944F0425A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 25 Feb 94 p 3

[Article by Rais Tuzmukhamedov and Vladimir Pustogarov, doctors of legal sciences, under rubric "Opinion": "Victory, Divided Equally: Treaty Between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Tatarstan as an Act of International Law"]

[Text] The date of 15 February 1994 became a landmark in the history of relations between Moscow and Kazan, since, for the first time since Russia seized the Kazan khanate in the middle of the sixteenth century, a treaty was concluded between the new RF [Russian Federation] and the new RT [Republic of Tatarstan], a treaty that was based, as is stated in its preamble, on "the generally recognized right of nations to self-determination, on principles of the completely equal and voluntary expression of free will."

This treaty is a compromise, just as any agreement is, whether it be in everyday life, at the domestic state level, or in international relations. But it is a compromise that preserves the sovereignty of both sides. They have divided, in a sovereign manner, the powers in a new unification. Inasmuch as, according to Minister Sergey Shakhrai, one of the chief representatives of the Russian side, as quoted in a ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA interview, "the methodology of the Federative Treaty formed the basis of the document," we shall refer to that act and compare what was put in whose jurisdiction by that act.

A number of areas of behavior, including some extremely important ones, that were ascribed in the Federative Treaty to the sphere of the joint jurisdiction of the Center and the subjects of the Federation have now been firmly established as being within the exclusive, that is, sovereign, jurisdiction of Tatarstan. They include, for example, "questions of the possession, use, and disposal of the land, mineral wealth, the water, timber, and other natural resources, as well as the state enterprises, organizations, and other movable and

immovable property situated on the territory of the Republic of Tatarstan." We might note, incidentally, an extremely important principle that has been established: the topic being discussed is the "exclusive property owned by the people of Tatarstan," rather than "by the state" (read: the state bureaucracy), as is frequently written in RF acts.

According to the Treaty, Tatarstan itself has the right to resolve questions of the bar and notary practices, and to carry out the legal regulation of administrative, family, and housing relations, and relations in the area of environmental protection and use of natural resources. Tatarstan itself establishes the system of the republic's state agencies, and the procedure for organizing them and for carrying out their activities. Like any other sovereign state, Tatarstan itself resolves questions of republic citizenship. The republic itself forms its budget, establishes and collects taxes, and independently carries out foreign-economic activity; resolves questions of conversion at enterprises that are part of the republic's state property; creates the National Bank; concludes agreements with foreign states; participates in international organizations; etc. These and other exclusive powers and sovereign rights correspond to the Tatarstan Constitution, which has firmly established the state sovereignty of the Republic of Tatarstan.

It is fundamentally important that the documents that are recognized as the legal basis of the treaty are the constitutions of both states. Legally this means not only the paramount importance and the priority of the norms and principles of the two constitutions and of each of them, but also the fact that, when interpreting the treaty, each side primarily proceeds from its own Constitution and coordinates its point of view with the Constitution of the other participant in the Treaty.

For those who, in 1991, adopted the Declaration of the State Sovereignty of Tatarstan, who, in March 1992, in a referendum voted for the republic's sovereignty, and who subsequently, on the basis of that referendum, developed and adopted, in November 1992, the Constitution of the sovereign state of Tatarstan, something that must be of substantial importance is the fact that the treaty, as is stated in its preamble, is the "completely equal unification of two states," and that this unification occurred on the basis of the constitutions both of Russia and Tatarstan, as well as the principles enumerated in the treaty itself. The treaty is an agreement between sovereign states and the subjects of international law. This is not stated in the text. But that essence of the act is self-evident, primarily on the basis of the sense of the name and text of the agreement. It is called: "Treaty Between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Tatarstan." That means an agreement between two sovereign states (Article 1 in both constitutions). This is also mentioned in the preamble, where it is directly stated that the Republic of Tatarstan unites with the Russian Federation "as a state."

Furthermore, the treaty was signed at the highest level—by chiefs of state. The sovereignty of the contracting parties as entities in international law is also attested to by the subject of the agreement. It pertains to the delimitation of the authoritative powers, that is, the powers that are inherent in state sovereignty, since sovereignty is a category of authority.

The fact that the treaty is an act in international law, that is, an agreement between two subjects of international law, also evolves completely obviously from the fact the contracting parties indicated as their legal basis their own constitutions—each of them unambiguously established the quality of a sovereign state that is based on the sovereignty of the multiethnic people of those countries (Articles 1 and 3 of the RF Constitution; preamble and Articles 1, 2, and 61 of the RT Constitution).

Sergey Shakhrai, RF minister of nationalities and regional policy, stated in the interview that was previously mentioned that "this treaty is not subject to ratification, in order not to create the illusion of being a document in international law." But ratification is a completely unmandatory attribute of the nature of the treaty as a document in international law. This depends upon how the contracting parties come to an understanding. Another matter is that the treaty distributes the sovereign powers within the framework of the unification of the two contracting parties that is created by them.

Sergey Shakhrai said, "From the point of view of international law and state law, this (the signing of the treaty and Tatarstan's consent to participate in elections to the Federal Assembly) means the recognition of the federal electoral law and sovereignty of Russia." If the minister, by his use of the word "recognition," means not the assertion of the existence of Russia's sovereignty, but the subordination of Tatarstan to the sovereignty of the RF, then the very preamble of the treaty begins with words to the effect that the contracting parties are guided not only by the RF Constitution, but also equally by the RT Constitution, and that they are proceeding from the "generally recognized right of nations to self-determination, on principles of the completely equal and voluntary expression of free will", etc. Incidentally, the nation of Tatarstan also expressed its self-determination unambiguously not only in March 1992, but also during the April 1993 referendum and during the referendum on the new RF Constitution.

Gavriil Popov and Fedor Burlatskiy, in a Dialogue broadcast on 19 February, did justice to the political wisdom of President Mintimer Shaymiyev and the endurance of President Boris Yeltsin, who justly divided the victory (it is only in such an instance that it is indeed a victory) equally between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Tatarstan.

Finally, we would like to direct attention to the fact that the Treaty text contains four references to agreements between the contracting parties. As is well known, there

are more than ten of them. It must be assumed that these agreements will also become accessible to the public. That would help to make a better evaluation of the historical nature of the role and limits of the importance of a treaty that is so important for Russia and Tatarstan.

Tatarstan Prime Minister's Moscow Trip

944F0429A Kazan RESPUBLIKA TATARSTAN
in Russian 10 Mar 94 p 1

[Release of the Republic of Tatarstan Cabinet of Ministers' Press Center: "Interstate Agreement in Action"]

[Text] Tatarstan Prime Minister M.G. Sabirov visited Moscow from 28 February to 5 March. He conducted negotiations with Chairman of the Russian Government V.S. Chernomyrdin, during which they discussed issues associated with the realization mechanism for the recently signed interstate agreement "On Delineation of Subjects of Jurisdiction and Mutual Delegation of Powers Between Organs of State Authority of the Russian Federation and the Organs of State Authority of the Republic of Tatarstan." The heads of the governments emphasized the need to concentrate joint efforts of state organs, ministries, and agencies of Russia and Tatarstan on a more effective use of all the potential built into this document, which is of great importance for both states.

During the meeting between Prime Minister M.G. Sabirov and Russian Minister of Defense P.S. Grachev, both republics' defense and security issues were discussed. Articles of the intergovernment agreement between the Republic of Tatarstan and the Republic of Tatarstan in the military sphere were brought into concordance. This twelfth agreement, which had been envisaged in the course of preparation of the interstate treaty, was ratified on 5 March by Chairman of the Government of Russia V.S. Chernomyrdin and Tatarstan Prime Minister M.G. Sabirov.

At the center of attention of the negotiations that took place between Tatarstan Prime Minister M.G. Sabirov and First Deputy Chairman of the Russian Government O.N. Soskovets were issues of the state of the oil production and oil refining industries, and the situation in Tatarstan's military industrial sector.

Prime Minister M.G. Sabirov and Central Bank of Russia Chairman V.V. Gerashchenko discussed issues associated with the mechanism of implementing the agreement on the powers of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Tatarstan in the area of banking, monetary-financial, and foreign currency policy, which had been signed by the leadership of the Governments of Russia and Tatarstan, as well as by V.V. Gerashchenko, the chairman of the Central Bank of Russia, and by Ye.B. Bogachev, chairman of the National Bank of Tatarstan.

The issue of future cooperation in the area of developing the agro-industrial complexes of Russian and Tatarstan, preparation for the spring field work, and allocation of

credit resources were discussed during the negotiations between M.G. Sabirov and Deputy Chairman of the Russian Government A.Kh. Zaveryukha. Tatarstan Minister of Agriculture and Food F.S. Sibagatullin took part in the negotiations.

Prime Minister M.G. Sabirov took part in the expanded session of the Russian Federation Government on the subject of the state of the Russian economy and the prospects of its development this year.

Tatarstan Bank Reviews 1993, Plans for 1994

944F0446A Kazan RESPUBLIKA TATARSTAN
in Russian 16 Mar 94 p 1

[Article by Ye. Taran: "The Stockholders of Tatpromstroybank Did Not Miscalculate"]

[Text] The news that the joint-stock industrial construction bank of development of the Republic of Tatarstan (Tatpromstroybank) was among the top 100 banks of Russia for the second time in a row (it is the only representative of Tatarstan financial institutions on the rating chart) arrived just in time—a conference of the stockholders of Tatpromstroybank convened yesterday at which the results of last year's operation were summarized and reference points for the current year were charted.

Rafael Mingazov, chairman of the bank's board of directors, had no reason to be ashamed in front of the founders and stockholders when presenting his report on the work accomplished. The bank's balance sheet turnover, total assets, and credit deposits increased fivefold. While bank profits grew twice as fast as the volume of credit extension, increasing by a factor of 11. In the words of R. Mingazov, the bank succeeded in achieving this primarily by accelerating monetary turnover, not by setting high rates for credit.

The reliability and prestige of Tatpromstroybank is confirmed by the fact that more than 2,000 enterprises and entrepreneurs became its clients last year and 17,000 individuals became depositors.

As we know, it was decided at the previous stockholder conference to increase the bank's authorized capital to R1.5 billion. In July of last year this task was accomplished, and towards the end of 1993 the authorized capital of Tatpromstroybank had grown to R3 billion. The bank directors have proposed to the stockholders that the level of authorized capital be raised to R10 billion, especially since the Russian Federation Central Bank adopted a resolution establishing the minimum amount of capital at R2 billion, to be increased over the course of five years to R10 billion.

Tatpromstroybank's borrowers are predominantly state enterprises. They account for more than 63 percent of the credits, mainly short-term credits. Long-term credits increased fourfold in terms of absolute amount, but their rate of growth decreased. This is explained by virtue of

the overall crisis in the economy and the striving of bank directors to accelerate the turnover rate of resources. The share of long-term credits was reduced from 10 to 7 percent.

Nonetheless, R. Mingazov states that the bank saddled itself with obligations to distribute long-term resources for providing credits to the Yelabuga Motor Vehicle Plant and defense enterprises amounting to over R12 billion. The bank's income from these transactions is entirely minimal, however—3 percent annual interest.

In order to soften the blow inflicted upon enterprises by the nonpayments crisis, Tatpromstroybank has established direct corresponding accounts with 16 banks of the near abroad and 15 of the far abroad, which include financial enterprises of the United States, Germany, England, Switzerland, Turkey, and Korea. In order to regulate the use of ready cash in 1994, it is planned to introduce plastic cards for obtaining cash through automatic teller machines.

Kazan Housing Privatization Reviewed

944F0429B Kazan KAZANSKIYE VEDOMOSTI
in Russian 10 Mar 94 p 6

[Article by A. Ganeyeva: "More Millionaires Every Day"]

[Text] Privatization of housing in Kazan began three months ago. Over the elapsed time, this mechanism has been fine-tuned and now is working almost without a glitch. The city authorities have managed over an extremely short period of time to put together a legislative base—the basis for the conduct of privatization; to set up a powerful computer network linked to the main computer in the city agency for housing privatization, which gave the city the necessary information on the process of transferring housing to private hands. The agency, created at the end of November of last year, practically began its operation at the time that housing privatization got its start—on 6 December.

According to the agency's data, which were provided to us by its chief, Yevgeniy Tokarchuk, as of 5 March 4,430 apartments had been privatized in Kazan, which comprises 3.5 percent of all city housing subject to privatization by law. In Kazan's Baumanskiy Rayon, 273 persons received contracts transferring housing to private ownership; in Sovetskiy Rayon—1,083, Vakhitovskiy—572, Privolzhskiy—956, Moskovskiy—934, Leninskiy—1,220, and Kirovskiy—368.

More than 9,500 applications for housing privatization already have been submitted. Now in the housing maintenance organizations, waiting for its owners who apparently had not expected to get all [lines missing].

Instead of the period of one month envisaged by the law for a contract to be issued after the application is submitted, in Baumanskiy, Sovetskiy, and Moskovskiy Rayons the processing period for housing privatization documents has been reduced to 10 or at most 16 days. In

Leninskiy and Privolzhskiy Rayons, however, which are experiencing some computer problems, contracts are issued a month after the application is submitted.

Time begets new problems: refusal to privatize after the contract has already been processed. People had submitted applications to housing maintenance offices, and then changed their mind. Ye. Tokarchuk's comment on this situation was that they explain their change of mind by open threats of extortion. For instance, quarrels have already begun in some families, and canceling the contract in this situation is the best way out of the situation. Quite possibly, some of soon to be property owners have run into those who already own it and have realized that it is better at this point to keep living in a state-owned apartment.

The pace of housing privatization in the city has stabilized. Looking at the December data, at the time more than 1,000 applications a week were coming in; in January, the number dropped to 800, and in February—600 a week. According to the latest data from the agency, now about 650-700 applications are coming in every week. Ye. Tokarchuk noted that city residents are not well informed on the terms, rules, and advantages of housing privatization. People ask the most elementary questions. The most often asked is whether they may have to pay more for a privatized apartment.

"We have to explain patiently that payments for a privatized apartment remain the same," Ye. Tokarchuk tells us, "while the property tax amounts to only 0.1 percent of the book value of the cost of the housing as of 1 January 1994; that the tax is paid once a year in November-December, and inflation will make the amount of the tax rather modest. Besides, some categories of citizens are exempt from property taxes altogether."

Many questions are asked regarding residence permits as applied to privatized housing. People ask about the procedures of willing apartments as inheritance, giving them as a gift, and buying and selling.

Generally, however, the city agency's main tasks are not in answering people's questions. The agency represents the main link in the chain of housing privatization departments under heads of rayon administrations; it has been set up under the head of the Kazan administration. [Line missing] of privatization is computerized. One of the agency's main functions is to monitor compliance with the law. The main computer located at the agency checks whether the housing unit indicated in the application is subject to privatization. As is known, it is against the law to take possession of decrepit housing or housing assigned as part of one's official position. There are restrictions on apartment privatization in buildings that represent historic and architectural landmarks. The dispassionate machine also picks up facts of multiple residence permits and repeat privatization by the same person.

The main computer also assigns a registration number to all contracts transferring housing into private ownership. Each rayon has its own code, but the city keeps its own integrated registration. Therefore, the registration number consists of a code and a sequential number.

In addition, the agency monitors the work schedule and operations of housing maintenance offices and rayon housing privatization departments and conducts planned weekly audits.

As to the concrete results of the city agency's work, over these three months three incidents of multiple residence permits have been detected, and several precedents of attempts to privatize housing that by law is not subject to privatization. The privatization applications of all these persons were rejected.

According to fresh statistical data received in the agency through the computer network, local soviets' housing comprises 65.9 percent of all privatized housing, and 34.1 percent—housing previously owned by organizations. The city authorities had quite a few unpleasant moments dealing with reluctance and open sabotage on the part of enterprises that did not want to relinquish their housing to ownership of the people living in it. Now the situation has improved perceptibly, and enterprises that attempt at all costs to make their housing a part of their charter capital are few and far between. They have managed, however, to slow down privatization of enterprise-owned housing, which accounts for a lower share of such housing as compared to one owned by local soviets.

The main computer has a full picture of the attributes of the privatized housing. One-room apartments account for the greatest share of privatized housing (44.3 percent), followed closely by two-room apartments (37.6 percent), then three-room apartments—14.9 percent, and rooms in communal apartments—3.2 percent.

[Lines missing] cases become single or elderly people. Our state has deprived our elderly of the opportunity of leaving inheritance in a deposit book. Their life savings—3,000-5,000 rubles—have lost their value completely. Now, however, they have the opportunity to leave a million-ruble inheritance—an apartment—and the elderly want to take advantage of this right.

According to Ye. Tokarchuk, the results of analysis conducted by the service show that 3.5 percent of housing has now been privatized in Kazan; by the end of the year it will reach approximately 20 percent. In Russia during the first year also 10-12 percent of housing had been transferred to private ownership; now it is between 30 and 50 percent, depending on the region.

So far, housing privatization is proceeding here in the same way as in Russia, and only a few of us have had the chance to appreciate fully the right to own housing. However, a market in apartments is already emerging in the city, where enormous prices per square meter will lift the mood of owners of Kazan real estate.

Kabardino-Balkaria Soviet Chairman on Work Since Election

944F0411A Nalchik KABARDINO-BALKARSKAYA
PRAVDA in Russian 5 Feb 94 p 3

[Interview with Z. Nakhushhev, by I. Mezova, under rubric "Politics": "Zaurbi Nakhushhev: It's No Easy Life for the Speaker...: Interview With the Chairman of the Council of the Republic, of the KBR [Kabardino-Balkaria Republic] Parliament"]

[Text] [Mezova] Well, Zaurbi Akhmedovich, like the Council of the Republic, which you head, Parliament has been working for one and a half months. That's a short period of time, but certainly something has already been done. Precisely what?

[Nakhushhev] We were elected as deputies on 12 December, but have been working less than a month. That is linked basically with installing Parliament. Naturally, not much has been done so far. We are basically working for ourselves: we adopted Provisional Regulations, confirmed the makeup of commissions, and elected their chairmen. There is also another important document in our assets: KBR Law entitled "The Making of Amendments and Additions to the KBR Constitution (Basic Law)." The plan for the legislative activity of the Council of the Republic for the next two months is almost ready, so the house is approaching the finishing line for creating legislation.

Within the near future a commission to develop the draft of the KBR Constitution will be created. It would be a rather good idea to publish the draft in October in the mass media, and then, in November-December, to submit it for review by parliament. We are also engaged in preparing the republic's symbols—the seal, anthem, and flag. We already have final versions of the seal and flag for submittal to the President.

[Mezova] As an invited individual, you were present at the first session of the Council of the Federation. What were your impressions?

[Nakhushhev] Yes, for two days I was at sessions of the Council of the Federation. To tell the truth, it did not seem to me that discussions about the fact that the Council of the Federation is Boris Yeltsin's agency have sufficient foundation. The people who gathered in the house were the administrators of major enterprises in the defense industry, administration heads of krays and oblasts, Presidents, and well-known academicians—in general, people who can make their own judgments with regard to all questions pertaining to the vital activity of the Russian state, people who are strong personalities, professionally speaking. The fact that Shumeyko headed the Council of the Federation has a positive role. The house immediately went to work. Also, he has an excellent knowledge of the government's kitchen, so to speak, from the inside. It will be easier to cooperate with him.

[Mezova] Everyone says that the reforms will be rolled up. Is that correct?

[Nakhushev] He (Vladimir Shumeyko) has stated frankly that we need supporters of the reforms that are being carried out by the government. In general, one thing is clear: the interaction between the Council of the Federation and the government will be good and stable.

[Mezova] Since we have touched upon this topic, you apparently know that both the RF [Russian Federation] Parliament and the KBR are predicting the fate of the pocket parliament. What do you think such suppositions are based on? What is your attitude toward them?

[Nakhushev] I have already said that the Council of the Federation produced a favorable impression on me. It seems to me that it will scarcely be a pocket parliament. Its makeup includes deputies who are rather independent and strong.

Nevertheless I agree that they definitely are predicting. These discussions are occurring and probably contain a share of truth. But still the present Parliament is really not the Supreme Soviet, which used to engage in all state matters, and sometimes also usurped the functions of the executive power. It seems to me that these discussions are based on the fact that there has been a fundamental change in the functions and powers of the representative authority. Parliament will engage in the creation of legislation. It has retained the function of monitoring the execution of the laws and the executive power. In particular, it possesses powers concerning the expression of confidence or lack of confidence in Parliament. The budget is also in the joint jurisdiction of the houses.

[Mezova] Are you saddened that Parliament's powers have been narrowed?

[Nakhushev] In the broad sense Parliament actually does not possess the previous completeness of power. But that is what the division of powers is. Currently it is simply that people have not yet become accustomed to this, but in two or three years, I am convinced, this situation will not surprise anyone.

Yes, we actually have been limited to a definite framework. Nevertheless, the Council of the Republic, like Parliament as a whole, will not be a pocket organization. I do not think that anyone, including the President, has an interest in this. We do not intend to cause any frictions in the interrelations with the other authorities. Each has its own functions and its own duties.

[Mezova] You probably are already rather well acquainted with the deputies in your house. Are you pleased with the makeup of the house? What would you change if that depended on you? What kind of specialists (or individuals) would you prefer to have more of in the Council of the Republic?

[Nakhushev] I cannot say that this acquaintance is as profound or complete as I would like, but I am satisfied with the deputy corps. People of different ages, with

different knowledge and work experience, are represented in it. There are lawyers, entrepreneurs, three former school directors... I view their working ability optimistically. I hope that in a year our deputies who are working on a professional basis will actually become professionals. If, of course, we work...

[Mezova] Do you mean that Parliament might be broken up or disbanded?..

[Nakhushev] No, no. If we work on ourselves.

[Mezova] In the house there actually are people who evoke curiosity. But am I correct in saying that it does not contain, for example, any clearly expressed radicals?

[Nakhushev] Apparently not. But I am completely happy with this makeup, although we do not have any people who are as well known in the republic as the Council of Representatives has. However, we do have people who are very interesting, and who evoke, as you have said, genuine curiosity.

[Mezova] In general, how do you imagine the ideal parliamentarian? Do you see him in any concrete way—in the present makeup of the Parliament or the former VS [Supreme Soviet], the present or former Parliament of the RF, or even the USSR?

[Nakhushev] I am not confident that I am speaking about the finished image of the ideal parliamentarian, but, in my view, he is a restrained individual, who is very tactful and highly cultivated. It is not mandatory that he have several higher degrees. But he must also be consistent, competent, and be able to speak laconically and expressively. He must be a democrat in the true sense of the word, and an aristocrat at heart. Incidentally, in our house I see several persons who promise to become this kind of parliamentarian in the future.

[Mezova] Could you name them?

[Nakhushev] I shall not anticipate events. Nor shall I name real ones who have already distinguished themselves. Although, to tell the truth, I was not enraptured either by Sobchak or Popov, or even Sakharov, even at those times when everyone was delighted by them. At first I was irritated even by Yevdokiya Gayer. Do you remember that small woman? Then I learned to respect her, because it was obvious that she was speaking in a meaningful way and was genuinely experiencing what she was talking about and what she felt for her people.

[Mezova] There have been a lot of discussions about the powers assigned to the houses. For example, certain deputies of the Council of Representatives assume that it would make sense to return to a division of them. What do you think? Which powers that are, in your opinion, the prerogative of the Council of the Republic have gone to the other house, or vice versa?

[Nakhushev] When each deputy was elected, he knew about his powers according to the Statute that had been confirmed by the President of the republic. Each one

know where he would be going and what he would engage in. Today people cannot engage in pulling the blankets over themselves. God willing, each one will be able to cope with his powers. I feel that our house has not been insulted by anyone. We have even shared a lot of them with the Council of Representatives with regard to confidence or lack of confidence in the Government. We also discuss the budget jointly. We have the responsibility for its initial review. There have been recommendations concerning the creation of joint commissions. They are, of course, necessary, but not too many of them. Why, then, was it necessary to divide parliament into two houses? Especially since that house is operating on an unrelieved basis, and it will not be convenient to convoke them each time. Everyone, so to speak, has his job to do, so let each person pull his own wagon honestly.

[Mezova] People say that the parliament is being specially evicted from Government House allegedly to emphasize that the representative power is currently out of favor and is no match for the executive power. How would you comment on that?

[Nakhushhev] First, no one is evicting us. Second, I do not know that it is mandatory anywhere for the powers to be situated together. I do not think that it is worse for Parliament to have its own accommodations...

[Mezova] Rather nice...

[Nakhushhev] If not fashionable. The building that housed the former Nalchik Go-kom of the CPSU, and that is being offered to us, is the second building in prestige after Government House. True, it will be slightly crowded for Parliament, and therefore a plan for expanding the building has been prepared.

As for whether or not the representative power is a match for the executive, I have already said earlier that everyone should engage in his own job, and the better he performs it, the more everyone wins.

[Mezova] The British Parliament, which is the ancestor of many parliamentary traditions, also gave birth to the job of speaker, which is already more than 600 years old. At first the speaker acted there in the role of the mouthpiece of the House of Commons. His basic purpose was to regulate order in conducting debates and in guaranteeing justice. In our conditions the speaker is assigned several other powers. What do you think they should consist of?

[Nakhushhev] I shall answer your question this way: the role of the speaker today is identical to the role of Parliament, and we have already touched upon that topic. Another important factor is the specifics that pertain to our republic. In general, at the present time, having worked a certain period of time, I can say that it's no easy life for the speaker, just as, incidentally, it's no easy life for the deputy.

[Mezova] Do you think that the two houses of the KBR Parliament will maintain stable, even, professional inter-relations?

[Nakhushhev] I feel that we have nothing to divide. Our tasks have been defined, and now it's simply a matter of executing them. Each house has been given its powers. The two chairmen are equal and independent of each other. I repeat that there will not be any frictions. We shall not allow them.

[Mezova] What kind of house would you like to see in a year or two? A professional one?

[Nakhushhev] A professional one that is self-assured. This also pertains to the chairman. I think that we shall grow together.

[Mezova] Just yesterday, speaking figuratively, you were not the last person in the system of the executive power. But today that power allows itself to look at you condescendingly. Doesn't this offend you? Can you say that you have won by changing your place of work?

[Nakhushhev] It surprises and... yes, it offends me. But, you know, I am not the kind of person who allows others to look at him condescendingly. I will growl, but if that becomes part of the system, I will simply leave...

To tell the truth, I do not know whether or not I won as a result of the new job. Time will tell...

Kabardino-Balkaria Procurator Reviews Year's Work
944F0410A Nalchik KABARDINO-BALKARSKAYA
PRAVDA in Russian 5 Feb 94 p 4

[Interview with Ruslan Ismelovich Abazov, procurator of Kabardino-Balkar Republic, by Z. Goplachev; date and place not given: "The Vigilance of the Procurator's Eye"]

[Text] January and February are the time for summing up the results of the previous year, including results in law enforcement agencies. The results of 1993 were summed up by the republic procuracy.

There was a thorough discussion of the procurators' performance in overseeing the enforcement of laws and securing the primacy of laws, the socioeconomic liberties of citizens, and the rights of the republic. Attention was focused on shortcomings in the work, unsolved problems, and the means of solving them.

Procurator R.I. Abazov of the Kabardino-Balkar Republic was interviewed a few days ago.

[Goplachev] Ruslan Ismelovich, attempts to evaluate the performance of law enforcement agencies in quantitative terms usually produce comparatively objective results. What can you tell us about some of the results of the past year, using these evaluations as a basis?

[Abazov] I want to start with the following comment. Everyone still remembers the tragic events of last year.

These events, which were caused by the confrontation between two branches of the federal government, certainly could have moved to the regional level. In our republic this was averted by the efforts of our leaders and the wisdom of the people living here. Now I will answer your question in more specific terms.

Procurators discovered 860 violations, challenged 289 unlawful legal instruments, and filed 251 reports for the elimination of these violations. They instituted 535 suits for 380 million rubles on behalf of state and public organizations and institutions.

[Goplachev] There is valid public concern about the rising crime rate in the economic sphere. I have a question about three aspects of this: the protection of state property and the violations committed during privatization and in foreign economic activity.

[Abazov] Equipment, vehicles, and other assets worth tens of millions of rubles fell into the hands of private firms and small enterprises as a result of the negligence of some administrators in maintaining state property and the late discovery of these incidents by municipal and rayon procurators. Cases of this were discovered at the Kabbalkproyektstroy Association, the Baksan Consumer Goods Combine, the Terskiy Meat and Dairy Product Combine, and other enterprises. Measures are being taken now to recover the illegally acquired state property. Procurators conducted 27 inspections of compliance with state and private property laws, discovered 118 violations, and filed 15 reports.

The inspection of compliance in the sphere of privatization was extremely productive. Although the republic managed to avoid "wholesale" privatization, around 30 violations were found and 18 reports were filed.

Decisions on the sale of state property or other forms of traffic in this property were frequently made without going through the proper channels. Municipal and rayon procurators did not have the necessary information about the state of legality in this sphere and could not influence the activities of the rayon committee for the management of state property in sufficiently effective ways.

A comprehensive inspection in an area as new to us as foreign economic activity produced positive results. We were able to draft specific proposals to improve the mechanism of foreign economic operations. Many enterprises and organizations engaged in this activity are not pursuing the goals that were set when they were founded: the attraction of advanced technology to the republic economy and the provision of the consumer market with adequate supplies of goods. The overwhelming majority of joint ventures and private firms are conducting trade and foreign economic operations not on a permanent and concrete basis, but in sporadic barter transactions, frequently ignoring the applicable limits imposed on export and interregional deliveries by authorized agencies, including the procuracy.

[Goplachev] How would you rate the state of republic agriculture?

[Abazov] The state of affairs in the republic agroindustrial complex is seriously disturbing. The theft and loss of products and the harvest are still widespread. Just last year around 9 000 head of cattle in the republic died or were stolen. Farms in Zolskiy, Sovetskiy, Chegemskiy, Urvanskiy, and Prokhladnenskiy rayons suffered the most damage. The measures procurators took were far from adequate: Only 37 suits for 1.5 million rubles in compensation were instituted for the dead cattle.

[Goplachev] How effective has procuracy intervention been in preventing violations of social laws?

[Abazov] Inspections revealed flagrant violations in the distribution of housing and telephones in Nalchik. The municipal procuracy knew about these cases but confined its response to filed reports. It was not until the republic procuracy intervened that suits were instituted to invalidate orders and evict citizens from illegally occupied apartments. The republic procuracy lodged the necessary protests with the Nalchik municipal administration, and dozens of citizens lost their illegally installed telephones.

[Goplachev] How are things with regard to felonies?

[Abazov] Regrettably, I have nothing good to report to the readers of KABARDINO-BALKARSKAYA PRAVDA. Although the overall crime rate was relatively stable (0.6 percent below the 1992 figure), there has been an increase in felonies in the republic, including homicide (+57.4 percent), the intentional infliction of serious bodily injury (+18.6 percent), rape and attempted rape (+60.5 percent), mugging (+55.6 percent), and vandalism (+52.2 percent). The number of these crimes has risen in all cities and rayons in the republic. They now account for 17.9 percent of all crimes.

In all, 7,681 crimes were reported in the republic. An increase in crime was recorded in Prokhladnenskiy, Terskiy, Urvanskiy, Mayskiy, Chegemskiy, and Sovetskiy rayons.

Last year was marked by an unprecedented rise in the homicide rate (from 61 to 96 cases). Furthermore, one out of every three has not been solved.

The number of homicides increased most dramatically in Nalchik—from 19 to 42 (+121 percent); 17 of these, or 40.4 percent, have not been solved. There were more homicides in Terskiy, Urvanskiy, Mayskiy, Chegemskiy, Zolskiy, and Sovetskiy rayons.

The rise (73.1 percent) in the number of crimes committed with the use of loaded firearms (one out of every three homicides) is particularly disturbing. The weapons generally come from outside Kabardino-Balkaria, which still has "transparent" borders, despite the presence of checkpoints on access roads from adjacent territories.

[Goplachev] How vigilant is the procurator's eye in discovering wrongful dismissals of criminal cases?

[Abazov] Last year procurators discovered 135 crimes which were removed from police records by the issuance of unlawful decisions to drop criminal charges. Procurators filed 173 reports on the violations, leading to disciplinary actions against 109 officials. The oversight of criminal cases by the procuracy, however, was also inadequate. This is attested to by the increasing number of dismissed cases. Procuracy personnel dismissed 30.4 percent of all cases. This is an impermissible luxury.

[Goplachev] Children are also involved in crime....

[Abazov] The overall rate of juvenile crime has decreased by 5 percent. There was an increase in Nalchik and in Prokhladnenskiy, Zolskiy, Sovetskiy, and Chegemskiy rayons. There are still too many cases in which juveniles are framed for crimes. A case in Nalchik is a good example: When the 9-year-old Karatsukov was "railroaded" for 10 thefts of personal property, including such items as a television set, a rug measuring 3 x 4 meters, and a crate of champagne, no one even wondered how this "miscreant" could have carried these items.

[Goplachev] The procuracy presses charges, and the criminal is convicted. Then what happens?

[Abazov] The punishment is usually left up to the courts, but the penalty is not always administered in a timely or satisfactory manner, and laws are sometimes broken during this phase. The group overseeing corrective labor institutions and the procurators conducted 87 inspections and filed 33 reports on the results. There are still numerous violations of prisoners' rights in camps No 1 and No 3, leading to the commission of crimes, and the absence of work precludes corrective labor.

There was an excessively formal approach to the oversight of the activities of the corrective labor institutions department of the republic Ministry of Internal Affairs, where standards were relaxed and other violations were committed. These led to the mass disturbances in March. Then the case of the suspect who had been held illegally for eight months came to light in December. The procuracy lodged a protest and the guilty parties were punished.

[Goplachev] Did the economic reform affect your work?

[Abazov] The intensification of economic reform and the democratic changes in the society transferred the protection of the interests of economic entities and the majority of civil rights to the jurisdiction of arbitration boards and people's courts, increasing their workload and, consequently, the possibility of judicial error.

This called for intense work by the Division of Civil Suit Oversight and by local procurators. The effectiveness of the appeals process to protest unlawful rulings was improved slightly.

[Goplachev] Is the procuracy involved in the exoneration of victims of political repression?

[Abazov] In accordance with the requirements of the Law "On the Exoneration of Victims of Political Repression," the republic procuracy has worked with security and internal affairs agencies to restore the reputation of innocent victims. The files of 422 people were reviewed. Decisions on exoneration were made in 289 cases. The majority of exoneration orders have not been delivered yet, however, and have not been requested, despite the coverage of the review of these cases on radio and television and in the press.

[Goplachev] What can you tell us about your personnel problems?

[Abazov] Six of the ten municipal and rayon procurators are serving their second constitutional term. Last year three staff members of procuracy agencies were elected to the republic Constitutional Court and two were elected to the Kabardino-Balkar Parliament. We are proud of this. Ten staffers were promoted to higher offices after their performance evaluations.

I would like to discuss two extremely important personnel problems we cannot solve without considerable assistance from the republic leadership and the Procuracy General. One is the urgent need for a new building or new premises for the republic procuracy, because our staff is several times the size it was when our present building was designed. Besides this, our staff was increased by another 23 positions in the new year. The distinctive features of our work, particularly our investigative work, require each inspector to have an office of his own, but our present offices have to be shared by two or three people. Meanwhile, the Nalchik municipal procuracy does not even have a building of its own and half of its staff has to do its work in a residential building. We also have no facility for meetings of the whole staff.

Problems in securing housing for procuracy personnel have not been solved either, especially in the city of Nalchik. The Law "On the Procuracy in the Russian Federation" says that the local administration must supply procuracy personnel requiring better living conditions with the appropriate living area as soon as possible, or within six months in the case of newly appointed personnel. We have not received a single apartment in the city of Nalchik in recent years, although one out of every three members of our staff needs one.

[Goplachev] What would you like to say in conclusion?

[Abazov] I want to express satisfaction with the adoption of the constitutions of the Russian Federation and Kabardino-Balkar Republic at the end of last year and the beginning of this year. These exceptionally important documents will serve as a sound legal foundation for the stabilization of economic and political conditions and reinforce the legal system and the administration of justice. The individual has been granted broader rights and freedoms.

The Constitution reaffirmed the organizational principle of the procuracy as a single centralized system. Edicts of the Russian Federation president assigned the procuracy the functions of coordinating the activities of law enforcement agencies in the fight against crime and granted our personnel various types of social protection.

We will evaluate our own performance from the standpoint of the requirements engendered by these changes.

Kabardino-Balkaria MVD Views 1993 Achievements

944F0413A Nalchik KABARDINO-BALKARSKAYA
PRAVDA in Russian 10 Feb 94 p 3

[Article by the press service of KBR [Kabardino-Balkaria Republic] MVD: "MVD: Year's Results"]

[Text] The results of the work performed by the internal affairs agencies in 1993 attest to the fact that the crime situation in republic as a whole is being monitored.

During the past year 7681 crimes were recorded in the republic. This is 0.6 percent less than during the preceding year.

There was a drop in the number of crimes committed on the streets and in other public places (decrease by 8 percent); and in thefts of state property (decrease by 5 percent) and personal property (decrease by 10 percent). A larger number of economic crimes (increase by 68.7 percent) were revealed, including an increase in heinous crimes by a factor of 3.6.

Definite positive shifts were achieved in a very important work indicator—the revealing of crimes. As compared with 1992, that indicator increased by 6 percent, including an increase by 6.4 percent in the rate of revealing of crimes of a general nature.

For purposes of improving the interaction with the internal affairs agencies of the Chechen, Ingush, and North Ossetinian republics, a coordination conference was held with representatives of the internal affairs agencies of those republics, where specific joint measures were worked out for combatting interregional criminal groups, and for exposing and cutting off the channels for the distribution of firearms in the North Caucasus. During 1993, a total of 289 cases involving the illegal carrying, storage, purchase, manufacture, and sale of weapons, ammunition, or explosives were initiated. This is 73.1 percent more than in 1992, and the rate of exposing thefts of means of transportation increased by 5.3 percent.

Efforts were undertaken to intensify the fight against organized crime. In the course of implementing the tasks posed in the Decree of the KBR President, entitled "Measures to Intensify the Fight Against Organized Forms of Crime and Corruption," and the corresponding orders of the RF [Russian Federation] MVD, agencies in the republic revealed and brought to criminal responsibility 34 organized criminal groups, from which 49

firearms were confiscated, including 36 with rifled barrels. A total of 20 thefts on an especially large scale were established, and thefts with a total of approximately 1.5 billion rubles were prevented.

Eighteen persons were brought to criminal responsibility as a result of their corrupt ties, and two representatives of the state authority were removed from their jobs for the same reason.

There was an increase in the intensity of combatting the illegal turnover of narcotics. Eighty-five areas of wild hemp were destroyed; 195 persons were brought to criminal responsibility; and 213.5 kilograms of narcotic substances were confiscated (as compared with 90 kilograms in 1992).

The investigators' work had a higher rate of success.

There was a 3.5 percent decrease in the crime level in the subdivisions of the corrective affairs and social rehabilitation service, and jobs were found for the entire special contingent.

The situation improved somewhat on the republic's roads. There was a reduction (by 13.7 percent) in the committing of road-transportation incidents, and a reduction in the number of persons killed or injured.

At the same time, in a number of areas the republic's internal affairs agencies have not only shortcomings, but also unresolved problems. There has been an increase by 23 percent in the number of heinous crimes of a general criminal nature. They became especially widespread in Sovetskiy, Prokhlanskiy, Mayskiy, Chegemskiy, and Baksanskiy rayons, as well as in Promyshlennyy Rayon in the city of Nalchik. The exposure rate for this type of crimes remains low.

For purposes of reacting appropriately to the negative processes that have been occurring in the republic's economy, there was a quantitative and qualitative reinforcement of the subdivisions involved in fighting economic crimes, and an improvement in their interaction with other law-enforcement and monitoring agencies. In 1993, a total of 543 crimes of an economic nature were revealed. This is 64.5 percent more than the similar indicator in 1992; 251 heinous crimes were revealed—this is an increase by a factor of 3.6 as compared with the previous year. Attempts to commit thefts with the use of falsified letters of advice with a total of 2.34 billion rubles were thwarted. Six criminal groups of counterfeiters, consisting of a total of 26 persons, were detained. Counterfeit money with a total value of 16.2 million rubles was confiscated from them. Approximately 13 tons of stolen alcohol and 1400 bottles of counterfeit vodka were revealed. A considerable number of crimes (62 percent of the total of all crimes revealed) continue to be committed at economic institutions with the state form of ownership. A number of problems linked with this require resolution at the governmental level. In

particular, it is necessary to raise the question of creating under the government or the Ministry of Finance an independent auditing apparatus that would guarantee the execution of the instructions issued by the law-enforcement agencies. This is linked with the elimination of the departmental apparatuses, which creates serious complications when carrying out documentary audits of the economic and financial activity of enterprises where crimes are being committed, and without the existence of an official document from which, as a rule, criminal cases are not initiated. It is also necessary to enact normative documents that regulate the procedure for guaranteeing state monitoring of the proper use of the credit appropriations from the budget that are allocated to enterprises and organizations from the Russian budget, and to develop a statute governing the responsibility borne by officials for their illegal use. As a result of the large increase in the use of counterfeit banknotes and other securities and the removal since 1989 of reproduction equipment from projects in the resolution system, it would be desirable to develop and enact a document governing the procedure for the registration and functioning of print shops, companies involved in the manufacture of presses and stamps, and private individuals and legal entities having copying and reproduction equipment, and to take steps of a technical nature to increase the degree of protection of monetary denominations, especially with a value of from 5000 to 50,000 rubles.

There has been a re-examination of the organizational principles and tactics for conducting the patrol-post service and a search nature has been given to their operation.

Militia precinct inspectors revealed 26,326 administrative offenses. At the same time they eased up on the positions in such an important matter as the fight against drunkenness and alcoholism.

Improvement in the effectiveness of the operation of the GAI [State Motor Vehicles Inspectorate] was aided by the introduction of new informational-search systems. At the present time they make it possible to resolve completely the task of registering means of motor transportation. But it is necessary to raise the level of professional training among the GAI employees.

Despite the preventive steps being taken, in 1993 there was an increase in the number of registered fires (increase by 24.8 percent), the damages from which came to more than 167 million rubles. The main cause is the fact that the State Fire Inspectorate employees are insufficiently demanding and are lax in questions of reinforcing the fire-prevention methods at structures that are various forms of property, and also that there is weak monitoring of their work by the administrators of the fire and emergency rescue service.

There was a sharp decrease in the effectiveness of the work performed by the Administration of Nondepartmental Protection. And this is despite the fact that in 1993 the administration personnel rolls were augmented by 178 militiamen.

It must be admitted that the overwhelming majority of the personnel have been conscientiously executing their official duties, frequently displaying, in their fight against crime, high moral and professional qualities. In 1993 incentive awards were given to almost two-thirds of the personnel; three employees were awarded state decorations; Senior Lieutenant of Militia A. B. Bitsuyev was posthumously nominated for the Order of Personal Bravery. Nevertheless, the number of violations of legality that have been committed by employees remains high, as is attested to by instances of illegal detention, red tape methods, and other violations that were revealed.

In 1993 the number of registered illegal acts that were committed by citizens against militia employees increased by a factor of 6. For 566 of these incidents, the materials were sent to the court so that administrative measures could be applied to the violators; 16 criminal cases were initiated, 13 of which were linked with an attempt on the life of militia workers. During the past year three militia employees died as a result of these circumstances.

An extremely acute problem is the problem of providing the personnel with housing and with apartment telephones. A total of 933 MVD workers are in need of housing; 1520 employees do not have home telephones. A way out of the situation can be seen in the creation and implementation of a comprehensive long-range program that has been approved by the republic government and the RF MVD, for the social development of the republic's internal affairs agencies in the next two or three years.

The results of the operational service activities were analyzed in all the city rayon agencies, services, and subdivisions of the MVD, and specific measures to improve their operation have been planned. There are grounds for assuming that the execution of what has been planned will make it possible to achieve a considerable improvement in the public and political situation in the republic and to intensify the fight against crime. One would like to hope that these goals will be maintained by the political parties, public movements and associations, and the entire population of the republic.

Kabardino-Balkaria Justice Ministry Views Work of Courts

944F0366A Nalchik KABARDINO-BALKARSKAYA
PRAVDA in Russian 1 Feb 94 p 1

[Article by M. Kyasova: "KBR Judicial Body Presents Results"]

[Text] Last Friday the work results of the KBR [Kabardino-Balkaria Republic] People's Courts during the first half of 1993 were given at an extended meeting of the

Ministry of Justice board and the KBR Supreme Court Presidium. The KBR Minister of Justice, A. M. Batyrbekov, who gave a detailed report, noted the particular significance of the activity of the People's Courts under circumstances in which crime issues in the republic are becoming more complex. During the period in question, 7,681 crimes were committed, a significant portion of which were classified as grave offenses. The number of infractions related to narcotic substances increased by 63 percent. Persons convicted of crimes involving the use of firearms and ammunition totaled 132, while convictions for personal property theft grew by 12 percent. Also, 221 juveniles were brought to trial for various illegal acts. These statistics are more than just disconcerting, radical and decisive actions on the part of all law-upholding bodies are needed in order to turn the situation around and stop the rise in crime. How ready are our courts for this? As was explained, there is no simple answer. While giving proper due to the positive results attained in judicial proceedings, the minister of justice noted that the professional training and legal competence of certain judiciaries was cause for doubt. As a consequence there are delays, and dangerous criminals are released without consideration being given to the graveness of the crimes they have committed.

A. M. Batyrbekov directed the attention of those gathered to shortcomings in the work of the marshalls of the court, and noted the necessity of increasing efforts in the area of legal education.

The deputy chairman of the KBR Supreme Court and chairman of the Board for Criminal Proceedings, A. S. Gelyakhov spoke on an analysis of criminal cases based on data from appellate courts and courts with supervisory authority. In his opinion, the Mayskiy People's Court was deserving of the most praise, as it had not even had one judgement reversed; a statement that could not be made about the Nalchik Municipal Court (presided over by V. Vybornov), the rulings of which were cited as "least stable."

In the opinion of A. S. Gelyakhov, cases in which citizens are wrongfully convicted, and equally, those in which the guilty are acquitted, do not further judiciaries' authority, but give rise to justified social protest.

The acting KBR Supreme Court chairman, Georgiy Alekseyevich Mamilov paused to discuss neglect in how civil cases are being reviewed. According to his information, virtually every third ruling on these types of cases was reversed in appellate proceedings. Viewing this kind of regard for one's work unacceptable, Mamilov spoke in favor of conducting a review and immediately releasing judiciaries noted for neglect.

Chairmen of Municipal and Rayon People's Courts S. A. Klyuyeva (city of Prokhladnyy), V. T. Vybornov (city of Nalchik), I. Kh. Topalov (city of Zalukonoazhe), V. M. Khushtov (city of Terek), A. F. Khazhnagoyev (city of

Baksan), and several others talked about problems in need of attention, as well as their own views on how to resolve them.

The acting chief of the KBR MVD Investigation Directorate, Mukhamed Mussov answered a number of questions that arose during the exchange of opinions that took place, and pointed out the importance of close cooperation between judicial bodies, the militia, and the prosecutor's office.

We are all responsible for one thing, stressed KBR Minister of Internal Affairs Kh. A. Shogenov. He called on judiciaries to approach those who break the law and infringe upon the lives, honor and dignity of other men with the utmost strictness. In spite of differences of opinion on how to conduct the fight against crime, KBR Prosecutor R. I. Abazov said, the strategic focus of both judicial and law-upholding bodies is one and the same: to protect the population from criminal acts against them. It is in acknowledging this truth that we must proceed.

KBR Vice-President G. S. Gubin, having made a number of serious critical remarks directed at the the republic's courts, suggested the Minister of Justice demonstrate more consistency in selecting personnel and utilize the services of the qualifications commission more fully.

In spite of the impartial tone of the discourse, the finale was marked with a pleasant announcement. Gratitude was expressed for the results of the courts' work in 1993 and a monetary bonus was awarded in the sum of 100 thousand rubles by order of the republic minister of justice to the following judiciaries: A. A. Makoyev, L. A. Shapkinaya, V. S. Khashkutovaya, M. I. Olmezov, I. K. Borokov, L. A. Lesnykh, Kh. V. Kudryavtsevaya, V. B. Dogov, L. M. Martynovaya, G. I. Gorislavskaya, I. Kh. Topolov, B. Kh. Malbakhov.

KBR Prime Minister G. M. Cherkesov participated in the work of the meeting.

Kabardino-Balkaria Internal Affairs Ministry Holds Press Conference

944F0366B Nalchik KABARDINO-BALKARSKAYA
PRAVDA in Russian 3 Feb 94 p 2

[Article by Z. Malbakhova: "Situation Under Control: From an MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] Press Conference"]

[Text] A press conference took place in the assembly hall of the KBR [Kabardino-Balkaria Republic] Ministry of Internal Affairs. The republic's Minister of Internal Affairs, Kh. A. Shogenov, and his deputies: Chief of Criminal Militia M. Kh. Zhigunov; Investigation Directorate Chief M. Kh. Abrokov, Chief of Personnel Management V. S. Popov, and MVD agency leaders answered questions posed by journalists from newspapers, television and radio.

In a brief address, Kh. A. Shogenov presented the primary results of the previous year's progress. Most importantly, he said, in the overall fight against crime they managed to keep the situation under control, although there was no dramatic change for the better.

In 1993, 7,681 crimes were recorded. Analysis has shown, said the minister, that offenses under ordinary law decreased by four percent, street crime and apartment theft indices went down, auto break-ins decreased by 11 percent, and auto theft by 37.6 percent.

Kh. A. Shogenov noted that grave offenses, which grew in number during 1993 by 41.9 percent, were a cause for particular concern for the MVD. We are not satisfied with the work we have done, noted the minister. During the coming year we have a real opportunity for improvement.

Having noted that the number of homeless people on the streets has increased, and weapons have spread throughout the republic, a ZAMAN newspaper correspondent questioned the minister about how the MVD plans to combat these phenomena.

With a growth in the number of people out of work, the number of crimes will also increase, answered Kh. A. Shogenov. A big problem and a major task is to assist those previously convicted returning from detention camps to find employment. It is namely these people, unable to find a place for themselves in our society, who retrace their steps back to the world of crime.

The minister also stated that an average of 20 firearms are confiscated each day. Where they once originated in Abkhazia, firearms are now primarily coming from Ossetia, Ingushetia, and the Chechen Republic.

A second question asked by the newspaper ZAMAN touched upon the MVD's work on repatriating the Balkarian people.

The ministry's work on this issue was acknowledged by its leader as being most productive. In no republic is activity of its kind proceeding at such a rapid pace as in Kabardino-Balkaria.

In response to a question posed by a KABARDINO-BALKARSKAYA PRAVDA newspaper journalist about how much organized crime rings have decreased this year over last, the minister said that there are no exact figures as to their overall number because the rings themselves have an unstable character. One of the reasons the fight against organized crime has not yet taken on an offensive posture is that the main MVD department handling this type of work is understaffed.

There are three stages of combating organized crime. The first is to gain knowledge and control of such groups, and break them up. The second is to arrest and try, and the third is to execute. In 1993 several members of organized crime rings were executed. Several others were put out of commission, convicted, or are under investigation.

"Where is the counterfeit money in the republic originating?" In a response to this question posed by SEVERNYY KAVKAZ, it was said that the "goods" were primarily being brought in from the Chechen and Ingush Republics. Quite recently 75 million counterfeit rubles were discovered in the city of Prokhladnyy. Three women were among those dealing in the latter.

The range of problems touched upon at the press conference was quite broad. The newspaper SINDIKA INFORM reproached the forms and methods of work applied by the MVD when ethical norms for behavior are ignored. The republic minister of internal affairs replied that the militia is a part of society, which reflects the trends and processes occurring in society as a whole. However, he said, at present it has become possible to cease recruiting employees, and implement a selection process that will invariably help to put the best people in the job.

A SOVIETSKAYA MOLODEZH correspondent asked about an incident during the MVD's pursuit of the criminal Malkanduyev in the Volnyy Aul region, when one of the people involved in the chase, A. Iritov, was injured from an explosion. The minister explained that the incident was the result of an accident, and that the ringleader was not successfully apprehended. However, another well known criminal, Bashiyev, nicknamed "Spartak" was arrested and is being examined.

"How is the MVD combatting racketeering?" This question was given by a republic radio journalist.

If enterprise leaders, from whom criminals extort huge sums of money, turn to us for help, as did the chemical plant "Iskhoz," they will in the future be protected from these types of offenses. However, we have no pity for those leaders who allow themselves to be led around by racketeers. We know the reasons why these people do not turn to the militia for help.

"The figures for auto theft are quite high in our republic. What is being done in this regard?" asked a radio broadcast journalist.

Success in this area of our work, as perhaps in no other, said Chief of Criminal Militia M. Kh. Zhigunov, depends on coordination and close cooperation between agencies. At the present time a new subdivision is being created which will serve to coordinate this type of MVD activity.

"Could the Ministry of Internal Affairs give its own answer as to why it is virtually impossible to obtain credits at the bank? After all, large sums are being appropriated to fill this need." A KABARDINO-BALKARSKAYA PRAVDA correspondent touched upon this problem.

In giving an explanation, the chief of the MVD Directorate for Economic Crimes, Yu. Kokov, said that virtually all credit resources at commercial banks are, in one form or another, state funds. The latter is comprised

of centralized credits from the bank of Russia, deposit funds from enterprises and organizations, and the free balance in accounts, with the exception of the small portion which comes from the population.

However, bank employees do not carefully review letters of guarantee or insurance coverage. They do not verify the reliability or credit worthiness of clients, their guarantors, or even the existence of firms themselves.

There have been incidents in which nonexistent structures, land parcels, cars and other property have been used as a security and considerable credit funds have been granted.

As a result on January 1 this year past due debt on bank loans came to more than 11 billion rubles.

Khakimov, a Chechen Republic resident, for example, temporarily registered in community housing in the city of Nalchik. He registered the "Martan" firm at this address, having opened an account at the "Evrazia [Eurasia]" commercial bank. However, having received credits in the sum of 20 million rubles, he absconded with the money.

Unfortunately, there are many examples of these types of incidents that one could give; incidents that have occurred at virtually all of the republic's commercial banks.

Having squandered funds, yet convinced that they were deceived, bank leaders are turning to us for help. For the commercial bank "Nalchik" alone we secured the return of 224 million rubles that had been given up as unrecoverable debt. A considerable sum, however, still remains irretrievable.

For these reasons criminal proceedings have been instituted and a search initiated for debtors throughout all of Russia and the CIS countries.

Difficulties with obtaining credit and searches for such "clients" are problems created by bank leaders and employees. However, it does not have to be this way, in which case we more than likely would not have to ask why all these bankers took such risks.

Tambov Admin Chief Struggles With Oblast Soviet

944F0379A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian
26 Feb 94 p 2

[Article by Vladimir Toporkov, SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA correspondent in Tambov: "The Governor Has Become Enraged; War With Oblast Soviet Continues in Tambov"]

[Text] It was difficult to find the open room on the third floor of the old private residential house in the center of Tambov, over which the Russian tri-colored flag still shudders dimly and shamefully. All the others were locked tight and sealed with several seals. But in this one room was the entire apparatus of the oblast soviet, all of the

representative people's power. I could not help but think: Here it is, the last redoubt of the Tambov deputies.

It was no accident that this military terminology came to mind. What has been going on in Tambov during recent months is reminiscent of fierce battles. Here the head of oblast administration, V. Babenko, has declared a real war against the soviets. But if it were only a war of words...

Vladimir Dmitriyevich is conducting the siege of the Tambov "White House" on a broad scale, using the subdivisions of the militia, the mass media, and threats to cut off the deputies' telephone service. In general, the entire experience of Krasnopresnenskaya embankment has been taken into the arsenal, except that there are no devoted Taman followers in Tambov and they are not shooting at the building from tanks. Also, the plumbing works.

What sins have the Tambov deputies committed before Mr. Governor? Here we must take a short excursion into the past.

V. Babenko assumed the chair of the head of administration after the events of August 1991 which were victorious for the "democrats." The chief physician of the oblast hospital, a urologist by education, he at first conducted himself loyally in regard to the oblast soviet. Vladimir Dmitriyevich liked to emphasize the fact that there was complete peace and mutual understanding in the relations of the local executive and representative power, and that together they have only one noble goal—to show concern for the people's welfare.

It is true, however, the welfare of the people was ever dwindling, and it was necessary to find a "scapegoat." And so they found one, particularly since the events of September-October thundered in Moscow. Here the power of Vladimir Dmitriyevich unfolded to its full extent, as well as that of the president's representative, V. Davituliani. The latter directly announced in the pages of the press that "it is specifically A. Ryabov (the chairman of the oblast soviet—V. T.) who bears the main responsibility for the failures in the economy, since he... subordinated the oblast administration to himself." V. Babenko found another accusation. He exposed the oblast soviet in its anti-governmental, anti-presidential and confrontational position.

Mr. Babenko did not specifically decipher the manner in which this "terrible position" was expressed, believing that it was enough simply to issue the verdict: As of 22 October, to cease the activity of the Tambov Oblast Soviet of People's Deputies and its agencies. It is true, the decree also spoke of one other reason for the impossibility of the oblast soviet's implementation of its functions—"due to the absence of a quorum as a result of the mass resignation of its deputies from their powers and authorities." We will return to this accusation, but for now we must remind the honorable Vladimir Dmitriyevich that no later than 11 October the session of

the oblast soviet adopted by a two-thirds vote the decision not to include the question of self-dissolution on the agenda. Only six deputies supported this proposal.

That is when the pressure on the deputies started. Their official statements began to come in, which were brought by special messengers from the rayons. But without waiting for the decision of the mandate commission on the correctness of these statements, the governor publicized his decree at the meeting of the minor soviet. Naturally, the minor soviet found it to be unlawful, and on the basis of the Russian Federation law, "On the Kray Oblast Soviet of People's Deputies and the Kray Oblast Administration" (no one has repealed this law even to this day), the minor soviet appealed to the Russian Federation Procurator General and the oblast procurator with the request to answer: Are such actions by the head of administration legal?

The Procurator General of Russia, A. Kazannik, kept quiet in this affair. However, the oblast deputy procurator, V. Amelin, directly announced that since the minor soviet repealed the decree issued by the head of the oblast procurator's office, he finds no grounds for intervention. Although it is written somewhat ingeniously, it is not difficult to deduce the fact that the procurator's office holds the actions of the minor soviet to be correct.

It would seem that this should be the end of the Tambov battles. But no, this merely egged the governor on to new skirmishes. Speaking at a press conference, he openly announced that, of all the political problems today, the question of liquidating the soviets of all levels stands in first place. And that was the beginning of it all. The financing of the oblast soviet was cut off, the automobiles were "arrested", and then the phones were disconnected. As of 1 November, the oblast soviet apparatus has been placed on leave for a month and a half. And although such a term is not indicated in any KZOT [Code of Laws on Labor], nevertheless this did not trouble the head of administration. He generously paid, out of the taxpayer's pockets, the month-and-a-half idle time of the people, many of whom, we might add, had already taken their regular vacations even before.

This saga was further continued on 16 December. As described in the local press, it was specifically on this day that they were met at the oblast soviet building with sealed doors of offices and a reinforced militia guard. It is true, some people, as they say, were able to slip into the building. Deputy Head of Administration I. Filatyev assured them that all would be placed in jobs within the course of the present day.

Mr. Filatyev was evidently hasty in this announcement. Even today, not all the workers have been placed in jobs. But that is not all. Who gave permission to violate the labor legislation in the most blatant manner, to nullify the presidential edict of 26 November 1993, which clearly states that a change in the staff numbers and structure of the apparatus of the Soviet of People's

Deputies is not permitted in the period prior to start of work of the new representative organ?

I believe that Mr. Babenko's attitude at that time was definitely influenced by the results of the elections to the Federal Assembly. They turned out to be rather pathetic for the Tambov "democrats." Having understood where the gentlemen from Babenko's command were leading the oblast, the voters gave them, in the words of Sholokhov, "a complete thrashing." People who were not subject to political twists and turns were elected to the Federal Assembly. Among them was A. Ryabov, the chairman of the oblast soviet.

Here it is time to say a few words about the chairman of the soviet. Aleksandr Ivanovich worked his whole life in the Tambov area. He is a candidate of science and enjoys great authority among the people. And he entered the elections with a precise and clear program of preserving people's power, implementing social justice and protecting the interests of the people. We might add that he registered not as the former, but as the currently acting chairman, and the people appraised the true worth of Ryabov's civic courage. He won by a large margin, beating out that very same Babenko and the people from his command.

This blow to his self-esteem rocked V. Babenko. He hastily announced in the press that conclusions would be drawn also in regard to the activity of the oblast agricultural administration, the newspaper TAMBOVSKAYA ZHIZN and the experienced economic managers. Many of them did not reject their nomenclature predilections and, in essence, had dealt a stab to the back, announced the governor.

The situation in the oblast is leading to poverty. Here are but a few figures. Today there are already more than 13,000 officially registered unemployed persons in the oblast. This is two or three times more than in neighboring oblasts. The volume of industrial production has declined by 10.3 percent in a year, and fewer consumer goods were produced. And here is the situation in the rural areas. Meat production has declined by 21 percent during the year, milk—by almost 7 percent, and wool—by 22 percent. The herd size of all types of livestock is declining. Investments in the national economy have declined by 32 percent, and the operational introduction of automobile roads has declined by 46 percent.

The representative of the president, Mr. V. Davituliani, best summed up the truth, I believe. In a lengthy announcement regarding the situation, addressed to President B. Yeltsin, he writes that the old and new bureaucrats are hindering the reforms which threaten to take power out of their hands. "It was you, Boris Nikolayevich, who imposed this power! Did the people dream of such power when they supported you in 1991?"

As they say, you can't put it any better than that!

So, the problem is not in the deputies. Nevertheless, the Tambov governor continues to "storm" his "white

house." Having learned that a meeting of the minor soviet was slated for 15 February, V. Babenko urgently "took measures." At 3 o'clock in the morning, under the cover of the militia, the doors to the oblast soviet were once again sealed. And this after the oblast court of arbitration found the decree by the head of administration on terminating the financing of the oblast soviet, on the upcoming lay-off of workers of the apparatus, and on the attitude toward the newspaper TAMBOVSKAYA ZHIZN to be invalid, and after the court decision was handed down to return the building to the deputies.

Nevertheless, the minor soviet did hold its meeting. It adopted a decision on measures for ensuring the safe-keeping of the soviet's property, reviewed information on the arbitration court ruling, and repealed the 2 February decree issued by the head of administration, "On the System of Organs of State Power in Tambov Oblast." Almost immediately there followed a statement by the administration press service, saying that this decision is nothing other than a statement by a group of private individuals, and will not be implemented by the organs of executive power. These actions are qualified as being directed toward the destabilization of the socio-political situation in the oblast. No more and no less! Evidently, under pressure from some forces, the arbitration court also suspended the implementation of its ruling, forgetting even to specify the term of this suspension.

In short, the storming of the building on Internatsionalnaya Street continues. Babenko is also not embarrassed about the tyranny in regard to Federation Council member A. Ryabov. During the days when I was in Tambov, the telephone in the room assigned to him did not work. Not to mention the fact that he had been deprived of transportation, harried and exhausted by the terrible strain on his nerves.

Meanwhile, as before, people are going to the oblast soviet, as before with questions of the most vital importance. They also do not conceal their attitude toward the tyranny of the administration. This, roughly, is how N. Perepegin, an engineer and deputy of the oblast soviet, Deputy V. Drozdovich, a former scientific associate of one of the institutes, and others with whom I had occasion to meet characterized Babenko's actions.

Yet the people are worried not only about the tyranny of the executive power against the soviets. The elections to the oblast дума are coming up soon in Tambov. Only thanks to the intervention of the minor soviet was it possible to double the size of this agency and to eliminate numerous violations of the effective legislation. But the gentlemen-democrats are once again bent on their own. Once again they are pushing their Tambov fellow citizens toward confrontation. For example, the mayor of the city of Tambov and leader of the "Democratic

Russia" movement, V. Koval, had submitted the TAMBOVSKAYA ZHIZN program even at the last elections. It is quite obvious that some parties cannot be allowed to participate in the elections. In no case must the electoral commissions register representatives of the patriotic movement "Otechestvo" ["Homeland"] or any communist structures, regardless of what flag they may emerge under. Such an announcement has a wild smell about it.

Then again, the leaders of the Tambov "democrats" are not only making political announcements. They are acting unceremoniously. One of the workers of the oblast soviet told me how, in his presence, in Mordovskiy Rayon the head of administration sent a militia detachment to interfere with the meeting of a candidate for deputy in the Federal Assembly, Aleksey Ponomarev, with the voters. It is a good thing that Aleksey Alekseyevich turned out to be not of the timid sort (he managed to stay in the besieged House of Soviets on Krasnaya Presna until the last hour), and forced the zealous militiamen to leave.

There is currently a fuss going on around the people's-patriotic electoral association "Rus," which unites representatives of over ten parties and movements. The association had a lease agreement with the "Avangard" House of Culture for several rooms which it needed to conduct business with voters. After several threatening phone calls, the director hastened to break this agreement.

Pressure is also being exerted on the mass media. Even on 2 November, the head of oblast administration issued a decree on handing over to the administration the powers and authorities of the oblast soviet in regard to the newspaper TAMBOVSKAYA ZHIZN. The decree unceremoniously assigns the resolution of the question of handing over the newspaper's state property, as well as the question of co-foundership by the oblast administration. In this situation, the journalists have not yet flinched, but no one knows how things will be in the future.

...This year there is a snowy, frost-bitten winter in the Tambov region. In the city, which, it seems, has long ago been neglected by the politicians, one cannot even get through along the main roads. But the snowstorms are raging not only in nature. They are also devastating the souls of the people, before whose very eyes the scenes of destruction of the soviets are being played out and the will of the people is being flouted.

No sooner had I written the last lines of this correspondence than I received a phone call from Tambov. A. Chubushev, section head of the oblast soviet called and bitterly informed me that the governor had made the decision to hand the oblast soviet building over to the humanitarian institute. That means there will be new battles. It is a shame that, amidst all the political battles, we are losing sight of the individual, for whom life is not sweet.

Discontent of Volga Germans Examined

944F0432A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 10 Mar 94 p 2

[Article by staff correspondent Irina Chernova: "Achtung! Achtung! The Secret of Esteemed Frau Kopel's Success Lies in the Millions"]

[Text] Volgograd—They pleaded: do not harm us. If Germany refuses us help, we will have nothing else to put our hopes in. Our children have no native tongue. Our adults are the most uneducated nation in the country. There are no churches left for our believers. But who today wants to have anything to do with these trivial problems? If Germany, too, refuses help, we will have no future in Russia.

They pleaded: tell the truth. For it is even worse to live in a lie than it is to live in poverty. And with the consent of the people who trusted me, I am choosing the honest truth.

Throughout the past four years the question of Russian Germans as a repressed and not entirely rehabilitated people was a stumbling block for the two countries' politicians, for the public and for individual citizens. Passions seethed, dozens of conferences were held, and journalists engaged in furious debate. A separate republic. An autonomous national cultural entity. Renaissance. The desert lands of Elton. Practically everything imaginable was proposed to solve these problems. And the Soviet Germans quietly gathered their belongings and left for the West.

Two hundred and fifty years ago their ancestors had fled Germany to Russia. Because things were bad there and good here. Now things are good there and bad here. And people always are pulled to where things are better. In 1989 100,000 Germans left the Soviet homeland. In 1993, about 200,000 left. As a rule, these are skilled workers and the most industrious peasants. There are few members of the intelligentsia among them. That is because as of the beginning of the 1990s only about four Soviet Germans in 100 had a higher education.

Today no one speaks any longer about an autonomous entity. The explosion of ethnic conflicts has cooled the hottest heads.

Today on the intergovernmental level projects of ordinary socioeconomic and cultural development of the territories where there are concentrations of Russian Germans are being proposed and carried out. Germany is giving special attention to the Volga region. Equipment for schools, hospitals and mini plants is being sent there, along with equipment for private farmers and humanitarian aid. We spoke with those to whom this aid is directed and heard: "No one needs us—neither Russia nor Germany." These attitudes are especially strong in Volgograd Oblast.

"Our taxpayers' money is being spent uselessly in Russia." A scandal over this matter, after gradually

ripening, suddenly burst into the open, stirring up not only the upper echelons of power but also Germany's public opinion. The most popular publications started talking about Germany's having gotten bogged down in Russian problems.

Investigators from the Federal Accounting House, analyzing reports on aid to Russian Germans, discovered that the financial investments did not accord with existing expenditures. Millions of deutsche marks had disappeared altogether, and no one knew where. The state prosecutor got involved in the case.

And everything had started in 1990, when, under the pressure of the fourth wave of emigration from the Soviet Union and the problem of determining the status of the eastern lands, Germany's government reached the conclusion that it was better to aid Russian Germans within Russia itself than to help them migrate to the FRG. All that needed to be done was to create the necessary conditions for the development of their own culture and education and provide them with economic support, and everything would be fine.

A Mr. Waffenschmidt, the German Ministry of the Interior's official in charge of immigrant affairs, was assigned the job of preparing the project and carrying it out with the help of Soviet Germans. However, not having any concept of his own on this account, the civil servant shifted the burden of the problems onto the Association for Germans Abroad (VDA), turning it into his money courier. Today Karsten Slamelcher, VDA's federal secretary, has been sent on an indefinite leave that looks very much like a permanent separation. His further fate depends on the results of an investigation. However, Germany's prosecutor will hardly succeed in finding the ends of all the German money lost in Russia without help from Russia itself. In any case, our attempt to conduct our own journalistic investigation in Volgograd, where a VDA bureau has been operating for two years, led to the surprising conclusion: the truth about the money has no place whatsoever among the interests of the local civil servants.

The VDA bureau was set up in the spring of 1992 in Volgograd. A certain citizen from Ulyanovsk who calls herself Frau Kopel, became the head of it. The history of the frau's appearance and activities in Volgograd is mysterious. While spending a half-year in VDA courses in Germany, the Russian citizen Svetlana Kopel gained the support and trust of Mr. Slamelcher. After returning to Russia, she became acquainted with yet another influential "comrade," Anatoliy Yegin, Volgograd Oblast's deputy governor for ethnic questions. By mutual agreement of the two men, Svetlana moved to Volgograd, where she opened and became head of the VDA bureau, which is supposed to implement the program of aid to Russian Germans on behalf of the German government.

For reasons known only to her, the Frau did not register the bureau, did not open a bank account, and herself

obtained no residence permit in Volgograd, remaining officially employed in the Saratov Chamber of Commerce and Industry. Under Russian laws, this means that the VDA company in Volgograd does not exist, and the frau herself is not a resident and taxpayer of that city.

Through unknown means, but most likely not without the help of Yegin, she managed to obtain permission and have a seal of the Volgograd VDA bureau made. The firm does not exist, but its seal does. So she could get to work.

In accordance with an intergovernmental agreement, Germany pledged to finance the construction in eight Volgograd villages of 800 cottages for immigrants from the former USSR. Naturally, the homes were intended primarily for Russian Germans. The overall expenditures required investments of more than 8 million DM. Our country assumed obligations to build the infrastructure for the revived villages. The total expenditures are unknown. Volgograd Oblast's Deputy Governor Yegin was in charge of the project on Russia's behalf. Frau Kopel was in charge of it on Germany's behalf.

In the summer of 1992, Yegin, who knows nothing about construction, singlehandedly distributed the most profitable contracts, for which foreign exchange had been allocated, among local companies. "Who has what proposals?"

There were proposals. In certain cases the cost of houses grew to more than one and one-half times what had been planned. Once again, the reasons are unknown.

The participants in this highly unique "competition" included the owner of the VEST Individual Private Enterprise, a well-known former knitwear factory shop chief named Karapetyan. He got a contract to build 65 houses in the village of Umet for a total cost of 3.2 million marks. Yegin's decision to enlist Karapetyan in the German project is yet another riddle, since prior to June 1993 VEST had no license for construction work, and the deadline for fulfilling the contract expired in November. But Kopel approved the contract, paying an advance of 620,000 marks—part of it in cash.

When a German government delegation visited the village of Umet in November 1993, it was horrified: foundation pits that had been dug for 17 houses and foundations that had been laid were filled with ground water. There was hardened cement. Here and there stacks of broken brick had been laid with the mastery of primordial man. And this was 190,000 marks' worth. The Germans dissolved the contract and demanded that the advance of 620,000 marks be returned. No one has returned the money to them.

Incidentally, seven out of the eight contracts handed out by the generous hand of Yegin have still not been carried out. Although the deadline for their fulfillment has long since passed.

In 18 months of life in Volgograd, Frau Kopel's wealth increased with cosmic speed. It is possible that not only

the German government's lack of oversight over the expenditure of funds in Russia, but also the VDA Volgograd bureau's lack of a bank account contributed to this.

The frau brought hundreds of thousands of marks from Germany to Volgograd in nothing more than a suitcase. Out of this truly golden suitcase, she withdrew personally for herself tax-free wages of 4,600 marks. Incidentally, not a single one of the executives of Russia's other VDA agencies earns so much. The suitcase also produced a bonus of 8,000 marks and then 30,000 marks for the purchase of the apartment where Svetlana's mama now lives. This, incidentally, is also a unique phenomenon—none of the executives of the other Russian bureaus has received money for the acquisition of housing.

Money from the same suitcase was used to acquire four motor vehicles for the needs of the Volgograd VDA bureau. Only they were registered, with Slamelcher's permission, in the name of Frau Kopel and are kept in her personal garage. This four-car garage is attached to the two-story home that Svetlana has also managed to acquire in 18 months of living in Volgograd. And the more the frau's property grew, the more incomprehensible events occurred in the VDA bureau.

First a very valuable computer disappeared, and then a fax machine, and then certain other small items. On the other hand, the firm's rolls include people whom no one has ever seen. The bureau's employees have dubbed them "dead souls." However, the "dead" contrived to get their pay in foreign exchange. They included, for example, the director of the Saratov Chamber of Commerce and Industry and certain other interesting citizens. Only suddenly something unforeseen happened: part of the report documents disappeared from the VDA office. This was connected with a scandal in Germany, which broke out at the end of 1993.

The FRG Federal Accounting House demanded a report on the budget-financed money that had been spent in Russia. And delegations from the German Ministry of the Interior became frequent visitors in Volgograd. They did not want to hear any more of Mr. Yegin's eloquent discussion, and they demanded that they be taken to visit the construction projects and the schools and enterprises where German equipment had been installed.

Slamelcher's position became shaky. Yegin's was not yet.

The frightened Slamelcher sent a telex to Volgograd: "The contract with Kopel is dissolved. She is not to be allowed to work with documents until the new bureau director arrives and affairs are turned over to him." This was on 23 December 1993. And on 24 December Kopel appeared in the firm's office in the accompaniment of a man. He showed VDA employees his credentials: "Maj Shcherbak, chief of the Ninth Division of the Central Rayon Department of Internal Affairs." Together they opened sealed doors of the director's office, put something in a suitcase, and left. The raid, covered by the officer's epaulets, was repeated two more times. And

once again, a suitcase was carried off. During all this time the major was officially on leave. After the second visit of Kopel and Shcherbak, the VDA employees wrote a complaint to the militia. It disappeared. During the third visit they called the OMON special militia. In the presence of armed officers, the "raiders" laid the valuables they had taken on the table. They turned out to be contracts for the lease of tractors that Germany had turned over to Volgograd farmers, certain contracts with "dead souls," and reports on the allocation of humanitarian aid and medical equipment. They were all confiscated as evidence by the Central Rayon Department of Internal Affairs "in the interest of the investigation," and the bank packages of currency—70,000 DM, about \$2,000, and several million rubles—were also sent to the same place.

A couple of weeks later Mr. Tsilke, the new director of the Volgograd VDA, demanded that the militia return the firm's property. The money was returned. Not to the VDA, however, but to citizen Kopel. The investigator's explanation was murderous in its logic: "The lady said that the money belonged to her." And the "lady said" also that as soon as she left the militia office she was robbed immediately, so she no longer has possession of either the marks or the dollars.

One could tell something else about the humanitarian aid from Germany that was sold through the rayon trading organization, with the money earned subsequently being loaned at interest. And about how that aid was selectively unloaded at Lebyazhye Field from Boeings into the cars of civil servants from Yegin's department. One could also tell a lot about the exchange of delegations of schoolchildren, who for some reason were accompanied to Germany by those same civil servants and their wives. But all that is small potatoes, and all in the past.

Our task—to show the scale of the abuses connected with the provision of aid to Russian Germans living on the territory of Volgograd—has proved impossible to accomplish. It is already virtually impossible to find the German money that has been lost in Russia.

The Russian Germans still have draft programs for the revival of their own culture and for the social and economic development of the territories in which concentrations of them reside. The programs, however, are based not on humanitarian assistance but on the establishment of joint ventures. But local civil servants do not want to hear of these proposals. It is more interesting for them to tackle the problems of Russian Germans without the Russian Germans themselves, so that they can satisfy their own personal requirements in the course of the business. And in the broader sense, both sides are to blame for this. Germany—for the fact that it was too trusting of its own and another country's civil servants. Russia—for the fact that it shifted the problems of its own citizens onto the shoulders of Germany. The color photos spread out on the VDA desk show a smiling and embracing Yegin and Kopel, who is not a frau at all but

citizen Smirnova, who kept the name of her former husband—a Russian German. As for Maj Shcherbak, he is living peaceably under the same roof with the former frau. It's such a close-knit collective.

The Story Continues

At a session of a Russian-German intergovernmental commission that just began the other day in Bonn, one of the most urgent questions will be that of implementing the Russian Federation president's 21 February 1992 edict "On Urgent Measures for the Rehabilitation of the Russian Germans." In many respects, relations between the governments of Russia and Germany will depend on the extent to which progress is made in creating the German national territorial formations provided for by the edict. As will the nature of the economic assistance in settling Russian Germans in Volgograd Oblast. The government delegation will include Anatoliy Yegin, deputy governor of Volgograd Oblast.

Volgograd Left-Wing Groups Oppose Reconciliation Monument

944F0436A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 11 Mar 94 p 4

[Article by Valeriy Korney: "Battles Over Reconciliation Monument"]

[Text] Representatives of the Volgograd Oblast organizations of the Russian Federation Communist Party, the All-Russian Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the Russian National Union, and the Congress of Soviet Women held a special press conference to announce that they had not changed their stance: "The sacred ground of Stalingrad is not the place for the so-called reconciliation monument." They were referring to the scheduled dedication of a pillar—a "symbol of reconciliation"—in Volgograd on 14 May, almost half a century after the end of the war, in accordance with a Russian-Austrian agreement. The campaign against the monument, according to the organizers of the press conference, is being joined by the whole leftwing and communist press. Petitions have already been printed. Signatures will be collected by the party obkom. Activists will also go to enterprises to collect signatures.

An open letter from the Central Council of the Officers Union "To the Veterans of the Battle of Stalingrad, Public Veterans Organizations, Patriotic Movements, and Patriots of Russia" is being distributed to protest "the erection of a monument that is hostile to our people."

A delegation from Austria, headed by Vice President Walter Seledetz of the "50th Anniversary of the Battle of Stalingrad" committee and Vice President Hugo Mueller of the "Black Cross" society, was in Volgograd at the time. The "Black Cross," which is leading the search for the remains of soldiers who fell in battle, will also be erecting the pillar in Volgograd.

It is supposed to have the following inscription: "This monument is dedicated to all of the victims of the Battle of Stalingrad of 1942-1943. It is a reminder of the suffering of the soldiers and civilians who fell here. The monument was erected with contributions from the Austrian people. We ask that the soldiers from Germany, Austria, and all other countries who fell here be granted eternal peace on Russian land."

The Austrian delegation held a press conference to voice the same request for "eternal peace on Russian land." There was one other interesting detail: The "Black Cross," according to Hugo Mueller, has learned the identity of all of the Soviet soldiers who died in Austria. The number turned out to be much higher than the figures in official records. More than a thousand requests have already been received from people wishing to attend the dedication ceremony for the "symbol of reconciliation" on 14 May.

The organizers of the protest campaign are alleging that the Volgograd administration decided in secret to erect the monument and to locate it in the square in the center of the city.

"There was nothing secret about it," Volgograd Administration Deputy Chief Svetlana Antonova responded. "There was constant coverage of the talks and the preparations for the dedication ceremony in the local press. Apparently, however, the time is right for a political campaign."

The leaders of the "opposition" to the reconciliation monument are not certain they have the support of the majority of people in Volgograd, however, and are willing to compromise: They would agree to a monument, and even a chapel, outside the city limits.

I do not wish to offend the veterans who bore the weight of the war, but will the "symbol of reconciliation" and the request for "eternal peace on Russian land" really diminish their distinction? Nevertheless, the constant propaganda has even divided the veterans themselves.

At the end of last week Volgograd Mayor Yuriy Chekhov met representatives of public organizations and political parties to discuss the issue of the reconciliation monument. The appeals of the mayor and democratic parties for the avoidance of confrontations were rejected. A new phase of the campaign began—a move to the exertion of strong pressure on government officials.

Sakha President on Developing Northern Regions

944F0425B Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 26 Feb 94 p 3

[Article by Mikhail Nikolayev, president of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia), under rubric "Position": "Peoples of the North: Prospects for Common Development. Yakutia Sets a Good Example"]

[Text] By and large, all of the problems in the North are a human problem. Primarily, the problem of the northerner—a person living in the planet's high latitudes. Nevertheless I shall never get tired or trying to prove, or of repeating, that the problems of the North were and will continue to be problems of a scale that affects mankind as a whole. Having recognized that truth, we shall move far ahead along the path primarily of humanism.

In the Russian Federation and in the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) in recent years there have been major changes in the entire way of life and it is impossible to evaluate in any simple manner the importance of those changes for the peoples of the North. However, the value of the reforms manifests itself precisely against the background of the overall condition and well-being of the peoples of the North.

Upon attentive consideration it is revealed that the northern peoples of our planet not only assimilated for mankind a vast territory that is unbelievably severe and also very rich in resources, but also created a unique spiritual and material culture. One can confidently speak about a specific circumpolar (existing in the regions of the Arctic Circle) civilization that enriched mankind by its invaluable historical experience, an experience that reveals man's ability to survive and to engage in creative activity under the most severe climatic conditions.

For Russia this experience is unusually important, or even invaluable, for the simple reason that 60 percent of Russian territory is nothing but an arctic and northern zone. For the Republic of Sakha this experience is national wealth, property that belongs to the entire nation, the dividends from which we shall receive in the twenty-first century, when we shall see the fruition of the words of the great Lomonosov, to the effect that Russia's might will accrue to Siberia and the Arctic Ocean.

The peoples that formed the circumpolar civilization have many attributes in common, such as a harmonious, completely balanced interrelationship with the fragile environment. The northern peoples created great models of economic culture, the fruits of which the industrial part of mankind is just beginning to use. The cult of life, the recognition of the inherent value of life, collectivism, mutual tolerance and mutual aid, respect for women, the family, and the tribe, heightened aesthetic sense, a sense of beauty—those are only a few of the shared and special attributes of northern civilization.

The North's vast mineral wealth became the chief reason for invading and destroying the fragile circumpolar civilization, for having it become absorbed by industrial civilization. A large amount of harm was inflicted on the peoples of the North by the social experiment that was carried out in Russia after October 1917 under the slogan of the building of a communist society. The industrial breakthrough to the unlimited natural resources of the northern territories was accompanied by a disdain for the peoples populating those lands. by the

incompetent interference of the state and officials into the social and spiritual life of the northern peoples.

At various stages in the development of Russia, the effectiveness of administering the northern territories varied. The first and most significant legal act, in our opinion, was the Regulations for Administering Aliens, which were enacted in 1822. Tribal communes were recognized as being the basis of self-government and the subject of land use. Under the Soviet authority the freedom of national associations of northerners was declared: in the early 1930's the Presidium of the VTsIK [All-Russian Central Executive Committee] even enacted a decree entitled Organizing National Associations in the Rayons Inhabited by Small-Population Nationalities of the North. For example, 15 national rayons were formed as part of the Yakut ASSR of that time. Officially that decree was never appealed, but it was also never executed. For Russia as a whole, those rayons were gradually deprived of their national status, and that fact, combined with other unfavorable factors, led to a decline in the development of the northern peoples and to a loss by them of many achievements of circumpolar civilization.

The restoration of Russia, the reformation of all aspects of its life at the present-day stage, creates excellent opportunities for overcoming the mistakes that were made. And the experience of Yakutia that was gained in recent years inspires optimism.

According to the data in the 1989 population census, there were 24,817 persons residing on the territory of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia)—representatives of 25 of the 26 peoples, practically all with a small population, inhabiting the North of the Russian Federation. We are gratified that, during the period between the most recent censuses, the size of the population in the small-population peoples of the North on the territory of our republic increased by 6372, or by 34.5 percent. During that same period the size of the Sakha nation increased by 16.3 percent, and the size of the rural—mainly indigenous—population increased by 9.8 percent. I might note that the rates of population increase among the small-population peoples of the North in the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) are considerably higher than the same indicators on the whole for the Russian Federation. There the total increase for all 25 ethnic groups was 16.6 percent. Thanks to the higher rates of population increase, the percentage of the small-population peoples of the North in the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) increased from 11.8 to 13.7 in the total figure of Russia's indigenous North.

The highest birth rate is observed among the Eveny—those rates came to 50.4 percent during the period between censuses. More than half the Eveny in the Russian Federation live on the territory of the Republic of Sakha. The number of Evenki in our republic increased by 24.5 percent, whereas, for Russia as a whole, the increase came to 10.6 percent, and in the Evenki Autonomous Okrug, which is in Krasnoyarsk

Kray, it came to only 7.4 percent. The percentage of Evenki in the Republic of Sakha in the entire Evenki population of the Russian Federation increased by 24.8 to 48.2 percent. The favorable conditions for the population increase can be explained by a number of factors.

First of all, we benefited from the declarations and promises to change over to practical matters. The republic's leadership, in defending the rights and interests of the indigenous population of the North, in the scientific posing and practical resolution of a number of problems of the socioeconomic and cultural development of the small-population peoples of the North, has been recognized in all the regions of the Russian North. Something that serves as the best confirmation of the correctness of the course that was chosen by us is the increase in the migration in the Republic of Sakha of representatives of the indigenous population of the North from adjacent krais and oblasts. For the time being, the only nationality that does not live in our republic is the Nganasany.

It is difficult to cure a sick person if he himself does not really want to be cured. In the same way, it is important in the rebirth of the northern peoples to reinforce their will to live and their confidence in their own abilities, and to develop national self-awareness. Any nation is reborn through the development of language and the resuscitation of cultural and spiritual life.

Look at the results of the 1989 population census and you will easily be convinced that a large number of people in various ethnic groups have lost the knowledge of their native language—Orochony, Chvantsy, Itelmeny, Nivkhi, Udegeytsy, Evenki, Yukagiry, and Mansi.

One could hardly expect any other result: the way of life has changed so, and there has been such a narrowing of the sphere of use of the native language. Unfortunately, it is precisely the native language of the peoples in the North that used to be viewed most frequently as a subject of secondary importance in primary school and as a linguistic phenomenon in science. Currently in the Russian Federation and the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) very important laws have been enacted, that regulate the linguistic life of the peoples residing on the particular territory. Work has been broadened to restore and develop national systems of educating the indigenous peoples of the republic, including those for the Eveny, Evenki, and Yukagiry. The Institute of Problems of Small-Population Peoples of the North, of the Siberian Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences, has submitted a concept for national Evenki, Eveny, and Yukagiry schools, the concept of preschool education. They have become components of the republic-wide concept of the national school. For the first time, the Nizhnekolymskiy College of the Peoples of the North is operating, and the School of Northern Philology has been created at Yakutsk State University. The Institute of Problems of Small-Population Peoples of the North has been created under the academy, and that institute, during just one year of its existence, in addition to conducting fundamental research, has developed state

programs entitled "The Health of Small-Population Peoples of the North" and "The Press of Small-Population Peoples of the North." The draft of a Program for the Socioeconomic Development of the Eveny, Evenki, and Yukagiry is being prepared. The institute is also executing a number of state production orders for the Russian Federation and the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) for the correct guaranteeing of social questions in the development of the peoples of the North.

For example, for several years there have been regular broadcasts by the "Gevan" ("Dawn") radio station in the Evenki, Eveny, and Yukagiry language. There is a special program on republic television, and the thick artistic magazine ROZOVAYA CHAYKA [Pink Seagull] is published. Supplements to it are published in the languages of the peoples of the North.

I shall particularly emphasize that all this work is being carried out by the forces of the republic itself and within the confines of the republic. Therefore at one time it was surprising to hear the enthusiastic report that Moscow had begun radio broadcasts in the Assyrian language for a nation that scarcely numbers 1000 persons. Why doesn't Moscow have radio and television broadcasts in the languages of the peoples of Russia, especially the peoples with small populations which spend most of their life far from populated places and for whom radio is practically the only thread that links a person with the outside world and with his state? Active, functioning language, press, radio and television, meaningful publishing activity, and the creation of literary and artistic works—all these things and many more form the nation's vital spirit and make its spiritual life unique. Nor can we do without the national intelligentsia. Using as an example the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) I can state confidently that our land has its rightful share of talent. We have brilliant individuals who are capable of becoming the expressers of the national self-awareness of the northern peoples. I do not doubt that the spiritual life of northerners will become even more enriched with the influx of fresh forces, under the conditions of freedom and democracy that are new for us. There is no need to interfere in that natural process, or to unify and level the culture of peoples. The variety of cultures is the beauty that will save the world.

Something that can serve as the confirmation of what has been said is the history of the nomadic tribal commune, which was destroyed during the years of the Soviet authority and that is being restored now. In a resolution enacted by the first congress of tribal nomadic communes that was held in our republic, it is directly stated: "...The restored tribal communes will become a true socioeconomic and spiritual base for the rebirth and further prosperity of the way of life of the small-population peoples of the North as completely equal subjects of the sovereign renewed state." Prior to that, the Constitution of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) was enacted. Article 42 of that constitution reads: "...The republic, respecting the traditions, culture, and customs of the indigenous peoples

and small-population peoples of the North, protects and guarantees their inalienable right:

- "—to own and use, in conformity with the law, the land and resources, including the tribal agricultural, hunting, and fishing grounds;
- "—to organize a social program and a medical program with a consideration of the economic peculiarities of the area being populated, and the management and ethnic specifics of the human organism;
- "—to protect against any form of coercive assimilation and ethnocide, as well as encroachments on ethnic uniqueness, the historic holy places, or monuments of spiritual and material culture."

I might note that the demand stated in the Constitution is being translated into the language of practical life. Several laws have been enacted and are in operation: "The Nomadic Tribal Commune of the Small-Population Peoples of the North," "Citizenship," "Languages in the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia)"; and "The Alternative Military Service of Representatives of Small-Population Peoples of the North." According to those documents, the languages spoken by the peoples of the North have been recognized as official in places of dense population.

In our opinion, the question of the self-government of the nomadic tribal commune as a form of national-territorial formation of the small-population nation that does not have its own state system deserves the most careful and complete study. It is also necessary for us to analyze the rich experience of the indigenous nations of the North beyond the border.

The further work of creating legislation dealing with the problems of the small-population peoples in the North of the Russian Federation must be aimed at developing, for example, legislative drafts and legal-normative acts dealing with: legal status; local self-government; the traditional trades engaged in by these peoples; benefits; the training of cadres of specialists; the northern domesticated reindeer; and the construction of housing and social and cultural amenities in places of dense population by those peoples.

The reform of the self-government of the peoples in the North of the Russian Federation presupposes a change in the strategy of state policy with respect to the northern territories. The territory of the Russian Federation remains the cradle of the unique culture of the peoples of the North. The government of the Russian Federation, like the governments of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) and the other subjects of the Federation, is responsible for preserving and developing those peoples.

There is nothing surprising in the fact that the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) has proven to be on the cutting edge of the problems pertaining to the life of the northern peoples. It is herein that the republic views the priorities of its policy and develops the strategy and tactics for its development. What is much more surprising is the shortsightedness of certain influential politicians who do not see the vital

importance of the northern problems and postpone indefinitely the resolution of those problems. The republic will patiently explain its views and its policy with respect to the future of the entire North and the Arctic zone for Russia and for mankind as a whole. Practical steps have already been taken in the direction of reinforcing the cooperation among the northern states. We shall develop as a northern state and as such shall cooperate with the world community and bear responsibility to that community for keeping intact the achievements of circumpolar civilization and for the rebirth of the northern peoples. Today the Republic of Sakha is becoming a completely equal member of the community of northern states—the Northern Forum—and feels completely confident in its new role. This kind of “northern” specialization of international cooperation under the conditions of the political thaw must yield weighty and tangible fruits both for the participants and for the rest of mankind. The Cold War is not for northerners—it’s already cold here. Warfare is definitely not a northern pastime.

The time has come for the joint development and enactment of an international law governing northern space—a law governing the Arctic. It would make it possible to lay the legal basis for the efficient use of the resources of the North and to establish international monitoring of their use.

It is also necessary to strive constantly to improve the legal acts dealing with the protection of the northern ethnic groups, their traditional way of life, and modern forms of management, spiritual self-expression, and self-government. It is necessary to recognize the fact that the inhabitants of the North are now a new population of people who have become firmly established in their life in the higher latitudes. Irrespective of nationality, they must possess the corresponding set of rights and obligations that guarantee the conditions for prosperity in the North. The vital activity and the standards for guaranteeing it and providing services for people must have a zonal peculiarity. It is also necessary to proceed from the specific requirements of the natural and geographical environment in which people live.

Justice requires the consolidation of the efforts of the world community in supporting circumpolar civilization. The humanization of international relations will promote the conception and development of a new policy in the area of the Arctic Circle.

‘Siberian Agreement’ on Regional Growth

944F0434B Novosibirsk SOVETSKAYA SIBIR in Russian
11 Mar 94 p 1

[Report by V. Maltseva under the rubric “Press Conference”: “Siberian Agreement: Concept of the Region’s Development”]

[Text] Vladimir Ivankov, general director of the Siberian Agreement interregional association’s executive board, held a press conference on the results of the association council meeting that took place in Moscow.

This was not the first time Moscow was selected as the place for a “large gathering” for reasons of convenience: This time heads of oblast administrations—association members—came to the capital for an expanded session of the government. It is also important that, as a rule, high-ranking statesmen take part in Moscow conferences of Siberian Agreement: On 4 March it was Deputy Prime Minister Oleg Soskovets. In his address he spoke against raising electric and transportation rates, which was supported by Siberians. The deputy prime minister detailed his trip to Norway, where he was familiarized with the practical side of taxation. The tax policy of our northern neighbors is aimed at supporting their own producers, and this, of course, is the main lesson for our legislators, through whose efforts domestic industry continues to remain in a difficult situation.

Representatives of Siberian territories who spoke at the council asked the government rather pointed questions. Their meaning was that along with delegating to Siberian regions responsibility for conducting reform, rights should be delegated that would make it possible to proceed more effectively with this process. So far there is not even a government concept of economic reform in the Siberian region. Speaking of the interdependence between the European part of Russia and its eastern territories, in this respect the scales are revealingly tilted. Siberia needs only one-tenth of the electric power produced here, one-hundredth of the aluminum, and does not need as much oil, gas, and coal... But if Siberia works for Russia as a whole, there should be a corresponding attitude toward it. So far, however, no such line is seen in economic policy.

An example is the allocation of credit to back up agricultural campaigns. Novosibirsk Oblast currently can cover only one-third of its countryside’s needs for fuel and lubricants. Keeping in mind that only one-third of the needed fallow land area has been plowed, one may assume that spring plowing will “eat up” the fuel quite fast. The outcome is well known: You reap what you sow. It appears that it will again be cheaper to buy Canadian grain than to grow our own...

A score of current problems were discussed at the Siberian Agreement council, regarding which decisions were made, agreements signed, and so on.

One of the main items was the document “On the Socioeconomic Development of Siberian Regions and the Course of Economic Reforms,” which was adopted after the discussion following the report by the association council chairman, V. Zubov, “Siberia and Economic Reform: Concept of a Development Strategy.”

This decision states the need to prepare documents corresponding to the strategic goals of Siberia’s development. The first line in this list is “On Principles of Siberian Regional Policy.”

Although it was said both at the meeting and in the back rooms and at the press conference that Moscow cannot survive without Siberia, Siberian Agreement intends

through its activities to prove not so much this idea as a more fruitful one—that of restoring the eastern territories through joint efforts, protecting them from demographic expansion on the part of contiguous states. This danger is quite real: Siberians are dying out or moving away, and population centers are being filled with new residents; in some places, for instance, there are twice as many Chinese as there are Russians.

'Siberian Agreement' Seeks To Expand Regional Export Rights

944F0431B Moscow *SEGODNYA* in Russian 5 Mar 94 p 2

[Article by Vladimir Tordes: "Siberia Demands an Increase in Export Quotas: and the Far East Military-Industrial Complex Demands a Supplemental Feeding From Moscow"]

[Text] It is not just in the capital that passions over the budget are heating up: Demands by members of the Council of Ministers from the army, agriculture and the military-industrial complex are being backed up by the voices of their subordinates from remote Russian regions.

On behalf of the defense industry in the Far East (which remains the patrimony of the military-industrial complex), a "conference of commodity producers" that convened in Khabarovsk has already expressed its views perfectly clearly. The directors who gathered there stated that in the past two years their production volume has amounted to nearly 30 percent, and more than 122,000 specialists have left the region than have come there during the same period.

The major council of the Siberian Agreement Association that met yesterday identified a similar situation in Siberia. However, Siberia's raw material producers may count not only on Moscow but also on themselves. The main proposals to the government from the governors of the krais and oblasts across the Urals have to do with a very sizeable expansion of the territories' export rights. The Siberians believe that the "institution of special exporters" ought to be abolished as a concept, granting everyone equal rights to engage in foreign economic activity. At the same time, export quotas should be

increased to 20 percent of the output produced in the region—by decision of local authorities, without getting the Center's consent.

In the opinion of Siberian Agreement, the share of collected customs duties and export taxes that is left in the region should be raised to at least 30 percent. However, the export duties themselves, the Siberians insist, should be reduced, and import duties for medicines, food and equipment should be abolished entirely.

Aleksey Gumilevskiy, director of the Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations Main Administration for Coordinating the Foreign Economic Activities of the Components of the Federation, told ITAR-TASS that "such favorable treatment cannot be granted to any one territory taken by itself," and that "a number of the problems mentioned would be eliminated if there were a gradual transition from nontariff methods of regulating foreign economic activity to purely tariff-based methods of regulation." However, it does not look as though Siberia will agree to wait until that finally happens. Valeriy Zubov, governor of Krasnoyarsk Krai, has repeatedly stated that the use of regional export revenues may become the only alternative to federal budget subsidies to money-losing enterprises.

As for the military-industrial complex's directors themselves—the "commodity producers" (although the word "commodity," i.e., what is bought and sold, is somewhat strained when applied to their products)—they continue to count on being bailed out by one form of support or another. Despite the industry's crisis, fewer than 4 percent of the enterprise's in Khabarovsk Krai have been shut down, and just a little more than another 7 percent have gone to a reduced work week. Employment is being artificially maintained: with official unemployment of 6,500 persons, hidden unemployment exceeds 50,000.

In the meantime, in neighboring Maritime Krai the defense industry has already wangled money from the government to pay the power engineers. What's sensational about the situation is that the power engineers' debts were not paid anyway, and the emergency economic situation in the krai has been extended until 7 March. According to some information, the directors of the defense industries preferred to put the money into circulation and put off repayment of the debts "until later."

Smolensk 1993 Socioeconomic Figures Reported

944F0392A Smolensk RABOCHIY PUT in Russian

3 Feb 94 pp 1, 5

[Report by the Smolensk Oblast Statistics Directorate: "Socioeconomic Situation of Smolensk Oblast in 1993"]

[Text] The socioeconomic situation of the oblast last year is characterized by the following data:

	Actual values, 1993	1993 values compared with 1992 (percentage or factor increase)	Reference: 1992 values compared with 1991 (percentage or factor increase)
Industrial production:			
in actual prices	R 758.4 billion (rubles)	6.8-fold	11.1-fold
in comparable prices	X	88.3	83.3
Production of consumer goods (in actual prices, 1993)	R 429.5 billion	87.4	82.3
Including:			
food products	R 134.5 billion	95.3	83.0
nonfood products	R 275.2 billion	85.6	79.9
alcoholic beverages	R 19.8 billion	101.7	124.6
Capital investments from all sources of financing (actual values)	R 118.8 billion	8.8-fold	7.9-fold
in comparable figures	X	68	56
Housing commissioned (including individual housing construction), square meters	288,700	84	74
Shipment (dispatch) of freight by general-use transportation, tonnes	16.3 million	63	66
Average number of payroll employees engaged in the oblast economy (not including coopera- tives, small and private enterprises)	451,000	97.3	96.7
Per capita monetary income (average monthly)	R 30,067	10.4-fold	7.3-fold
Retail trade turnover, including public kitchens, of officially registered enterprises:			
in actual prices	R 245.2 billion	9.8-fold	8.4-fold
in comparable prices	R 22.7 billion	90.3	50
Paid services to the populace:			
in actual prices	R 18.1 billion	9.2-fold	6.2-fold
in comparable prices	R 1.2 billion	61	67
Portion of paid services constituting everyday services			
in actual prices	R 6.3 billion	8.9-fold	6.1-fold
in comparable prices	R 0.5 billion	64	65
Consolidated consumer price index, not considering optional-use items (December 1993 as compared to December 1992)	X	8.1-fold	X
Profit, all types of economic activity, January- November 1993 (not including agriculture, consumer cooperatives, other cooperatives, and small enterprises)	R 197.7 billion	8.0-fold	13.9-fold

FINANCE

Over the January-November period, R197.7 billion [rubles] was received in profit, including R65.4 billion (33.1 percent) in the nonstate sector. More than 75 percent of all profit is attributable to industry.

Profits increased 8.0-fold as compared with January-November 1992, including a 7.5-fold increase in industry. The entirety of the increase seen in profits was due to increased prices.

At the same time, the financial state of enterprises continues to be adverse. The profitability factor with respect to industrial production was on the level of 41-44 percent. However, the increased prices are noticeably depreciating the income received by enterprises. Over 16 percent of all enterprises and organizations of the oblast were operating unprofitably in January-November. In industry and transportation, 14 percent of enterprises operated at a loss; in housing and municipal facilities—12 percent; in trade—over 20 percent; and in provision of everyday services—40 percent. On the whole, the number of enterprises operating at a loss decreased by 7 percent as compared with January-November 1992, but their number in industry rose 17 percent.

On the whole in the state sector of the oblast economy, the proportion of unprofitable enterprises was 3.8 percentage points higher than was the case in the nonstate sector.

Insolvency of enterprises is significantly aggravating the problem of unprofitability. As of 1 December 1993, the total amount of creditor indebtedness of enterprises in industry, construction, transportation, and agriculture came to R145.6 billion, of which R40 billion, or 27 percent, was overdue. Residual free monetary assets totaling R19.4 billion as of 1 December covered one-seventh (13.3 percent) of their total creditor indebtedness. Debts receivable for the above-mentioned sectors amounted to R185.2 billion, 27.2 percent higher than the enterprise debt.

Low solvency (the ratio of monetary assets and debts receivable to creditor indebtedness and debts on credits and loans secured) was observed at enterprises of the coal industry (12.7 percent), the machinebuilding and metalworking industry (68.2 percent), the lumber and woodworking industry (64.7 percent), the textile industry (55.4 percent), the garment industry (69.5 percent), the food industry (54.3 percent), and at agricultural enterprises (48.3 percent).

The indebtedness of industrial, construction, transportation, and agricultural enterprises with respect to bank credits as of 1 December exceeded their own monetary assets fourfold.

Delinquent indebtedness with respect to issuance of consumption funds in the sectors of industry, construction, and agriculture amounted to R3.8 billion as of 1 January 1994. The amount of unpaid wages in industry

decreased by 23 percent in December 1993 as compared with November, amounting to R1.7 billion; in construction this figure dropped to half its November level, coming to R0.7 billion; in agriculture, the figure decreased by 13 percent, amounting to R1.3 billion.

Poor payments discipline at enterprises is complicating the generation of financial resources necessary for production and social development.

The largest share of assets expended consisted of payments to the budget—55 percent (31 percent for 1992).

Some R215.6 billion in taxes and other payments were made to the state budget from enterprises, organizations, and the populace of the oblast in 1993. This is seven times the amount paid in 1992. About half this figure (48.7 percent) came from tax on profits. Value-added tax accounted for 24.6 percent, and taxes from the populace—11.5 percent.

PRIVATIZATION

As of 1 January 1994, 1,375 enterprises in the oblast had been privatized. Of these, 439, or 32 percent, were privatized in 1993. Of the total number of privatized enterprises, 20 percent became private property through conversion to joint-stock operation (full or partial), 80 percent—through sale.

The proportion of large-scale federally owned enterprises privatized increased from 5 percent in 1992 to 11 percent in 1993, while the proportion originally constituting oblast and municipal property decreased somewhat—from 18 to 14 percent and from 76 to 75 percent, respectively.

The main avenues for sale of property of enterprises during the process of "small" privatization were: buy-up of leased property (21 percent of the total number of enterprises privatized); sale through commercial competition (35 percent); auctions (23 percent). Sale of the property of liquidated enterprises was chosen by only 1 percent of enterprises.

The proportion of enterprises privatized through conversion to joint-stock operation rose 4 percentage points over 1992. Of three alternatives of benefits offered labor collectives when converting to joint-stock operation, the second alternative was preferred, allowing the labor collective to hold a controlling package of shares. More than three-fourths of the enterprises converting to joint-stock operation selected this benefits option. One-fifth of such enterprises chose the first alternative. In addition, 2 percent of enterprises converted to joint-stock operation through transformation of leased enterprises.

The total value of property of enterprises privatized (prior to reevaluation of fixed capital) amounted to R27.5412 billion. The average value of an enterprise privatized from municipal ownership was R2.7 million, from oblast ownership—R39.6 million, and from federal ownership—R88.4 million.

Competitive demand for property privatized is determined both by sector affiliation and type of ownership. On the whole, the difference between the sale price and initially declared value of the property, i.e., the average value rate of enterprises privatized, is 12-fold, including 24-fold for enterprises of municipal ownership, and threefold for enterprises of oblast and federal ownership.

Total proceeds from the sale of property to new owners (including funds from enterprises privatized in 1992) amounted to R5.7 billion in monetary assets and 526,300 privatization checks.

Over 60 percent of the funds received from privatization of enterprise property was deposited as revenue into oblast, rayon, and city budgets; 16 percent went to the federal budget, and 22 percent was directed to state privatization organs.

As of 1 January 1994, 82,300 apartments were privatized in the oblast (30.6 percent of the total number), including 35,700 in 1993. Of the total number of apartments privatized, 99 percent were privatized at no cost.

Funds totaling R59.6 million were received from the privatization of housing, R37.4 of which (63 percent) was received in 1993.

The average value of a privatized apartment was R11,000. The average size—50 square meters.

PRICE AND RATE LEVELS AND INDICES

The fairly high level of inflation was maintained in 1993. It was spasmodic, however.

Consumer prices for basic products and services increased 8.1-fold by December 1992. The maximum level of inflation was set at the beginning of the year, when consumer goods and services had almost doubled in price toward the end of the first quarter, as compared with December of the previous year. A trend toward reduced rates of inflation was seen beginning mid-year: 1.7-fold during the second quarter, 1.8-fold during the third quarter, and 1.4-fold during the fourth quarter.

However, the growth of consumer prices of goods and services in 1993 was significantly lower than in 1992, when a 24.9-fold increase was seen.

Thus, prices for food products in 1993 increased 8.7-fold, nonfood products—6.7-fold. These figures for 1992 were 13.1-fold and 19.8-fold, respectively. In this regard, during the first half-year of 1993, food product prices rose at a galloping rate, while this was the case for nonfood products in the third quarter. Then in the fourth quarter an alternation was seen: in October in favor of food products, in November nonfood products, and in December the rate increases were the same.

Changes in the prices of individual food products were also diverse. Compared with December 1992 prices, meat dumplings increased in price 29-fold; vegetables—18-fold; cottage cheese and sausage products, meat and

meat products, milk and dairy products—from 11- to 14-fold; butter, cheeses, eggs, bread, and bakery products—from seven- to 10-fold. Fluctuations in the rates of price change for industrial commodities were also observed.

Prices increased significantly over the year for medicines (102-fold), operating stock (27-fold), office products, building materials, fuel, and individual commodities for children and adults (from 10- to 14-fold).

A more significant rise in prices was observed with respect to paid services provided the populace. This change overall amounted to a 14.8-fold increase for the year (48.2-fold for 1992). This is 2.2 times greater than the growth of prices of nonfood products, and 1.7 times greater than that for food products.

In 1993, the stipulated rates for certain notary services increased by a factor of 1,462, for legal consultation—by a factor of 61. Passes for rest and relaxation facilities increased 44-fold, tickets for the theater and museums and the initial visit to the doctor—more than 30-fold. Certain cosmetic and medical services, parental fees for child care, lodging in hotels and dormitories, photography, laundry, dry cleaning, and barber services, repair of footwear, refrigerators, and televisions, rates for electric power and intercity communications, postal rates, subscriber fees for home telephone use and cable radio—all increased in price by factors of six to 20.

Wholesale prices of enterprises for industrial production in 1993 increased 9.6-fold as compared with December 1992.

The rise in wholesale prices was most significant in the meat and chemical industry, electric power industry, and building materials industry (13- to 14-fold), and in the milk industry (10-fold). Nitrogen fertilizers, water-heating boiler facilities, footwear, meat products, and glass kitchenware increased from 11- to 14-fold in cost, and crushed stone—more than 19-fold.

The purchase price index for grain in 1993 was 578 percent, for potatoes—330 percent, vegetables—1,545 percent. The purchase price of livestock and fowl increased 13.4-fold over the year, milk—10.3-fold, and eggs—9.5-fold.

THE SOCIAL SPHERE

The demographic situation. As of 1 January 1994, the population was 1,167,000, according to estimated data.

In 1993, 9,600 infants were born in the oblast. This is 1,200 (11 percent) fewer than in 1992; 19,200 people died—2,900 (17.6 percent) more than in 1992.

The level of natural population loss was 1.7 times greater than that of 1992, and amounted to 9,600 people. This was observed everywhere except in the city of Desnogorsk. The city population of the oblast diminished by 4,700 people as a result of natural processes, the rural population—by 4,900.

Heart disease and malignant tumors remain the most frequently encountered illnesses, constituting the cause of 72 percent of deaths.

Some 8,408 marriages were registered in the oblast in 1993, or 3.7 percent more than in 1992. The number of divorces increased 2.5 percent, amounting to 5,534. There are 63 divorces for every 100 registered marriages.

The volume of migration (arrivals and departures) dropped 13 percent as compared with 1992, amounting to 66,800. The number of arrivals exceeded the number of departures by more than 10,000 individuals. New arrivals in the oblast included 4,374 refugees and people forced to resettle. Among those leaving the oblast, 208 departed for permanent residence in countries of the far abroad.

Labor resources. The number of persons employed in the oblast economy (not including cooperatives, small or private enterprises) during 1993 was 451,000. This is 2.7 percent fewer than in 1992.

Some 18,100 citizens seeking jobs filed application with the state employment service in 1993. The intermediary efforts of this service resulted in job placement for 9,200 individuals, or 51 percent of the applicants.

As of the beginning of January of this year, 2,800 citizens out of work were registered with the employment service organs. This number decreased 24 percent over the year. Some 1,100 individuals were declared unemployed. Some 44 percent of the unemployed were persons laid off in connection with the elimination or reorganization of enterprises and with personnel cuts. More than 56,000 people (12.4 percent of those employed in the oblast economy) took additional leave or were shifted to employment based on less than a full work week at the initiative of the administration, i.e., constitute the potentially unemployed. For every 10 vacancies indicated by enterprises, there are 13 individuals seeking employment. In this regard, it is blue-collar workers that enterprises require most of all (73 percent of the employment requirement).

Some 362 persons (3.7 times greater than at the beginning of 1993) underwent occupational training at the direction of the employment service.

Monetary income of the populace in 1993, according to preliminary estimates, totaled over R406 billion, a 9.7-fold increase over 1992. Growth of income of the populace last year surpassed the growth of consumer prices during all months except January, May, and July.

Income of the populace increased 10 percent over the year in real terms.

Growth of income in December is explained through the regular increase in the minimum wage and corresponding increase in salaries in the budget sphere. Also influencing the growth in incomes were material-assistance payments at the end of the year and awards for annual work results.

In the final months of 1993, the proportion of outlays for purchase of goods and services decreased, while the proportion of savings in deposits and securities increased. Significant amounts of ready cash stayed in the possession of the populace. Thus, in December 1993, the share of total income kept on hand by the populace came to 31.4 percent (in November this was 26.8 percent, in October—24.8 percent).

Average per capita face-value monetary income over 1993 amounted to 197 percent of the subsistence minimum (157 percent in 1992). At the same time, almost one-fifth of the population had an average per capita monetary income lower than the subsistence minimum during the course of 1993.

The average monthly wages of workers at enterprises and organizations (not including cooperatives, small or private enterprises) for 1993 came to R43,800—9.7 times greater than in 1992 (first quarter—R14,300, second quarter—R30,500, third quarter—R51,500, fourth quarter—R78,800).

The average wage in December 1993 was R96,300—35 percent greater than in November 1993.

In this regard, the average wage in the material production sectors exceeded R96,100. In the nonproduction sphere it was R97,000, and not including credit and insurance organizations—R77,000.

Consumer market of goods and services. Toward the end of 1993, the decline in production of consumer goods had decelerated. The industry of the oblast produced consumer goods during the year totaling R429.5 billion, or 12.6 percent less than in 1992 (for the first quarter the reduction was 26.4 percent, for the first half year—14.2 percent).

The output of nonfood products decreased to the greatest extent (by 14.4 percent). This was affected by the sharp reduction in output of light industry products (by 20.4 percent).

The production decrease was 48 percent for cotton fabrics, 34 percent for knitted articles, and 14 percent for leather shoes.

The output of food products decreased by 4.7 percent. Some 5,300 tonnes (14 percent) less meat (industrial output) was produced than in 1992, sausage products—1,200 tonnes less (7 percent), whole milk products—8,200 tonnes less (13 percent), bread and bakery products—44,300 tonnes less (21 percent), and confectionery items—1,100 tonnes less (9 percent).

The production volume of dishware and crockery, sewing machines, electric irons, umbrellas, tape recorders, and greenhouses was higher than in 1992.

Over the past year, the retail trade volume of officially registered trade enterprises and public kitchens of all forms of ownership amounted to R245.2 billion. Expenditures by the populace on the purchase of commodities

increased 9.8-fold in actual prices as compared with 1992. Trade turnover in physical terms decreased by 9.7 percent. Almost half the trade turnover volume (48 percent) was attributable to privately owned enterprises. With respect to food products on the consumer market, an adverse situation has developed concerning provision of potatoes and vegetables to the populace.

As far as nonfood products are concerned, sales of televisions and synthetic detergents rose significantly (1.4-fold). It was precisely with respect to these goods, however, that interruptions in trade were observed.

Paid services totaling R18.1 billion were provided residents of the oblast over 1993. In current prices, the provision of paid services increased 9.2-fold as compared with 1992, while in physical terms 39 percent less in services was rendered to the populace.

The volume of provision of everyday services decreased 36 percent in comparable price terms over the 1992 level. Over half the volume of everyday services were provided by officially registered enterprises of the non-state sector. Provision of everyday services to the rural population deteriorated. According to the results of a one-time survey of the network of rural enterprises providing everyday services to the populace, 16 rural rayons lack a permanent network of consumer services, and an equal number do not have the itinerant variety of service provision.

Education. As of the start of the 1993/1994 school year, there were 696 general-education schools operating during the daytime and 14 evening-session schools. Additionally, there were two nonstate schools—a private high school and orthodox secondary school.

Pupils number over 153,000—1,719 (4 percent) more than was the case the previous school year.

There continues to be an increase in the number of schools operating in two or three sessions. Whereas for the 1992/1993 school year, 17 percent of schools were in this category, the proportion was 20 percent in 1993/1994. The percentage of pupils attending second session increased from 23 to 25 percent, third session—from 0.7 to 0.8 percent.

Some 12,300 students receive instruction in five institutes of higher education of the oblast. This number includes 9,800 students in daytime instruction. As compared with the 1992/1993 school year, the number of students has decreased by 679 (5 percent). Some 2,435 individuals obtained higher education in 1993. Only 49 percent of the graduates received employment assignments. The remainder were afforded the right to seek job placement independently.

In 27 special secondary and higher educational institutions, 17,200 students are receiving instruction. This includes 7,900 students (46 percent) at nine colleges. The number of students decreased a negligible amount—by 400 (2 percent)—as compared with the (1992-1993

school year. In 1993, 4,413 specialists were trained with special secondary and higher education. Fewer than one-third of the graduates (26 percent) received an employment assignment.

Crime. Some 22,700 crimes were registered in the oblast in 1993, 10 percent more than in 1992 (in 1992 the increase was 30 percent). Over half the crimes (58 percent) were solved.

The proportion of grave crimes committed during the year increased by 3 percent, amounting to 13.6 percent.

The proportion of property crimes continues to rise. Theft constituted almost 60 percent of all the crimes committed.

MATERIAL PRODUCTION

Industry. Industrial production in the oblast in 1993 was marked by instability. A trend toward deceleration of the decline in production was noted in the final months, however. Whereas the ratio of production volume for the first quarter of 1993 to that for the same period of 1992 was just 79.4 percent, the volume of industrial production on the whole as compared to the 1992 level was 88.3 percent. Deceleration of the decline in industrial production was affected by a growth in production output achieved by enterprises of the energy-producing machine building industry (137.6 percent), garment industry (112.7 percent), butter and cheese processing and dairy industry (115.5 percent), and printing industry (103.7 percent). The most significant lag behind 1992 levels was observed in the tractor and agricultural machine-building industry (37.6 percent of the 1992 level), in instrument manufacture (75.1 percent), the fuel industry (78.4 percent), and the textile industry (73.1 percent).

A drop was noted in the production of electric power—by 4 percent, major electrical machinery—by 31 percent, light bulbs—by 13 percent, automation tools and devices and their spare parts—by 41 percent, computer equipment—by 39 percent, and mineral fertilizers—by 20 percent.

Production of commercial timber fell by 31 percent. Due to the lack of raw timber, output of sawn lumber was reduced 17 percent.

Enterprises of the construction industry curtailed their output of building bricks by 7 percent, prefabricated reinforced concrete components—by 20 percent, soft roofing materials—by 39 percent, enameled ceramic tile—by 16 percent.

At the same time that production volume in industry diminished, a reduction was seen in the number of employees. This reduction in personnel is proceeding less intensively, however. In 1993 the number of employees decreased by just 5.1 percent. As a result, the drop in labor productivity was more significant—6.9 percent. One reason for this situation is the fact that the

number of qualified workers has been retained in hopes that production will improve.

There are 10 enterprises in the oblast engaged in conversion. In 1993 the total volume of production at these enterprises decreased 17 percent from the 1992 level, including a 47 percent decrease in military production. The proportion of the total output of these enterprises attributable to civilian production was 56.8 percent, as opposed to 63 percent in 1992.

Agriculture. With respect to agriculture, 1993 saw a continuation of the redistribution of lands, their privatization, and the reorganization of kolkhozes and sovkhozes. As a result, at the end of the year the oblast had 312 partnerships and joint-stock companies of the closed variety, 60 collective farms, 31 agricultural cooperatives, 31 sovkhozes, 21 kolkhozes, and two associations of peasant (owner-operated) farms. As of 1 January 1994, there were 3,183 peasant (owner-operated) farms, with 165,800 hectares of land at their disposal.

Some 633 peasant (owner-operated) farms were newly established during the year (1,947 in 1992), while more than 300 farms ceased their operation.

The gross production output of farms of every category in 1993 amounted to R936.2 million (in 1983 comparable prices). This is R82.3 million (8 percent) less than in 1992.

More than half (52 percent) the volume of gross agricultural output was obtained from farms of the populace and peasant (owner-operated) farms. Their share amounted to 42 percent in 1992. For all categories of farms, planted crop production output was significantly less than in 1992, as a result of reduced areas under seed and diminished crop productivity. Grain output totaled 726,200 tonnes (weight after additional processing)—88,800 tonnes (11 percent) less than in 1992; vegetable production totaled 106,200 tonnes—45,500 tonnes (30 percent) less; and flax fiber output was 6,800 tonnes—11,700 tonnes (65 percent) less. Production of potatoes increased by 8 percent, amounting to 719,500 tonnes.

For the 1994 harvest, agricultural enterprises almost cut in half their sowing of winter crops and plowing of land for spring planting.

The situation with respect to livestock is ambiguous. In 1993, a 2 percent growth was achieved in livestock production output for all categories of farms by increasing production in owner-operated farms and farms of the populace.

Agricultural enterprises reduced their production of meat in 1993 by 7 percent from 1992 levels, eggs—by 4 percent, wool—by 45 percent. Production of milk increased by 7 percent due to increased productivity of the cows, amounting to 412,800 tonnes. The average amount of milk yield per cow for the year was 2,008 kilograms (1,677 kilograms in 1992). The trend toward reduced herd size is continuing. As of 1 January 1994,

the number of cattle at all varieties of farms decreased by 8 percent, amounting to 618,300 head. The number of cows was reduced by 1 percent, amounting to 276,300 head. The number of pigs came to 318,800, 0.7 percent less; the number of sheep and goats—133,000, 6 percent less.

Increased numbers of livestock on farms of the populace and owner-operated farms did not compensate for their drop at agricultural enterprises.

Agricultural enterprises went into the winter season with reduced feed supplies.

In 1993, 57,600 tonnes of mineral fertilizers (converted to 100-percent effective nutrient substance) were delivered to meet the agriculture needs of the oblast, 20 percent less than the quantity requested.

As compared with 1992, agricultural enterprises obtained 73 percent fewer trucks last year, 67 percent fewer tractor trailers, 69 percent fewer bulldozers, and 6 percent fewer tractors. Sixty-six more combines were purchased, and 44 percent more earth movers.

Capital construction. Facilities and capacities were put into operation last year in the oblast at the Yartsevo diesel engine plants, at Dvigatel (in Yartsevo), at the Smolensk printing combine, Roslavl chemical plant, and Smolensk city dairy.

Hard-paved roads were constructed over 402.6 kilometers, including 285.6 kilometers of intra-farm road. This is 34 and 51 percent less than in 1992.

Livestock breeding premises were put into operation in the oblast to accommodate 4,100 cattle and 660 pigs; storage facilities for grain and seed storage—for 14,600 tonnes; and vegetable and potato storage facilities—for 1,200 tonnes of simultaneous storage.

The volume of capital investments from all sources of financing in 1993 was reduced by 32 percent, amounting to R118.8 billion. This is the consequence of decreased investment activity on the part of enterprises over the past two years. The rate of decline of capital investment volume was significantly higher in agriculture (53 percent) than in other sectors.

The proportion of centralized capital investments dropped from 58 percent in 1992 to 36 percent in 1993. The remainder of capital investments are covered by funds of enterprises (51 percent), preferential term credits (4 percent), and investment funds (9 percent). Some 59 percent of the centralized funds are attributable to republic budget funds.

Construction work is being accomplished by contractor organizations of various forms of ownership. State contractor organizations account for 23 percent of the cost of the work. The rest is accomplished by privately owned (21 percent) and mixed (56 percent) organizations.

Some 63 percent of capital investments were used in the construction of production facilities, 33 percent lower than the prior year level.

Capital investments in the nonproduction sphere were reduced by 2 percent, amounting to R43.9 billion. Of the total volume of capital investments, the share of funds used for housing and sociocultural construction increased from 35 percent in 1992 to 37 percent in 1993.

Some 4,780 apartments with all the modern conveniences were commissioned out of all sources of financing, including individual housing construction. These covered an area of 288,700 square meters—56,200 square meters (16 percent) less than in 1992. At the same time, the volume of housing put into operation from funds of the populace increased (by 26 percent), although the share of total housing introduced in the oblast attributable to such funds is still quite low (4.9 percent).

Transportation and communications. Some 16.3 million tonnes of diverse freight was shipped in 1993 by general-use transportation of all varieties—9.7 million tonnes (37 percent) less than in 1992.

Shipments of freight by motor vehicle transport decreased 2.2-fold. Shipments by rail decreased by 11.8 percent.

Virtually the entire volume (about 97 percent) of freight shipments by motor vehicle transport was accomplished by privatized enterprises.

Passenger traffic volume in general-use transportation totaled 6 billion passenger-kilometers, a decrease of 2.2 percent. This includes motor vehicle transport—decreasing by 16.7 percent—and railroad transportation—increasing by 1.2 percent.

Over 1993, 19.8 million (6.2 percent) fewer passengers were conveyed by all types of transportation than was the case a year ago, including a drop of 2.6 percent in railroad transportation and 14.2 percent in motor vehicle transport.

The plan for number of trips completed by intracity bus service was implemented only to the level of 79.5 percent as of 1 January 1994. This is 8 percent lower than for 1992.

Income from basic activity of communications enterprises totaled R9.1 billion in 1993, including R1.7 billion from services rendered to the populace. This represents a 10.7-fold increase over the 1992 level.

The main factor accounting for the growth in income was increased prices and rates for services.

FOREIGN ECONOMIC ACTIVITY

Fifty enterprises and organizations of the oblast shipped production output abroad in 1993 (including to the

Baltic countries). The volume of exports came to R164.6 billion in domestic prices, and \$171 million in foreign trade (contract) prices.

The production association Minudobreniya shipped \$12.5 million worth of fertilizers abroad (7.3 percent of the export volume of the oblast); the production association Kristall shipped precious stones valued at \$150.8 million (88.2 percent).

Enterprises also shipped 2,600 tonnes of artificial graphite, 2,100 tonnes of pelts, 460 tonnes of wood for fuel, 3,475 refrigerators (household), 330,900 fluorescent lamps, 131,600 square meters of facing tile, 640.7 tonnes of reinforced concrete items, 590,000 pair of socks, 624 tonnes of flax fiber, 138,100 square meters of roofing material, in addition to other production output. Some 42 percent of all exporter enterprises concluded barter transactions, receiving commodities from their foreign partners in exchange for their output.

The total volume of foreign trade turnover (total of exports and imports) through trade exchange relationships amounted to \$9.2 million in 1993.

Smolensk Internal Affairs Chief on 1993 Crime Statistics

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2 Feb 94 p 3

[Article by militia Major-General V. Vorobyev, chief of the oblast UVD [Internal Affairs Administration]: "Without Overcoming Crime, We Will Not Achieve a Normal Life." Comments on summary of criminal statistics for 1993]

[Text]

[Begin boxed material]

The operational situation in the oblast during the past year was difficult. There were 22,712 crimes recorded, an increase of 10 percent over 1992.

There was a characteristic increase in serious crimes. Moreover, not only was there an increase in their number, but also in their relative share within the overall structure of crime. This signifies an escalation of violence, cynicism and harshness in relations between people. During the year there were 182 reported cases of murder with assault. Moreover, almost half of them were in the sphere of family-domestic relations. There were 421 cases of grave bodily injury, with one in four of these resulting in the death of the victim, as well as 101 cases of rape and attempted rape.

[End boxed material]

Behind each of these criminal acts are the grief and tears of the victims, their loved ones and family members, a huge and often irreplaceable material loss, moral and psychological trauma, and broken human lives.

The situation is particularly alarming in the rural areas, where crime has increased by 10.5 percent and practically one out of every three crimes registered in the oblast is committed. The blame for this may be placed not only on the ill-planned migration policy, which has flooded the rural areas with convicted persons who have persistent negative habits and who are the outcasts of society, but also on the total absence of leisure time of the rural residents, their spiritual decline. A rich, full life, healthy in its constant interaction with nature, is often replaced by a ruinous passion for alcohol. The rural areas are steadily degenerating both spiritually and physically...

We may find many reasons for the avalanche-like growth of greedy acts, but the main one, in our opinion, consists of the increasing enmity between the haves and the have-nots, which is caused by an increase in the process of stratification of society by level of income and living standard. Criminal expropriation is rampant. But they are robbing not only the millionaires. Among our 10,230 fellow citizens whose property has been subjected to criminal encroachments, the overwhelming majority are ordinary workers with moderate or low income. Thieves have "cleaned out" 2,858 apartments, stolen 790 automobiles and motorcycles, and performed 258 acts of stealing livestock from personal subsidiary farms. There have been 972 cases of robbery and 166 cases of assault and brigandage committed against the personal property of citizens.

Taking the misfortune of others close to heart and understanding very well the condition of the people who have suffered because of criminals, I once again call upon Smolensk residents to show concern for the safety of their relatives and dear ones and the safekeeping of their personal property. We are ready to give aid in equipping residences with security alarms and to issue permits in accordance with the law for obtaining hunting rifles and gas-powered weapons, to help in the protection of enterprises, stores and offices, to train our four-footed friends for the security-guard service, etc.

Such a form of greedy-violent crime as extortion also requires special mention. There were 125 recorded cases of racketeering during the year. And, unfortunately, we are predicting an increase in such crimes in the future. We must say frankly, the detainment of extortionists presents no special difficulties. Many are caught red-handed and brought to criminal responsibility on all instances which have been reported in a timely manner by the victims. Nevertheless, according to the estimates of our experts, there are hundreds of times more cases of extortion than are officially reported and registered. This is an extremely dangerous crime, fraught with the most serious consequences, and the appraisal which the criminal code gives it is rather inadequate to the severity and social significance of racketeering.

Indulging in extortion and the obedient payment of the sums demanded by it will inevitably lead the bribe-payer into a maze of crime and will place him in jeopardy, along with the members of his family, his life and health, his

property and well-being. I suggest that anyone who knows of cases of extortion and anyone who has become the victim of criminal terror, threats and violence immediately report this to the law enforcement agencies.

The number of encroachments on state property is continually growing. Underground "privatization" is going on due to the carelessness, connivance, and sometimes even the participation of economic managers and other official and materially responsible persons. This is inflicting a great loss upon the economy. Along the line of criminal investigation alone there have been 6,470 registered crimes against state property, 79.5 percent of which constitute theft. The number of violent encroachments on our goods has increased: There have been 100 recorded cases of robbery and 13 cases of assault and brigandage.

The decline in the level of morality and culture, the disappearance of many hindering barriers, coupled with the spread of alcohol, have led to a significant deterioration of law and order. There were 2,271 crimes committed in public places, an increase of 54.8 percent. Street crime has increased by almost 30 percent. Moreover, almost half of these crimes were committed in Smolensk, and one-fourth—in Promyshlennyy Rayon, which for a number of reasons has become the most dangerous in terms of crime for Smolensk residents.

The increase in all forms of crime has been facilitated by a weakening in the struggle against drunkenness. Drunks committed around 5,000 crimes, which is 26 percent higher than in 1992. And in individual rayons, as for example in Roslavlskiy, Khislavichskiy, Monastyrshchinskiy, Temkinskiy and Rudnyanskiy Rayons, the increase in "drunken" crimes has comprised more than 80 percent.

Especially negative processes are taking place among the young people. Today few are worried that a thousand youths have been thrown out of schools and other educational institutions, deprived of the possibility of earning an honest living. Left to their own devices, having lost their moral guidelines and faith in justice, raised not on respect for the traditions of the older generations and all-human moral principles, but on worship of far from the best examples of Western life, young people often embark upon the path of crime.

Around 2,000 crimes of the racketeering type are committed by young people ranging in age from 14 to 18 years old. Among them there are thieves, robbers, rapists and murderers. Statistics show that the "army" of those who have transgressed the criminal law is being replenished not from the ranks of repeat offenders, but at the expense of young people. While recidivist crime has declined by 5.2 percent, crimes committed by minors have increased by one-fourth.

Especially daring crimes are often committed in groups. The increase in group crime comprised 24.3 percent. The participants in many criminal groupings are juveniles. An exceptional social danger is posed by the increasing

tendency of adults to involve juveniles in criminal activity, by the division of spheres of influence between the groupings, and by the training of physically developed but morally deficient young people who are ready to do anything for money in semi-underground sections and karate, boxing and kick-boxing clubs.

One other very complex problem is the struggle against the unlawful distribution of narcotics. The desire to withdraw into the phantom, unreal world of dope is especially inherent to young people. Judging by the official data, the scope of drug distribution is huge. In Russia during 1993 there were 53,169 identified cases of crimes associated with the illegal circulation of drugs, with one out of every 72 of these being discovered in our oblast. The Russian internal affairs agencies have seized around 20 tonnes of narcotic-containing plants from criminals, and here in our oblast—over 300 kilograms! Yet the "profession" of the drug addict is certainly not quiet: Considerable money is required to obtain the drugs. And this money is acquired through theft, robbery and hold-ups...

The increased boldness and violent directionality of crimes is expressed also in the fact that criminals are using weapons more often, including firearms. They are showing active resistance to the associates of the militia. According to the data of the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs], during the year associates of the Russian militia had to use weapons in suppressing crimes and detaining malefactors in 2,186 cases. The militia itself has borne tangible losses in this uncompromising struggle: 183 associates of law enforcement agencies were killed and 572 wounded in encounters with criminals.

There have been over 400 cases of unlawful storage and carrying of firearms discovered in the Smolensk region. Seized from the underground arsenal were 70 rifles, an anti-tank gun, 53 sawed-off shotguns, 39 homemade firearms, 81 grenades, 8 mines, 13 kilograms of tolite and almost 14,000 cartridges. There were over 800 recorded cases of resistance to associates of the militia, and 64 criminal cases were filed against persons using physical violence against the associates. The associates of the Smolensk militia were forced to use their weapons in over 200 cases!

Last year, thanks to the intensive work of the investigative services, 14.6 percent more criminal cases were investigated. The rate of crimes solved increased by 0.7 percent and comprised 58.1 percent (for all of Russia this figure is 50.6 percent). Of course, neither we, the professionals, nor the victims of the crimes, nor the oblast population can be satisfied by any positive results as long as there are 19 murderers and attempted murderers, 51 persons guilty of committing grave bodily injuries, 12 rapists, 500 robbers and brigands and over 7,000 thieves whose wrongdoings have not been exposed living in our midst. All our efforts and means are directed toward exposing these grave crimes and identifying and detaining the guilty parties.

This in general was the criminal situation in the oblast last year. We cannot call it extreme, but we predict an even more difficult situation whose control will require the effort of all forces and the attraction of all available means.

Sverdlovsk 1993 Socioeconomic Figures Reported

944F0380A Yekaterinburg URALSKIY RABOCHIY
in Russian 4 Feb 94 pp 1-2

[Article by Sverdlovsk Oblast Statistical Administration: "Gaydar Would Call It Stabilization...On the Socioeconomic Position of Sverdlovsk Oblast in 1993"]

[Text] In 1993 enterprises of the oblast produced 5.4737 trillion rubles [R] worth of products in current prices, which is 6.5 times more than last year's production volume.

In comparable prices, the volumes of industrial production were 17 percent below the 1992 level, and the reduction of volume in 1992 as compared to the level of the preceding year was 27.4 percent, that is, the rates of reduction have slowed up. At the same time the highest rates of reduction of volumes of production of products occurred during the first and fourth quarters, and the lowest during the second and third quarters.

The main reasons for the reduction of production volumes were the difficult financial position of the enterprises caused by nonpayments of buyers of products, lack of material resources and difficulties with the sale of products, and numerous production shutdowns. The greatest losses were observed at enterprises of machine building and metal processing and light, chemical, and petrochemical industries.

The basic volume of products (56.6 percent) was produced by enterprises with a mixed form of ownership. They make up 29.7 percent of the overall number of enterprises, and 49.1 percent of the industrial production personnel work at them. State enterprises, making up 55.5 percent and employing 44.2 percent of the personnel, produced 37.7 percent of the overall volume of products. Additionally, there were 88 private enterprises and nine municipal enterprises functioning in industry along with 11 enterprises that are the property of public organizations.

Industry

A reduction of the volumes of the production of products occurred in all branches of industry but there were significant differences in terms of rates and scale. Thus light industry enterprises reduced volumes as compared to last year's level by 25.2 percent, machine building—23.3 percent, nonferrous metallurgy—22.8 percent, and the food industry—1.6 percent.

In the fuel and energy complex there was a reduction of the output of electric energy of 14.2 percent as compared to the 1992 level, the extraction of coal—by 3.7 percent, and peat—by 51 percent.

In ferrous metallurgy there was a reduction as compared to the 1992 level of the output of iron—by 10.3 percent, steel—by 11.9 percent, high grade cold rolled steel—by 36.1 percent, and cold rolled sheet metal—by 66.4 percent. At the same time the production of finished rolled metal was 3.1 percent above last year's level and cold rolled steel strips—5.6 percent.

For a number of kinds of machine building products the output was below the 1992 level: The production of technological equipment for the processing branches of the agro-industrial complex decreased by 47.2 percent, diesel engines and diesel generators—by 40.3 percent, gas turbines—by 37.1 percent, large electrical machines—by 32.4 percent, excavators—by 13.4 percent, blast furnace and steel smelting equipment—by 7.1 percent, and machine tools with numerical programmed control—by 66.7 percent (although the output of metal cutting machine tools exceeded the 1992 level by 35.4 percent).

Enterprises of the chemical-timber complex reduced the production of sulfuric acid by 18.6 percent as compared to last year's level, synthetic resins and plastics—by 16.7 percent, commercial timber—by 23.7 percent, lumber—by 27.3 percent, chip board—by 30.4 percent, and paper—by 57.2 percent. The output of passenger vehicle and motorcycle tires and nitrogen fertilizers remained at the 1992 level.

In the construction materials industry the output of cement increased by 1.4 percent as compared to last year, window glass—by 15.7 percent, ceramic facing tiles—by 4.2 percent, and ceramic sanitation items—by 3.5 percent. But there was a reduction of the production of construction brick—by 24.1 percent and prefabricated reinforced concrete elements—by 17.7 percent. Consumer goods production amounted to R836.9 billion, which in comparable prices is 6.9 percent below the 1992 level. For all groups of goods except wine and vodka and beer we did not manage to maintain the 1992 production volumes.

Food production amounted to R299.3 billion. The sharp decline in the production of food products in 1992 by 19.4 percent was replaced by a relative stabilization of their output in 1993 (a reduction of 0.8 percent as compared to the level of the preceding year). More meat was produced during the year—4,499 tonnes (4.9 percent), butter—1,067 tonnes (14.9 percent), mayonnaise—1,701 tonnes (15.1 percent) and confectionery items—1,529 tonnes (2.2 percent). At the same time less semimanufactured meat products were produced—386 tonnes (1.8 percent), whole milk products—27,061 tonnes (7.4 percent), margarine—10,136 tonnes (30.3 percent), vegetable oil—373 tonnes (17.7 percent), and bread and bakery items—34,918 tonnes (6.4 percent).

Some R34.7 billion worth of wine and vodka items and beer was produced, which exceeds last year's level by 8.1 percent, as a result of increasing the output of strong alcoholic beverages, champagne, and beer.

At light industry enterprises there was a reduction of the production of fabrics by 24.2 percent, footwear—by 48.3 percent, knitted items—by 19.8 percent, and the output of goods for children decreased by 31-67 percent.

The output of nonfood consumer goods (not including light industry goods) decreased by 9.2 percent, while this figure was 6.8 percent in 1992. The production of motorcycles was 7.4 percent less, enameled steel dishware—37.6 percent, bicycles—40.5 percent, and household goods—41.2 percent less. There was an increase in the output of certain kinds of complicated household equipment: kitchen appliances—by 38.4 percent, television sets—by 167.8 percent, electric irons—by 29.2 percent, and electric teapots—by 8.4 percent. At the same time there was a 39.2 percent reduction of the production of washing machines, video cassette recorders—53.5 percent, and radio equipment—56.3 percent.

Capital Construction

In the oblast national economy during the report year fixed capital valued at R257.5 was introduced, including for production purposes—R140.7 billion (54.6 percent of the overall amount introduced, in 1992 it was 64.6).

During the report period 1,490,500 square meters of residential space was introduced (100.1 percent of the 1992 level). At the same time there was a reduction of the rates of housing construction in 11 cities (35.5 percent of the overall number) and 18 rayons (78.2 percent). Among them were the cities of Irbit, Nevyansk, Serov, and Severouralsk, and the following rayons: Verkhoturskiy, Prigorodnyy, and Krasnoufimskiy.

General educational schools were introduced to accommodate 8,837 (72.7 percent of the 1992 level), children's preschool institutions to accommodate 2,310 (65.3 percent), hospitals with 639 beds (2.8 times more than in 1992), and polyclinics for 2,702 visits per shift (149.7 percent).

The introduction of housing per one oblast resident amounted to 0.32 square meters (in 1992—0.31), children's preschool institutions—0.53 places for 100 children of preschool age (in 1992—0.78), general educational schools—1.11 places for every 100 school children (in 1992—1.54), hospitals—1.37 beds for every 10,000 residents (1992—0.48), and polyclinics—5.78 visits per shift per 10,000 residents (1992—3.84).

Capital investments in the oblast economy amounted to R671.5 billion (71.4 percent of the 1992 level in comparable prices). Of these R385.6 billion (57.4 percent; in 1992—61.2 percent) was used for production purposes.

Centralized capital investments in the oblast national economy amounted to R204.2 billion (98.0 percent of

the 1992 level), and of these, money from the federal budget amounted to R65 billion (63 percent of the 1992 level) and from local budgets—R139.2 billion (132.4 percent). Capital belonging to state enterprises and organizations amounted to R200.9 billion (38 percent of the 1992 level) and other forms of ownership and credit—R254.9 billion (136.1 percent of the 1992 level), and capital belonging to the population and housing construction collectives—R11.5 billion (71.8 percent of the 1992 level).

In the agro-industrial complex during the report year fixed capital valued at R25.7 billion was introduced, including for production purposes—R19.7 billion. There was a reduction of the volume of startup of housing and social, cultural, and domestic facilities: In 1993, 126,500 square meters of dwelling space was introduced (70.8 percent of the 1992 level), children's preschool institutions to accommodate 50 (18.9), schools to accommodate 960 (in 1992—71.4), and clubs and houses of culture to accommodate 360 (48.0).

As of 1 January 1994 there were 514 contracting and repair-construction organizations in operation (as of 1 January 1993—514), of which 131 (192) were state, 4 (5)—municipal, 229 (199)—with a mixed form of ownership, and 150 (118)—private. They performed contracting work in a volume of R504.7 billion, including by state enterprises—R93.6 billion (19.1 percent of the overall volume; in 1992—33.6), municipal—2.6 (0.5 percent; in 1992—0.5), with a mixed form of ownership—254.3 (50.4 percent; in 1992—41.1), and by private organizations—R151.5 billion (30.0 percent; in 1992—24.8).

Agriculture

The increase in the number of producers of agricultural products did not lead to an increase in their production. According to the estimate, the gross agricultural output decreased by 5 percent as compared to 1992.

In 1993 the gross yield of grain on all categories of farms amounted to 744,200 tonnes in weight after cleaning (73 percent of last year's level), potatoes—654,700 tonnes (72 percent), and vegetables—228,900 tonnes (121 percent). The production of potatoes was 139 kg and vegetables—49 kg per oblast resident. Grain production was concentrated mainly on agricultural enterprises and potatoes and vegetables—on private subsidiary farms belonging to the population.

By the beginning of 1994, 12,700 tonnes of grain had been added to state resources, which is 2.5 times more than last year; potatoes—26,000 tonnes (39 percent of the 1992 level), and vegetables—53,300 tonnes (76 percent). The proportion of grain procured as compared to the volume of its production was 2 percent, potatoes—4 percent, and vegetables—23 percent.

The situation in animal husbandry is characterized by a reduction of the arrival of products from the farms of agricultural enterprises and simultaneously a small

increase in their production in private yards of the citizens. For one resident of the oblast they produced 319 eggs, 199 liters of milk, and 36 kg of meat.

Agricultural enterprises sold 149,200 tonnes of cattle and poultry for slaughter (94 percent of 1992), including poultry—60,900 tonnes (99.8 percent); the milk yield—562,200 tonnes (99.7 percent); and 1,374.1 million eggs were received (94.5 percent). The average milk yield from one cow was 2,681 kg and exceeded last year's level by 202 kilograms.

The reduction of the breeding herd led to a reduction of the production of young animals. During the report year as compared to the 1992 level we failed to receive 17,700 calves (7 percent) and 34,800 piglets (5 percent). Losses from death and destruction of hogs exceeded last year's level by 19,900 and cattle—by 200 head. As of 1 January 1994 the farms had 501,300 head of cattle, including cows—193,200, horses—17,000 (92 percent each), hogs—347,100 (93 percent), and poultry—13,706,100 head (97 percent).

State procurements of animal husbandry products (except for eggs) during January-December 1993 exceeded last year's level and amounted to: cattle and poultry—137,200 tonnes (101 percent), milk—480,000 tonnes (102 percent), eggs—1,153.9 billion (98 percent); the share from agricultural enterprises in state resources accounted for 94.1 percent of the meat and 99.2 percent of the milk. The amounts purchased from the population were 7,400 tonnes (5.4 percent) of cattle and poultry and 2,400 tonnes (0.5 percent) of milk, and the amounts purchased from farmers were 700 tonnes (0.5 percent) and 1,400 tonnes (0.3 percent), respectively.

As of 1 January 1994 there were 3,119 farmers, which was 16 percent more than at the beginning of 1993. Farmyards occupy 91,200 hectares of land, including 57,300 hectares of plowed land, which amounts to an average of 18 hectares per one farm.

Transportation and Communications

There was a reduction of freight shipments on all kinds of transportation, including automotive—by 47 million tonnes (38.5 percent), and rail—34.6 million tonnes (20 percent). The volume of shipments of freight and mail on air transportation decreased by 6,400 tonnes (37.2 percent). The reduction of the shipments of freight was caused by the reduction of the output of many kinds of products and also their concentration in warehouses of enterprises because of nonpayments.

Passenger turnover on general purpose transportation increased by 433.7 million passenger-kilometers (1.6 percent), including on rail transportation—by 2.3365 trillion passenger-kilometers (14.5 percent) and automotive—by 32.3 million passenger-kilometers (0.5 percent). Passenger turnover on air transportation decreased by 1.9351 trillion passenger-kilometers (47.7 percent).

The quality of passenger service is still poor. There was a considerable deterioration of the work of city transportation in Yekaterinburg. Each week buses and streetcars fail to make up to 13 percent of the planned trips, and trolleys—up to 10 percent of the trips. An investigation conducted by state statistical organs in November 1993 showed that during the morning peak hours every other bus passenger had to wait more than 20 minutes for a bus to come, as did every fifth streetcar passenger and every sixth trolley passenger. Time spent traveling to work and back amounted to an average of 1.5 hours a day, but 16 percent of the passengers (every sixth one) spends more than two hours. Three-fourths of the passengers questioned mentioned the crowding of the transportation vehicles during the morning peak hours. Only 2 percent of those questioned used the subway.

Commuter train and bus service for the population of the city of Yekaterinburg is getting worse. The number of scheduled suburban trips has been reduced. During January-February 1993 each week the schedule included 2,400 suburban trips, and during November-December—only 2,100.

As of 1 January 1994 there were 14 joint-stock companies operating in the general purpose automotive transportation system (25 percent of the overall number). They moved 62 percent of the freight and 8 percent of the passengers.

During 1993 communications enterprises received R34.7 billion in revenues from their basic activity, including R8.8 billion from the population. The volume of communications services in physical terms decreased considerably: The delivery of newspapers, magazines, and parcels—twofold, and letters, printed material, money transfers, and telegrams—by one-fourth.

The number of telephones in cities of the oblast increased by 21,200 (4 percent), and in rural locations—by 600 (1 percent). At the same time the number of city and rural automatic telephones decreased by 404 (6 percent) and interurban ones—by 143 (17 percent).

Finances

In 1993 the consolidated budget of Sverdlovsk Oblast received R837.3 billion in revenues, which is 10 times more than last year's level. The main sources of revenue are still: profit tax—R449.2 billion, income tax from citizens—R147.6 billion, value added tax—R87.1 billion, property tax—R19.2 billion, and excise tax—R18.2 billion. But because of the unsatisfactory financial conditions of a number of enterprises and organizations, the debt on payments to the oblast and local budgets continues to grow. As of 1 January of this year its amount reached R49.5 billion.

Budget expenditures amounted to R829.7 billion and increased 11-fold. Financing the national economy took R287.8 billion, public education—R180.7 billion, public health and physical culture—R203.7 billion, culture and

art—R16.3 billion, science—R0.7 billion, and stipends and compensation payments for children amounted to—R16.5 billion.

The consolidated oblast budget ended up with a surplus (with revenues surpassing expenditures) of R7.6 billion.

According to preliminary calculations, the sum of profit received by enterprises and organizations of the oblast during 1993 will amount to R1.750 trillion. State enterprises account for 43 percent of all the profit, and nonstate enterprises—57 percent. Based on the results of their operation over 11 months, losses were sustained by 306 of the more than 2,100 enterprises considered. The sum of their losses amounted to R5.4 billion.

Credit indebtedness of industrial, construction, transportation, and agricultural enterprises and organizations as of 1 December amounted to R1.4344 trillion, of which R438.9 billion or 30.6 percent was defaulted. The monetary funds of the enterprises, which amounted to R110.5 billion, covered their credit indebtedness by 7.7 percent, including in industry—7.8 percent, construction—5.4 percent, transportation—10.7 percent, and agriculture—5.9 percent.

Significant amounts of defaulted credit indebtedness are related to the existence of debit indebtedness. As of 1 December debit indebtedness amounted to R1.5395 billion, including defaulted debts—R538.8 billion, 92 percent of which are defaulted debts of buyers.

Prices and Rates

In December 1993 as compared to December 1992 consumer prices for goods and services rose 8.5-fold (not including non-necessities—8.6-fold), and wholesale prices for industrial products—10.7-fold. The growth rates for food and nonfood goods were considerably below the rates of prices and rates for paid services to the population, which increased 33.5-fold during the year.

In 1993 subsidies were allotted to producers of agricultural products for livestock, milk, and eggs, and there was regulation of wholesale prices of monopoly enterprises, rates for certain socially significant kinds of services, and also trade increments for a number of goods, which undoubtedly retarded the growth of prices.

In December 1993 as compared to the level of December of the preceding year vegetables became 16 times more expensive, milk and dairy products—15 times, and eggs—12 times. Prices of meat and poultry, sausage and macaroni items, and potatoes increased 9-10-fold; fish, butter and vegetable oil, flour, bread and bakery items—7-8-fold; and cheeses, margarine, and confectionery—6-7-fold. For fabrics, knitwear, leather and textile footwear, tobacco items, radio equipment, and electrical goods prices rose 3-4-fold, and clothing, rubber footwear, and furniture—5-fold. The highest growth was for medications—an average of 36-fold.

Of the services rendered to the population, the greatest price increases were for services of a legal nature and of banking institutions (386-fold) and also institutions of culture (86-fold). Rates for passenger transportation and communications and prices of medical service and housing services increased 17-19-fold, and consumer and tourist-excursion services and services for keeping children in preschool institutions—22-24-fold, and the cost of passes to sanatorium-health resort and health institutions rose 26-fold. The least growth in rates occurred for municipal services (11.3-fold).

As of the end of December in retail trade in the oblast the following average prices developed for the main food products: beef—R2,058 per kg, butter—R3,327 per kg, potatoes—R287 per kg, sugar—R812 per kg, eggs—R752 for 10, and milk R301 per liter. There is still a considerable differentiation of prices among the various cities (rayons) of the oblast. The minimum price for a liter of milk in the oblast in December was R123 and the maximum—R524; for 10 eggs—R405 and R930, respectively, for a kilogram of beef—R1,800 and R2,943, for butter—R2,765 and R4,485, for sugar—R620 and R848, and for potatoes—R70 and R360.

The greatest disparity of prices among the various cities and rayons of the oblast is still for paid services to the population. Thus the disparity in prices for laundry services was 10-fold, hotels—12-fold, bathhouses—25-fold, dormitories—80-fold, and medical service—from 10-fold to 39-fold.

Prices of food products at city markets in 1993 increased more slowly than they did in state trade. In December 1993 as compared to December 1992 at the markets meat increased in cost on average 7.8-fold, milk, sour cream, and cottage cheese—6.6-fold, and potatoes and vegetables—14-fold. As before, the market price level was higher than prices in organized trade. At the end of December the average price level at city markets for meat was R2,474 per kg, sour cream—R4,254 per kg, cottage cheese—R1,780 per kg, potatoes—R363 per kg, and milk—R656 per liter.

Prices of producers of industrial products grew at more rapid rates than did consumer prices, and in December 1993 as compared to December 1992 they increased for products for production and technical purposes 10.8-fold, and for consumer goods—9.5-fold. Since September the growth rates of prices for industrial products have begun to drop and in December they were the lowest in the report year—11.6 percent. In December a smaller increase in prices than in all the preceding months of 1993 was found in ferrous metallurgy, forestry and light industry, in which, as compared to December 1992, prices increased on average 10-12-fold. Prices increased most during the year in electric energy engineering, especially electric energy for agricultural consumers (91-fold). Rates for electric energy for industrial consumers increased 16.7-fold, for electric commuter rail transportation—23-fold, for city transportation—37.5-fold, and for thermal energy—on average 35.7-fold.

The rates for the shipment of freight for all kinds of transportation in December 1993 as compared to December 1992 increased almost 23-fold, including automotive—11.5-fold, air—15.2-fold, pipelines (gas)—20.9-fold, and rail—26.7-fold.

Commodity Turnover

Retail commodity turnover, including the sale of goods for hard currency, amounted to R1.2673 trillion, including in the trade network—R1.1787 trillion, and at public catering enterprises—R88.6 billion. In actual prices commodity turnover exceeded last year's level 10-fold, but in comparable prices it was 5.3 percent less.

Retail commodity turnover of all officially registered trade enterprises developed as follows: 39.6 percent (in 1992—54.9 percent) of all the goods were sold in the state sector, and in the private sector—47.9 percent (35.6 percent), at enterprises of the consumer cooperation system—5.8 percent (9.3 percent), and at other nonstate enterprises—6.7 percent (0.2 percent).

Commodity supplies in warehouses of the retail network of officially registered trade enterprises as of 1 January 1994 amounted to R202.5 billion, which was R496.5 million (2.5 percent) more than as of the beginning of last year. This volume of commodity resources could maintain continuous trade for 28 days.

There was an increase in the proportion of nonfoodstuffs in the structure of retail commodity turnover in 1993.

The situation in the foodstuffs market was relatively stable, but the assortment and quality of the products and the prices did not always meet consumer demand. In spite of the constant availability of practically all foodstuffs for free sale and their active sales, the low buying power of the population allowed them to acquire less food than in past years, although there was an increase in sales in the main commodity groups.

The situation with the provision by state trade organizations of potatoes and vegetables for the population is worse than in previous years. By the beginning of the winter season in the storage facilities of the trade network there was less for long-term storage than last year: potatoes, onions, and carrots—by half, and cabbage—by one-third. The volumes that were stored up were practically 50 percent less than the amount sold annually in the trade network.

The provision of the population with nonfoodstuffs improved last year, with R597.9 billion sold. The stores were saturated mainly because of costly goods and increased foreign procurements by commercial structures. According to accounting data, more than half of the fabrics, clothing, and footwear brought into the oblast, up to 40 percent of the business goods, and 30 percent of the haberdashery items are imports.

In turn, one-fourth of the commodity mass produced in the oblast is shipped outside, including one-third of the

finished knitwear items, one-fourth of the felt footwear, one-half of the hosiery items and leather footwear, and 70-80 percent of the radio equipment, motorcycles, and motor scooters.

The following was sold to the population of the oblast during the year: clothing and underwear—1.1 times more than during 1992, hosiery items—1.2 times, footwear—1.1 times, silk fabrics—1.8 times, and cotton fabrics—1.3 times. The demand of the population for cultural and domestic goods is not declining—99,100 radios were sold (1.8-times more than last year), and television sets—92,200 (1.7-times). Of the goods in daily demand there was an increase in the sales of toilet soap by 15.5 percent (5,500 tonnes were sold), household soap—30 percent (4,200 tonnes), and detergents—61.5 percent (13,200 tonnes). The sale of wool fabrics and knitted items did not reach last year's level.

The volume of sales of paid services amounted to R125.8 billion, but in physical terms the population received half the volume of services rendered in 1992.

The sale of paid services was mainly at enterprises of the state and municipal sectors, which accounted for 83.0 percent of the total volume. Enterprises with the mixed and private forms of ownership accounted for 16.5 percent of the overall volume of paid services, and 0.5 percent was at enterprises that are the property of public organizations. The greatest decline in the number of orders was for consumer services—repair of housing and furniture, laundry, and dry cleaning.

Foreign Economic Activity

Product exports amounted to R520.9258 trillion in domestic prices or \$892 million in foreign trade prices. The volume of goods delivered for freely convertible currency was R82.2799 trillion in domestic prices or 15.8 percent of the overall volume of exports.

The largest proportion of the overall volume of exports was made up of raw and processed materials—93.9 percent. The proportion of machines and equipment was 3.5 percent; equipment and materials for facilities under construction abroad with technical assistance from the Russian Federation—0.8 percent; consumer goods—0.3 percent; and services—1.5 percent of the overall volume of exports. The main export items are metals and items made from them, chemical products, ores, and concentrates.

The largest exporting enterprises are: the NTMK Joint-Stock Company—48.5 percent of the overall volume of exports, the VIZ Joint-Stock Company—3.4 percent; and the Bogoslovskiy Aluminum Plant Joint-Stock Company—2.9 percent.

Among the countries delivering raw materials, the industrially developed countries are in the lead. Thus imports from Japan amounted to \$9,447,000., the United States of America—\$9,237,000, Austria—\$7,809,000, and Germany—\$5,220,000.

During 1993, \$581.4 million was deposited in the foreign currency accounts of enterprises and organizations. Foreign currency revenues from exporting products amounted to \$461.1 million, services—\$42.7 million, and other revenues—\$77.4 million. A total of \$562.4 million in foreign currency funds were spent, including for importing products—\$97.1 million, services—\$2.6 million, and other payments—\$96.1 million. Foreign currency amounting to \$366.4 million was sold.

Exchanges

During the year the five exchanges held 946 trading sessions and concluded 5,120 transactions. The turnover of the exchanges amounted to R55.0597 trillion. More than half of the transactions—56.6 percent—were for the sale of products for production and technical purposes, and commodity turnover amounted to R23.4783 trillion.

Monetary resources that were sold amounted to R16.2194 trillion, of which R8.068.5 were credit resources and R8,150.9 were deposit resources. Security sales amounted to R7.8805 trillion, including stocks—R3.4437 trillion, options—R2.3932 trillion, and privatization checks—R2.0436 trillion.

The Standard of Living of the Population

After the sharp decline in 1992 the standard of living of the population stabilized at a mark considerably below that of the pre-reform period. Monetary incomes of the population increased 10.2-fold, reaching R41,000 per one resident per month. In December the nominal per capita monetary income amounted to R95,000.

According to data from an ongoing selective study of family budgets, during the fourth quarter 14 percent of the families were on the threshold of poverty, which is defined by the physiological minimum for nutrition (R38,100), 41 percent were underprivileged families with income per one family member between the poverty threshold and the subsistence minimum, which is evaluated by the consumer basket, which is valued at R71,500. The proportion of these families decreased from 69 percent in the fourth quarter of 1992 to 55 percent during the same period of last year.

There was a 10 percent increase in the proportion of families with incomes equal to the value of one to two consumer baskets. There were more well-off families (with an average per capita income equal to the value of two to four consumer baskets)—8 percent, while a year ago they made up 5 percent, and for the first time it was possible to single out rich people—0.4 percent of the families have an average per capita income in excess of the value of four consumer baskets. As a result of the continuing stratification of the population, the average level of per capita income of the 10 percent of the most well-off citizens was 7.7 times above the corresponding level of the 10 percent of the least well-off.

Bank deposits of the population as of 1 January 1994 amounted to R125.8 billion. The increase in savings of

the population in deposits and securities (bonds, certificates, treasury notes) reached R108.5 billion and increased 13.3-fold as compared to the preceding year.

The AVERAGE ANNUAL NUMBER OF WORKERS was 1,785,900 (not counting workers at small enterprises), which is 4.2 percent less than in 1992.

A one-time study of the employment of the population conducted by statistical organs during the period from 20 through 31 October 1993 encompassed 0.3 percent of the population between 15 and 72 years of age living permanently in the cities and rayons (except Garinskiy and Tabsoinskiy) of Sverdlovsk Oblast. As a result it was discovered that of the overall number studied, 62.1 percent had work and 3.1 percent of them were looking for different or additional work. Of the number who did not have work, 8.2 percent were looking for it, including those registered with the employment service as unemployed—1.4 percent, those not looking for work—36.2 percent, and those who did not need to work—55.6 percent.

The number of citizens applying to the employment service regarding questions of labor placement amounted to 80,563 at the end of 1993, 46,832 of which were women.

The demand for labor force continues to decrease. Notifications by enterprises of the need for workers decreased as compared to the beginning of the year by 17.4 percent and as of 1 January 1994 amounted to 5,459.

As of 1 January 1994, 28,015 people were officially recognized as unemployed, of whom 17,471 received compensation. Women make up 67.2 percent of the unemployed. The number of youth under 29 years of age among the unemployed decreased by 2 percent as compared to last year and amounted to 36.0 percent.

During the year R1,165.1 million was spent for payment of compensation, including R235.7 million during December.

The average annual wages in the oblast reached R59,551, which is 8.8 times above last year's level. In December in the oblast wages amounted to R133,554, and the average amount of material assistance and benefits per one worker was R25,312.

According to preliminary figures, the population as of 1 January 1994 amounted to 4,665,300. There remains a tendency toward decrease of the birth rate and increase of the death rate of the population. In 1993, 4,400 fewer children were born than in the preceding year, and the coefficient of the birth rate (the number of births per 1,000 population) decreased from 9.5 in 1992 to 8.6, or by 10 percent.

The decline of the birth rate is explained not only by objective demographic factors but also by the deterioration of the socioeconomic situation in the oblast. These same factors can explain the continuing rise of the level of the death rate of the population; during the past year

the number of deaths increased by 10,700. The coefficient of the death rate (the number of deaths per 1,000 residents) was 15.0, and in the preceding year it was 12.7. There was a 9 percent increase in the coefficient of infant mortality; 19 children die out of every 1,000 births. The number of deaths in 1993 exceeded the number of births by 30,000.

As a favorable factor in the demographic situation one can observe a certain increase in the number of marriages—by 1,300.

By the beginning of 1994 on the territory of the oblast there were 4,000 refugee families registered and only 8,400 who were forced to resettle. The majority came from Tajikistan—42 percent, from Georgia—23 percent, and from Azerbaijan—9 percent. Two-thirds of them are Russians, and then come Greeks, Armenians, and Tatars. They are settling mainly in Yekaterinburg and other large cities of the oblast; 824 people have settled in rural areas.

During the year internal affairs organs registered 108,123 crimes—1,528 less than in 1992. There were 5,435 fewer crimes committed in Yekaterinburg and 1,768 more crimes committed in the other territories of the oblast. The proportion of these crimes increased from 18.7 percent to 23.6 percent. The number of premeditated murders increased—1,097 (last year—898), premeditated serious bodily harm—3,334 (2,662), torture—650 (550), and rape—587 (last year—466). As a result of the crimes that were committed, 2,828 people died. The number of property crimes decreased by 5 percent compared to last year, and their proportion in the structure of crime is the highest—74 percent; there was a 4 percent increase in crimes against public order and the health of citizens, and the number of crimes against individuals increased by 26 percent. The number of people who had committed crimes who were found out was 44,165.

During the year 45 rallies and demonstrations were registered in the oblast in which more than 278,000 people participated, four strikes, with a total of 1,704 strikers, and 18,822 work days were lost.

Privatization

The year 1993 is characterized by the completion of "small-scale" privatization and the beginning of privatization of enterprises of the base branches of the national economy. As of 1 January 1994 2,828 enterprises in the oblast had been privatized (which was about one-third of the number of enterprises owned by the state), including 1,610 in 1993. The number of privatized enterprises increased 2.3-fold as compared to 1992. Of the overall number of privatized enterprises, 74.3 percent were completely bought out, of which 58.5 percent were bought in 1993, which exceeds the 1992 rates 1.4-fold. By the time of their privatization more than 620,000 people were employed at these enterprises. Privatization of enterprises and individual facilities was conducted in

all cities and rayons of the oblast except Garinskiy, Pyshminskiy, and Taborinskiy.

With the development of "large-scale privatization" there was an increase in the proportion of federally owned enterprises in the overall number of those privatized from 8.6 percent in 1992 to 16 percent in 1993, and the proportion of enterprises privatized through the creation of joint-stock companies increased from 0.7 percent to 18 percent. The most widespread form was privatization of enterprises on a competitive basis—41.5 percent; 8.1 percent of the facilities were sold at auction; and 27 percent of the enterprises were purchased by collectives who were leasing the property. The sales price exceeded the initial price 4.5-fold as compared to two-fold in 1992.

Earnings from privatization of enterprises (facilities), including joint-stock companies, during 1993 amounted to R10.2179 trillion, which was 90.4 percent of the volume of monetary funds envisioned by the oblast program for privatization for 1993. From privatization of municipally owned enterprises they received R6.3225 trillion (61.9 percent), oblast owned—R499.1 million (4.9 percent), and federally owned—R3.3963 trillion (33.2 percent). Of the earnings, 41.8 percent was transferred into local budgets, 25.6 percent—into the oblast budget, 13.9 percent—into the federal budget, and 18.7 percent went to state privatization organs.

During the year 276,500 apartments were turned over to private ownership of citizens; this is 23.1 percent of the number of apartments subject to privatization. The overall value of privatized apartments is estimated at R17.919 trillion. The local budget received R32.7 million. Since the beginning of privatization of the housing supply (July 1992) a total of 364,700 apartments (30.4 percent) have been sold to the citizens for private ownership.

Environmental Protection

As compared to last year investments in environmental protection measures decreased by 20 percent (in comparable prices) and amounted to R26.392 trillion. Of the overall volume of capital investments, 56 percent went for protection and rational utilization of water resources, 28 percent—for protection of the air, and 4 percent—for protection and rational utilization of land.

During the year 29 cases of surging overflows and discharges of pollutants were registered. They led to extremely high levels of pollution of the environment. The overall total damage amounted to R88.4 million.

Discharges of pollutants into bodies of water in excess of the norm were allowed by almost every fifth enterprise of the 975 that were investigated, and every sixth one of the 1,096 inspected was functioning while exceeding the maximum permissible discharges into the atmosphere.

In 1993, 521 cases of forest fires were registered, 9,400 cubic meters of timber burned or was damaged in the stand, and the damage caused by forest fires is estimated at

R7.6 million. Forest restoration work has been conducted on an area of 59,500 hectares, 41.6 percent of which are planted in seeds and seedlings.

Rossel Continues Work To Legalize Urals Autonomy

944F0415A Moscow OBSHCAYA GAZETA in Russian
No 9, 4 Mar 94 p 8

[Article by Oleg Zhirnov: "Rossel Persists"]

[Text] **The all but buried and long-forgotten plan for the Ural Republic has risen like a phoenix from the ashes.**

Last week former Governor Eduard Rossel, now a senator from Sverdlovsk Oblast, officially submitted a package of documents to the Federation Council in an attempt to legalize the Ural Republic. Copies of the documents were forwarded to the State Duma. According to plan, the State Duma should pass a law to change the status of the federation member, and the Federation Council should ratify it.

Both will require the support of a two-thirds majority. Eduard Rossel and his fellow countrymen in the Duma have launched an intense lobbying campaign. The former governor, who was removed from office by the RF president precisely for his declaration of the Ural Republic, asserts that he is finding support in the higher chamber. Furthermore, he is winning the support of not only senators from krais and oblasts, but also senators from republics who were previously against this idea. In the lower house, parliamentary hearings on the Ural initiative have already been scheduled for 18 April.

On his next trip to Moscow, the ex-governor hopes to talk to the leaders of political parties and parliamentary factions: Zhirinovskiy, Zyuganov, and Gaydar. He has special hopes for his meeting with Vladimir Volfovich, who is "always talking about the equality of federation members." Sergey Shakhrai, the leader of the PRES and the minister for federation affairs who is willing to support the idea of a Ural Republic extending to at least two oblasts, but who objects to a republic confined within the boundaries of only Sverdlovsk Oblast, was given a copy of the constitution of the Ural Republic, autographed by Rossel: "A keepsake, an example of the construction of a strong Russian state."

"This will be a colossal breakthrough," Eduard Ergartovich told the OBSHCAYA GAZETA correspondent. "We are the flagship. If we break through the lines, all oblasts can have the same status in the future."

In the words of the ex-governor, "after the blow we were dealt, none of the oblasts is claiming the right to republic status and its own constitution." The new Russian Basic Law, however, gave each oblast the right of legislative initiative and the right to approve its own charter. This started a run on the Sverdlovsk Oblast legislative drafts. According to Rossel, all krais and oblasts, without exception, quickly analyzed the text of the Ural constitution and copied it in their own charters. There was no

need to rack their brains: All they had to do was preface the text with their own title: "Charter of X Oblast."

In view of the fact that the new Russian Constitution proclaimed the equality of federation members, can the duplication of the Ural constitution in the kray and oblast charters serve as a practical method of realizing this desired equality? Can this give new life, "a second wind," to Rossel's own initiative, which seemed to have been stifled completely by the president's stern decision?

The Ural constitution does not grant the federation member the kind of privileges that were granted to Kazan, for example, in the treaty with Moscow. There is one article, however, which Rossel calls a "major breakthrough": The declaration that anything within the boundaries of Sverdlovsk Oblast "belongs to the Ural Republic." On this basis, local economic laws can be published and local economic programs can be launched. There would be no need for the dozens of economic agreements Kazan concluded with Moscow. Everything would be defined by local laws. The Ural Republic is being used as a model in several oblasts, such as Ulyanovsk Oblast, for example, where bicameral representative bodies of government will be empowered to make laws.

"We see the Ural Republic as the prototype of the territorial division of the Russian Federation," Chairman Vasilii Tarasenko of the Senate Committee on Federation Affairs, the Federation Treaty, and Regional Policy told the OBSHCAYA GAZETA correspondent after he had read the package of Ural documents. He warns that they still need careful examination. "If, however, they do make references to regional or territorial legislation, I would welcome this. All krays and oblasts need good basic legislation today."

Rossel has less chance of success in the Duma. The Duma Committee on Federation Affairs and Regional Policy insists that the general principles of the federal process must be consolidated before specific forms of this process can be regulated. Chairman Vladimir Lysenko of the Subcommittee on the Development of Federal Relations believes that Rossel's idea is less relevant now that the new Russian constitution has granted federation members equal rights. "As soon as this equality was declared, the other oblasts seem to have calmed down and stopped making demands. Precedents can be quite dangerous in Russia, however, and if the Ural Republic wins approval, the others will begin demanding the same treatment, and this process will be impossible to stop."

The next "breakthrough" in the federal process could be accomplished in different ways: either by elevating the status of a particular RF member or by concluding a separate treaty with one of them. The "breakthrough" could occur far from the Urals (Kaliningrad Oblast was the first claimant) and could have completely different consequences, especially in view of the fact that

Chechnya and Tatarstan—and not the Urals or Kaliningrad—are still the main source of headaches for central government officials.

Tyumen Statistics Committee Reports 1993 Figures

Statistics for Enterprises

944F0402A Tyumen TYUMENSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian
9 Feb 94 p 1

[Report of Tyumen Oblast Statistics Committee: "The Amount of Money Is Substantial but Insufficient"]

[Text] Businessmen and organizations in the oblast earned 1.2 trillion rubles in profit in the first 11 months of 1993. Around 84 percent of all the profit in the oblast was earned by industrial enterprises and transport organizations. The higher profits in these branches were mainly due to higher wholesale and retail prices.

The majority of industrial enterprises and agricultural, transport, and construction organizations are experiencing financial difficulties. This is attested to by data on the status of mutual settlements between the buyers and producers of goods.

Overdue payments on incurred debts (or nonpayments) increased by 586.2 billion rubles (or 42 percent) in November 1993, and nonpayments on credit debts increased by 482.1 billion rubles (36 percent). (Incurred debts are all of the debts owed to enterprises—Ed.)

Almost one out of every two enterprises was unable to pay its debts to creditors on time. Financial conditions are particularly unsatisfactory at the Otdelochnik-20 and Sibkomplektavtotrans joint-stock companies of the closed type, the Tobolsk Meat Combine, the Surgut Municipal Dairy, the Gydansk Fish Plant, the Vagay Joint Timber Association, the Feniks joint-stock company, the Mir Sovkhoz, and the Sibir Kolkhoz.

There were no overdue payments on credit debt in the Kogalymtruboprovodstroy Trust, the Ishim Reinforced Concrete Products Plant, the Surgut Meat Processing Combine, the Tyumenskiy Dom Khleba open joint-stock company, the Akva joint-stock company, the Pyshminskoye closed joint-stock company, and the Marma Oil Company.

Enterprises in the petroleum refining industry now owe the budget 567.2 billion rubles, or 80 percent of all nonpayments to the budget in the oblast. Overdue payments to the budget amount to 127.3 billion rubles for the Yuganskneftegaz joint-stock company, 79.2 billion for Langepasneftegaz, 62.4 billion for Kondpetroleum, and 43 billion for the Noyabrskneftegaz Production Association.

Oblast enterprises applied for bank credit and loans to supplement their financial resources. Their total debt amounted to 341.6 billion rubles (including 19.3 billion

in overdue payments). This figure is lower than the figure for 1 November 1993.

Deposits in State Bank branches in the oblast from savings banks in 1993 were 24.4 times as high as the 1992 figure, receipts from rail, air, and water transport were 20.6 times as high, the receipts of enterprises of the Ministry of Railways were 15.9 times as high, local transport receipts were 6.8 times as high, and the receipts of consumer service enterprises were 9.6 times as high. The rate of increase in receipts in the oblast was slightly lower in January-December.

The amount of money put into circulation in the oblast was 2.0721 trillion rubles. This was 11 times as high as last year's figure.

Production Statistics

944F0402B Tyumen TYUMENSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 10 Feb 94 p 1

[Report of Tyumen Oblast Statistics Committee: "More New Structures, Fewer Products"]

[Text] **Output and Deliveries of Manufactured Goods:** The process of forming new entrepreneurial structures was more intense in 1993. At the beginning of 1994 there were 154 joint-stock companies (45 percent of the total number), 26 commercial partnerships (8 percent), and 14 leased enterprises (4 percent) engaged in industrial production. The number of joint-stock companies was six times as high as at the beginning of 1993, and the number of partnerships was three times as high. The number of leased enterprises was reduced by more than half.

Oblast industry produced goods worth 7.2127 trillion rubles in existing prices, with state enterprises accounting for 94 percent, mixed enterprises accounting for 5 percent, and municipal and private enterprises accounting for 0.4 and 0.6 percent respectively. Enterprises of the Khanty-Mansiysk Autonomous Okrug produced 71.2 percent of the total output, enterprises in the Yamalo-Nenetsk Autonomous Okrug produced 19.6 percent, and enterprises in the south of the oblast produced 9.2 percent.

The growth of production volume (or the maintenance of the previous volume) at enterprises of the Rosneftegaz corporation and Gazprom concern began to stabilize the output of manufactured goods in the oblast as a whole and in the autonomous okrugs in October 1993. Production volume is still decreasing, however, at enterprises in the southern zone. Output decreased at the turbo-machine and Ishim Agricultural Machinery plants, the Zavod ATE joint-stock company, the Ishim Machine-Building Plant, the Tobolsk Petrochemical Combine, and other enterprises.

Production Output in Physical Terms: The output of petroleum and gas condensate at oblast enterprises in 1993 was 35.6 million tonnes (or 13.7 percent) below the

figure for 1992 and amounted to 224.7 million tonnes, including 218.6 million tonnes of oil. Most of the oil (98.8 percent) was produced by enterprises of the Rosneftegaz corporation, and the rest was produced by enterprises of the State Geology Committee (0.7 percent), the Urengoygazprom Production Association (0.4 percent), and the Krasnoleninskneftegazgeologiya state enterprise (0.1 percent).

The Kalchinsk subdivision of the Tyumenneftegaz Scientific Production Association and the Tyumennedra state enterprise produced 50,300 tonnes of petroleum in Uvatskiy Rayon.

The average daily output of petroleum and gas condensate at the end of 1993 was equivalent to the 1977-78 level and amounted to 615,600 tonnes. This was 13.5 percent below the 1992 figure and 0.5 percent below the figure for January-November 1993. The output decreased at all enterprises of the Rosneftegaz corporation, with the exception of the Varyeganneftegaz joint-stock company.

The output of natural gas was 3.1 percent below the 1992 figure. The average daily output was 2.8 percent below the previous year's figure.

Urengoygazprom, the largest gas production association, produced 24.8 billion cubic meters, or 8.6 percent, less than it had produced the previous year.

There was a decrease in the output of electricity, liquefied hydrocarbon gases, synthetic resins and plastics, metal-cutting and woodworking machine tools, oil production equipment, technological equipment for light industry, tractor and vehicle trailers and semi-trailers, agricultural machines, building brick, prefabricated reinforced concrete structures and elements, and other items. The output of all of the main products of the timber and woodworking industry also decreased.

The output of diesel fuel, batteries, and disposable needles and syringes increased.

More Production Statistics

944F0402C Tyumen TYUMENSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 15 Feb 94 p 2

[Report of Tyumen Oblast Statistics Committee: "Work in 'Automatic Stop' Mode"]

[Text] Industrial enterprises in the oblast employed 304,500 people in January-November 1993: 52 percent in the Khanty-Mansiysk Autonomous Okrug, 20.4 percent in the Yamalo-Nenetsk Autonomous Okrug, and 27.6 percent at enterprises in the south of the oblast. Funds designated for consumption during that period amounted to 611.2 billion rubles, with wages accounting for 89 percent of the total and financial assistance and special incentives accounting for 11 percent. Funds for all personnel were equivalent to 10.5 percent of the total production output. The average wage of people

employed in oblast industry in November was 317,300 rubles, and the figure in the southern zone was 123,600 rubles.

In December there were work stoppages in some production units at 17 industrial enterprises (3 in the Khanty-Mansiysk Autonomous Okrug and 14 in the south). They included the Nadezhda joint venture, the Zavod ATE joint-stock company, the Ishim Machine-Building Plant, plants of the Ishim Agricultural Machinery Production Association, the electrical machinery plant, the DSP-250 plant, and other enterprises.

The main reasons were difficulties in selling products and shortages of material resources. The stoppages led to the dismissal of 151 workers in December, including 125 from Ishim Machine-Building Plant. Another 4,012 workers had to take an unpaid leave at the administration's request.

Production Expenditures: Expenditures per ruble of commercial product were 14.3 percent above the figure for January-November 1992 and amounted to 82.7 kopecks. Expenditures decreased by 5 percent at enterprises in the oblast's southern zone and amounted to 70.68 kopecks. Expenditures per ruble of commercial product increased in all branches of industry except the chemical and petrochemical industry, machine building, and metal working.

Expenditures were much higher than they had been the previous year at the Chernogorneft closed joint-stock company (by 145.8 percent), the Langepasneftegaz joint-stock company (58.5 percent), enterprises of the Nizhnevartovskneftegaz Association (31.7 percent), the Megion, Mezhdurechenskiy, and Pionerskiy timber associations, the Lina joint-stock company, the electrical machinery plant, and other enterprises.

Meanwhile, production expenditures decreased at the Tobolsk Meat Combine, the Tyumen Bread Combine, the Serginoles joint-stock company, the Sovetskiy Saw Mill and Woodworking Combine, Vinzili firm, and other enterprises.

Tyumen Counterintelligence Service Restructured

944F0403A Tyumen TYUMENSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 9 Feb 94 p 1

[Press release of Tyumen Oblast Administration of Federal Counterintelligence Service: "Tyumen Counterintelligence Will Be Regional"]

[Text] Colonel-General Nikolay Golushko, director of the Federal Counterintelligence Service (FSK), had a conference in Moscow with Tyumen Oblast and Khanty-Mansiysk and Yamalo-Nenetsk autonomous okrug administration chiefs Leonid Roketskiy, Aleksandr Filippenko, and Lev Bayandin, Tyumen Oblast Presidential Representative Gennadiy Shcherbakov, and Major-General Anatoliy Antipin, chief of the oblast FSK administration.

They discussed the structure of local counterintelligence agencies and their objectives in view of the present critical state of the fuel and energy complex. A decision was made to form a regional FSK administration for all three members of the federation in Tyumen Oblast and to reduce the staff of the former oblast office of the Ministry of Security by 12 percent for the more effective safeguarding of the security of the strategic facilities of the fuel and energy complex and the performance of other functions defined in the statute on the FSK of 5 January 1994.

Tyumen Law Enforcement Officials Meet Press

944F0403B Tyumen TYUMENSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 5 Feb 94 p 1

[Article by V. Grachev: "Not That Bad?"]

[Text] The heads of oblast law enforcement agencies had a meeting with journalists last Wednesday at the suggestion of the oblast administration.

I have to say right away that I do not share the skeptical views of some of my colleagues with regard to this gathering. It is true that the specific purpose of the press conference was absolutely obvious: Deputy Administration Chief Valeriy Bagin, who conducted the press conference, frankly admitted that the crime rate is rising, but the public must not lose all hope. Law enforcement agencies are doing their job in spite of all obstacles and are adapting to the new conditions. Criminals do not feel as unconstrained as some news programs have suggested.

It seems to me that this is a valid statement. The reason for the rising crime rate is not the unsatisfactory performance of the police, the courts, or the procuracy. The main cause is the steady disintegration of the economy and all the foundations of our daily life. The personnel of the police force, the courts, the procuracy, and other law enforcement agencies that did not leave, in spite of all inducements, and move into the comfortable offices of commercial structures—where everything is peaceful and where the pay is much higher—might deserve more respect today than anyone else, in spite of all the remaining problems, in spite of the fact that people feel the need to hide behind iron gates, and in spite of the fact that "every flock has its black sheep."

The statements at the press conference were reserved: The situation is still under control, thank God, and has not reached the point of total chaos and lawlessness. Furthermore, there have been some successes: Several homicides that were "pending" for several years were recently solved, the organizers of the recent notorious and bloody fights between mafia clans were exposed and arrested, and the invaluable canvases of the Russian old masters that had been stolen from the Tyumen Art Gallery were recovered. Even the president heard about this case. The devastated service for the prevention of economic crime is being revitalized to some extent.

It is extremely difficult to do this work today. As I look through my notes, the following details stand out: Viktor Simonov, administration chief in the State Trade Inspectorate—subjected to intense psychological pressure by criminal gangs during inspections of commercial stores, around 90 percent of which are paying protection money to racketeers. Valeriy Borisov, chief of the regional administration for action against organized crime—identified more than 100 criminal gangs and broke up over 30 of them last year. The gangs are well-organized: They have power structures, fighting forces, and economic divisions for the “laundering” of money, the organization of credit operations, and so forth. Last year the regional administration solved more than 400 serious crimes—homicides, cases of extortion, and racketeering. Veniamin Basharin, chief of the oblast internal affairs administration: The criminals feel invulnerable. They commit murders here and then go abroad—to Kazakhstan, Georgia, or Armenia. Ten people were arrested in connection with the mafia clan warfare and two are still at large. The main culprit—a professional hired killer—was “brought to light” in Kazakhstan, but our request for his extradition led to a whole series of other events. It took the threat of road blocks on all highways—so that not one vehicle carrying lumber or anything else could reach Kazakhstan—before the murderer was finally turned over to us. Our neighbors in Sverdlovsk Oblast also experienced bloody confrontations and have not found the guilty parties yet. In the words of V. Basharin, the present irresponsible behavior of some citizens is interfering with the performance of police work: People cannot be arrested for vagrancy. They do not have to work if they do not want to. They are free to make their own choices, but this is a breeding ground for criminals. Witnesses are another big problem. They are completely unprotected by the state and the law and are intimidated and threatened. People are afraid of saying anything, and criminals escape responsibility for crimes because of a lack of evidence. There are many other problems as well, but the number of solved crimes was nevertheless higher than in 1992 in some areas. V. Belyayev, chairman of the oblast court: Legal protection should not depend on attendant circumstances, but it does. Judges are not the problem: They will work as many hours as they have to. The problem is the shortage of jurors. People do not want to serve on juries. By law, their place of employment pays them the average wage for the time they spend in court, and who wants that? There are not enough auxiliary personnel in the courts, no process servers, no gasoline, no vehicles or guards to bring the criminals to court, etc. Witnesses cannot be called because people are afraid.

That is the situation in our law enforcement agencies today. As I have already said, however, they are still doing their job. They have finally begun taking action against people who take bribes: Last year they investigated 146 cases of bribery. The figure is not that high, but at least there has been some progress. They prevented 120 crimes connected with forged bank remittance notes during the year, saving 46 billion rubles.

Someone asked when the agencies would restore order in the market: The prices there, after all, are being set by the market mafia. Simonov replied that the market is a matter of constant concern to the State Trade Inspectorate. Prices drop as soon as the inspectors arrive, but the next day they are raised again. Basharin said that a special office of the internal affairs administration had been opened to take charge of the market, and he assured the press that order would be restored. All of the same problems still exist: There are no witnesses to testify. People either do not want to get involved or are simply afraid. Nevertheless, the situation in the market will get better. The registration of “foreigners” from the former fraternal republics, who are largely responsible for the present situation in the market, should be a big help. Those who behave unscrupulously run the risk of losing their licenses, and that does have an impact.

There were understandable questions about the amnesty. In view of the present crime wave, no one at the press conference was in favor of this. The prognosis was that this would cause more outbreaks of criminal behavior and that things would get worse.

There were many other questions as well. Some of the answers were reassuring and some were not. The law enforcement officials agreed to hold regular press conferences. I had the idea that it might be best to arrange for televised conferences of this kind once or twice a month for the whole oblast population, so that the people who have locked the iron gates of their homes can see that they can rely on the services of the police force, the courts, the procuracy, the trade inspectorate, and even the former State Security Committee, now renamed the Counterintelligence Committee, all of the individuals entrusted to combat corruption, the illegal drug traffic, and the theft of our national resources. They could take a look at these people and ask them—if they have a telephone—whatever they want to ask them, and find out what lies ahead. What bothers the people most, after all, is the uncertainty and unpredictability of events and the extremely depressing suspicion that the state and its law enforcement agencies have simply forsaken all of us. Mutual understanding is a great achievement, especially at a time of crisis.

Tyumen Oblast, Autonomous Okrugs Negotiate on Treaty

944F0403C Tyumen TYUMENSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 15 Feb 94 p 1

[Article by S. Shilnikov, economic correspondent: “The Negotiations Are Over”]

[Text] On 11 February “groups of experts from Tyumen Oblast, the Khanty-Mansiysk Autonomous Okrug, and the Yamalo-Nenetsk Autonomous Okrug, having discussed the drafts of the treaty submitted by the State Committee of the Russian Federation and Tyumen Oblast in conjunction with the Khanty-Mansiysk and Yamalo-Nenetsk autonomous okrugs, agreed on the following”:

Subsection One: "It is necessary and possible to combine" the drafts of the treaty submitted by Tyumen Oblast and the Khanty-Mansiysk and Yamalo-Nenetsk autonomous okrugs for the purpose of elaborating a single, agreed draft treaty on this basis.

"Necessary and possible"—this is quite good in itself. What is the subject of the treaty? Take a look at the second subsection: "The subject of the treaty is the whole group of interrelations" between Tyumen Oblast and the two okrugs.

Let us move on from the subject of the treaty to the title. It is listed in the third subsection: "The working title of the treaty is the Treaty on the Interrelations of Tyumen Oblast, the Khanty-Mansiysk Autonomous Okrug, and the Yamalo-Nenetsk Autonomous Okrug—with a specific reference in the text of the treaty to the status of the parties to the treaty as autonomous and equal members of the Russian Federation."

An old Russian adage tells us: "Go ahead and call it a pot if you wish, but do not put it on the stove." This is not the case here, and this is why I have quoted the third subsection in its entirety.

This is the time to say something about the structure of the treaty. Experts are experts, and they make provisions for these "minutiae." This, therefore, is the structure: the preamble, the general provisions, the principles of interrelations, the interrelations of state governing bodies, interrelations with agencies of local self-government, interrelations with federal government agencies and their territorial structures, humanitarian contacts, the settlement of disputes, and the final provisions.

As we can see, everything is specified in detail. This was the fourth and last subsection of the protocol of consent, and now it is time to move on to the protocol of dissent. It consists of only one sentence: "The groups of experts from Tyumen Oblast, the Khanty-Mansiysk Autonomous Okrug, and the Yamalo-Nenetsk Autonomous Okrug, having discussed the drafts of the treaty submitted by the State Committee of the Russian Federation and Tyumen Oblast in conjunction with the Khanty-Mansiysk and Yamalo-Nenetsk autonomous okrugs, could not reach a general consensus on the interpretation of the term used in Article 66 (4) of the Constitution of the Russian Federation—autonomous okrugs constituting part of the oblast—and the term proposed jointly by the groups of experts from the Khanty-Mansiysk and Yamalo-Nenetsk autonomous okrugs—'autonomous okrugs located within the territorial-administrative boundaries of the oblast.'"

The protocol of dissent is cited exactly as written, down to the last comma. The fourth subsection of Article 66 of the Constitution is a serious matter and, in general, there is no reason to expect the parties to find a common language in a hurry. After all, why would an okrug want to give up its constitutionally guaranteed status as an equal member of the federation? The very fact that the experts met for this conference suggests that the oblast

administration has reconsidered its methods of solving the problem of oblast unity and has given up making decisions "from a position of strength" in favor of making decisions "from a position of probability."

This is not a bad change, particularly from the standpoint of the economy. After all, while they were fighting, they managed to cause considerable destruction. To put it more precisely, they managed to miss several opportunities. All I have to add is that the oblast administration was represented by the following experts: G. Chebotarev, L. Berezin, and S. Nikitin; the Khanty-Mansiysk Autonomous Okrug was represented by G. Tikhonov, N. Usoltsev, and V. Sharafilov; the Yamalo-Nenetsk Autonomous Okrug was represented by A. Artejev and G. Chudnovskiy.

Now all of this is a matter of public record.

Komsomolsk-on-Amur, Sakhalin Clash Over Gas Pricing

944F0431A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 10 Mar 94 p 2

[Article by Boris Reznik, IZVESTIYA staff: "Sakhalin, Too, Is Beginning a 'Gas' War"]

[Text] Khabarovsk Kray—Gas stoves are not working in the homes of residents of Komsomolsk-on-Amur, and primus and kerosene stoves have been taken out of storage. The city central heat and power station has shifted from burning natural gas to burning residual fuel oil. Once again, the Sakhalinmorneftegaz Association has grabbed the Komsomolsk-on-Amur residents "by the throat" and cut off the supply of the blue fuel.

This time the reason for such harsh measures was not a delay in mutual settlements but the petroleum that, along with the gas, is discharged from Sakhalin wells in the form of condensate. The islanders were sending it, like the gas, to the "city of youth" through the pipelines whose construction was hailed in the well-known novel *Daleko ot Moskvy* [Far From Moscow]. The price for it was cranked up immensely—to 140,000 rubles per tonne. If the Komsomolsk Petroleum Refinery had continued to take raw material at that price, it would have long since gone bankrupt. The petroleum refinery found suppliers with a better-quality and less expensive product—the Tyumen oil fields, which are delivering petroleum to Khabarovsk Kray at R110,000 a tonne. The Sakhalin people did not rack their brains trying to figure out how to lower the price of their oil, but decided to act from a position of strength—they delivered an ultimatum to the Komsomolsk-on-Amur's residents: either take our oil at our prices, or we will close the valve on the gas pipeline.

They closed it, forgetting that Khabarovsk Kray could take countermeasures. After all, Sakhalin receives up to 70 percent of its economic cargo by way of the Vanino-Kholmsk ferry crossing. However, to the credit of the kray's leaders, this time, as during the first such incident

last year, they have been showing restraint and reasonableness. Residual fuel oil, jet fuel and all other goods addressed to the island oblast are being punctually dispatched to it. The kray's administration has sent an emergency telegram informing the Russian president and head of government of the existing situation. The law, not arbitrary rule, should act.

Arkhangelsk Banker Reports Nomenklatura Machinations

944F0423A Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian
3 Mar 94 p 2

[Article by Pavel Anokhin: "Solovetsk Miracles, or How 434 Voters Cast 1604 Ballots"]

[Text] Passions aroused by the December parliamentary elections have not yet settled, and now Russians will have new elections in March and April, this time for local government bodies. The Russian President's Edict No. 1765 allows administration chiefs to approve local election statutes themselves: The parliament is only just beginning to consider a general federal law. One doesn't have to be a genius to imagine what will happen. However, much is already clear: Read our item.

"There is a vast bureaucratic plot against democracy in the country, which took shape just before the parliamentary election," says Vladimir Rasskazov, former people's deputy and chairman of the banking subcommittee of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet, retired vice-chairman of the Russian Central Bank, and current president of the All-Russian Stock Bank. "I know from personal experience that local nomenklaturas were given complete control over the elections to the Federation Council."

Like every businessman, he supports his statements with specific documents and facts, although many of them are clearly colored by the pain of a person who has lost an election campaign. Vladimir Rasskazov ran for the Russia's Choice bloc for an Arkhangelsk Oblast seat in the Federation Council. His opponent, Yuriy Guskov, chairman of the Arkhangelsk Oblast Soviet and before that first secretary of the Arkhangelsk Oblast CPSU Committee, was nominated as candidate by the Russian Communist Party. He won by 9,000 votes. In Vladimir Rasskazov's view, this was a result of machinations, forgery and outright legal arbitrariness of the local powers that be. Nor was it only the issue that communist representatives could conduct their campaigns directly at enterprises during work hours, which democratic candidates could not. Or that the oblast radio would fall silent "for technical reasons" precisely when broadcasting an interview with Vladimir Rasskazov.

Much more mysterious was the kaleidoscope of number errors in the Arkhangelsk election returns. Thus, 42,000 ballots more were cast for the Federation Council election than in the federal district, where parties and blocs were determining their standing with the people. What does this suggest? Two assumptions come to mind:

Either the voters deliberately failed to cast their "party" ballots, or someone deliberately stuffed the ballot boxes with extra "paper" ballots, which decided the outcome of the race for the upper chamber of parliament.

There are many such flaws. For example, the total number of ballots issued to voters or cancelled was 118,508 less than the number of registered Arkhangelsk voters. One can think of many reasons for this. Say, again blame voters who for some reason put the lacking number of ballots in their pockets. But is it possible that more than 100,000 people would want to commit an identical prank? Or could one justifiably say that voter turnout in the oblast was expected to be low, so fewer ballots were printed in order to save paper.

For all its peculiarities, the complex existing situation may not have aroused so many distortions if Vladimir Rasskazov or his representatives had a document stating the total number of printed ballots, indicating how many were handed out and how many remained in reserve. The absence of such information has aroused the most evil suspicions of the losing side: Where the ballots "saved" before or after the election? Try and find out now, while 116,000 election ballots account for almost 20 percent of the vote.

Also surprising are the "miracles" of the Solovetsk election precinct, where 434 voters cast a total of 1,604 ballots. It is hard to imagine that in their civic enthusiasm the Solovetsk citizens managed to vote several times. Was this some unfortunate accident? Quite possible, but if the mistake was discovered and not corrected one can't help thinking of direct fraud.

"Nevertheless," says Vladimir Rasskazov, "a preliminary count of votes in Arkhangelsk, Severodvinsk and Novodvinsk, which include half the district constituents, showed that 1.7 times more had voted for me than for my opponent. Seeing this, the district commission immediately halted ballot collection for three days. In the final result Yuriy Guskov was already ahead..."

Incensed by such "democratism," Vladimir Rasskazov prepared papers and appealed to the Central Election Committee and procurator agencies, seeking a recount of the Arkhangelsk Oblast ballots. So far with no result.

"As fate would have it, the Central Election Committee's complaint commission is headed by P. Zhigaltsov, an Arkhangelsk crony of Yu. Guskov," says the would-be deputy, explaining the reason for his unsuccessful quest for the truth.

The first thing that comes to mind after talking to him is: Here is a person who has lost an election and now seeks to make a political issue of it. New times breed new traditions. And all his appeals to courts and procurator offices, allusions to the biased makeup of election commissions "formed back in 1989 by the communists," and "the absence of the possibility to monitor their actions

by democratic forces" could be seen as an effort to create "publicity" around his name with an eye on future elections.

You must agree that if something like this were expounded by some run-of-the-mill politician or a representative of the humanities his words could be classified as populism. But the assertions of a ranking banking-brokerage executive well versed in the intrigues of the powers that be, moreover an economic scholar with two university degrees who acquired professional experience both as a director at the Computer Center and in academic and research work at the economics and management chair of a technical college, tend to ring true. Moreover, the results of the latest election reflect, as on a screen, the strategic redeployment of the communist-soviet nomenklatura forces, bringing hidden secrets to light.

Understanding that the democrats' political prestige depends on the local successes of the changes taking place, and that the apparat plays a key role in this process, the nomenklatura, having regained consciousness after the August debacle, hastily began to deploy its people over the entire vertical of power. Launching a personnel offensive, it soon gained control over Russia's major regions. Suffice it to cite facts for just a few of them (see table).

Oblast	Total number of administration chiefs	Of them, former secretaries or executives of central, oblast, city, rayon CPSU committees
Rostov	58	28
Voronezh	33	25
Belgorod	27	21
Irkutsk	38	16
Novosibirsk	37	14
Sverdlovsk	24	12

In Krasnoyarsk Kray, every other city or rayon administration chief is a former CPSU apparatchik. And if one considers personnel who completed the Higher Party School, then it is all of 80 percent...

This was described and happened two years ago, but for some reason we only now seem to have overcome amnesia and are worriedly asking: How come that in, say, Penza Oblast 40 out of 45 seats in the legislative assembly have gone to former party committee secretaries, deputies of disbanded soviets, directors of plants and state farms, and other local leaders of communist orientation? And now, egged on by Sergey Filatov, chief of the Russian president's administration, and Nikolay Medvedev, chief of that administration's department for work with territories, the democratic chorus has suddenly voiced its alarm at the possibility of the formation of a "red belt" made up of regions with strong anti-reform moods around Moscow and the return of the local party-managerial nomenklatura to power.

Actually, it never lost that local power, only adapting deftly to circumstances. We all remember the metamorphoses when the leaders of party committees of various levels instantaneously, like a shoal of fish following some signal known only to them, occupied leadership position in soviets of the respective levels, and then, with the same alacrity, moved over to the positions of administration chiefs. Now, again in consort, they are occupying the seats of dumas and other legislative bodies. Today the entire nomenklatura force is following their bosses in the "personnel offensive." Which is to say that so far the only "belt" around Moscow has been "red."

Maritime Kray Struggles To Save Economy

944F0445B Vladivostok KRASNOYE ZNAMYA
in Russian 15 Mar 94 p 1

[Article by Dmitriy Latypov: "Alas, Moscow Has Cooled Toward Us: The Center Is Far Away. Economy Is a Shambles, and Only We Ourselves Can Save the Kray"]

[Text] This was more or less the tone of the conference held by the kray administration last week. Among those present were deputy heads of the kray administration, heads of administrations and committees, as well as of the fuel and power generation complex, a large group from the military, and trade unions.

"Lately we feel acutely that the government has cooled off quite noticeably toward the Maritime Kray," said the kray administration head, Yevgeniy Nazdratenko. It is practically impossible to "wring out" the money due as envisaged by Decree No. 1001. And the thorniest issue, which practically separates our kray from Russia's central regions, is high transportation rates. Instead of somehow helping the Far East in this respect, the Russian Federation Government just a few days ago made a decision to raise them again by more than 20 percent.

What the result will be is clear. High costs will force many enterprises located in West Siberia, in the Urals, and the European part of Russia to reroute the flow of export cargo. Now it will go abroad through the ports on the Black or Baltic Sea. This trend already is detectable. The following data point in this direction: Freight volume at the Far Eastern segment of the railroad system fell off by 37 percent. Naturally, the output of our plants and factories, and most importantly, mining enterprises, will not be competitive in the regions where industrial consumers are and which are long distance away from Maritime Kray.

In this situation, a vitally important question comes up with all urgency: How is Maritime Kray to survive? Vladimir Kolesnichenko, who is considered the most knowledgeable and competent economist in the kray, predicts this development of the situation. In May, electric power rates will go up. This blow will push a considerable number of kray enterprises into bankruptcy. They are already literally being strangled by hidden unemployment. It runs by most modest estimates at 25-40 percent of enterprises' labor force. One can only

course, understand the directors—they still hope for some mythical subsidies and preferential credits. But there will be none. Therefore, says V. Kolesnichenko, we need to take radical steps right now. We have to immediately set up a commission that will determine the backbone enterprises in the kray capable of surviving at the current stage of transition to a market. Those labor collectives that cannot survive we should declare bankrupt and start finding jobs for the people.

The first to go bankrupt, in V. Kolesnichenko's opinion, are enterprises in the cities where mining combines and machine-building plants are located. It is Dalnegorsk, Arsenyev, and the settlement Kavaleroovo. We can already see the validity of this forecast—the mining and enrichment combine in Khrustalnyi is practically dying.

The kray administration presented at the conference its plan for saving Maritime Kray from the impending destructive processes; the plan had been drafted by Moscow academics and executive branch departments. It was decided to "bring it into proper shape" during March, incorporate proposals of economic managers and the military, and then send the document for consideration to the Russian Federation Government.

N. Pimenov, the chief of the kray administration's main planning and economic administration, related to the conference participants the gist of this plan. According to the document, the priority sectors will be defense, foreign economic relations, and transportation. In order to move it all from the a centralized-economy state into a market-based one, the government will have to provide financial support. Otherwise, nothing will come out of it. Here is why. The government owes 56 billion rubles [R] to our defense plants, even those where it had placed orders. (For instance, production of the "Black Shark" helicopter at the Progress plant.) And now they are literally dying at the root.

Next. One may say that the government forgot about the existence of its troops and their high concentration in Maritime Kray. Take the cost of the Pacific Fleet alone! The center practically keeps them on a financial starvation diet. The kray is compelled in extreme cases to provide money for the military from its own budget. And quite substantial sums, sometimes. The result is that in addition to paying taxes, Maritime Kray residents carry an additional load, which affects the social sphere.

Foreign economic relations. Maritime Kray already has in operation five vehicle crossings and eight ports open for entry to foreign vessels. What does the territory get from it? Nothing. Only 10 percent of the customs duty goes into the kray budget; the rest goes to the center. The document proposes to leave the entire customs duty collected in the kray for about two years.

The transportation complex cannot be improved without targeted federal programs. Ports and port-adjacent rail stations need to be developed, new branch lines built. All of this requires government investment money. The program proposed in the document

assumes, of course, subsidies from the federal budget. And this is not dumping one's problems on the center—these are precisely the expenditures the state has to finance: maintenance of the Armed Forces, development of foreign trade and large transportation systems. As to our own business, says the kray leadership, it is time to pay very close attention to the development of the entire spectrum of relations with the countries of the Southeast Asia and the Pacific region. The following fact is quoted in support of this argument: In order to bring grain from Altay Kray, Maritime Kray has to pay agricultural producers and the railroad R270,000 per tonne. Transportation of the same tonne from Canada will cost R100,000. A tangible difference. And it is visible in everything.

Railways Official on New Tariffs

944F0446B Vladivostok KRASNOYE ZNAMYA
in Russian 16 Mar 94 p 1

[Article by German Orlovskiy: "The Debt Predicament"]

[Text] The Russian Federation Committee on Pricing Policy has established effective 10 March 1994 the maximum index of tariff increases for freight shipments in intra- and interstate transportation in the amount of 1.20 of the tariffs in effect prior to that date.

To what degree does the decision of the Russian pricing department affect the railroads and clients of the maritime region? Viktor Yefimovich Lyannykh, deputy chief of the freight and commercial operations section of the Vladivostok Division of the Far Eastern Railroad, provides commentary.

"Following the directive of the Committee on Pricing Policy came the order of the Ministry of Railways with a specific deciphering of the financial aspects with our business partners. In particular, it was prescribed that the tariffs for intrastate transportation would be applied to export-freight shipments through Russian border and port stations.

"Additional charges will be applied over and above the tariffs and fees (with the exception of export-freight shipments, including to the Baltic countries), consisting of a tax of 20 percent and special 3 percent tax (for financial support to the most important sectors of the national economy). The application of a maximum index of 1.20 to existing payment rates for other operations and services is authorized. But in order to preclude monopolistic pressure from being applied to clients, the ministry has established an upper limit of profitability for operation and services in the amount of 35 percent.

"The measures being undertaken by the ministry are not for the sake of enjoyment. The ministry itself is operating at a loss. The Far Eastern Railroad, for example, has entered 'minus 6 billion rubles' in the 'Profits' column. Losses from transportation operations include rising costs of fuel and electric power, spare parts—now

in short supply—for diesel locomotives and freight cars, outlays for worn-out track, cross ties, and switching-signal sections.

"And prospects for the future are cloudy. The transportation business is in decline. The enterprises—our clients—are shutting down production output. Our partners of yesterday are turning their attention with ever increasing frequency to motor vehicle transport. Short-run motor vehicle transport has been more convenient, more advantageous, and quicker. Thus, the railroads are facing a struggle for clients who want efficient execution of orders and high-quality service.

"In the meantime, a natural process of reduction of our worker contingent has begun. We are not taking action to effect this, but neither are we accepting people for work.

"And then we have that same old situation today concerning debts receivable. They are colossal! The list of enterprises in debt to us for transport spans 10 pages—they owe us R12.5 billion.

"We are trying to restrict our acceptance of freight for transport from those dispatching enterprises that are most steeped in debt. But this is a two-edged sword: When enterprises do not ship production output, they do not get paid for it. And they do not settle accounts with us either. While the state treasury tells us to hand over the required amount, think about paying wages later.

"The only aspect, undoubtedly, that does not distress everyone is the following point of the ministry order: 'The boosted index for tariffs in effect is not applied with respect to small, lightweight shipments of freight and citizens' household goods being transported by intra- and interstate transportation.'"

Novosibirsk Migration Official on Refugees

944F0452A Novosibirsk SOVETSKAYA SIBIR
in Russian 15 Mar 94 p 2

[Interview with Yuriy Moshkov, head of the Novosibirsk Oblast migration service, and Mikhail Bakshin, his deputy, by SOVETSKAYA SIBIR correspondent G. Sassa; place and date not given: "Siberia Can Be Warm, Too: Refugees' Fate"]

[Text] This service is located at Krasnyy Prospekt, in the former national economic council building. It occupies just three small rooms on the fourth floor. The entire staff is six people. The problems the migration service is dealing with are many, however, and all of them are difficult, requiring a lot of hard work and human empathy.

The Russian Federal Migration Service was set up recently, when the Soviet Union disintegrated, when tens of millions of Russians suddenly found themselves abroad and in a number of places deprived of elementary human rights. The word "refugees" entered our vocabulary.

Our correspondent met with Yuriy Mikhaylovich Moshkov, the head of the Novosibirsk Oblast migration service, and Mikhail Sergeyevich Bakshin, his deputy.

[Sassa] Tell me please, what is the trend in the migration process? Has the flow of refugees not diminished during winter months?

[Answer] We also assumed that the cold Siberian winter would reduce the number of people coming here. We were mistaken. The same number—450-550 people—arrive every month as did in the summer. Last year our oblast accepted more than 40,000 refugees and forced resettlers. All in all, more than 2 million people arrived in Russia. The time of year and weather conditions have no effect on flow intensity. If people leave behind apartments, dachas, everything they have accumulated over the years, it means that they absolutely cannot live in these conditions. We talk to every person, listen to their sad, tragic tales, and therefore have a good idea of the situation in which our compatriots have found themselves. We see people who are barely clothed, semi-starved. Here, for instance, a young woman from Tajikistan. Not a kopek, head uncovered, no passport, no labor service book. Turns out that her home was hit by a bomb. We took her to the social protection department. They gave her a cap, jeans, some other things, and R5,000. The militia issued papers to her. Then they started looking for a job, which is very difficult now. Finally they found her a job as an attendant in one of the hospitals. She lives right there. Or a Georgian family—husband, wife, two children. They made it from Sukhumi to Moscow. No money to buy tickets to go from there. The woman sold the only valuable possession—her wedding ring. They called acquaintances in Novosibirsk, who sent the money. This was enough for three tickets. The mother and children came to our city. The husband is still in Moscow.

[Sassa] So it is not only Russians who are coming here?

[Answer] Most are Russians, of course. But there are also many people of other nationalities. There are many Armenians, Ukrainians, Tatars, Tajiks. Some Azerbaijanis, Moldovans, Chechens, Abkhazians, Germans, Ossetians, Kazakhs, Turks, Jews, Chuvash... People of all kinds of professions, including doctors, teachers, and scientists.

The telephone rings. Yuriy Mikhaylovich greets the caller, listens, and says:

"No, no. You cannot delay the move. You absolutely have to be in place by March or April. Keep it in mind that potatoes and vegetables are planted in May here. And you absolutely have to have a vegetable garden—you have children. You know yourself what life is like... This is one of the farms in Moshkovskiy Rayon. There is housing, school, a cafeteria, running water. No money whatsoever? That is all right, we will help you with the move..."

Our conversation continues.

[Sassa] Does it not look like opportunities to house people and find jobs for them are dwindling? There are already unemployed and semi-unemployed in our oblast as well.

[Answer] This is true. Nevertheless, we are still able to somehow help the people left without any shelter. Our service maintains contacts with the employment and social protection services, with enterprises and organizations, with oblast rayons, kolkhozes, sovkhozes, joint-stock societies. Right now there are 5,500 job vacancies in the oblast. The demand is mostly for skilled workers and construction workers.

Fast development of commercial activities and the emergence of a large number of businessmen relieves some pressure. Many people found cozy jobs in commercial structures, they resell the goods bought from wholesalers.

Some agricultural enterprises help to house and provide jobs for people. There is the Aleksandrovskoye Joint-Stock Society [AO] in Maslyaninskiy Rayon, which is headed by Valeriy Ivanovich Prikhno. They accepted 14 families. More than 30 resettler families received housing and jobs in Suzdalskoye AO, where Nikolay Nikolayevich Goryunov is the chairman. Iskitimskiy and Moshkovskiy Rayons build apartments and create jobs.

[Sassa] Where do they get the money?

[Answer] The Federal Migration Service helps. It does not have much money, but you can get some. If you knock on the door, they will open it. Take, for instance, the head of the Moshkovskiy Rayon administration. He personally went to Moscow, told of his plans, shared his troubles, and came back with R74 million "in a pocket." The Aleksandrovskoye AO was among aid recipients.

We have to underline one important detail here. Many heads of administrations, and enterprise and farm directors do not use the opportunity to improve to a certain extent the situation of their collectives with the help of the migration service. There are many unfinished production facilities in villages and cities, as well as housing. If their construction is completed, it will produce new jobs and new apartments. But the owners do not have the money. This is where the migration service may become a magic wand. An economic manager submits a project for the facility to us, indicates how many new jobs it will create, and how many refugees he can accept and provide housing for. We send these documents to Moscow, and there is a good chance of getting positive results.

A telephone call. Yu. Moshkov:

"Fergana? What do you have? No, we do not pay for the move. We do not have housing. Why can you not live in Uzbekistan? Language... Well, the children should study Uzbek if you live there. Impossible to live... Well, you decide. If you come, you will get papers as refugees and temporary resettlers. What does it get you? The right to

obtain a residence permit to live with relatives or acquaintances regardless of the size of their living space. Then you can get an interest-free loan for home construction. So you think about it..."

[Sassa] The call from Fergana has interrupted us... Are there examples that will support that your offer is realistic?

[Answer] Take the same Moshkovo. They are building 12 apartments there. By the agreement with the migration service, which has provided the money, the oblast migration service will get six apartments intended for refugees; three apartments go to local authorities, to be distributed at their discretion; and three are placed at Moscow's disposal.

[Sassa] Moscow?!

[Answer] Yes, they have a very difficult situation there. Four and a half thousand refugees live in hotels, room-and-board facilities, and pioneer camps. We visited one such room-and-board facility. It is Vatutinka, which belongs to the Council of Ministers' economic administration. There are 118 refugee families living there. It was decided to set up a rehabilitation center in this facility; equipment has been brought in, but they cannot install it. Refugees do not want to leave their temporary shelter. Moscow has to "unload" its refugees. Therefore, in the agreements the republic service puts in a clause that some apartments go to them.

Two young men enter the office. They are from Kazakhstan, from Semipalatinsk. Both are construction workers, have families, apartments. But no job. There are no prospects. It is impossible to sell the apartments. And even if they do sell them, it will be very cheap and only for local money. What are they going to do with this money in Russia? Yuriy Mikhaylovich and Mikhail Sergeyevich tell of the situation in the oblast: that construction workers will find jobs here; that one can now buy a house in a rural area with yard structures and a vegetable garden, inexpensive by current standards—about R4-R5 million. But the men do not have these "lemons." If the apartments could be sold as a noncash transaction and Kazakh money converted into rubles through official channels... The interlocutors take time to discuss the feasibility of such an operation...

The visitors leave with some hope.

[Sassa] So you are saying that refugees get free of charge the apartments built with the help of migration service?

[Answer] Yes, but under certain conditions. They do not have the right to sell or exchange the apartments, and must work in the organization to which the apartments belong. Because enterprises accept refugees in professions and skills they need.

[Sassa] One can understand it when Russians move from Central Asia, the Baltics, the Caucasus. But why do Georgians from Abkhazia not go to Georgia, or Armenians from Azerbaijan not want to go to Armenia?

[Answer] These people have learned what war is like; they have seen senseless bloodshed. They abandon everything they held dear and escape from hell to where at this point there is no shooting; where the situation is more or less stable; where they can save the children.

The Russian people are great in their generosity, good-naturedness, and hospitality. Themselves impoverished, humiliated, and insulted, having become "occupiers" and "strangers" in those newest states that they had protected, made them strong and prosperous; they share the last with the people crippled by fate. They understand that it was not these ordinary people who started the competition of sovereignties.

And so it became warmer in Siberia than in Central Asia or Transcaucasia.

And what if, God forbid, shooting begins here? We have no place to run...

Another telephone call. A young woman says:

"Thank you, good people!"

She and her husband came here straight from the train station. He has a Category II disability. Used to work as an explosives expert in a mine in Uzbekistan. Something happened: He got "pushed," with damage to the spine. Everything they had they have used up for food. Came here without a penny.

Problems cannot be solved in one day. The arrivals spent the night at a train station. Then spent another day there.

Meanwhile, people from the migration service were struggling to find a place for them to live. They talked a student dormitory superintendent into taking them in for just one night. Then they found the money to pay for one week in a hotel. Meanwhile, they were calling around at enterprises and organizations. Finally they found some gardening cooperative that hired the resettlers as watchmen. This means free room, electricity, a plot, and some pay. The gardeners helped with potatoes and vegetables.

The woman confessed once:

"I was on the verge on jumping in front of a train..."

Yuriy Mikhaylovich, a kindest man, exploded:

"Forget these idiotic ideas. Did you read Sholokhov's 'A Man's Fate'; did you see the movie? Andrey Sokolov returned from war—everything has been destroyed, it lays in ruins. He has nothing but the clothes on his back. He took Vanyusha by hand and went to look for a new destiny... And you? You are still young!"

I was listening to this tale, looking at the window sill in Moshkov's office. Two different flowers shared one pot. Yuriy Mikhaylovich perked up:

"See, I found this bulb. Brought it here and stuck into the pot. Before you know it, a shoot came out. Leaves sprouted. A bud formed. And now look—it is blooming.

It is holding to the soil by white threads, but what a beautiful red flower! I have to add more soil..."

Novosibirsk Land Distribution Detailed

944F0441A Novosibirsk SOVETSKAYA SIBIR in Russian
12 Mar 94 p 1

[Unattributed report: "Land Distribution"]

[Text] The oblast administration has approved the report on the inventory of lands and their distribution by category, agricultural use, proprietor, land owner, and land user as of 1 January 1994. The report also quotes the following figures: The oblast area comprises 17.7756 million hectares, which include 8.3205 million hectares of agricultural land, of which 8.3205 million hectares are plowed land. To meet the needs of individuals, village and settlement administrations have under their jurisdiction 1.2623 million hectares of land for hay mowing and livestock pasture. The oblast has 5,843 private farms, to which 294,200 hectares of agricultural land have been transferred. Another 26,400 hectares have been allocated for collective orchards, and 20,000 hectares—for collective vegetable gardens.

Vladivostok Mayor Adds Referendum to Vote

944F0434A Vladivostok VLADIVOSTOK in Russian
11 Mar 94 p 2

[Report by VLADIVOSTOK correspondent Vladimir Rozanov: "The Mayor Wants the City To Live by a Charter"]

[Text] The head of the Vladivostok administration, Viktor Cherepkov, announced in a television address on 9 March that on 27 March, simultaneously with the elections, he intends to hold a citywide referendum on two issues: Whether city residents think it necessary to shift to a single system of managing the city economy, liquidating rayon structures, and whether they approve the draft of the Vladivostok Charter, written by Cherepkov personally. The text of the charter has not yet been made available to city residents, however.

The city mayor explained the need for a general referendum on these two issues by such an important factor as Vladivostok entering market relations at a time when the city administration system has outlived itself and is no longer relevant. Viktor Cherepkov especially emphasized that introducing a centralized system in such matters as allocation of apartments and tax collection will allow, as he put it, correct justice to be achieved.

The Vladivostok Charter also is extremely important in the new economic conditions and political realities. Viktor Cherepkov said that city soviet deputies had worked on the charter earlier, and he continued what they had started, reducing the deputies' version to five pages. The mayor did not describe in detail the contents of the draft city charter, only saying that the charter will delineate the functions of the executive and representative branches of power in Vladivostok and the city's

relations with kray and republic authorities. Viktor Cherepkov also said that he refused to put in the draft charter a provision that the city mayor serves at the same time as head of the city дума.

State law specialists, commenting on Viktor Cherepkov's address, told our VLADIVOSTOK correspondent that the city mayor is most likely attempting to widen his power base, protect himself in advance from дума interference in the mayoralty's affairs, and acquire maximum powers. Blessed by a popular vote, the charter may make the mayor practically absolutely invulnerable in his confrontation with kray authorities.

Vladivostok To Be Polled on City Charter

944F0447A Vladivostok UTRO ROSSII in Russian
16 Mar 94 p 2

["Proposed Charter of the City of Vladivostok"]

[Text]

Popular Referendum

[Begin box]

On 27 March, together with elections to the Vladivostok City Дума, a popular referendum will be conducted.

Vladivostok residents will answer two questions:

1. Do you find it expedient to approve a common system of city administration, which envisages the functioning of city services as one whole, with the phased elimination of rayon administrations?
2. Do you agree with the text of the draft Vladivostok Charter?

This draft contains the basic principles of organizing the representative and executive authority in Vladivostok and defines their powers in the structure of local self-rule bodies.

We ask that proposals and comments on the draft Charter be sent in writing to the following address: 20 Ocean Avenue, Vladivostok, or call 222-333.

[End box]

1. General provisions.

- 1.1. Vladivostok is the administrative center of Maritime Kray, a city, a single administrative-territorial unit without apportionment into rayons.
- 1.2. Vladivostok's city limits are defined by Decree of the RSFSR Council of Ministers No. 138 dated 25 April 1985.
- 1.3. The city of Vladivostok has an official seal, approved by the Statute on the Seal of the City of Vladivostok.
- 1.4 "City Day" is the first Sunday in July.

2. Status of City Resident

- 2.1. Any person who is a citizen of the Russian Federation and lives permanently in the city is considered a resident.
- 2.2. A city resident possesses to the full extent all socioeconomic, political, and personal rights and freedoms proclaimed and guaranteed by the Constitution of the Russian Federation and this Charter, including the right to elect and be elected to bodies of state authority and administration, and take part in public debates and referendums on matters of city life and control over the activities of elected bodies of administration.
- 2.3. A city resident has the right to receive without obstruction any information on the state of affairs in the city, on issues under discussion in city bodies of authority and administration, appointments and transfers of city officials, with the exception of information that contains state secrets, as defined in corresponding normative acts.
- 2.4. A city resident has the obligation to observe the provisions of this Charter, directives and decrees of administrative bodies on matters that have bearing on the stable and efficient functioning of city services.
- 2.5. Conscientious labor for the good of personal and public well-being is the obligation and matter of honor for all work-eligible city residents.
- 2.6. A physical person who has rendered great services to the city may be named an honorary citizen of the city of Vladivostok.

3. Vladivostok City Administration

- 3.1. City administration is carried out in keeping with the Constitution of the Russian Federation and the current law.
- 3.2. The city authorities are the State Дума and the mayoralty (city administration).
- 3.3. The City Дума is elected by city residents who permanently live on the territory of the city, on the basis of equal and direct electoral right in a secret ballot.

Any city resident who has reached the age of 18 and has lived in Vladivostok at least 10 years may be elected a City Дума deputy.

The membership of the City Дума shall be 22 persons.

The term deputies serve in the City Дума shall be two years.

Up to 20 percent of City Duma deputies may work on a professional (permanent) basis; they cannot hold government jobs or engage in other paid activities, with the exception of teaching, research, and other creative work.

3.4. City Duma prerogatives include:

- approval of the local budget;
- local taxation and duties;
- development of general principles of price formation keeping in mind the interests of city residents;
- matters of ecology, use of natural resources, environmental protection;
- general issues of upbringing, education, science and culture, and sports;
- health care;
- relations with religious communities and ethnic groups;
- social protection of the population.

3.5. The mayoralty's prerogatives are:

- ownership, use, and disposal of land, mineral deposits, water and all other natural resources;
- rational and prudent management and disposal of municipal and other property under its ownership;
- expenditure of budget and nonbudget means;
- setting the general principles of organizing the system of local self-rule bodies, including appointment and removal of heads of municipal enterprises, organizations, and institutions;
- coordination of economic ties with Russian Federation components;
- establishing and carrying out international and foreign economic relations within the boundaries of existing Russian Federation law;
- assisting the functioning of the mass media;
- coordinating operations of postal, telegraph, and telephone services on the territory of the city;
- creating favorable conditions for functioning of the city's financial and credit institutions, keeping in mind the interests of Vladivostok residents and the city's economic development;
- control over fulfillment of contract obligations between commercial structures and municipal enterprises, organizations, and institutions in matters of the city's life support;

- protection of historic and cultural landmarks;
- awarding and revoking the title of "Honorary Citizen of Vladivostok."

3.6. The city mayor of Vladivostok is the head of the local self-rule on the entire territory of the city.

The city mayor is the guarantor of implementation of the provisions of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, current Russian Federation law, and this Charter, and of citizens' rights and freedoms; he ensures the coordinated functioning and interaction of bodies of state authority and local self-rule, defines the main direction of city infrastructure development, and represents the city administration at the federal and international level.

3.7. The city mayor is elected for a five-year term by popular vote of citizens who are permanent residents of the city of Vladivostok.

3.8. Any Russian Federation citizen who has lived on the territory of the city of Vladivostok for at least 10 years and is not younger than 30 or older than 60 may be elected mayor.

3.9. In assuming office, the city mayor takes the following oath of allegiance to city residents:

"I solemnly swear (promise) that I will carry out conscientiously my duties as mayor of the city and will to the full extent of my capabilities support, protect, and defend the Constitution of the Russian Federation, ensure the safety and peace of city residents, and faithfully serve their interests."

3.10. The city mayor has the right:

- to approve the appointment or dismissal of heads of the mayoralty's structural subunits, municipal enterprises, organizations, and institutions;
- form the mayoralty's structures and staff roster;
- through decrees and directives, define and regulate activities of city residents, interaction between enterprises, organizations, agencies, and other formations and structures located on the territory of Vladivostok in the interests of city residents;
- coordinate relations with the military authorities on matters of functioning of military units and rendering assistance in the maintenance of public order in the city; interact in the event of the emergency situations and natural disasters, as well as elimination of their consequences; and direct civil defense;
- submit drafts of normative acts to the City Duma;

—on the basis of Russian Federation law, "veto" City Duma decisions;

—issue decrees, directives, and instructions that are mandatory for heads of municipal enterprises, organizations, and institutions on the territory of the city;

—carry out control over normative acts issued by the mayoralty's structural subunits and municipal enterprises, organizations, and institutions and revoke them in the event they are not in compliance with current law;

—approve the boundaries of intra-city territorial units.

- 3.11. Early recall of the mayor's powers is possible only as a result of a popular vote of citizens who reside permanently in the city of Vladivostok, if more than 50 percent of eligible voters vote for such a recall; or by his own volition.

4. Making changes to the Charter

- 4.1. Changes to the city Charter, adopted by citywide referendum of the Vladivostok population and approved by decree of the city mayor, may be made only on the basis of a new citywide referendum.

- 4.2. Decisions on holding citywide referendums on the most important problems of the city's functioning are made by the mayor at his initiative or at the proposal of the City Duma.

5. Concluding provisions

- 5.1. This Charter becomes effective the day of official publication of the results of the popular vote (referendum) of the city population.
- 5.2. The day of the popular referendum shall be considered the day of adoption of the Charter.
- 5.3. Normative acts of local bodies of municipal and federal authority that were in effect on the territory of the city continue to apply after the adoption of this Charter in the parts that do not contradict it.

Vladivostok City Manager Runs for Kray Duma

944F0435A Vladivostok UTRO ROSSII in Russian
11 Mar 94 p 1

[Interview with Vladimir Gilgenberg, Vladivostok city manager, by Raisa Fomicheva; place and date not given: "Vladimir Gilgenberg: 'There Is Hope...'"]

[Text] Vladimir Aleksandrovich Gilgenberg, 38 years old, manager of the city of Vladivostok, married, has been nominated to the Kray Duma from the Republican Party.

[Fomicheva] Vladimir Aleksandrovich, you have power today. Quite a lot! You manage the city. What is prompting you to run for the Kray Duma?

[Gilgenberg] The law is being flouted here in the presence of all the branches of authority. Everyone has already sensed that it is bad living without deputies. Deputies are a restraining and controlling factor for the executive branch. They compel all the organs to work.

[Fomicheva] That is, you are moved only by a desire to help the kray?

[Gilgenberg] I decided several years ago that Moscow was not for me, I am a person of my own kray, my own city, [line missing in original] position, after all, it is a new one—city manager.

The position has existed for a long time in world practice. And if we are aspiring to a market economy, this kind of position will also exist. It is possible that it has not yet achieved the necessary level with my performance. At the present time, it is necessary to expend a lot of effort on the attacks of the kray administration, which authorized the subordinate organs not to subordinate themselves to the city mayoralty. But in the meantime we received a letter from the Ministry of Justice yesterday which states that the mayoralty is right on all questions. But they frayed our nerves for three months, and inflicted damage on the city in a useless fight. Who will answer for this?

[Fomicheva] What is authority to you?

[Gilgenberg] I would not want that feeling—of authority. The work is difficult and thankless, but I will work until we get democracy going.

[Fomicheva] Here is a question for you from a meticulous reader: Are you planning to go to the FRG? It is said that you agreed to this position because you want the same kind of position in another country.

[Gilgenberg] I have relatives in the FRG. They asked me: Are you not insane to remain in Russia at such a time? I answered that I will only go there when everything is fine in Russia, and when it is necessary to help Germany.

[Fomicheva] A question from many readers: Why has it become so dirty in the city?

[Gilgenberg] It would be strange if it were clean, considering that the kray administration authorized the rayon authorities not to show up for four months at planning meetings and conferences in the mayor's office. So, under conditions of such anarchy, the city became swamped in garbage. But the administration for services and utilities was disbanded back during Yefremov's time. We are now restoring it. Relations with the sanitary inspection service have also become tense. The chief doctor, who did not punish those responsible for the dirty conditions, has compiled a protocol against me as the manager. But about 200 persons work in this system. I recall a case in the former USSR, in the city of

Solikamsk: The chief doctor shut down plants with injurious wastes. She was summoned to the party bureau, a scandal broke out, and the whole country came to the defense of the chief doctor, letters were written, telegrams sent. You do not investigate such heroes here. No one is fined, no appeals are made to the mayor's office. There is no sanitary militia. Then at least let the district militia officer look after cleanliness together with the yardmen. I think that it will be said in any house now that, against the background of the fights between the two administrations, the yardmen are practically not working. I think that the residents should come out in spring and tidy up; after all, they also are littering. But I can imagine what the VLADIVOSTOK newspaper will write in this regard: "The mayor's office has acknowledged its impotence and has decided to summon everyone to volunteer weekend work. But, after all, not in one city of the world do residents conduct themselves so unwisely. As if it were not their yard, home, and street. They do not give a damn, they litter, they move on."

[Fomicheva] You were the deputy of a kray soviet and enjoyed great authority among your voters. I remember that grateful letters addressed to you were sent to our newspaper. You have experience. What do you think? Will you succeed in leaving the old [illegible word] soviet?

[Gilgenberg] A Duma of 40 persons also cannot solve all problems immediately. However, it is not a matter of the number of deputies. At the end of the 1970's I was in the state of Vancouver, where the parliament consisted of 200 persons, but they all wanted the best for their state. We have a different psychology and a habit of constantly living in a fight with one another. Beginning with the Pioneers, remember: "In the struggle for the cause, be prepared!" Now, everything depends on the voters. If they in all seriousness elect worthy people, the Duma will be able to change the situation.

[Fomicheva] Did you easily collect the signatures for your registration as a candidate?

[Gilgenberg] Yes.

[Fomicheva] But how did you collect them?

[Gilgenberg] I do not know, my supporters did this in the microrayons.

[Fomicheva] Did you use your official position? We have a lot of letters that talk about such cases in other cities.

[Gilgenberg] In no way!

[Fomicheva] A commission headed by Nelli Yakimenko from the human rights committee came to Vladivostok to look into the dispute of the two administrations. Did you meet with it?

[Gilgenberg] Of course. I have known Yakimenko for a long time: We worked together in the militia, and we joined the democratic movement together. But this time I met her as a person who was an official from Moscow.

She has set herself up well in the capital, and the apartment question was resolved. But, after all, there have been a lot of commissions, and we hope that they will gain an understanding.

[Fomicheva] What is it like in the mayor's office now? Quiet?

[Gilgenberg] Those who came to work along with Cherepkov have mastered the situation and are working. We are accepting new people for a probationary period.

[Fomicheva] I wrote once that when we were electing a mayor we had a poor idea of what it meant. Are you planning a trip abroad for training?

[Gilgenberg] This is an interesting question. We are planning one. Cherepkov's trip to Japan has already fallen through. Now he is being invited to Italy. Four employees have been invited to Alaska. However, we cannot leave yet, work in the city has not been settled. But, then, imagine what we will hear about the trips. "They left for a rest," it will be said.

[Fomicheva] You will excuse me, but even you have the old viewpoint! So, let them say it! In any country a person goes where he has a mind to, and it is only in our "camp of socialism" that a trip by someone in a managerial position is accompanied by "howling" in the newspapers. Previously, this was understandable, as they traveled on party money. But now?

[Gilgenberg] When we were getting buses from South Korea, I wanted to go myself, but I did not allow myself to do so for this reason. Although today a trip abroad is really open to everyone, and any cooperator has traveled through Turkey, France...

[Fomicheva] You have always wanted democracy to come, when you started the movement for it with Yaki-menko. But are you living well today?

[Gilgenberg] I will answer you like this: The builders of both socialism and a society with market relations are one and the same. And the methods are old, unfortunately.

[Fomicheva] Well, is it good for you or not?

[Gilgenberg] There is the hope that it will be good. And I think that it is absolutely necessary to retain one principle of socialism: A person should not fall below a certain level. And it seems that there was a higher morality.

[Fomicheva] But this is all in your power as the city manager. Perhaps, start with pornography on vendor stands. After all, children pass by. Such, excuse me, nonsense is being disseminated in many aspects of life where we are smartly trying on the garments of foreign life. Without a moment's hesitation. But they do not accept pornography there either. What do you think of the decision of the State Duma on the amnesty?

[Gilgenberg] It seems to me that this question should have been decided by lawyers at an international level. I am not very pleased that they were all released. But at the same time, in periods of crisis, the leadership was completely changed in all countries. A younger generation of politicians should normalize the situation in Russia.

[Fomicheva] And in the kray? Will the two administrations reach an agreement?

[Gilgenberg] I hope that common sense will prevail among the kray leadership. And then Maritime Kray has every chance of coming out of the crisis.

Vladivostok City Manager Shuffles Staff

944F0445A Vladivostok KRASNOYE ZNAMYA in Russian
15 Mar 94 p 1

[Article by Sergey Glushkov: "A Personnel Revolution?"]

[Text] Last Friday, administrations of three rayons in Vladivostok were literally shocked by an unexpected visit.

Early in the morning several persons, led by City Administrator V. Gildenberg, showed up in the office of T. Vadilyeva, the acting head of Sovetskiy Rayon administration. Two of them wore militia uniforms and were armed. After an "entertaining" conversation, T. Vadilyeva learned that she had been removed from the job, and the new appointee was N. Beletskiy, a former head of the city education department and a former candidate for a mayor. Our readers may recall that during the election campaign he stepped down as a candidate in favor of the current head of administration, V. Cherepkov.

After that, V. Gildenberg, again with an escort, visited Pervomayskiy Rayon, where the head of administration, V. Pletnev, was relieved of his duties. His place was taken by V. Kalenik, a former deputy chairman of Sovetskiy Rayon Soviet.

The same fate befell the head of Leninskiy Rayon administration S. Zhurmilov, whose chair will now be occupied by D. Ilyinskiy. One can only tell about him that he is 50 and is a retired Captain 1st Rank. By the way, S. Zhurmilov did not accept his dismissal and filed a court complaint.

A strange personnel "reshuffling...." Especially keeping in mind that not too long ago the head of the Frunzenskiy Rayon administration was replaced—by a militia officer.

Vladivostok Official Interferes With Media

944F0441B Vladivostok UTRO ROSSII in Russian
12 Mar 94 p 1

[Article by Damir Gaynutdinov under the rubric "The Authorities and the Press": "Dare Not To Have an Opinion—Vice Governor Igor Lebedinets Demanded of our UTRO ROSSII Correspondent"]

[Text] From now on, esteemed reader, there will be no reports from teleconferences of the extraordinary commission for kray heat supply, which used to be published on Wednesdays and Saturdays under the rubric "Winter Problems." Not because with the advent of spring these problems have disappeared overnight. It is simply that Igor Petrovich, our chief troubleshooter everywhere, forbade me to attend these events from now on. Not for the first time, though.

Back in December he was very unhappy over the item "Where Did the Firewood Come From?" in which the author made no secret of reports from Khorol officials that because of coal shortages in rayon villages, people were chopping down the woods. This was a misstep, as the "Cheka" [extraordinary commission] chairman explained to me the next time we met. Instead of mobilizing people to struggle against adversity, the way it used to be during the times of agitation and propaganda and party committee press departments, it turns out that I, in Lebedinets' opinion, had demoralized the workers. It somehow does not occur to Igor Petrovich that only the truth can mobilize people, including the kray leadership, toward liquidation of the fuel crisis. The Khorol leadership has rung enough alarms by then.

The most entertaining part at the time was Igor Petrovich's accusation that both I personally and UTRO ROSSII are doing everything possible to make things worse... for President Yeltsin. I have to confess that sometimes I disagree with the actions of Boris Nikolayevich—who during his visit to Vladivostok gave his blessing to the publication of our newspaper—which should be a normal thing in a law-based state and a democratic society. But Igor Petrovich himself developed an affinity for Yeltsin only when he ascended to this administrative job. As I recall, he had none of that affinity during his time in the communist faction of the kray soviet, which he headed.

Whatever—the result was that he banned me from attending the conferences then, but later relented after M. Savchenko, chairman of the kray administration committee for housing and municipal services, said publicly (this is how you discover people's mettle even in our democratic times) that I do write objectively.

On 5 March, however, Mikhail Lvovich sensibly remained silent, having decided that to keep trying to educate and teach Igor Petrovich is like trying to cure a dead man. Here is what happened.

Not a single teleconference passes without a reminder of the money owed to the energy sector. All the rayons and cities are in this debt up to their ears. All of them Igor Petrovich treats with benevolence and understanding, however, but as soon as it comes to Vladivostok he literally goes into a fit of rage. This time what prompted his outburst was that I do not get upset and treat Vladivostok like every other place. My especially dangerous fault was that I did not write that one of the causes of our common shivering this winter was the fact

that V. Cherepkov allocated money to start the BOLSHOY VLADIVOSTOK newspaper.

"Why do you not write about that?" the vice governor said, looking as if he were spoiling for a fistfight.

I explained to him that then I would have to write that millions of taxpayer rubles are allocated by the kray administration to KRASNOYE ZNAMYA and NOVOSTI, as well as by local authorities to all rayon and city newspapers. Is this a solution to the heating and power problem?

"A demagogue," was the label slapped on me this time. Kray party committee ideologist Antokhin once called me a rebel; another party secretary, Kharchev, suggested that I decide for myself whether I was for the Soviet power or not. It turned out that the way he saw it, I was against it. And now another kray zealot of propaganda customs, without doubting for a moment...

There are many people in the kray who have known both Igor Petrovich and myself for many years. Since he got his education as a part-time student, I will remind our mutual acquaintances—as food for thought—of the meaning of one word.

DEMOGOGUERY (demogogia in Greek, from demos—people and ago—lead)—deception through intentional distortion of facts, false promises, and flattery; hypocritical pandering to the taste of the less educated part of the masses in order to achieve political goals.

I really cannot accept such a characteristic of myself. As to I. Lebedinets, who calls journalists "slimeballs"—I do not know...

Watching Igor Petrovich in his capacity as de facto first vice governor, I cannot help recalling his namesake and predecessor Igor Chernyanskiy. He was rakishly rough, but while holding this job he did not stoop to pettiness and vindictiveness.

"I want to understand, looking from the position of an elephant (meaning his job of great responsibility—D.G.) why I am being barked at, even if I am not aware of it," he said once.

I think it is time for Igor Petrovich to grow to fill this job rather than staying in the old position he is accustomed to.

Actually, he is not as insignificant as some may think or imagine. If I am asked some time in the future who Ye. Nazdratenko was, I will say he was Maritime Kray governor during Lebedinets' time.

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

International Conference on Bosnia Under UN Aegis Urged

944Q0226A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 4 Mar 94 p 4

[Article by Igor Laptev, Foreign Policy Association: "Conference on Bosnian Conflict Needed"]

[Text] The process of reaching a settlement in Bosnia and Herzegovina based on the principle of threat of use of force has reached an impasse and constitutes the road to nowhere. The NATO countries cannot go on threatening air strikes for years on end. Nor can the peoples of Bosnia, Serbia, and Croatia live under such a threat for years on end. Unfortunately, not even having begun combat operations, military leaders in the United States are already discussing the possibility of their expansion. UN Secretary General Butrus-Ghali and the NATO leaders have not rescinded their threat—they have only postponed it. They are not considering that in the event of air strikes in Bosnia, NATO and the United Nations will turn into a warring faction. The blue helmets will turn dark with blood, and the units wearing them will be quickly swept aside by armed forces of Serbs, Croats, and Bosnians—which might evoke a responsive reaction from the NATO forces. Such a course of events could lead inevitably to large-scale war in Europe.

It is clear that the peoples of Bosnia, Serbia, Montenegro, and Croatia would be the primary victims of this. It is not clear who would compensate for the material damage—many times surpassing the scope of humanitarian assistance now being extended to Bosnia.

Today like never before it is important to prevent escalation of the conflict in Bosnia into a European tragedy and to deny NATO the right to determine when bombing and missile strikes will be carried out in Bosnia. It is important that we urgently begin to seek new approaches and ideas for achieving a political settlement in Bosnia and, on the broader scale, in the Balkans. As a minimum such a decision must be made by the UN Security Council. It seems that a conference must be convened to this end under the aegis of the United Nations to attain a settlement in the former Yugoslavia. The initiator of such a conference could be Russia and other Slavic states that support even contacts with all sides in the Bosnian conflict. Such a conference could give all republics of the former Yugoslavia the opportunity to participate in it on an equal basis and preclude the possibility of a situation arising where decisions would be made behind their backs and be imposed on them by outsiders. It is also important that all permanent members of the UN Security Council participate in the conference.

In the event accord is reached with respect to convening this conference, the preparations group need not be limited to international representatives David Owen and

Thorvald Stoltenberg, whose positions reflect the pro-West, pro-NATO orientation, but should include representatives from Serbia, Montenegro, Croatia, and Bosnia, as well as the ethnic minorities of these republics. The group could include Russia, Greece—as the neighbor of the Yugoslav republics, and Bulgaria—as a Balkan Slavic country. The preparatory work of a broad-based group could help convene the international conference in a more favorable environment than that in which negotiations have thus far been conducted.

Conflict in the former Yugoslavia has been ongoing for about two years and no end is in sight under the current development of events. Conference preparation with participation of the Serbs, Croats, and Bosnians themselves should help reduce the tension. Negotiations can and must replace military operations.

The time has come to establish in Russia the Committee of the Russian Community To Facilitate a Political Settlement in Bosnia and Herzegovina, with the participation of representatives of political parties, social movements, and Slavic organizations. This committee could also facilitate the search for a settlement through the establishment of unofficial contacts between representatives of the sides in conflict. This too could yield great dividends.

RF Diplomacy on Bosnia, Politicking on Foreign Policy Assessed

34402331 Moscow *OBSHCHAYA GAZETA* in Russian
No 9, 4-10 Mar 94 p 7

[Article by Pavel Kandel: "Russian Policy in the Bosnian Matter"]

[Text] Russia's actions in the recent crisis around Sarajevo can be relegated to a number of rare successes from the standpoint of diplomatic skill. There was, it is true, a certain confusion in the beginning. Indications of this are the diplomatic illness that the president "endured on his feet" and the statements of various officials that contradicted each other, which has already become traditional. But at the culminating moment the situation was assessed accurately, the weakness and ambiguity in the positions of the other players were fully exploited, and the thrust that was created by NATO's ultimatum was used to support its own line, which also led to the triumph of Russian diplomacy.

There is boasting in Moscow about Russia's independent role. The obvious irritation in Western capitals with Russian "license" is competing with secret satisfaction over the outcome of the Sarajevo crisis. Meanwhile, success became possible only because all the players, although hardly by agreement, played their role in the current game. Using KGB terminology, the West played the role of "malicious investigator," after which came Russia's turn, to whom it fell, in the person of the "good investigator," to reap the fruit.

Russia and the Western powers objectively mutually complemented each other in their actions, but differed sharply in their substantiation. The price of such rhetoric, it would seem, is not high. But it always addresses itself to those social forces that have a predominant influence on foreign policy and, therefore, it is not indifferent to the real driving motives of the parties. Russia explained its resistance to NATO's ultimatum in a different way: The impermissibility of attempts to bypass it, the unacceptability of imposing the model of settlement, and the danger of any decision other than a continuation of negotiations. But objectively this denoted an attempt to lessen international pressure on the Serbian side, which was the most powerful and most successful in seizures, and which would also reinforce its position behind the negotiating. And while at the beginning of the Bosnian conflict Russian foreign policy tried, albeit inconsistently, to be impartial, as it developed it began to regard "Orthodox co-religionists" and "Slavic brothers" with greater and greater favor. This corresponded fully to the biased leniency of the European states toward Croatia, and of the United States toward the Bosnian Muslims.

However, the important interests of the Western states are not affected here, and only the Bosnian gap in European law and order stains their reputation. It is hardly possible to ascribe to genuine Russian foreign policy interests an inclination to assist the Belgrade regime in a partition of the former SFRY in accordance with the ideals of a Greater Serbia. Bosnian rural areas are hardly the most effective scene for demonstrating greatness. The space, where the collapsed Yugoslav dinar, contrary to an anti-German mood, is being squeezed out by the German mark, which Russia will be unable to counter with anything for a long time, is outside the radius of influence of the Russian economy. In precisely the same way a military advanced post, separated from it by the territories of Ukraine, Moldova, and Romania, is not very suitable for the defense of Russia, if the counterproductive task of having a permanent irritant on NATO's southern flank is not set. There is also no promise of foreign policy dividends in an alliance with an international social outcast that contrived to squander the enormous foreign policy capital of the former SFRY.

Of course, it can be assumed that Russia's readiness to support "a Serbian cause" to the last Serbian soldier is explained by sober political realism. After all, Serbia, as has happened more than once, will remain an "historical ally" of Russia only while the war lasts and the international isolation continues. It is then in Russia's interests to support this status as long as possible. The task is the more gratifying in that it does not require any sacrifices by Russia, except for damage to its international prestige. But access to the matches for the powder keg of Europe is a considerable temptation. The intent is sufficiently cynical to appear politically authentic. Of course, in this case also, the question of the cost of such a temporary "historical alliance" remains.

The reality, however, is more transparent. Russian foreign policy is more and more becoming a direct derivative of the arrangement of internal political forces, taking on a dangerous independence from the strictly foreign policy interests and objectives of the country. The most authoritarian ruler is incapable for long of refuting through his behavior the well-known formula of foreign policy being a continuation of domestic policy. The exerted striving for foreign policy self-affirmation is greater the weaker the domestic stability of the existing regime, the narrower its social base and political support, and the more dismal its socioeconomic situation. It is not just a question of complaisance to the pressure of the national-communist opposition that prevails in parliament and to the intrigues of the lobbyist groups, from the pro-Serb to the Karabakh and Abkhaz groups, which need an example and an international-legal precedent to legalize their own claims. It is not only a matter of the efforts of the president's "court" to forestall the opposition by intercepting some of their slogans and the votes of the electorate. For the country as a whole, which is obsessed with a complex of greatness but which is deprived of many of its status symbols and a material basis, there is an inevitable striving to assert an independent role in the international arena.

The time has also come for a sobering up of Russian foreign policy from "romantic Westernism," and just as naturally for a departure from "market romanticism." The policy is even more pertinent in that such romanticism is principally foreign to the West itself. Fraternizing with windmills is just as absurd as fighting them. Perhaps it is for this reason that all the factions of the State Duma voted for a resolution that denounces NATO's ultimatum. However, the age-old misfortune of the Russian character—dislike for the middle ground—turns into a tragic shortfall in the policy of the centrist social and political forces. Therefore, there is a very great risk that "market romanticism," given the most insignificant changes in the composition of the leading personalities, will be replaced by an antimarket romance, and that illusory Westernism will turn into great power illusions. The magical transformation of Kozyrev's Stockholm parody into a Russian foreign policy program is a dangerous symptom of precisely such an evolution. It is entirely superfluous to talk about the foreign policy constructions of the national-communist opposition.

The Sarajevo crisis revealed latent maturing processes of changes in Russian foreign policy. This may become the guarantee of more businesslike relations of Russia with Western states—proof of the fact that not only is the West necessary to Russia, but that Russia is also necessary to the West. The Sarajevo crisis can also turn out to be the start of a new opposition. But while Russia cannot escape a serious discussion with the Western partners, for example, as a result of their attempts to counteract the voluntary reintegration of the post-Soviet space, to quarrel regarding Bosnia is pure childishness. But the president and his circle are hardly ready to be at loggerheads with the State Duma over this. It is because what is happening there in fact makes no difference to one or

the other. After all, Russian foreign policy, to Russian politicians of various colors, is only a place for settling domestic political scores.

Brutents Ponders Russia's Position Between East, West

944Q0212A Moscow INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
in English No 1-2, Jan-Feb 94 [Signed to press 26 Jan 94]
pp 40-44

["Viewpoint" article by Karen Brutents, doctor of historical sciences and adviser to the president of the Political Studies Foundation: "Russia and the East"]

[Text] Russia is in transition in almost every respect. This also goes for the crystallisation of its identity as regards both its rightful role in the world community and its concept of its own distinctiveness and essence. I take the view that in this respect as in some others Russia still keeps in large measure to the past, to disconnected fragments of it, and may be said to apply the formula of its legal succession to this sphere as well.

Yet Russia will have to "predetermine itself," with its vision of the problems of "Russia and the East," of relations with the East, as a most important part of the process.

What is the issue today, when the substance of a problem that seems so very traditional or rather historical for the country is undergoing a serious transformation as a result of 70 years of membership in the Soviet Union and, above all, drastic geostrategic, social, and economic changes in Russia?

It is primarily our relations with Eastern (in fact Asian) countries as well as their projection into our relations with the West. Until recently this part of the globe received little attention from Russian policy and diplomacy for both objective and subjective reasons. But Boris Yeltsin's visit to South Korea, China, India and Japan, his remarks in Peking about "breakthroughs" to Asia and in Delhi about a "period of pro-Eastern policy" give hope for serious reassessment, for a continuation of the process of revision, with tangible deeds following important statements.

The attitude to the East and relations with it are a key aspect of Russia's identity, of its self-determination as a civilised spiritual, psychological and even political phenomenon. Whether Russia belongs to or sees itself as part of the West or the East was the object of a controversy that ran through Russian social thought for a long time, being slightly diluted in the 1920s by emigres who advanced the concept of Eurasianism. Nor is this surprising, for the controversy has always involved diametrically opposed political notions of the road along which Russia should move.

It seems to me, however, that this aspect of the controversy has lost meaning (assuming that it ever had any).

and the present flare-up of Eurasianism is rather indicative of the opposition's search for ideological equipment and its reaction to immoderate (and occasionally indecent) Westernisation on the part of a section of the intelligentsia and some spokesman for the government. Be that as it may, the formula of Westernisers versus Eurasianists and those who consider themselves inseparable from Russia's "native soil" provides no answer to the question of the relationship between Russia and the East.

The issue today is obviously Russia's fundamental attitude to the East, the need to recall certain distinguishing characteristics of our country, not a reproduction of theses of Eurasianism, which argues that Russia is following a road of its own and that regular global developments do not apply to it. The experience gained to date leaves no room for doubt that they involve the East, West, North and South. Hence Russia cannot stay off the road of democracy and a social market economy, whose various forms are winning ever wider recognition.

This, however, presupposes realising that the long-standing notion of the "ownership" of the phenomenon of democracy is outdated and that to embark on democracy is not the same as accepting the Western model.

The vitality of democracy depends on its ability to make further progress. Currently, many in the West are pondering on how to improve the democratic procedure in use. More and more people there consider that these procedures are by no means ideal and that it is indispensable to devise effective ways of combating increasing corruption, overcoming the population's political indifference due to the crisis of the party system in its present form and to the disregard of pressing needs of the electorate by leaders, to their selfishness and demagoguery of defending the interests and rights of minorities from the democratic diktat of the majority. In this situation the search for consensus which is typical of Eastern countries seems to be coming to the fore in various sections and structures of society.

The 21st century is likely to become an era of democratisation in the East. But this will hardly come down to a mere transplantation of the Western model and hence to Westernisation. Incidentally, all talk about grafting Western ideals is indefensible also tactically. It may complicate the democratisation process, causing this "extraneous" phenomenon to be rejected, a prospect exploited by nationalist and oligarchic forces in the East. Formerly, in the period of confrontation between two world systems, there certainly was a point in stressing the "Western" character of democracy. Today, however, the situation is entirely different.

Russia largely owes its originality (but not exclusiveness) and its legitimate role and potential as a member of the world community to the fact that it combines, if not always harmoniously, the features of Western (European) and Asian (Eastern) civilisations. While the poet Alexander Blok used those famous words "Yes, we are

Scythians, yes, we are Asians" in the heat of debate, they were not accidental but reflected a historic intertwining.

Traditionally drawn primarily to the West, Russia has always been a Eurasian country nonetheless, and this not only territorially. Its history, polyethnic environment, culture and very interests induced it to play the role of a link or even mediator between the two countries. Of course, how far it coped with this role is open to question. But there is no doubt that over the centuries diverse civilisational streams converged in the expanses of Russia, where a polyphonic socio-cultural area, a fabric of intercivilisational bonds and a culture of mutually enriching interchanges came into being and an atmosphere of psychological tolerance and openness to beneficial influences was created.

Everything relating to Russian nationals—their way of life, individual and social psychology, arts and letters, character and mentality—bear the imprint of this intercivilisational and supranational phenomenon influencing also the political evolution of the country, if not decisively. The "non-Westernness" of many spiritual and moral qualities of ethnic Russians and other inhabitants of Russia is obvious.

Directly deducing the specifics of Russia and its people from contacts with the foreign and internal parts of the East or from the "Eastern" component of their "soul" is out of the question, for they are a product of more complex interaction.

Still, the influence of these contacts, of Russia's Eastern environment, seems indisputable. Traces of it can be found in the language, the humanities (meaning their scope and the range of their interests), literature, noblemen's names and much else. This is as it should be, for, apart from two and a half centuries of the Mongol domination, Russia continuously and intensively extended its contact with the East through conquest and cultural interpenetration. It grew into Asia, forming its own East, an Asia of its own, where hundreds of thousands of ethnic Russians and other Russian nationals closely interacted psychologically, intellectually, and emotionally with the Eastern way of life and Eastern culture.

No non-Asian country has anything like this, and the spiritual reverberations of this interaction were bound to make themselves felt in one way or another throughout Russia. How very tangible the results of this mutual receptiveness can be is illustrated by the problem of adaptation of today's wave of emigration from some southern republics. It appears that there is a substantial distinction in psychology and way of life between these emigrants and their compatriots in, say, Central Russia, which creates difficulties in this respect as well.

A high degree of tolerance for a polytechnic environment is a further reflection of Russia's historic identity, of the blend of Western and Eastern components that its genetic type represents. To be sure, Russian chronicles have also recorded other things. Chauvinism, too, has

had and still has influential adherents. By and large, however, Russia as a country and society is more resistant—as the dramatic experience of recent years shows—to anti-emigration trends like those that are now rife in, for example, Western Europe.

Russia's attitude to the East is an attitude to itself, too, for Russia is also home to Tatars, Bashkirs, Yakuts, Caucasian, and dozens of other "Eastern" nationalities. Their place in our country, in its life and fortunes, is entirely different from that of, say, Arabs or Africans in France, Indians or Pakistanis in Britain. Russia is not just a habitat of diverse ethnic groups but a polytechnic country where the Russians as its backbone and other peoples have for centuries lived not only side by side but together, intermingling, fusing culturally and spiritually, jointly weathering social cataclysms and repulsing foreign invasions. They have a common history and common destiny.

Add to this that for 70 years we lived in one state, leading a common life with millions of Uzbeks, Kazakhs, Kirghiz, Turkmens, Tajiks, Azerbaijanians, and that today we belong with them to the Commonwealth of Independent States. All this was bound to and did have its effect, drawing and linking us together.

In other words, whereas Western Europe and the United States may look on the East as something different or even alien, it would be unnatural of Russia to do so. This is what geography and history, cultural and civilisational factors have willed.

Some Russian leaders today repudiate Russia's "Asian heritage," seeing nothing in it but negative, ignominious things, a burden pulling us back. Yet this heritage is as contradictory as any other legacy of history. Along with elements of medieval stagnation and even slavery, it includes what is a natural part of the historic strength and potential of Russia and its civilisation.

Russia belongs to neither the West nor the East alone. It is at once a Western and Eastern country. This does not mean that Russia is a mix or mechanical combination of cultural continents. Our country is the product of a synthesis that has given rise to a new, distinctive civilisation, a whole civilisational mainland, an original organism whose thinking and sentiments set it apart from others. And so all attempts to "rid" us of things Eastern and fully Westernise us are futile. What is more, they are absurd.

Today the multicivilisational, Western and Eastern sources and nature of Russian distinctiveness are acquiring special value. "Integration" is a word you now hear almost everywhere. It is a trend paving the way to the future for humanity. A universal civilisation is dawning all over the world, and its components are taking shape and spreading, especially to the economic sphere but also to politics and culture.

Much less is said, however, about the circumstances that the result will by no means be a unified world, the

effacement of distinctions, the abolition of cultural diversity. If this were to happen, humanity would become faceless, for it would lose one of the most powerful driving forces of its progress.

I am sure the 21st century will give existing civilisations a second wind as they develop and adapt to new conditions without losing their identity. It will usher in an increasingly polycentric world. We will arrive at it after abolishing a bipolar system, as we have already done, and completing the present transitional stage of unbalanced concentration of political influence, military power, and information potential at one pole.

Unlike the past, however, the evolution of diverse civilisations will probably take place in unprecedentedly close mutual contact. The era of isolated civilisations shutting out all others is over. They are being drawn together by the transnationalisation of economic life and information, the feverish development of communications, mass migrations. This creates tensions at "junctions" and other difficulties. Experience shows that even the achievement of a high, roughly equal level of economic growth does not eliminate problems arising from civilisational and cultural heterogeneity.

We live at a time when not only close contacts and a rapprochement between countries and nations but a convergence of civilisations and cultures are gaining in importance and urgency. This is all the more essential now that the greatest ideological conflict of the 20th century is over. Against this background Russia with its mixed civilisation, a country which has gone through a social experiment, is a particularly noteworthy phenomenon. Its intercivilisational essence, the experience of the coexistence of and contacts between diverse nations, may prove very valuable for humanity at this stage if preserved and fostered.

The East always held a prominent place in the foreign policy and overall potential of the Russian state and the Soviet Union. Basically, this also applies to the present period even though a number of important circumstances and vectors have changed, which means that many earlier approaches will have to be revised. What is different now is primarily Russia's real status.

Russia used to identify itself with a superpower, the Soviet Union, and actually embodied it. The Soviet Union was chiefly a Russian state. Most foreigners called it "Russia" and its citizens "Russians," doing so not only by mistake or force of habit.

Today Russia is striving to act as a full-fledged legal successor of the Soviet Union, and Russian diplomacy is doing as much in the main sectors. Yet the changes that set in with the disappearance of the Soviet Union as a superpower strongly affected Russia even though it may still not quite realise its new situation because the aura of the recent past and reflexes of a state that has gone out of existence linger on. Russia has joined the ranks of great powers (with a population half the size of the Soviet Union's and an area that is smaller by a third) and will

yet have to back up this new status by providing itself with an appropriate economic and political basis.

The priorities and main tasks of Russian policy and diplomacy are not quite clear as yet. They are certain to depend for some time to come on personal predilections, reflexes of attraction and rejection, automatic reactions evolved over the past few years. But however pro-American and pro-European a section of the intelligentsia and some leaders of the country may be (they understandably want Russia to be regarded as inseparable from Europe and the West and to have a say in European affairs), there is no disregarding realities.

The disintegration of the Soviet Union has objectively shifted the geostrategic and geopolitical epicentre of Russia to the East, towards Asia, although nominally this is not the case and, more importantly, is somewhat contrary to our current requirements. A belt of new independent states has emerged to the west of Russia (Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, the Baltic republics) drawn mainly to Western Europe, not Russia. These states are virtually moving Russia away from Europe, being a partition that may become a barrier where the position on Russia is unfriendly. On its southern periphery Russia is now faced with independent Transcaucasian and Central Asian states plus Kazakhstan. Furthermore, some of them are becoming a serious security problem.

Today Asia accounts for nearly 80 percent of Russia's territory, 70 percent of its frontiers and the lion's share of its natural resources. What the country can expect to help it end the present economic deadlock and make progress are primarily its eastern areas. Siberia and the Far East (12 million square kilometres of territory and the longest Pacific coastline), their economic cooperation with and integration into the fast-developing Asia-Pacific region.

As matters stand, the Asian part of Russia is thus bound to play a bigger role in the destiny of the country, its economic growth and foreign policy. This is also true of its Far Eastern coast at a time when most of the country's Baltic and Black Sea ports are gone.

A welcome change is the fact that Russia is no longer shackled by a superpower policy involving overarmament and ideological messianism and demanding that the country approach the world as the arena of an all-out rivalry for leadership. Russia no longer sees the East as an area of confrontation between two systems. It has withdrawn from an unacceptable and unwinnable game.

I believe all this means that Russia must resist the temptation of a duumvirate approach that, while possibly tickling its self-esteem, is useless. Besides, the United States remembers Russia in this context mostly when it is a question of certain survivals of the Cold War, an attitude which is only natural from the point of view of that country's national interests.

Russia's most powerful neighbours are in the East—in Asia. Its relations with the East include relations with

China. These are already of fundamental importance and their importance for Russia's destiny will grow further in the first decade of the next century, when China will have a real chance to become an economic (and possibly also a military) superpower, according to many forecasts.

Russia's Past Contribution to Civilization Invoked

944Q0211A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 1 Mar 94 p 3

[Article by Richard Ovinnikov, ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary, doctor of historical sciences: "We Should Be Proud of Our Mission"]

[Text] The Russian Federation, which is currently overloaded to breaking point, will, of course, ultimately determine its fate itself, within its own walls. But the question also of the international climate in this difficult period is far from secondary.

The dramatic content of the external problems which Russia is encountering is obvious. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, it has for the first time in several centuries been deprived both of the western and Central Asia-Transcaucasus cordon. Beyond its new borders is an encircling focal point of conflicts, and 25 million of its colinguals today rank as foreigners.

To avoid being caught unawares by the further development of events, a sober, impartial analysis of trends in the surrounding world is required. It is time that Russians tired of the incantations about the fact that to each proclaimed course there is no alternative recalled the truth that the way to the future is always variant. As far as the possible forecasts for the future are concerned, four scenarios of the impact of the surrounding world on the national interests of the Russian Federation may be imagined.

First scenario (optimistic or positive). The reintegration of the economies of a sizable number of countries of the CIS and their political and military interface occur. Conflicts on Russia's borders subside. Relations with countries of East Europe improve. The West, primarily in the shape of the Seven, renders the restoration and modernization of our industry appreciable assistance by way of large investments and the lifting of trade restrictions.

Second scenario (pessimistic or negative). Economic and political disintegration of the space around Russia occurs. It suffocates without friends or markets. Problems of its security as a consequence of the proliferation of nuclear weapons close by and/or the growth of conflicts along the perimeter intensify sharply. The West denying Russia stabilization on its borders, engages in a tug-of-war in respect to the former allies and republics of the USSR, and its economic interaction with us amounts to shoring up Russia's raw material sectors.

Third scenario (interim or stagnant). The formation of a common market of the CIS comes to a standstill. With the East European countries—cool relations. Conflicts

along Russia's perimeter smolder, although they do not develop into a conflagration. The danger of the proliferation of nuclear weapons nearby hangs in the air. The West dribbles out economic assistance and politically and strategically contemplates the development of events.

Fourth scenario (sudden or spontaneous). An abrupt deterioration in Russian-Ukrainian relations arises. In the wake of the Transcaucasus, borders are revised in Central Asia between former Union republics. Tension is created throughout the system of relations with an increasingly assertive West. The distant surroundings could bring rolling to Russia seismic waves of their own tectonic shifts—the bankruptcies of a number of important developing countries, trade wars, and the unleashing of "hot wars" in the Third World or against it.

It is not known which of these scenarios is possible today. There are even more uncertainties with regard to their probable combinations. The sole solution for Russia in this situation is to be ready to defend its national interests all along the line and to assert its statehood. Precise reference points are required for this first and foremost.

It would seem that the cornerstone of the policy course of the Russian Federation should, as in critical times in the past also, be its clear understanding of its own significance in world geopolitics. A big ship has no need to be constantly flashing its lights. It cannot be forgotten that we are a major global factor, and in emergency situations, an irreplaceable factor.

The truth is that the entire history of mankind in the second millennium would have developed tragically had there not been at the intersection of Europe and Asia the Russian state. Three times it has saved the European continent, and on the last occasion, the world also, from unprecedented aggression. The first time, when, in the 13th-15th centuries, Russians shielded Europe from the invasion of the hordes of the descendants of Genghis Khan. The second, at the start of the 19th century, when Russia crushed the armies of Napoleon, invincible to subjugated Europe. The third time, in the 1940's, when two-thirds of the might of Hitler's fascism was pulverized and its backbone broken on the Soviet-German front. Who else could have done all this?

Russia has thus traditionally, throughout the millennium, acted the part of proven stabilizer of European civilization, guarantor of its peace, and dependable shield against history's biggest acts of aggression. To maintain anything different is to falsify.

It is odd under these conditions, if not insulting to Russians' national pride, to hear today talk to the effect that, for example, Russia generally (both tsarist and Soviet) has always been a "constant threat" to Europe. But this imaginary threat has simply never materialized. Or that Russia, the times of the USSR included, has been an invariable "potential aggressor." Finally, that Russia,

ideology notwithstanding, is organically typified by sinister "imperial ambitions." And once again this is merely something ascribed to us, but unconfirmed.

Well, lack of scruples, let it pass. Gratitude is a stranger to politics. But today's rehashes of unfriendly rumors must not, in any event, provoke us into needless and humiliating excuses or evoke an inferiority complex. Russians have nothing to make excuses for. We should be proud of our noble historical mission and continue it. Russia now is now, and will remain a great power vitally necessary to the world. Only such a confident, majestic position is the way to its revival.

A most important specific task of the Russian Federation, as of any other state also, is the attainment of tranquillity for internal transformations, prelude to the way of the formation of friendly surroundings. Today, these are primarily the CIS countries. Agreement to their unnatural alienation would mean tearing up our own age-old roots, the earth for which cannot be imported from overseas. Russians do not, understandably, want such a development. At the recent elections, however, within the CIS figured as a priority in the program of the majority of election associations. Of course, this can only be a question of a process of voluntary cooperation by political methods.

Another large-scale practical goal of the Russian Federation on the outside is assurance of a generally stable international climate. This signifies a renunciation of principle of confrontation with the West and a search for mutually profitable and long-term cooperation. But this presupposes also Russia's firm defense of its own valuable national interests and legitimate and equal rights in world politics and economics. In any event, anyone erect either a cordon sanitaire or a wire mesh around Russia's borders are unnatural, discriminatory, and unacceptable.

Are any of these reference points a threat to national interests? Great, sovereign Russia, with its rich "potential," is approaching the world of the future in the best possible way.

Citizens Democracy Corps Projects Outlined

944Q0227A Moscow MOSCOW NEWS (RUSSIAN)
No 9, 4-10 Mar 94 p 7

[Article by Sergei Strokan: "Economic Missionary From the USA Coming to Russia" first paragraph, introductory paragraph]

[Text] An American organization has suggested a new form of cooperation to Russian entrepreneurs. They will send Western specialists and pay for their work and living expenses.

"The purpose of our organization is to use the knowledge and resources of the US private sector in assisting reforms in Central Europe," says Michael Kiser, official representative of the Citizens Democracy Corps.

Corps (CDC) in Moscow. "We are working on the assumption that the transition to the market implies not only reforms at the macro-level, but also day-to-day work at the level of enterprises, public organizations and municipal services."

The Citizens Democracy Corps is an American noncommercial, nongovernmental organization whose Executive Committee includes former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, former US Ambassador in Russia Robert Strauss, many prominent Congressmen, industrialists and scientists. It is financed by the state-owned US Agency of International Development (USAID) which has allotted 2.2 million dollars for the Corps' programmes. These programmes envisage the extension of aid by highly skilled consultants from the USA.

A distinctive feature of the CDC program is that it envisages the extension of aid in the shape of business advice on a pro bono basis. The Corps' staff members identify what specialists are needed for a particular enterprise and undertake all subsequent work to complete the Russian applications. They find specialists in the USA and pay the cost of air tickets. Customers must only offer local transportation, provide housing and an interpreter.

One more feature of the programme is its volunteers. They are Americans who desire to share their time and knowledge with those who could utilize it in Russia.

The work of the Citizens Democracy Corps is carried out on the basis of two main programmes. The first—Business Entrepreneur—is geared to small and medium-size businesses. "We do not impose our model, but explain things which are the abc's of any successful entrepreneurship making it possible to bring out competitive products," says Robert C. Jacoby, director of the Business Entrepreneur program in Moscow.

The second programme—Citizens Volunteer Program—focuses on strengthening the economic basis of public and private democratic institutions. This programme is used to render assistance to local authorities in areas such as local economic development and institution supporting privatization.

The selection of Russian customers is highly competitive. "For the time being we select a mere 10 percent of the total number of applications, counting on promising enterprises which seriously desire to reach out to the world market," says Robert C. Jacoby about his programme.

What requirements must an enterprise meet? The number of its employees vary from 50 to 1,500, the enterprise must have been privatized or be in the process of privatization, with priority being given to producer enterprises. Besides, the leadership of the enterprise must be receptive to new ideas. At present and in the next few months the Business Entrepreneur program will be carried out the most actively in Moscow, the Moscow Region and Samara.

The Citizens Democracy Corps has been active in Russia since July 1992. Here are but a few examples of its cooperation with Russian partners.

Administration of the Nizhny Novgorod Region

Barbara Chronovski, business consultant with international experience, has helped in appraising the investment proposals of individual enterprises and in selecting the most attractive of them for the CEETEX-94 Exhibition in London.

Lima joint-stock company—Obninsk, Kaluga Region

Michael Laurence, a businessman with 40 years of experience in different countries, has analyzed the company's work and suggested a plan of its reorganization. The samples of products were sent to the USA. The second consultant, Paul Kirschner, carried out a financial analysis of the activities of one of Lima's subunits and compiled a business plan.

Troika-Dialogue investment company—Moscow

Robert Green, Assistant Vice-President of the RCY Information Technology Co., assisted in the development of the department's information system.

Moscow Public Committee Russian Reforms

Wendel Hulcher, a specialist with 30 years of experience in the fields of business, state administration and higher education, has helped in drafting projects for the organization of the Corporation for the Development of Territory and the Administration of Small Business.

Factory of Theatre Properties—Moscow

Gerald Berstell, who once consulted companies such as IBM, Fiat, United Technologies and Nutra-Sweet, has given a number of recommendations for the adaptation of the methods of American marketing to the conditions of the enterprise's work and for the reorganization of the marketing system.

Tenzor instrument-making works—Dubna, Moscow Region

The work of Gerry Behler, owner of the American consulting firm, has been instrumental in reorganizing the enterprise.

Association of charitable organizations "United Way"—Voronezh

Jean Gerding of the American charitable organization "United Way" helped in the organizational rise of the Association of Six Charitable Funds in Voronezh, held seminars on the methods of fund-raising, and helped establish contacts with organizations capable of offering financial and other support in the USA.

Proposed Diamond Deal With U.S. Firm Criticized

944Q0228A Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY in Russian
2 Mar 94 p 11

[Article by Vladimir Teslenko: "Lazare Kaplan Project Discussed in Moscow: The Yankees Want To Fortify Their Position in the World Raw Diamond Market"]

[Text] This week the lively discussion of the proposal by the New York firm, Lazare Kaplan International, to grant the Russian government a loan of 3.3 billion dollars for 10 years on the security of raw diamonds continues (KOMMERSANT wrote about this on 23 February). The president of Lazare Kaplan, Leon Tempelsman, made a short visit to Moscow from 25 February through 1 March. All his Moscow meetings were strictly confidential. But the editorial office of KOMMERSANT managed to gather some information regarding the position of the interested parties and to determine that final negotiations are planned for mid-March.

The precedent of large loans secured by diamonds was created in 1990: the DeBeers firm loaned the USSR government 1 billion dollars for 5 years on the security of 14.6 million carats in raw diamonds. Only certain details of the liquidation of the loans are known: payments are made under a special schedule four times a year and by the end of 1995 will total 1.25 billion dollars. After that the Ministry of Finance received a whole number of such proposals. Some of them have already been rejected and some are still being considered. In accordance with existing practice, all negotiations in this field were strictly confidential. But in the case of Lazare Kaplan International (LKI), there was an information leak and the American firm's proposal began to be discussed extensively throughout the diamond world.

In Western business circles, it is commonly thought that the purpose of Lazare Kaplan International's proposal is to prevent an excessive flow of jewel-grade diamonds out of Russia by transferring the entire federal reserve to the United States.

But according to KOMMERSANT experts' opinion, with its proposal LKI is demonstrating the serious intention of North American capital to launch a power play in the world raw diamond market: to drive a wedge in DeBeers' delicate relations with Russia, squeeze them out of the market, and free up a niche for Canadian diamonds (industrial production of these diamonds amounting to 5-7 million carats a year is expected in 3 or 4 years). The participation of the large firm DuPont de Nemour and the American branch of the mining company VNR is possible in this project.

In any case it is quite unlikely that the Russian Federation government will accept LKI's proposal. In mid-March the deputy minister of finance, Anatoliy Golovaty, plans to conduct final negotiations with the LKI leadership and make a counter proposal which is more modest in parameters, for example, a 5-year loan of 1 billion dollars on the security of raw diamonds worth 1.2

billion dollars, on the condition that the specialists of Komdragmet [Committee on Precious Metals and Precious Stones] make up the specifications and there is a commission of 0.1 percent; Mr. Tempelsman will most likely reject this proposal. But then the Yakut government and the Almazy Rossii-Sakha company will apparently continue separate negotiations with LKI on a loan of 300 million dollars on the security of 3-4 million carats in raw diamonds from their own reserves. If the federal authorities do not take a sharply negative stand on this issue, an American-Yakut agreement can be expected by the summer (the start of the navigation season).

As of today, the interested parties upon whom realization of LKI's deal with the federal government depends take the following stands:

The Group of Experts of the Russian Federation President

"We have no instructions on the LKI proposal," the leader of the group, Viktor Krivov, reported yesterday. Most likely if the group is hired to analyze this proposal, its experts will take the finding prepared by the Ministry of Finance and Komdragmet as a basis.

Russian Federation Ministry of Finance

After Boris Fedorov's resignation, Anatoliy Golovaty became responsible for preparing the text of the decision. He let it be known that there are "respectable, well-known banks" behind the LKI proposal, but it is a "raw" one. According to information from other sources in the Ministry of Finance, two provisions in the LKI proposal are absolutely unacceptable: the enormous amount of the security and the high commission to Mr. Tempelsman.

Mr. Golovaty emphasized that the possible loan secured by diamonds "in no case should violate the agreement with DeBeers." "Whatever agreement there may be, it must be fulfilled," he stated.

Russian Federation Committee on Precious Metals and Precious Stones

"This is an unacceptable proposal," announced the deputy chairman of Komdragmet, Leonid Gurevich. It is interesting that 2 years ago Mr. Gurevich was a supporter of diamond security and during his time as a member of the parliamentary committee on foreign investments vigorously promulgated Western banks. But recently his opinion did an about-face. According to his assertion, this happened "as a result of new guidelines in the diamond strategy of Russia, which today has more effective means of using raw diamonds on international markets in its arsenal."

Administration of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia)

In the accompanying letter to Boris Yeltsin attached to the text of the LKI proposal, the president of Yakutia, Mikhail Nikolayev, not only showed fundamental interest in this idea but even formulated four additional

points. Taking into account persistent efforts to return some of the diamonds from the federal storage facility to the republic or receive part of the money from transactions with them, Yakutia's interest in federal loans secured by diamonds becomes completely clear.

As KOMMERSANT found out from circles close to the Russian Ministry of Finance, Yakutia is hoping to receive around 10 percent of any "diamond" loan which the federal government decides to take out. Moreover, Yakutia will be able to insist on an increase in the internal Russian quota for exports of raw diamonds through the DeBeers channel.

The Almazy Rossii-Sakha Company

"The company does not have instructions from the federal government to provide a conclusion on the LKI proposal," said the executive director of the company, Sergey Ulin. It is not impossible that such instructions will be given in the near future, since the company specialists, in particular advisor Valeriy Rudakov, participated directly in preparing the security agreement with DeBeers and has valuable experience in ongoing diamond security transactions. Obviously, a state loan secured by diamonds meets both the company's tactical (increasing the internal quota on exports) and strategic interests.

DeBeers

"LKI informed the DeBeers management of the essence of its proposal but does not act on DeBeers' instructions," reported the LKI representative, Robert Keshmir. Most likely the president of LKI discussed the possibility of hiring DeBeers specialists to make up the security specifications with the DeBeers executives. But there were no public announcements on DeBeers' part.

Obviously, the DeBeers management is facing a dilemma: either free Russian reserves with LKI's help, and if the security agreement is violated buy up the diamonds and thereby increase its own reserves which are already burdensome (according to information of the newspaper BUSINESS DAY, they are estimated at 3.4 billion dollars), or refrain from any participation in this deal and reconcile itself to the "diamond drain from Russia" which it believes exists.

Description of Lazare Kaplan International

Lazare Kaplan International was founded in 1903. It became a public company in 1972, the only diamond firm in the United States whose stock is quoted on the stock exchange.

LKI is a shareholder of DeBeers, participates in a joint advertising campaign for prestigious diamond jewelry, and jointly with DeBeers is realizing a project in Ghana on the Bawim River.

LKI concluded the fiscal year which ended on 31 March 1993 with a sales volume of 150 million dollars, which is 4 percent higher than the result of the preceding year. The

sales volume in cut and polished diamonds totaled 43 million dollars, but in March-May dropped by 30 percent. In the next half year, which ended on 30 November, the total volume of sales grew by 32 percent, although cut and polished diamond sales fell by another 6 percent. The volume of sales of raw jewel-grade diamonds rose by 48 percent in the second half year, which allowed profits of 1.1 million dollars to be obtained.

Basic Provisions of the LKI Proposal (According to Information from the Western Press: Reuters, WALL STREET JOURNAL, BUSINESS DAY, and others):

- LKI is undertaking to organize a loan for Russia in the amount of 3.3 billion dollars for 10 years at 6 percent annual interest;
- raw diamonds worth 4.5 billion dollars function as security and are removed from the federal storage facility in Moscow by representatives of the creditor;
- in the event Russia violates the obligations, the diamond security or part of it will be sold through the Central Marking Organization (a trade subdivision of DeBeers);
- for the deal LKI acts as the foreign advisor of the Russian government and receives 1.5 percent of the total amount of the loan plus costs and consultation fees (in all about 50 million dollars).

Chemical Bank To Trade Russian Government Securities

94AQ02104 Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY in Russian
22 Feb 93 p 9

[Article by Sergey Aspin: "Clients of New York Bank Offered 'Taiga Securities'"]

[Text] One of the largest American banks—Chemical Bank—on Monday began regular operations in the purchase and sale of Russian Ministry of Finance state domestic currency loan bonds. The emergence on the market of such a professional participant, in the opinion of KOMMERSANT experts, will not only bring qualitatively new forms of operation with these securities, but will also become the source of additional liquidity for the still weakly organized market in currency bonds.

The "Taiga bonds" (in the terminology of the Chemical bank, this is what the Minfin [Ministry of Finance] state domestic loan bonds issued against the frozen debts of the Vneshekonombank [Foreign Economic Bank] are called) have attracted the attention of banking experts for a number of reasons. First of all, Chemical Bank has the reputation of being one of the most active dealers on the state loan bonds markets of the developing countries. Bank experts have experience in working also with Soviet debts. Specifically, the bank conducts active operations with the European bonds of Vneshekonombank. Secondly, in the opinion of the Chemical Bank, domestic currency loan bonds are very important from the standpoint of evolution of the Russian securities market. A significant volume of emissions, a broad investment base

and diversification of repayment terms makes these securities one of the basic financial instruments in Russia.

As our KOMMERSANT correspondent was told at Chemical Bank, today on the world market there is a small but stable demand for Russian Mirfin currency bonds. Specialists at the American bank believe that the market in these securities is in the stage of formulation and a serious quantitative leap may occur only after certain steps have been taken in the development of its commercial and accounting infrastructure. Nevertheless, the Chemical Bank hopes that already in the near future transactions on currency bonds may be conducted through the international clearing systems Euroclear/CEDEL. In response to our KOMMERSANT correspondent's question about what presently hinders the performance of bilateral fixed quotation of these bonds (for now the bank buys them from its clients, setting the price in the process of negotiations), the bank representatives gave the reason as being the insufficient liquidity of the market. They defined the criterion of liquidity as follows: "When at least three large financial institutions begin to announce bilateral quotations of bonds for purchase and sale, and also are ready at any moment to buy or sell the bonds for a sum of no less than \$2 million, then we too will join in this game."

Commentary

KOMMERSANT experts believe that the initiative in the organization of a secondary market in currency bonds will nevertheless come from the Russian banks. Judging by the available information, at the beginning of the second quarter the largest banks will be able to assure the bond market that level of liquidity which experienced Western financial institutions such as Chemical Bank demand. Moreover, the rapid rates of development of the commercial networks of the MFD [Interbank Financial House] and the Cash Union will already by summer make it possible for the banks to conduct trade through professionally organized dealing systems.

January Foreign Trade Statistics

944Q0210B Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 22 Feb 94 p 11

[Unattributed article: "Decline in Import of Basic Food Products in January Exceeded 50 Percent"]

[Text] The foreign trade turnover of Russia in January of 1994 declined by 7.6 percent as compared with January of 1993, and comprised \$3.6 billion, according to the operational data of Goskomstat [State Committee on Statistics]. The positive balance reached \$1.4 billion, as compared with \$1 billion in January of last year.

The volume of export comprised \$2.5 billion, increasing by 1.3 percent as compared with January of 1993 (we must note that the average export prices on a number of goods in January of 1994 were significantly lower than the January 1993 level). The relative share of power sources within the structure of export declined by 7 percent, and comprised 50 percent. Export deliveries of crude oil declined by 16 percent, to 5 million tonnes. On the other hand, deliveries of petroleum products increased by 38 percent, to 1.676 million tonnes, and of natural by 14 percent, to 10.121 billion cubic meters.

Import comprised \$1.1 billion, declining by 23 percent as compared with January of last year. Import deliveries of basic staple food products continued to decline. The import of grain declined by 57 percent, of meat—by 64 percent, of butter—by 91 percent, and of tea—by 63 percent. The main reasons for the continued decline in import, explained the deputy chief of the MVES [Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations] Main Economic Administration, Vladimir Kiselev, were the introduction of increased excise tax rates on certain types of goods at the end of 1993, the repeal of subsidy coefficients on centralized import for state needs which became effective on 1 January 1994, as well as the lack of resolution in the question of exempting goods of centralized import from the payment of NDS [value-added tax] and import duties. A significant role here was played also by the sharp decline in the exchange rate of the ruble at the beginning of the year, as well as the increase in import tariffs which was planned for March of 1994.

Table 1. Export of the Russian Federation

	for January 1993, in percent	for January 1994, in percent
Developing countries	13.7	13.7
Former CEMA [Council for Mutual Economic Assistance] countries	20.3	21.8
China, DPRK [Democratic People's Republic of Korea], Laos, Yugoslavia	7.9	6.5
Baltic countries	0.8	0.8
Industrially developed capitalist countries	57.3	57.2

Table 2. Foreign trade turnover of Russian Federation for January 1994

	January 1993, million dollars	January 1994, million dollars
Former CEMA countries	658.6	655.8
China, DPRK, Laos, Yugoslavia	434.6	330.6
Baltic countries	25.6	24.6
Industrially developed capitalist countries	2200.2	2082.8
Developing countries	603.3	532

Table 3. Import of the Russian Federation

	for January 1993, in percent	for January 1994, in percent
Developing countries	18	17
Former CEMA countries	11	10
China, DPRK, Laos, Yugoslavia	17	15
Baltic countries	0.4	0.4
Industrially developed capitalist countries	54	58

Table 4. Export of basic goods from Russia in January 1994

Name	Unit of measure	1994		1994/1993, %		Price per unit, dollars		Relative share in volume, %	
		Amount	Sum, million dollars	Amount	Sum	1994	1993	1994	1993
Total			2522.0		101.3			100.0	100.0
Fish, fresh frozen	thousand tonnes	50.9	49.3	116.7	80.4	969.6	1407.2	2.0	2.5
Calcium phosphates	thousand tonnes	44.3	2.3	515.5	264.7	51.3	100.0	0.1	0.0
Iron ores and concentrates	thousand tonnes	718.2	12.5	256.5	139.4	17.4	32.0	0.5	0.4
Rock coal	thousand tonnes	1043.9	35.6	115.4	119.3	34.1	33.0	1.4	1.2
Coke	thousand tonnes	7.5	0.5	126.7	168.3	70.2	52.9	0	0
Crude oil	thousand tonnes	4994.5	454.0	83.6	69.8	90.9	109.0	18.0	26.2
Petroleum products	thousand tonnes	1676.4	161.7	138.1	108.3	96.4	123.0	6.4	6.0
Natural gas	million cubic meters	10121.6	749.4	113.5	102.1	74.0	82.3	29.7	29.5
Electrical energy	million kW/hr	433.0	9.2	150.3	142.8	21.3	22.5	0.4	0.3

Table 4. Export of basic goods from Russia in January 1994 (Continued)

Name	Unit of measure	1994		1994/1993, %		Price per unit, dollars		Relative share in volume, %	
		Amount	Sum, million dollars	Amount	Sum	1994	1993	1994	1993
Total			2522.0		101.3			100.0	100.0
Ammonia	thousand tonnes	351.0	33.4	151.9	165.9	95.2	87.1	1.3	0.8
Methanol	thousand tonnes	78.3	6.6	147.2	196.4	84.7	63.4	0.3	0.1
Nitrogen fertilizers	thousand tonnes	403.6	32.9	189.2	185.6	81.4	83.0	1.3	0.7
Phosphate fertilizers	thousand tonnes	1.7	0.3	19.3	29.4	159.4	104.7	0	0
Potassium fertilizers	thousand tonnes	283.3	18.5	215.5	187.7	65.3	75.0	0.7	0.4
Mixed fertilizers	thousand tonnes	237.4	29.1	156.7	158.9	122.4	120.7	1.2	0.7
Synthetic rubber	thousand tonnes	13.4	9.7	156.5	130.6	730.1	874.9	0.4	0.3
Unprocessed lumber	thousand cubic meters	444.0	23.1	96.7	99.2	52.1	50.8	0.9	0.9
Processed lumber	thousand cubic meters	127.7	18.8	82.1	82.1	147.1	147.1	0.7	0.9
Plywood	thousand cubic meters	23.0	7.1	130.1	143.6	310.1	281.0	0.3	0.2
Cellulose	thousand tonnes	49.4	10.2	205.0	152.2	207.2	279.0	0.4	0.3
Newsprint	thousand tonnes	22.9	5.3	71.5	53.0	231.7	312.5	0.2	0.4
Iron, steel and rolled stock			192.1		164.1			7.6	4.7
Cast iron, converted and specular	thousand tonnes	142.1	15.7	152.7	157.3	110.2	107.0	0.6	0.4
Ferroalloys	thousand tonnes	4.4	4.2	25.3	48.0	947.9	500.0	0.2	0.4
Copper	thousand tonnes	3.0	4.2	45.5	29.1	1419.8	2220.1	0.2	0.6
Nickel, unprocessed	thousand tonnes	2.0	8.5	49.9	37.0	4154.4	5599.6	0.3	0.9
Aluminum, unprocessed	thousand tonnes	90.1	50.3	103.5	67.2	558.0	860.0	2.0	3.0
Machines and equipment									
Transport means			92.7		55.8			3.7	6.7

*Based on operating data of the Goskomstat of Russia.

Table 5. Import of basic goods into Russia in January 1994

Name	Unit of measure	1994		1994/1993, %		Price per unit, dollars		Relative share in volume, %	
		Amount	Sum, million dollars	Amount	Sum	1994	1993	1994	1993
Total			1103.7		77.0			100.0	100.0
Meat, fresh frozen	thousand tonnes	3.0	3.5	35.5	25.6	1186.3	1643.3	0.3	1.0
Poultry meat	thousand tonnes	3.1	3.2	259.6	283.2	1013.4	929.0	0.3	0.1
Butter	thousand tonnes	0.2	0.3	8.8	8.7	1453.6	1454.6	0	0.2
Citrus fruit	thousand tonnes	4.6	2.4	74.5	106.5	527.7	369.1	0.2	0.2
Apples	thousand tonnes	3.2	1.0	135.6	72.0	300.9	582.0	0.1	0.1
Coffee, coffee substitutes	thousand tonnes	0.3	0.6	60.0	45.8	2474.9	3256.9	0.1	0.1
Tea	thousand tonnes	1.0	3.5	36.6	56.9	3314.8	2129.8	0.3	0.4
Grain crops	thousand tonnes	271.9	37.8	43.2	49.5	139.0	121.3	3.4	5.3
wheat		105.0	16.4	58.0	65.5	156.4	138.6	1.5	1.7
barley			0	0		113.2	0	0.7	
corn		166.9	21.4	51.2	55.7	128.0	117.7	1.9	2.7
Vegetable oil	thousand tonnes	1.2	1.3	53.2	69.9	1074.0	817.4	0.1	0.1
Raw sugar	thousand tonnes	19.1	5.7	15.7	19.0	297.4	246.2	0.5	2.1
White sugar	thousand tonnes	38.4	14.2	112.3	117.9	370.8	353.2	1.3	0.8
Macaroni products	thousand tonnes	0.4	0.4	3.6	5.2	913.0	626.5	0	0.5
Aluminum ores and concentrates	thousand tonnes	77.4	17.4	104.9	110.2	224.4	213.5	1.6	1.1
Medicines			23.5		104.1			2.1	1.6
Natural rubber	thousand tonnes	1.2	1.3	61.3	65.7	1039.6	969.4	0.1	0.1
Fur clothing			7.0		40.3			0.2	0.4
Tricot clothing			15.6		77.4			1.4	1.4
Textile clothing			34.6		63.8			3.1	3.8
Leather footwear	thousand pairs	375.6	7.5	36.6	47.8	19.5	15.2	0.7	1.1
Iron, steel and rolled stock			1.6		63.0			0.1	0.2
Steel pipes	thousand tonnes	38.2	32.0	269.3	237.2	837.4	950.7	2.9	0.9
Machinery and equipment									
Transport means			350.9		113.6			31.8	21.5
Furniture			6.0		7.3			0.7	7.7

* Based on operating data of the Goskomstat of Russia

RF Deputy Foreign Minister Views Goals in Asia-Pacific Region

944Q0232A Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 4 Mar 94 p 3

[Report on interview with Aleksandr Nikolayevich Panov, deputy minister of foreign affairs, by Vladimir Abarinov; place and date not given: "The Asian Year of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Aleksandr Panov: Power Politics Is Ineffective in the East"]

[Text] Aleksandr Nikolayevich Panov is a career diplomat. His professional biography began with the position of reviewer in the Far East Department of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1968. He then worked for several years as part of the permanent mission of the USSR at the United Nations in New York. In the period 1983-1988 he was first secretary and then counselor at the USSR Embassy in Japan. At the end of the 1980's he worked at the Pacific and Southeast Asia Desk in the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and in the period 1990-1992, as chief of the desk. Prior to his appointment as deputy minister of foreign affairs, he was ambassador of Russia in the Republic of Korea. His diplomatic rank is ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary. He is a candidate of historical sciences.

This year will be the year of Asia for the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Aleksandr Panov, deputy minister of foreign affairs of the Russian Federation, declared in an interview with our SEGODNYA correspondent. Russian diplomacy is setting itself the assignment here not only of maintaining good-neighbor relations with all Asian countries but also of becoming an active part of the economic life of the region and contributing to ensuring that Asia become a region of stability, security, and cooperation. An extensive program of exchanges of visits is planned. The minister of foreign affairs and then the chairman of the PRC, the president of the Republic of Korea, and the prime minister of India are expected in Moscow this year, and visits by the Vietnamese and Mongolian prime ministers are possible. Chernomyrdin, chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation, will head for Beijing in June, and a Russian delegation will take part in an ASEAN ministerial session in Bangkok in July. The deputy minister observed that greater attention to the rapidly developing region has come to be paid by Russian private business, Far East business particularly. The new commercial structures are accounting for up to 50 percent of commodity turnover in trade with certain Asian countries. According to Aleksandr Panov, Russia could not export such a quantity of finished goods to any other region of the world.

The Russo-Japanese consultations at deputy foreign minister level which were held in Moscow recently, the diplomat said, showed that "quickly arriving at a peace treaty" and, consequently, resolving the territorial problem were impossible under the current conditions. The parties understand this and intend in the immediate future to concentrate on specific questions in order to

gradually create a "new atmosphere" in bilateral relations. In the course of the consultations it was arranged, as we all know, that Tsutomu Hata, minister of foreign affairs of Japan, would visit Moscow in March. As was to be understood from the statements of Mr. Panov, no breakthroughs are to be expected from this visit.

To the correspondent's question as to how the Japanese side is reacting to Moscow's proposals concerning joint economic activity in the "Northern territories," the deputy minister responded that "the Japanese are giving our position a guarded reception": Joint ventures on the South Kurils must observe Russian legislation, and this, from Japan's viewpoint, is a violation of Japan's sovereignty. Mr. Panov disagreed that the numerous violations of Russia's border by Japanese fishermen were being perpetrated for political reasons and with the direct support of Tokyo officialdom. The border incidents, the diplomat declared, are explained primarily by economic factors. Moscow is raising the question of fishing in the area of the Kuril chain in strict terms, nonetheless, it is obvious that an economic solution needs to be found. A version of such a solution is already being applied in the area of Signalnyy Island, where the Japanese have obtained the right to procure sea kale on a compensation basis.

Things are comparatively better with respect to observance of the moratorium on fishing in the central Sea of Okhotsk. This area is not part of Russia's economic zone but Russia deemed it possible to announce last year a unilateral moratorium in connection with the fact that the reduction in the stocks of pollock had reached crisis point. At the present time neither Japan and nor South Korea are fishing, and China has reduced it 25 percent and is prepared to examine the question of compensation, that is, the exchange of this area for another within Russia's economic zone. This leaves Poland, which is agreeing to no restrictions.

Aleksandr Panov is not disposed to dramatize the fact of Russia's nonaccession to the Prevention of Pollution of the Seas Convention. Moscow and Tokyo are conducting negotiations on assistance in the utilization [utilizatsiya] of Russia's liquid radioactive waste, specifically, the financing of the construction of a repository for such waste. Until there is a repository, there will be no further disposals, which has been stated clearly.

But the most serious problem of the region is undoubtedly the DPRK's nuclear program. It is being complicated by Pyongyang's hard-line negotiating position, Mr. Panov said. The North Korean side is endeavoring to compensate each positive step on its part with return concessions by Washington. As a result a specific situation has been created, the deputy minister observed. On the one hand inspections of nuclear facilities are the prerogative of the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Authority], on the other, the DPRK is preferring to negotiate on this topic with the Americans. But there is a "third angle" also: the North-South negotiations on denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. Untangling

this knot is not easy, Mr. Panov said. Moscow, he declared, occupies a balanced position. The Sarajevo example has shown that a positive result cannot be achieved with ultimatums. Power politics will produce nothing in the East: History testifies that these countries are capable even in a difficult situation of sustaining quite strong political pressure. If, despite all the diplomatic efforts, the question is put to the UN Security Council for consideration, Russia will act circumspectly there also.

The Russian-North Korean intergovernmental agreement on the basis of which from 15,000 to 20,000 lumberjacks of the DPRK have been working at Khabarovsk Kray and Amur Oblast timber industry enterprises expired on 1 January. In this connection the SEGODNYA correspondent asked about the future of this document and, most importantly, about the legal status of the Korean timber industry enterprises, which are known for their mass violations of human rights. The agreement, the deputy minister observed, has expired and is operating now only "within a particular framework." But dropping it altogether would not seem possible: The local authorities maintain that they have no one with whom to replace the Koreans. A new negotiating position, with which we will resume negotiations in the very near future, is being shaped in the government at this time. In any event, whatever the economic agreements, the state within a state and the ex-territoriality of the Korean settlements have been done away with, was Aleksandr Panov's assurance.

The deputy minister commented on the reports of President Yeltsin's recent message to Indonesian President Suharto. The message, Mr. Panov reported, had been preceded by an appeal to Russia on the part of a number of members of the Nonaligned Movement proposing that it join the movement as an observer. Moscow deemed the proposal flattering and expedient. It is this that was the subject of Yeltsin's message sent to Suharto, as the present chairman of the Nonaligned Movement. According to the movement's charter, a member of the Security Council may not be a member, but is entitled to apply for observer status.

South Korea's Relations With DPRK, Russia Assessed

944Q0207A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 25 Feb 94 p 4

[Article by V. Tkachenko: "Preliminary Results: One Year After Kim Yong-Sam Took Office as South Korean President"]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted] Big hopes were placed on a new policy in Seoul regarding North Korea and reducing tensions on the peninsula. The president conceived the idea of a gradual convergence between North and South resulting from joint efforts to overcome animosity and mistrust, broaden cooperation, and ensure mutual coexistence and prosperity. The key feature of the new ideas

was that the convergence was to be voluntary and democratic, i.e., the majority of the population in the North and South would agree to live together at the same standard of living in two parts of a unified country.

Nonetheless, in spite of the proclaimed declarations relations between North and South have noticeably worsened in the last year. The euphoria caused by the sensationalized agreements reached in 1991-1992 on reconciliation and reducing tensions, was replaced by a deep pessimism. Contacts in humanitarian and cultural spheres that had been maintained even during sharp confrontation were broken off.

The cause for stagnation in inter-Korean relations involved a nuclear arms problem on the peninsula, MAGATE [IAEA, International Atomic Energy Agency] inspections of both DPRK nuclear sights and military bases in the North and South, and a bilateral agreement on a nuclear-free zone. No agreement was successfully reached on these issues during inter-Korean negotiations, and now a dialog is underway between the U.S. and the DPRK.

There were no major events that transpired last year in the development of Russian-South Korean relations. A feeling of dissatisfaction arose in connection with Russia's failure to act as a bridge between North and South Korea when a sharp political crisis followed the DPRK's decision in March to withdraw from a nuclear arms nonproliferation agreement. However, what bearing could Russia have had on the situation after relations became paralyzed between Russia and the DPRK for ideological reasons? The role traditionally belonging to Russia as a peacekeeper and guarantor of security in Korea has now gone to China, which is now skillfully performing these duties to its obvious benefit.

No boom in economic relations has taken place between Russia and the Republic of Korea. The exchange of goods between them has not even exceeded the 2 billion dollar mark, that is, it has remained at the same level as our trade in 1988 with North Korea. Not one of the 23 projects for economic and scientific-technical cooperation submitted for review to the South Korean government by Russia has been realized. The problem of Russia repaying 1.5 billion dollars in credit extended to us by the Republic of Korea, has also not yet been resolved.

This year Kim Yong-Sam will visit our country. Now is the time for tallying up results, studying prospects for strengthening cooperation between our countries to our mutual benefit, and preparing new terms and agreements. The Russian-Korean summit meeting, as expected, will allow for making our relations more dynamic and purposeful. [passage omitted]

Scholar Views Russo-Chinese Contacts, Prospects for China

944Q02184 Moscow *SEGODNYA* in Russian 1 Mar 94 p 10

[Interview with Sinologist V.S. Myasnikov by Andrey Vinogradov; place and date not given: "Chinese Civilization Has Proven Its Capacity for Survival"]

[Text] Vladimir Stepanovich Myasnikov is a well-known Sinologist, corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, deputy director of the Russian Academy of Sciences Far East Institute, and leader of the Russia-China Center. The author of more than 200 scientific works on the history of Russo-Chinese and Soviet-Chinese relations and problems of the development of countries of Northeast Asia.

[Vinogradov] Vladimir Stepanovich, you were a member of the delegation that accompanied Kozyrev, minister of foreign affairs of the Russian Federation, to China. In connection with the fact that there was quite scant coverage of Kozyrev's trip in the press, could you describe this visit in somewhat more detail? As far as I know, the visit is seen in the Foreign Ministry as having been exclusively successful. It did not seem so to me....

[Myasnikov] In order to evaluate the success of a visit it is necessary to compare the purposes that were set for it and the results that were obtained.

This visit had been planned long since, but its preparation was dragged out, and then the elections, formation of the cabinet, and so forth were approaching. A decision was ultimately made on a visit at government level by the foreign minister. The main task consisted of two components. First, following the visit of President Yeltsin, it was necessary to conduct a stock-taking, as it were, of how the agreements were being fulfilled. And, as practice shows, things are not moving successfully in all directions. This inspection purpose was combined with a desire to make good what had not been done during President Yeltsin's visit. You know that he was unable to go to Shenzhen, and a purpose of the visit, therefore, was a trip to the free economic zones. Specifically, the area of Heihe and Blagoveshchensk on the Russo-Chinese border, where it is planned to create a joint zone. And, of course, Shenzhen—a zone that has been in operation for 15 years now, which is the best-known in China, and which has achieved excellent results. The Chinese Government has decided, as you know, to make a northern Shenzhen of Heihe.

[Vinogradov] These matters are more within the jurisdiction of Shokhin, it would seem to me, not Kozyrev....

[Myasnikov] You are right. As I said, the visit of another member of the government had been planned originally, but in connection with various matters (I dislike the term "government crisis") the most suitable figure in this case was the minister of foreign affairs. But traveling with him were experts, administration chiefs, people involved in actual economics.... And some of them, what is more,

Ivanov, chief of the Administration of Chita Oblast, and Volkov, chief of the Administration of the Jewish Autonomous Oblast, say, had already been to Shenzhen as part of the group accompanying the president.

The appropriate invitations were made to the Chinese side during Yeltsin's visit for a return visit. But changes had occurred in this time in the Chinese leadership also, and it was necessary to extend an invitation to the new persons. In addition, agreement was reached on the visit to China this spring of Prime Minister Chernomyrdin, and problems of bilateral relations, border problems primarily, were discussed. You know that the transparency of the border and its openness and penetrability are a two-edged sword. On the one hand this stimulates border trade, on the other, a negative effect is manifested also: The potential for crime increases. Quite broad masses of representatives of the Chinese and Russian sides are coming into direct contact, but these are not, to be blunt, the best representatives of the two peoples. Prior to this, the "main conduits of relations with China" with us were L. Tolstoy, Gorkiy, a whole group of prominent Soviet writers, and so forth. Their works and they themselves are known in China and treated with great respect. Exhibitions of the Chinese artist Xu Beihong were held in our country in the 1930's, and the actor Mei Langfang, many theatrical ensembles, and so forth visited us. Today this line of cultural relations is somehow dormant, and quite a different line of interaction has emerged instead, which is causing quite a good deal of negative consequences of a purely psychological plane both in China and in Russia. The nations' ideas of one another are changing, and not for the better, what is more. This could create distorted stereotypes, which would influence our countries' relations in the future, in the 21st century. You know that, according to information of the Chinese side, at the end of the past month there were over 2 million Chinese on the territory of Russia. This figure is growing all the time. How many Russians, I cannot account for....

[Vinogradov] Quite a few also, particularly in Beijing. But not millions, of course....

[Myasnikov] If we wish to achieve mutual understanding, which is very important for good-neighborliness and for the strategic development of the relations of the two countries, order needs to be brought to bear. This does not mean that we have to ban or close down some things—we need elementary order at the state level. And the Chinese side is better and more successful here, as a rule. For example, they entrusted Heilongjiang Province with dealing with Russia and the CIS. Everything is specialized there: There is a permanent annual fair in Harbin and there is a particular set of companies that pursue commerce. On our side, on the other hand, total freedom, but not in the best meaning of this word. It was decided as the first order of business, therefore, to establish visa conditions.

[Vinogradov] As far as I recall, these matters were raised in the course of Sergey Shakhray's trip to China last July also....

[Myasnikov] Shakhray discussed primarily models of national relations within the country. He was beginning his campaign as leader of the PRES [Party of Russian Unity and Accord] at that time. China is the same type of multinational country as Russia and is typologically very close—the history of the creation of the two states is very similar. True, Shakhray had a mandate from the Siberian Accord public organization to discuss questions of border cooperation also. But I believe that neither he nor the Chinese side were prepared for a serious discussion. In this case this is within the jurisdiction of the minister of foreign affairs, minister of internal affairs, and minister of state security.

[Vinogradov] As far as I know, the Chinese and Russian Ministries of Security have signed an agreement on the mutual extradition of criminals....

[Myasnikov] Yes, but besides this, a new agreement has now been signed which amounts to the following: Persons who are truly engaged in developing trade and economic, scientific and technological, and other relations between China and Russia and Russia and China have preferential conditions for crossing the border. They may be issued multiple visas and one-year, two-year passports. Obstacles are put in the way only of people engaging in semi-legal and illegal business and making episodic raids on the neighboring territory.

[Vinogradov] How is the one distinguished from the other?

[Myasnikov] I agree that making the distinction is difficult. Development will, obviously, be along the lines of the consolidation of firms. If a firm has given a good account of itself, its representatives will be granted preferential conditions. I recall that we were visited here in the institute by staff of the embassy and the trade mission of the PRC in charge of economic problems, and they were severely critical of us at that time: "You sign an agreement immediately with the first Chinese who gives you his card. But this does not mean that he is a person backed by a real business or administrative structure. It is not hard to make calling cards in China."

[Vinogradov] I also have repeatedly taken part in such "negotiations" which subsequently were not continued. More, when I would attempt to find in Beijing the office of the "major firms" with whom we had been negotiating in Moscow, this proved more often than not to be a tiny stall.

[Myasnikov] For the entire world practice of the market economy, checking out one's partner and his actual possibilities is one of the main rules. Aside from the new rules of visa conditions, therefore, other agreements will be signed also. But not all at once. This needs to be done thoughtfully to avoid foolish mistakes.

In addition, serious regional problems, the Korean problem specifically, were discussed. As we all know, following the meeting in Seattle, this has become a controlled problem, and China is now performing a principal role in the achievement of a balance of interests. The proximity of positions was discussed and confirmed.

A second important question that was of interest to the Russian side was Russia's participation in the Asia-Pacific Economic Council (APEC). As we all know, a three-year moratorium on the admittance of new members to the council was imposed in Seattle. The question of the need to make an exception for Russia was raised in the course of the visit. The Chinese side took note of our wish.

[Vinogradov] But did not express a reciprocal wish to actively support the Russian aspiration....

[Myasnikov] It cannot make such declarations immediately. I can give you my viewpoint, which I conveyed to representatives of the Chinese side before, during, and after the visit. We should not be arguing along the lines of the "you help me, I'll help you" principle, of course. The Soviet Union formerly did a great deal for China's admittance to the United Nations. The support was very strong, even in the confrontation years. We refused to sign the San Francisco Treaty because the PRC had not been invited. But this does not mean that China must today pay us back. China should proceed from its own interests.

[Vinogradov] How far is it in China's interests to promote an increase in Russia's economic role in Asia, thereby creating competition for itself and depriving itself of a monopoly position in the sphere of contacts with the Russian Federation to a large extent?

[Myasnikov] I will explain it this way. Very important economic projects, in which China also has an interest, are being advanced at the present time. The idea of the creation of a free trade zone in Northeast Asia, say, which would encompass China, Japan, the Korean peninsula, and Russia, has been mooted for two years now. Without Russia it would be impossible to link this zone with the North American Free Trade Area: Mexico, Canada, and the United States, in Alaska. Could such a project be realized without Russia's membership of APEC? Or, say, the far-reaching "Yakut gas" project—the transfer of Yakut gas to China and South Korea. I believe that this would be extremely difficult on a bilateral basis. The Tyumenjiang project is also part of these integration economic processes, and Russia's participation is essential not only, of course, in the United Nations, where this project is being stewarded, but in APEC also. Of course, quite a tough struggle is under way in structures of an economic kind, but common rules of the game for this region should be formulated, and formulating such rules without Russia would be unrealistic.

[Vinogradov] You always emphasize in your articles and speeches that Russo-Chinese relations represent a zone of contact of two different civilizations. To what extent are psychological differences influencing specific bilateral relations?

[Myasnikov] We are undoubtedly representatives of two different civilization complexes. We will not say whose civilization is the more ancient, this is not the issue. But for an understanding of one's partner, an understanding of the motives of his policy, and an understanding of his political mentality a knowledge of civilization features is extraordinarily important. I have the impression, what is more, that the Chinese side has progressed further in this respect than us. It is possible that the Sinologists, you and I, are at fault here. The Chinese side is making very skillful use of the particular features of the Russian mentality and knows history well, which is a hallmark of far from all our representatives.

China is today laying the foundations of a new state of the 21st century, and its policy is pursuing long-term goals. The main thing here is plan orientation and precise adherence to the charted plans. And a particular feature of the Chinese mentality, what is more, is the fact that the plans are formulated by all the participants in the foreign economic process. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs or some other body over it may collate a whole number of proposals, but each organization necessarily has its own plan of interaction with its partners, which, as a rule, is not the case with the Russian side. In a word, it is necessary in all situations to take account of a whole number of salient features of Chinese custom and the Chinese mentality.

[Vinogradov] In respect to the human rights problem, for example....

[Myasnikov] If we are speaking of human rights, the millennial experience of Chinese civilization and Chinese philosophical social thought has formulated entirely different criteria of the relationship of the individual and society, the individual and the state. What are Western human rights today? They are Protestant morals in generalized form. At the start of the 19th century a number of founders of American democracy formulated some basic parameters, in their opinion, of democratic institutions for their country. They then embedded some messianic character in these notions of theirs and began to spread them to other countries. But inter-civilization convergence should not even contemplate the imposition of one's own historical experience. This is the mistake of the West today: demanding that China conform to its ideas or adopt its human rights legislation. It is necessary to perceive one's partner in international relations as he is, not attempt to remake him. Otherwise there will be conflicts. China understands Western experience and studies it, but cannot adapt it in a few years. There has to be a sufficient amount of time for an evaluation of the moral principles of Protestantism also. From China's viewpoint, they could seem absurd. After all, a beautiful European opera could

be perceived by the Chinese as some preposterous cacophony. Just as Chinese traditional music is not accepted by Europeans.

Political music is heterogeneous also. Of course, it is the job of diplomacy to level these differences. But diplomatic barriers cannot be crossed. The ideas of the Chinese concerning human rights are shaped by Confucian precepts, which exist in society. These are by no means communist inventions, against which the West is struggling. The Chinese communists, incidentally, have always made skillful use of their people's traditional experience and have adopted it in propaganda and ideological work. In the precepts that exist in China today there is a very great deal that is purely traditional. Let us take a look. A campaign to limit the birthrate is being conducted in China at this time. This is the sole rational policy possible in this country in this specific historical period. And combating it from the standpoints of human rights, as the American Congress has done at times, is to become ridiculous.

[Vinogradov] The events in Tienanmen Square in 1989, for example. I personally encountered in China the fact that even liberals and intellectuals today justify the actions of the authorities in that situation since this helped preserve stability in society. Except for the students who took part in these events themselves, almost no one in China now sees them as some crime on the part of Deng Xiaoping and others. They regard them as a tragedy, but historically necessary.

[Myasnikov] Yes, I also heard such opinions, and we need to try to understand them. Remember the events in Kwangju, in South Korea, when the students rebelled against the then Chon Tu-hwan regime. After all, liberal thought did not condemn the South Korean regime of that time for the shoot-up in Kwangju. Nor during their visits did the prime ministers of China and Japan condemn the events in Kwangju, but observed: There must be stability in Asia. That is, stability at the state level, at the level of international relations, was put above democratic aspirations. This is the point. So let us leave things Western to the West, things Eastern, to the East.

The West has been operating in the East for five centuries now—since the times of the great geographical discoveries. And throughout these centuries the West has continually attempted to bring here at times Christian standards, at times, Catholicism, but the foundations of the oriental civilizations have proven quite strong. In addition, they are today undergoing a renaissance, a positive renaissance, I would say, because the "dragons" of East Asia have largely grown up in the soil of Confucianism and traditional ideology. So we should not be fighting inter-civilization differences, we should be adapting to them.

[Vinogradov] What are the prospects of Russia's relations with China? After all, according to some estimates, China has today reached the position of the third economic power. China's role and influence in the world are

increasing, and its overall might is growing. Is this not a challenge to Russia, for having such a neighbor is far from safe....

[Myasnikov] We have today entered an entirely new historical period, and we need to look at this with open eyes. China's rate of development is outstripping that of Russia. Although many people have yet to recognize this, we will have to build a new model of relations with China. A particular feature of this model is the fact that China is today the world's third economic power, and the decline in production in Russia is continuing. I do not believe that Russia will in a year or two in a sudden spurt catch up with and overtake China. Russia is not today, thank God, confronted with the task of catching up and overtaking—its task is that of survival. It is under these conditions that the new model of relations will take shape. Full consideration of the national interests of Russia and the civilization features of both Russia and China are needed here, therefore, as are very well considered measures for the economic development of our Far East and Siberian oblasts that abut China.

The book "21st Century—Age of Chinese Civilization" has just been published by the Renmin Chubanshe official publishers. A very interesting book, which says that Chinese civilization is superior to other civilizations in terms of the essential characteristics, humanitarian parameters primarily, contained in it. And this will ensure China's triumph in the 21st century on a world scale. Without bloody clashes and without wars, mankind will be forced to acknowledge the superiority of Chinese civilization.

[Vinogradov] And if it does not so acknowledge it without wars and clashes?

[Myasnikov] I realize that this could, perhaps, be an extreme viewpoint. But such viewpoints reflect a growth of national self-awareness connected with economic growth, with the growth of the might of the country and China's new world role. This is the first point. Second, such forecasts usually appear in periods of a millennium—a change in the span of 1,000 years. Some are filled with eschatological sentiments: The end of the world is nigh, others, on the contrary, see new horizons. I believe that the horizons of the 21st century are, truly,

visible and that many of its parameters may be imagined quite realistically even today. And China will, of course, perform a principal role in the world arena as an economically, politically, and, yes, culturally most powerful state....

[Vinogradov] Militarily also, I believe....

[Myasnikov] I proceed from the fact that military factors will be on the wane in the 21st century. Nonetheless, competition will develop primarily according to economic and cultural indicators. In addition, China has one strategic trump card, which was planned by Mao Zedong even and, perhaps, by earlier rulers also—the size of its population. I do not believe that it will diminish appreciably in the 21st century.

[Vinogradov] We need to take account also of the upcoming unification with Hong Kong and, possibly, with Taiwan. In addition, there is Singapore, where ethnic Chinese constitute 70 percent of the population.

[Myasnikov] Yes, the Great China idea. If these countries' GNP's are added together, the result will be a supergiant.

[Vinogradov] There are, in addition, the huaqiao scattered throughout the world....

[Myasnikov] The huaqiao mean relations with the whole world. Plus a compact Chinese economic community furnished with all the latest achievements of Western civilization and aware, what is more, of its messianic role, if you will, in bringing the whole of the rest of the world closer not to Protestant morals but to Confucian values. Let us look at the Europeans, the Americans. After all, many of them are enraptured by East Asian civilization and culture. Those who know and perceive it. Adaptation is taking place quite easily here also.

I believe, therefore, that the talk about the possible disintegration of China at the national or economic, provincial, administrative level—these are all hopes which are, perhaps, desired, but which are unrealistic. Chinese civilization has in the four millennia of its existence and written history proven its exceptional capacity for survival.

KAZAKHSTAN

Aide Outlines Work With President

944K0878A Almaty EKSPRESS K in Russian 15 Mar 94 p 3

[Interview with Imangali Tasmagambetov, aide to the president of Kazakhstan, by Sergey Leskovskiy and Turekhan Daniyarov; place and date not given: "Defining a Sprint Distance"]

[Text] *How is the president's team formed? What problems does the president's inner circle work on? These questions are definitely of interest to many citizens of Kazakhstan. Therefore we decided to pose these questions to Imangali Tasmagambetov. Our choice is not accidental: Imangali Nurgaliyevich has daily contacts with the president probably more often than anybody else, participates in discussions of various problems, and sees him during moments of rest.*

[Question] Why not start the conversation with the question of how you met the president?

[Tasmagambetov] It was in 1989, on the eve of the organizational plenum of the Central Committee of Kazakhstan Komsomol [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League], to which Nursultan Abishevich was invited. On the agenda were multicandidate elections for first secretary, with six contenders on the slate. Before the plenum began, Nursultan Abishevich gathered all six and announced over a cup of tea: "Consider us acquainted. I completely trust your plenum and am ready to work with whoever is elected."

FROM OUR FILE. Before becoming the president's aide, Imangali Tasmagambetov had worked as a teacher, first secretary of the Atyrau Oblast Komsomol Committee, and first secretary of the Kazakhstan Komsomol Central Committee, as well as chairman of the republic State Committee for Youth Affairs. Candidate of philosophy. Married. Father of three. The youngest—a son—just turned one month.

[Question] Did you study in Atyrau?

[Tasmagambetov] No. I graduated from the Department of Natural Sciences and Geography of the Urals Pedagogical Institute. Its distinction lay in its preservation of the traditions established by talented scholars from Moscow and St. Petersburg. Many are no longer with us, but the traditions remained in Uralsk. I consider myself very lucky to have graduated from this school.

[Question] Was your candidate thesis in philosophy somehow related to pedagogic issues?

[Tasmagambetov] Not quite. It was titled "Philosophical Aspects of Ecological Problems." The topic, as you may see, is on the border of two sciences—geography and biology. The task was to attempt to analyze, by comparing the interrelations of various social groups, their views on ecological problems.

[Question] You see in your line of work how the president's team is formed. Our readers will probably be interested to know about this process.

[Tasmagambetov] Forming a team is a complex process, since we are talking about putting together a collective of like-minded people. This means it is necessary not only to find intelligent, competent specialists. It is also necessary for each person who comes to work here to be able to see the problem they are facing from the viewpoint of the state. And while in the past candidates for high-level positions were selected from among people with "practical experience," now everyone in the president's circle must be first and foremost an ideologue, whether we are speaking of banking or a market economy.

[Question] How many specialists are there working on the president's team?

[Tasmagambetov] Three hundred and ninety persons in positions of responsibility.

[Question] That is all?!

[Tasmagambetov] Yes. You are surprised, but some people may think this is too many. I will tell you for comparison that just a few years ago the apparatus of the VLKSM [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League] Central Committee, which I knew, had more than 1,000 staff in positions of responsibility. Now we are talking about the apparatus of the president of a large state. You cannot economize on talented specialists. We are used to economizing, and that is why we live such a life...

[Question] But people not only come. To put together a perfect team, you have to let some go...

[Tasmagambetov] This is very painful. And not only for those who have to leave. I have noticed that Nursultan Abishevich takes it very hard when he has to part with someone. And the main reason is not personal qualities but the loss of the sense of the times: For a number of reasons a person cannot work in the dynamic rhythm life demands of us, does not perceive the logic of change.

[Question] By the way, speaking about dynamics. What does the president's day look like?

[Tasmagambetov] His schedule is very busy. As a rule, no days off. Take, for instance, a recent day—10 March. From 0900 to 0930 the president prepared for his working day and reviewed documents. At 0930 he received the leaders of another state. At 1030 at an expanded meeting he listened to the report on recently held elections. From 1200 to 1600 (with a break for lunch) he conducted intensive negotiations with representatives of the Chevron company. From 1600 to 1800 listened to a report on the progress of privatization in Semipalatinsk Oblast. From 1800 to 2000 the president looked through business mail, conducted telephone conversations with top officials of oblasts and the republic. At 2000 he began studying documents related to a brief

visit by Geydar Aliyev. From 2100 to 0030—meeting with Aliyev and a press conference for journalists on the results of the visit.

[Question] Are you with the president the entire work day?

[Tasmagambetov] Yes. I am at work by 0800 in order to prepare all the necessary information for the president, and go home half an hour to an hour after Nursultan Abishevich leaves, after "transcribing" his comments and proposals regarding the next work day.

[Question] What else is included in your duties?

[Tasmagambetov] Together with members of other departments, I study and analyze the sociopolitical situation in the republic.

[Question] How do you manage to sustain such a pace?

[Tasmagambetov] I have to. You should ask whether the president has any chance to rest.

[Question] Consider it asked.

[Tasmagambetov] Generally, it is practically impossible to talk him into taking some rest. But sometimes he does cave in and leaves for an hour to shake off the stress on the tennis court. I have noticed that tennis is the best way for the president to relieve tension. Once a week is an absolute necessity. And also—songs. You will be surprised, even professional performers are surprised, that Nursultan Abishevich knows by heart a tremendous number of songs—both modern and folk. Generally, the Nazarbayevs are a very musical family. As an example I will tell you an incident that took place in America during a reception given by Vice President Gore. Gore told his guests what a wonderful singer Nursultan Abishevich is, recollecting his visit to Kazakhstan. The guests began to applaud and asked him to sing. They came out as a trio—Nursultan Abishevich, Sara Alpys-ovna, and their daughter. They sang together, and then Dariga sang a song on Abay's lyrics. And finally the Americans were totally elated when they heard Dariga sing an Elvis Presley song in English. Nursultan Abishevich joked later: "All the things you have to do for your country!"

[Question] Does Nursultan Abishevich visit his native parts?

[Tasmagambetov] Over the seven months that I have been working with the president, this has happened only once, when he went to a class reunion on the occasion of his school's anniversary.

[Question] We have been talking to you for an hour now, and we have noticed, Imangali Nurgaliyevich, that during this time you were twice asked for an appointment. And you did not say either "yes" or "no." Is this diplomatic finesse?

[Tasmagambetov] This is reality. I understand very well that in both instances an appointment is needed on an urgent matter. But there is a tight schedule, and it is very difficult to squeeze anything in. Therefore, both meetings had to be moved to another time, after coordinating with the president. Right now the president's schedule is filled by the hour for a month ahead. International visits are scheduled and discussed half a year in advance.

[Question] What particularly concerns the president today?

[Tasmagambetov] First and foremost economic issues. The president is not satisfied with the progress of reform in the republic. Therefore, in the second part of April and in May a considerable amount of time will be devoted to the country's economic problems, in order to define in detail the strategy and tactics of the reform. The second item that concerns the president is preservation of stability and interethnic accord in our society. You can put it this way: The president's unchangeable credo at all times is the idea of a single economic and spiritual space.

[Question] We are frequently visited by foreign consultants. This practice is somewhat disturbing. Sometimes one gets the impression that we know more about their life than they about ours. But the spiritual and intellectual potential of our people is certainly just as high. Can it be that we are short on educated people?

[Tasmagambetov] I understand that many people now have an opportunity to travel. And suddenly everybody began to appreciate the advantages of a market economy. But visual comparison is not the same as analysis; it is not a scientific approach to the problem. Therefore we need to both send our specialists there for internship and invite the most authoritative specialists of the world here.

[Question] The president certainly receives a lot of mail. And in that sea of mail surely there are some letters that deserve attention from the viewpoint of economic transformations. How does the president react to comments and proposals from the local level?

[Tasmagambetov] You are right. There is a sack of letters for the president every day. We have a letters department, which selects and sorts out correspondence. Nursultan Abishevich is indeed interested in letters whose authors contemplate ways of getting out of the crisis, problems of state importance, and offer competent economic advice. Some of them the president answers personally. All in all, however, there are all kinds of letters—with words of support, gratitude; there are congratulations on some or other occasion; and quite a few complaints.

[Question] It is hard to imagine Clinton or Mitterrand receiving complaints. We, however, have developed a habit over decades: If anything happens—write to the newspaper or the president.

[Tasmagambetov] Unfortunately, this is our reality. I cannot reproach people for turning to the president with complaints or requests at a time that is difficult in the socioeconomic sense. Because this is the way it has been for decades, when we were told that everything will be decided for you up there, at the top. But the real question as I understand it is whether you yourself have done everything possible to solve your own problems and whether the letter really should go all the way to the level of the president. I am convinced that when we achieve economic well-being, the number of letters to the president will not diminish. Perhaps only the character of the mail will change.

[Question] Do you ever argue with the president?

[Tasmagambetov] The president is a man open to a debate and polemics. He is willing to listen to his opponent's arguments, and if they sound convincing he will agree with the interlocutor.

[Question] Do you go on all trips with the president?

[Tasmagambetov] Almost all. I can even tell you the figure—how many "flight" hours we have accumulated over the past five months. It comes to more than 140 hours.

[Question] Much has already been written about the president's visit to the United States. It was clear from television reports that Nazarbayev and Clinton liked each other. Did this happen right away?

[Tasmagambetov] I think that much depended on the personal qualities of the two leaders. As to liking, it is only extended to equals. The Americans could not fail to appreciate Nazarbayev's sincere desire for democratic and economic reforms and his enormous conviction of their necessity; his ability to think in world categories, the desire to absorb the best there is in world practice, and to build a truly secular state taking into account historic traditions and multiethnic nature of his people. After all, as the hero of a Marcel Proust novel said: "...the world was not created just once; it is being created an indefinite number of times."

Suleymenov on People's Congress Platform

944K0872A Almaty SOVETY KAZAKHSTANA in Russian
12 Mar 94 p 2

[Interview with Olzhas Suleymenov by Mikhail Ambartsumyan; date and place not given: "In International Kazakhstan People Have More Things in Common Than They Have Differences...."]

[Text] Almaty— The results of the elections to the Supreme Council and the local representative authorities have still to be discussed and analyzed. It has still to be learned which political parties and public associations have won the greater trust of the electorate and why, and which candidates did not get elected to parliament and for

what reasons. But it may be said even today that Kazakhstani link their hopes for a better life with the new parliament.

His thoughts on the paths of development of sovereign Kazakhstan, the political situation, and the unfolding interethnic relations are shared today by People's Writer Olzhas Suleymenov, chairman of the People's Congress of Kazakhstan party. He was nominated for deputy of the Supreme Council on the official slate for Semipalatinsk Oblast and has, according to the preliminary data, been elected to the new parliament.

[Ambartsumyan] Olzhas Omarovich, the first question is connected with the "comrade" form of address. As distinct from many other representatives of your party, you have retained it.

[Suleymenov] It is what we acquired over many decades of dealings with one another. The word "comrade" retains a particle of the warmth of the soul of our fathers. And they are not to blame for the fact that our Great History of what is now the former Soviet Union bore within it the tragic element of the era of "victorious socialism."

We must see realistically what has happened to us and draw certain conclusions for the future, not wasting our acquired values, but, on the contrary, multiplying them. Genuine innovation does not cancel out all traditions but implies the development of the best.

We have been accustomed to beginning each new stage of history with a castigation of the past. This is why history as such has not been preserved in our consciousness. The "accursed past" the whole time. But there were in that past both joy and great discoveries also. And the main discovery, which has been called into question in recent years, unfortunately, is the friendship of the peoples. We should not give it away to anyone. To no independent orators and ranters, to no new careerist.

Internationalism is for this reason the firm foundation of our party's political program. The vital need for such a foundation is all the more obvious now, when some multinational republics are before our eyes becoming tragically mononational. In international Kazakhstan, people have more things in common than they have differences.

When I visit the Kazakh villages and see under what conditions people deprived of electricity, water, and telephones are dragging out a "survival" existence, it is clear that this problem will not be resolved by Kazakhs alone. The Russian-speaking population in the overpopulated industrial cities has its troubles also. The shortage of drinking water is growing in Mangistau Oblast, for example. Were the nuclear-powered desalination plant to be halted, the oblast would be left without water, heating, and light. And Mangistau means hundreds of thousands of people, oilfields, and a powerful industry.

The main reason for the trouble is the exodus of specialists to Russia, to Ukraine. Why? Uncertainty as to the future.

[Ambartsumyan] The period of formation of the sovereign state is complex and contradictory. We are now hearing the opinions of many people, political scientists included, concerning the possibility of the introduction of dual citizenship in the republic.

[Suleymenov] The demand for second citizenship is the effect, and the cause is lack of confidence that the rights of certain categories of citizens in the republic will not be infringed. Language rights, primarily. If a person is persuaded that, on account of his ignorance of Kazakh, neither he nor his children have a future, he will, of course, look to where knowledge of Russian secures for him a normal life. The Constitution seemingly guarantees against persecution on a language basis, but in reality everything is far more complicated. And if in the name of the tranquillity of Kazakhstan and its 17 million citizens it is necessary to revise certain articles of the Constitution, this should, I believe, be done. The causes of a maturing conflict need to be removed.

It is impossible to imagine that in Kazakhstan over 50 percent of the population will have other citizenship. This is like being on a passenger airliner. Half the people have parachutes and, should an accident occur, could save themselves, and the other half? It is rational and logical to have an airplane in a state of good repair and to improve its control in order that we might feel confident about the success of the flight. Then no one would require any parachute.

I want the Kazakh land to live in peace, tranquillity, and satiety. The Kazakhs to feel dignified. The Russians to have a better life here than in Russia. Ukrainians, better than in Ukraine, the Germans, better than in Germany, and so forth. And then no one would want to leave us. People would be proud of their Kazakh citizenship. "We are the people of Kazakhstan"—this is the motto of our party.

The Russian Kazakhstani has long been distinguished from the Russian. A different cast of consciousness. For example, my school comrade Aleksey Ugreninov, having married, left for Krasnodon. Six months later he wrote me a letter: "Before, when I lived in Kazakhstan, if I heard a dombra on the air, I would turn off the radio. Now, living in Krasnodon, hearing Kazakh music, I turn the volume up full and sit and weep. I greatly miss Kazakhstan, my homeland, where I was born and raised."

[Ambartsumyan] You have already partially touched on a very serious, difficult question—the two official languages.

[Suleymenov] We must be realists and recognize that the official language was for decades Russian. Kazakh—nominally the official language—is only just being pulled up to the level of Russian. And we know that there have

been far from professional attempts to speed up this progress. But they have only discredited this mission itself. Thank God, the government has put right many zealous administrators, who had "endeavored" to translate clerical work into Kazakh immediately. And I saw how high-class doctors, totally at a loss, not knowing how to fill out the history of a disease in Kazakh, quit. Who suffered from this? Patients, the people.

The process of the formation of a second official language is very long, delicate, and complex. It cannot be accomplished by some edict of rayon, city, oblast, or republic authorities. Our language, like many others also, was sacrificed to the idea of the communist society. It was said that in the future there would be no national differences. And our fathers and grandfathers believed this. And the peoples are not to blame for the fact that so pronounced a linguistic disproportion took shape over 70 and more years. And it cannot be eliminated in two or three years.

For this reason we objectively have two official languages. One is traditional-official, the other is fledgling-official. If necessary, this should, I believe, be documented by the new parliament so that there should be no speculation or repressive measures and so that people who are the exponents of the Russian language should feel themselves to be full-blooded citizens of the republic and be at ease over their children's future. So that Kazakh should gain strength, ascend, and naturally penetrate all spheres. I have made my credo: "To elevate the steppe without belittling the mountains," my life's conviction. And only such a path of development of the Kazakh nation will be fruitful.

[Ambartsumyan] You have advanced the slogan: "From age-old dependence through independence to a recognition of interdependence." Could you, perhaps, decode this?

[Suleymenov] Last summer I proposed the incorporation in the program of our party, the NKK [People's Congress of Kazakhstan], the idea of a future confederation of the states of Eurasia. Its initial stage implies confederal relations between Kazakhstan and Russia. After this, I was rebuked in certain news media for not being a patriot of my country. But I love Kazakhstan, and I have no need to prove this, I think.

The main token of the difficult period of disintegration of the USSR has been the steep fall in production, constituting 50 percent in some republics. The people are, consequently, becoming impoverished. We all feel and understand full well the need for the restoration of economic union, primarily with Russia, but within the framework of a confederal agreement. Sovereignty and independence here by no means imply one state's self-isolation from another. This is the same independence as that of the vivifying organs in each organism. All the best sober-minded forces of our republic, therefore, should be aspiring to the creation of an infrastructure of a future community of states that preserves the conditions for the

full, free, and equal coexistence of sovereign countries in the example of the European economic confederation, which has already been created.

There is no escaping the fact that Kazakhstan is economically dependent on Russia and that Russia depends to a large extent on Kazakhstan also. All the Urals foundries without exception are unable to cope without Sokolovskaya-Sarbay ore and without our nonferrous metals, and 92 percent of native chromium is mined on Aktyubinsk land. And without Kazakhstan chromium, there is no Russian alloyed steel. We will, therefore, make every effort to preserve the common economic space and raise it to the higher level of confederal union.

[Ambartsumyan] But for this it is necessary to create the corresponding legislative base, which would enable the government to undertake important economic reforms.

[Suleymenov] I hope that the newly elected professional parliament will be capable of tackling this problem.

It is very important that society not split along national lines. The epidemic of national demarcation which has gripped certain republics of the former Union is penetrating Kazakhstan also. Unless we are able to resist this phenomenon, we will have no future. If, however, we recognize this danger in time and take the path of good sense and common sense, we can look forward to a splendid future.

If we avail ourselves in proprietary and solicitous fashion of the powerful resource base of Kazakhstan and the strong personnel potential (and this means thousands of engineers, highly skilled workers, specialists of agriculture, and scientists), we can achieve a great deal. And our party, the People's Congress of Kazakhstan, offers such a program.

[Ambartsumyan] Your party has a strong economic analysis group. Can we already speak of specific efforts to its credit?

[Suleymenov] Yes, highly skilled economists, historians, political scientists, psychologists, entrepreneurs, and representatives of religious beliefs are members of this group. Our comrades carefully analyze the phenomena occurring in the life of the republic, make forecasts, and generate specific recommendations, which are subsequently used in various party programs. And some of them are being implemented already. Not many readers know, for example, that Kazakhstan wool was going begging and that thousands of tonnes of it had piled up at the warehouses. Prior to the disintegration of the USSR, it had been used for sewing the greatcoats of men of the Soviet Army. Now everyone in any way connected with this production had been left without a crust. And here our economists and entrepreneurs drew up a special program for use of the wool and set up the Klem corporation for the manufacture of carpets and felt. Equipment is being purchased in Turkey, and it will be distributed in the villages among the seamstresses free of charge. Good-quality and inexpensive carpets made

from Kazakhstan wool will be made at home. We are thinking of increasing their manufacture in the future to 1 million items a year. The problems of work for the women in the countryside are being resolved in this way to some extent.

We would like to set up garment production at the home in the cities also. If the women receive all that they need, from the machines through the thread, there will be no need to build giant garment factories. But the people would obtain from the home workers, on the other hand, a particular quantity of high-quality merchandise produced on a competitive basis and under the aegis of this firm or the other.

In the past year alone, funds of our entrepreneurs purchased an Italian baby food plant and four bakeries. One of them, in Pavlodar, is already producing fresh bread. The others are located in Semipalatinsk and West Kazakhstan oblasts. Medicines and 1,000 tonnes of baby food have been purchased for \$1 million. Members of our party are channeling all this to needy people free of charge around the oblasts, in targeted fashion, down to the rayon component.

[Ambartsumyan] The Nevada-Semipalatinsk international antinuclear movement, of which you are a founder and the permanent president, is five years old now. You write frequently in the press and speak on television on this subject. Nonetheless, what are your strongest impressions in connection with the minor anniversary of this movement?

[Suleymenov] The most appalling thing was that the nuclear testing at the Semipalatinsk range was carried out in an atmosphere of eerie secrecy. Therefore, even the people living in this region did not know what was going on there. They were frightened when the earth shook beneath them (the force of the jolts reached 5) and were subjected to lethal radiation.

How many persons departed life for this reason, no one knows. Two diagnoses—tuberculosis or brucellosis—were made of the deceased. And only when our movement appeared were we able to make contact with some documents of that time.

Many people now know Karipbek Kuyukov of Semipalatinsk Oblast. He was born without arms, but became an artist. He draws with a brush and pencil clenched between his teeth. We went to Japan together and took part in protest demonstrations against the nuclear tests carried out in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. I recall how he went into the square, where several thousand people were gathered, and said: "The gesture of our movement is an open palm, five continents against five test ranges. But I cannot make this gesture." And the whole square raised its hands with open palms. An unforgettable, stupendous feeling gripped all those present.

I am grateful to and have profound respect for the parents of Karipbek Kuyukov. They raised him, feeling by the hour his and their own misfortune. What a great

feat of mother and father! He is now nearly 30 years old. And he is telling people of the world what misfortune nuclear weapons bring.

[Ambartsumyan] Concluding the interview, I have to ask you about your literary plans. Your numerous admirers want to see new poems and works.

[Suleymenov] At this time the fate of literature does not excite me as much as the fate of my readers. We writers are going into politics not because we lack economists or because there is none beside us to uphold people's rights, but because we feel the need for personal, direct participation in the formation of our state.

But I am working, nonetheless, and completing in draft form my new book, which will be entitled "One Thousand and One Words." I hope to be able to present it to my readers this year.

Spokesman on Free Economic Zone Edict

944K08684 Almaty PANORAMA in Russian
No 10, 12 Mar 94 p 2

[Interview with Rust Zholamanov, manager of the Strategic Economic Development Department of the Strategic Research Institute under the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, by Karlygash Yezhenova; place and date not given: "The Idea of the Organization of Free Economic Zones Came to Nothing"]

[Text] Among the recent official documents of the president of the republic is the edict "On Measures for Regulating the Activity of Free Economic Zones," which declared that the decisions of the former Supreme Soviet on the establishment of the Atyrauskaya, Eastern Kazakhstan, Karaganda, and Mangistauskaya free economic zones were invalid. The aforementioned document apparently can be viewed as the manifestation of a rather traditional trend among the leadership of the republic of late to significantly correct, and even to reduce entirely to nothing, ideas that were popular a year or two back, which were implemented at a declaratory level and as a rule not developed either juridically or practically. One of these is the idea of creating free economic zones as one of the basic factors in the formation of an export orientation for the republic.

The president's edict is commented on for PANORAMA by Rust Zholamanov, manager of the Strategic Economic Development Department of the Strategic Research Institute under the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan.

"Our institute recommended that the government adopt this measure, based on a number of factors. We will start with the fact that free economic zones presuppose a special tax policy, customs system, and principles of investment. None of this, as we know, was worked out. Moreover, the free economic zones in Kazakhstan encompass territories that are too big, and when you consider that there were nine of them in the republic and

that they were formed on the basis of oblasts, as a result, the question goes beyond a strictly economic scope, taking on a political nuance—the territorial integrity of Kazakhstan could be threatened. It will be recalled that in its time the breakup of the USSR began precisely with the idea of regional economic accountability, which was implemented with great success by the Baltic republics. It was so great that they were the first to leave the Union system as a result.

"The free economic zones not only assume the existence of a definite technological infrastructure—international communications centers, hotel complexes, and transportation support—but they also must have commodity or technological potential for access to both foreign and domestic markets.

"And, finally, there is no strategy as such in Kazakhstan for the development of free economic zones.

"Our institute is now preparing a concept for a republic regional policy that develops a version of the mechanism for managing regions in general and an optimal formation of free economic zones in particular."

Edict on Regulating Free Economic Zones

944K08654 Almaty SOVETY KAZAKHISTANA in Russian
10 Mar 94 p 1

[“Edict of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan: On Measures Streamlining the Operations of Free Economic Zones”]

[Text] In connection with measures being implemented in the republic with respect to streamlining and balancing the budget system, as well as on the basis of the Republic of Kazakhstan Law "On Temporary Delegation of Additional Powers to the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan and Heads of Local Administration" dated 10 December 1993, I DECREE:

1. The decisions of the Republic of Kazakhstan Supreme Soviet on the matter of creation of the Atyrau, East-Kazakhstan, Karaganda, and Mangistau free economic zones are hereby repealed.
2. The Republic of Kazakhstan Cabinet of Ministers shall submit for consideration of the newly elected Republic of Kazakhstan Supreme Council a draft decree of the Republic of Kazakhstan Supreme Council on this matter.
3. This edict shall have the force of law and shall be in force until the adoption of the corresponding decree by the Republic of Kazakhstan Supreme Council.
4. This edict shall be effective as of the day of its publication.

[Signed] President of the Republic of Kazakhstan N. Nazarbayev
Almaty, 5 March 1994

Government Reports Worsening Unemployment

944K0865B Almaty SOVETY KAZAKHSTANA in Russian
10 Mar 94 p 1

[Article by A. Daurenbekov, deputy chairman of the republic State Committee on Statistics: "Increasingly Fewer Job Vacancies"]

[Text] According to the assessment of the Ministry of Labor's employment department and the republic State Committee on Statistics, the situation in the labor market continued to deteriorate over the past few months.

Beginning last September the number of vacancies reported to the employment service by enterprises and organizations continued to decline steadily. Over the elapsed year, of 237,000 persons who have applied to the employment centers, jobs were found for only 104,500.

The share of nonworking persons among all applicants looking for a job has increased. More than half of those who applied to the service last year are women; almost one half (49 percent) are young people between 16 and 29 years of age. The problem of their employment remains especially acute in Atyrau, Kzyl-Orda, East Kazakhstan, and Semipalatinsk Oblasts and the city of Leninsk.

As a result of the continuing decline in demand for labor force, the situation deteriorated even further in January: Of all persons who applied to the employment service, jobs were found for only one in four; in Atyrau Oblast, approximately one in 20; in Kzyl-Orda and North Kazakhstan Oblasts—one in nine to 10; and in Aktyubinsk, Semipalatinsk, and Kustanay Oblasts—one in six to seven. Overall in January 7,300 unemployed were registered, 45 percent of them rural residents.

A new trend in the labor market should be noted: While last year the demand for labor systematically exceeded the number of unemployed (especially in the summer months), as of 1 February almost 43,000 persons had the status of unemployed. At the same time the number of job vacancies (those that enterprises and organizations reported to the employment service offices) amounted to 28,000, that is, one and a half times less. Another important point that should be kept in mind is the mismatch between the supply of and demand for labor by territories, population centers, and professional skill level.

Of the total number of unemployed, 16,000 (37.4 percent) were receiving unemployment benefits; the rest were covered by other forms of social protection.

The situation with respect to hidden unemployment continues to worsen as well. According to the oblast employment centers' data, 1,194 enterprises with a combined labor force of more than half a million people have halted production partially or fully or shifted to a shortened work schedule. More than 154,000 persons are on compulsory leave.

1993 Agro-industrial Sector Course Outlined

944K0865C Almaty KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 10 Mar 94 pp 1-2

[Article by KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA correspondent Vasily Naumov: "Agro-Industrial Complex Is Deteriorating, but the Herd of Horses and Camels Is Growing"]

[Text] The Goskomstat [State Committee on Statistics] has released the preliminary results of financial-economic operations of the republic's agro-industrial complex. Over 1993 the expected losses of sovkhozes, kolkhozes, and agricultural combines will amount to 129.6 million tenge, and the loss level is 4.8 percent, while a year earlier 119.7 million tenge—recalculated into national currency equivalency—was earned in profits and the profitability level was 7.4 percent. Also, 1,232 entities, or 49 percent of the total, will account for 422.4 million tenge in losses.

As we can see, almost one-half of public sector agricultural enterprises ended up bankrupt. The other half, which have survived the trials of a savage market, managed to cover only 71.7 percent of the losses.

It would be useful to look at the financial side from the sectoral angle. Plant-growing, for instance, is overall profitable—17.5 percent. Moreover, all the main sectors are profitable: grain production—19 percent, potatoes—32 percent, field-grown vegetables—36 percent, and so on. At the same time, losses from sales of animal husbandry products amounted to 323.1 million tenge; the loss level in milk production is 40 percent, wool—39 percent, and horned cattle—34 percent.

The costs of agricultural production increased 11-fold as compared to last year, which in turn resulted in increased production costs in plant-growing by a factor of nine to 25, and in animal husbandry by a factor of seven to 11.

The Goskomstat provides specific data on how much of what products was produced, and the comparison between 1993 and 1992 figures. Grain and legumes were planted on 22 million hectares, or 348,000 hectares less than during the preceding year. The area sown decreased with respect to all crops, but an especially sharp cutback occurred with respect to millet—almost by half. The gross yield of grain in all categories of farms amounted to 21.6 million tonnes, which is 8.1 million, or 27 percent, less compared to last year's yield.

Grain yield per hectare amounted on average to 9.7 quintals, which is one quarter lower than the levels reached in the past. The average yield of millet was only 4.4 quintals per hectare, and buckwheat—3.2 quintals. The shortfall in the production of these crops amounted to 216,000 and 99,000 tonnes, respectively. Production of potatoes and vegetables also declined in 1993—by 9 percent and 15 percent, respectively. There are two reasons—smaller area sown and lower yields. The output

of fruit and berries, as well as grapes, also declined as compared to last year—by 37 percent and 52 percent. The gross yield of sugar beet declined by almost one-quarter, and sunflower seed—by 12 percent.

As Goskomstat reports, the herd of horned cattle decreased as compared to last year by 5 percent, of swine—by 6 percent, and of sheep—by 1 percent. At the same time, the herd of horses increased by 4 percent, and of camels—by the same proportion.

At first glance, the herd of cattle decreased insignificantly. Translated into absolute figures, however, the numbers are impressive—hundreds of thousands of head. I will add myself that over the past three years the herd of horned cattle decreased by 596,200 head, swine—by 783,800 (that is, by one-quarter), and of sheep and goats—by 1,460,500.

The state of affairs in animal husbandry in different regions of the republic obviously is far from the same. For instance, the most perceptible decline in the size of horned cattle herd took place in Pavlodar Oblast—by 28 percent; in North Kazakhstan Oblast it decreased by 10 percent, and in Kustanay Oblast—by 7 percent. The herd of swine decreased by one-fifth in South Kazakhstan Oblast and almost one-third in Zhezkazgan Oblast; in a number of northern oblasts an active reduction of sheep and goats herd is underway. There are, however, encouraging examples as well. In southern and western oblasts, for instance, there was an increase in the size of horned cattle herd, in Akmolinsk and Karaganda Oblast—in swine, and in Atyrau, Mangistau, Kzyl-Orda and some other oblasts—in the number of sheep and goats.

According to Goskomstat reports, the reduction of herd in the public sectors, which began several years ago, continues. The hope that the private sector will make up for the losses did not fully materialize. Yes, there is an increase, but not as significant as expected. Take for instance horned cattle. Their number at private farms increased by 18,000 bringing the total to 87,000. This is less than 1 percent of their total number.

They say that under market laws, bankrupt enterprises cease to exist and are sold at auction. But there are just too many of them—1,232, almost one-half. Let us say some brave people will undertake this step. But who would want them, these economically insolvent agricultural enterprises?

This is the first thing. Second, sovkhozes and kolkhozes became bankrupt not by their own volition. There were, of course, unprofitable enterprises before—five, 10 years ago—but not this many! And the explanation that in the past the state subsidized them is not valid, because at the same time it underpaid the farms for their products, and rural workers—for their labor.

Third, over the past three years everything has been done to push agro-industrial complex enterprises into bankruptcy. Prices for industrial production grew much faster

than for agricultural output. The cost of borrowing was unsustainable for sovkhozes and kolkhozes. On top of that, the state treasury ran out of money, delaying payments for grain and other products procured from the farms, which devalued the earnings even more.

It is clear today that the comprehensive solution for the problems of the agro-industrial complex that seemed possible turned out to be unacceptable. It is not so simple to disband unprofitable kolkhozes and sovkhozes, and land cannot be distributed to farmers overnight. Plus, far from all will take it, and it is far from certain that those who will can get operate it profitably. Of more than 15,000 private farms, a good half, or maybe even more, also are bankrupt. Thousands of independent peasants do not know how to make the ends meet.

In short, just as the leadership of the Peasant Union and the Kolkhoz Council had predicted, the republic's agro-industrial complex has run aground, and solidly. And it is unlikely that we will be able to find a genius (domestic or foreign) capable of sorting everything out—when and what step to make, what to do today, what—the day after tomorrow. We will have to search for a solution together—politicians, economists, scientists, and peasants.

The number one priority by far should be the introduction of price parity on industrial and agricultural production, without which economic stabilization is impossible. Agricultural Academy scientists have developed a conceptual program of agro-industrial complex development, and it would be a waste not to use it. Academician M. Suleymenov, director of Imeni A.I. Barayeva Scientific-Research Institute of Grain Growing. Transportation Academician S. Plokhov, and others offer original ideas aimed at stable development of grain growing. All we need is to learn how to see and hear them.

Director on Tengizchevroil Activities

944K0879A Almaty KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 15 Mar 94 p 2

[Interview with Morley Dupree, by Viktor Sutyagin; date and place not given: "We Like Working With the Kazakhstanis"]

[Text] As reported in a previous issue of KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA, last week Nursultan Nazarbayev, Sergey Tereshchenko, and other leaders of the republic met with Kenneth Derr, chairman of the board of directors of the Chevron Corporation, and discussed questions of cooperation in the sphere of the production and shipment of oil, including the activity of the Kazakhstani-American Tengizchevroil Enterprise, which, as the participants in the negotiations observed, has already produced the first positive results. Our correspondent met with Morley Dupree, manager of Tengizchevroil, and conducted with him the interview that is offered the reader today.

[Sutyagin] It is planned initially at the Tengiz deposit to produce 60,000 barrels of oil a day and subsequently to

raise production to 700,000 barrels. The terms of the contract specify that Chevron shall in the first three years invest in the production of oil \$1.5 billion, from which Kazakhstan is to receive \$805 million net profit. Several vitally important facilities, powerful water-purification installations, and a boiler house have been and continue to be built, and engineering systems are being modernized in the oblast from Chevron's resources paid out as a bonus for the right to work on Atyrau land, and money has been allocated for the development of medicine. Mr. Dupree, negotiations were conducted for quite some time between the Soviet Union and, subsequently, sovereign Kazakhstan, and Chevron on the right to develop the Tengiz deposit. A contract was signed. I would like to know: What did you imagine work at Tengiz to be like and what have you encountered in practice?

[Dupree] I would like to affirm first of all that our expectations of finding in the oblast people who could work at our enterprise have been borne out. When we came here, two integrated production lines (IPL) were already operating, and the construction of IPL-3 had begun. But the point is that problems of the shipment of the oil to ports with terminals had not been resolved. Our primary task was to put IPL-1 on a sound footing, fully equip IPL-2 from the safety standpoint, and find a market for the oil that could be produced and refined by the gas-treatment plant. The construction of IPL-3, say, had from our viewpoint, therefore, to be suspended, inasmuch as it would at that time have been simply unprofitable to scatter our forces. The main problem now is selling the oil that has been produced. And we have been unable as yet, unfortunately, to solve this question completely. The point being that Kazakhstan lacks its own oil line, via which it could ship the oil to the international market. All this is giving rise to a whole chain of difficulties.

[Sutyagin] Would it not be better to refine the oil in situ, having engaged the capacity of Kazakhstan's refineries, Atyrau primarily?

[Dupree] I am forced to remind you that from the very outset, the contract was based on all the oil recovered at this deposit being exported and the entire revenue being obtained from exports of crude. It will not be refined in situ. Gas is another matter. There could here be various options, which we are beginning to study with the government of the republic.

[Sutyagin] And how do you view the idea of the construction of an oil pipeline from Iran with an outlet at the Red Sea?

[Dupree] There are two very important aspects in the construction of this pipeline, I believe. The economic aspect entailing enormous expenditure and not completely weighed benefits. And the political aspect: The oil pipeline would run over the territory of Iran. Who could guarantee that Iran would not tomorrow say "no" to the oil pipeline or ban the shipment of oil for some reason or other?

We are, meanwhile, on the other hand, studying more acceptable ways, from our viewpoint, of the shipment of the oil. These include, primarily, the Caspian Consortium project incorporating Kazakhstan, Russia, and Oman. A solution of the problem may be found also in the creation of transport routes to the Black Sea by Tengizchevroil directly. But I am not a utopian, and I realize that this problem will not be fully resolved in the coming three to five years.

[Sutyagin] But can the joint venture reach design capacity in this case?

[Dupree] This is not currently part of our tasks. The joint venture has many other unresolved problems. Everyone knows that Tengiz oil is unique in terms of its composition. I refer primarily to its very high hydrogen sulfide content. We are building a plant to treat the oil, therefore, and we would like in the very near future to have achieved a volume of production of 6-7 million tonnes a year—this is perfectly sufficient as yet. Such a quantity of oil cleansed of hydrogen sulfide and other harmful admixtures could be shipped across Russia via the Druzhba oil pipeline.

After we have laid our own transport line, for which, I hope, it is planned to produce 12 million tonnes a year, the planned production of 30 million tonnes will be achieved only by the year 2010. Fewer than 1 million tonnes have been produced and shipped thus far. We hope to obtain permission for the construction of our own oil pipeline. In this case, we would embark immediately on equipping IPL-3, in order that we might increase production, raising it to the maximum.

[Sutyagin] When the contract was being worked up, Chevron fired up the hopes of the inhabitants of the oblast with a promise to actively enlist in work at the joint venture the local population and to train personnel. How are these promises being fulfilled?

[Dupree] Training local personnel is a tradition for us. This may be confirmed in many countries in which Chevron operates. Thus, in Indonesia, for example, more than 6,000 employees work at the company. Only 100 of them are not local specialists. I believe that this was one of the reasons why our company was invited to Kazakhstan. Even at the initial stage, we are cooperating actively with local contractors, who are offering us various services. Of course, they do not in all respects as yet conform to the high demands that we make of our specialists and workers. But at the same time, we are constantly observing a trend toward an improvement in their work indicators.

[Sutyagin] I would like to hear about specific examples of cooperation with local outfits.

[Dupree] I could cite as an example our experience of work with the Tengizneftstroy Trust. This was one of the first companies with which we concluded an agreement. Very useful partner relations have taken shape

between us. They provide us with various services connected with the buildup and development of the shift community of Tengiz and the production complex. The main difficulty in relations with local construction workers is the fact that they are not properly supplied technically and that they lack the technology that we need. But these problems are easily soluble via the organization or rather, the creation of every conceivable type of joint venture with foreign companies. Such ventures could be supplied with various Western equipment, and the same services as we usually obtain from Western companies could ultimately be expected of them. We ourselves are extremely interested in this, inasmuch as our contract with Kazakhstan is for 40 years. Seeking partners in the West is to our disadvantage. For this reason we are closely studying the potential of local enterprises.

[Sutyagin] Nonetheless, Turks, Hungarians, Slovaks, and representatives of a number of other states are today working on contract with Tengizchevroil on the rigging out and development of the field. Does it not seem to you that all the work that they are doing could be done by local personnel also?

[Dupree] The process of involving local organizations in the range of tasks being tackled by the joint venture is not something that can be accomplished overnight. Although even today we give the inhabitants of Zhylyoyskiy Rayon and Atyrau Oblast priority when we are looking for a contractor. It is among them that we begin the search for the specialists we need. And only if we do not find them here do we widen the sphere of the search—to the level of the region, all of Kazakhstan, and then the CIS. Only having convinced ourselves that the search has been unsuccessful do we turn to our old partners in other countries. The basis, however, for the conclusion of a contract are the good quality of the work performed for us, observance of the deadlines specified by the contract, and a reasonable price. It is my personal opinion, incidentally, that Kazakhstan has an appreciable advantage over other countries in which we have worked. There is here a wealth of experience in oil production: The first well produced a gusher of oil in Atyrau Oblast in 1911. You have many high-class specialists, and practically all residents of the area where we are located are familiar with the process of oil and gas production. Training them is not an issue. It is simply necessary to familiarize them with our standards of the organization of labor, and with Chevron they are at the level of the world's highest.

[Sutyagin] Our readers would be interested in learning, I believe, how the everyday life of employees of the joint venture who have come from America and Europe to the difficult semi-arid climatic conditions has been established. What difficulties have you encountered, and how are you resolving them?

[Dupree] Chevron specialists work in Africa and Indonesia and other countries with no less difficult a climate and a very unstable political atmosphere at times. Everyone who came here, therefore, knew that it would not be easy. And all day-to-day questions are gradually being solved: The Hungarian construction workers have built quite comfortable accommodations, and we have resolved transport problems, having purchased automobiles for a number of employees, and have ourselves organized flights from Atyrau to Europe.

The most painful problem is that of food. Although there are several pretty good restaurants, we cannot always find good-quality food in the oblast. But we are attempting to engage local resources as much as possible—we are concluding contracts for supplies of agricultural produce, purchasing what we can. We are trying to support our suppliers materially here and are supplying them with hardware and equipment. On just one condition—the quality of the food must be high. Unfortunately, we sometimes encounter amazing situations, which could, in my view, be avoided. Thus, we concluded a contract with the Atyrau poultry factory for the supply of broilers. We looked them over—pretty good quality. We started to talk about money, offering any form of payment in any currency. But they told us: We do not need money; supply us with gas for heating. According to the terms of the contract, however, we are not entitled to dispose of the gas—it is at the disposal of the government of the republic. We tried to explain: Buy the gas for foreign currency. The factory management is sticking to its guns. The contract is, naturally, in jeopardy, and we will be forced, consequently, to purchase the broilers elsewhere.

[Sutyagin] It is no secret that many people are trying to land jobs at the joint venture, where remuneration is higher than at Kazakhstan's enterprises. Especially since earnings are in dollars. Will the system of remuneration change?

[Dupree] We try to motivate people as much as possible. In principle, it is all the same to us in what currency wages are paid. We could have a mixed pay in two currencies, we could pay merely in tenge. But with the continuing inflationary processes, which have intensified as of late, payments merely in tenge could only increase the inflation and partially "eat up" the wages before they are spent, even. We will continue, therefore, to try to protect our employees as much as possible, stimulating their good work in every way possible. Especially since there is something to pay for. We are observing how the competence of the local personnel is increasing and their interest in the affairs of the venture is growing literally before our eyes. We like working with Kazakhstanis.

UZBEKISTAN

Growing Drug Problem in Uzbekistan, Transit Route to Europe

94WD0275A Moscow *SEGODNYA* in Russian
5 Mar 94 p 6

[Article by Umar Ongov, city of Tashkent, under the rubric "The Narcotics Business": "Uzbekistan: A Narcotics Window to Europe?"]

[Text] The problem of drug addiction has no borders. It has gone beyond the confines of individual regions and can no longer be considered one of the social problems or forms of crime outside the general economic and political context. The narcotics business is actively invading the sphere of international politics and world economics as a dominant factor. That is the opinion of the International Narcotics Control Committee expressed in the report of the director of the regional representation of the UN program UNDCP [United Nations Drug Control Program], Arkadius Meydzhik. In a most direct way it affects Uzbekistan, which at this time is one of the major consumer states and transit zones through which narcotic substances are transferred from Asia to Europe.

Despite the fact that, according to official data, only 4,400 drug addicts and 3,700 people potentially willing to use a drug are registered in Uzbekistan. But the percentage of narcotic substance users is much greater than the state statistics. Incidentally, even governmental circles acknowledge this.

Unfortunately, UNDKP representatives do not have complete information. Thus, according to Mr. Meydzhik, a characteristic feature of some law enforcement organizations of Uzbekistan is the unjustified top secrecy of the information they have. As a result, UNDKP is forced to work with official statistics which, alas, too often pass off wishes as fact.

At the same time, however, according to a sociological survey by independent experts and from sources close to law enforcement services, 1 out of every 100 of the republic's residents may be classified as persons who have tried narcotics at least once. The percentage of those who regularly use these drugs is also high. Drug use is most widespread among public transport drivers, workers, college students, and vocational-technical school students.

Cannabis is one of the main types of narcotics found in Uzbekistan. Moreover, in some corners of the republic the use of opium, especially its derivative koknar, is quite widespread. Undoubtedly, the government of Uzbekistan is taking concrete steps to resolve the problem, in particular regularly conducting "Black Poppy" operations to destroy plantings of opium poppies and developing programs to preserve industrial fields of hemp. But the development and application of new criminal procedure laws as well as ones now in operation which do not yet satisfy the existing convention are needed. Contemporary information systems and many other things must be introduced. And most importantly, consolidation of all interested organizations is needed rather than secrecy.

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